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-Abstract-
Financial liberalization in Taiwan during the late 1980s was juxtaposed against a history of 
strong government intervention in all areas ot finance. From banking, to the stock market, to 
the foreign exchange system, the ruling Kuomintang (KMT -  Guomindang) controlled or 
meddled in almost every facet of credit allocation. And then everything changed. By the early 
to middle 1990s, Taiwan was fast losing its reputation as a protected market for savings and 
investment, and steadily acquiring a capacity to compete with the financial service industries of 
Hong Kong, Tokyo and Singapore. Just how did the Taiwan financial system move from virtual 
autarky to an increasingly open market for credit in around half a decade? Why did the KMT 
regime, hardly a traditional domicile of liberal economic thought, choose to loosen its grip on 
the commanding heights of the economy?
The argument of this study is that the leadership practices o f technocrats matter in financial 
policy change. Ultimately, it was the ideas and opportunities of Taiwan’s economic 
technocracy that left the most fingerprints on new policy initiatives introduced during the 
watershed years of the late 1980s. To test this proposition, I propose a model of KMT ‘policy 
windows’ based on recent work by Jeff Checkel. The term policy window refers to a change in 
party politics that provides entrepreneurial technocrats with an opportunity to pursue their ideas 
for policy reform. Research results include: (1) evidence of independent programs for financial 
reform advanced by the economic technocrats, as well as instrumental links between the 
emergence of KMT policy windows and technocrat reform efforts, and (2) evidence of a broad 
temporal correlation between Taiwan’s three main episodes of financial liberalization and the 
opening of various KMT policy windows.
The thesis speaks to a narrow theoretical debate within political economy regarding the 
international trend toward financial opening in the last two to three decades -  an academic 
discourse that has recently been subsumed within broader discussion on economic 
globalization. Traditionally, this debate is divided among four schools: statist analysis, 
pluralism, the foreign pressures model and the market-driven approach. The thesis makes use 
of several types of research material and techniques. These include: biographical sources, 
historical literature, popular media publications, interview data and counterfactual thought 
experiments. Where possible and appropriate, the study seeks to engage with Chinese language 
academic works. While the thesis is primarily intended as a generalizable work of social 
science, it also has important implications for those specifically interested in Taiwan’s 
contemporary economic history.
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Introduction Crafting Markets in Taiwan
-Introduction-
Giving credit where it’s due: 
technocrat leadership and financial reform
Why is it that when we study the high politics of international history we are so often content to 
focus on the preferences of leaders as causal factors, but when we look at the low politics of day 
to day domestic policy development we feel obligated to seek out institutional imperatives, social 
or economic pressures or intrigue? Why is it that the making of war and peace or the birth of a 
nation are events which seem almost intrinsically tied to the actions of extraordinary individuals, 
but bank privatization or the construction of an unusually attractive shopping mall are faceless 
endeavors? Isn’t it possible that smart, dedicated, or at least unusual people are always 
responsible for political choice? Could it be that for every Otto von Bismarck, Winston 
Churchill or Gamal Nasser there are a thousand ‘micro-leaders’ whose actions, while less 
spectacular, have just as great an impact on the way we conduct our daily lives?
This is a thesis about the political economy of financial liberalization in Taiwan during the 
late 1980s, a period of policy change that is poorly understood in the established policy 
literature.1 It seeks to address a simple question, with a surprisingly simple answer: Just who or 
what drove the process of finance reform in Taiwan at this time? Despite the innate complexity 
of the topic area, the answer is no more obscure or less defensible than attributing Kuomintang 
‘Taiwanization’ to the foresight of past President Chiang Ching-kuo, or attributing many of the 
abuses of the White Terror period to the politicking of Chiang Kai-shek. In its most condensed 
and rudimentary form, the argument of this thesis is that leadership practices matter when it 
comes to questions of economic policy change or continuity. This holds even in the highly 
technical and arcane world of Taiwan financial regulation. In making this claim, I am not 
arguing that a host of other factors did not also influence policy development in Taiwan during
1 Taiwan’s experience of financial reform in the late 1980s is directly covered in only a few works, and 
much of it is written from an economics or legal studies perspective. See: Lawrence S. Liu, ‘Brave New 
World of Financial Reform in Taiwan, the Republic of China -  Three Waves of Internationalization and 
Liberalization and Beyond’ in Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs Vol.8 (1988-89); the 
Shea and Yang articles in Hugh T. Patrick and Yung Chul Park (eds.), The Financial Development of 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan: Growth, Repression, and Liberalization (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994); and Brian Wallace Semkow, Taiwan’s Financial Markets and Institutions: The Legal and 
Financial Issues of Deregulation and Internationalization (Westport: Quorum Books, 1992). Explicitly 
political science or policy science work is almost non-existent. For some lonely examples which at least 
broach the topic, see: Tun-jen Cheng, ‘Guarding the Commanding Heights: The State as Banker in 
Taiwan’ in Stephan Haggard, Cheng H. Lee and Sylvia Maxfield (eds.), The Politics of Finance in 
Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Yun-han Chu, ‘Surviving the East 
Asian Financial Storm: The Political Foundation of Taiwan’s Economic Resilience’ in T. J. Pempel 
(ed.), The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); and Elizabeth 
Thurbon, ‘Two Paths to Financial Liberalization: South Korea and Taiwan’ in The Pacific Review Vol. 
14, No. 2 (2001). There are no Taiwan equivalents for the work on Japanese financial policy produced 
by writers like James Horne or Frances McCall Rosenbluth.
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the watershed years of the late 1980s; factors besides the entrepreneurial activities of the policy 
elite were important. Ultimately, however, it was the ideas and opportunities of Taiwan’s 
technocracy2 that left the most fingerprints on new policy programs and strategies. Just as Mao 
Zi-dong’s principles of guerilla warfare were instrumental in deciding the outcome of the Chinese 
civil war, the preferences of Taiwan’s senior economic policy-makers dictated the pattern of 
Taiwan financial reform. This group of elites were ripple-makers in the arena of Taiwan 
financial policy -  even today, millions of people on the island feel the effect of their efforts every 
time they withdraw money from the bank, buy shares or use a credit card. Largely 
unacknowledged, these decision-makers defined the character and limits of the contemporary 
financial system in the Republic of China (RoC -  Zhonghua Minguo). It is high time we gave 
credit where it’s due!
But whatever the moral force of this plea for recognition, we need more substantive reasons 
for writing a thesis about the process of financial opening in Taiwan. Why look at Taiwan and 
financial policy? The answer to this question lies in the historical character of the Taiwan reform 
experience. Financial liberalization (jinrong kaifang or jinrong ziyouhua) in Taiwan during the 
late 1980s was juxtaposed against a record of strong government intervention in all areas of 
finance. From banking to the stock market to the administration of foreign exchange, the ruling 
Kuomintang (KMT -  Guomindang) or Chinese Nationalist Party controlled or meddled in almost 
every facet of credit allocation. Very few capitalist economies can claim to have had such a 
strong role for government in such a crucial sector of the domestic economy. And then 
everything changed. By the early to middle 1990s, Taiwan was fast losing its reputation as a 
protected market for savings and investment, and steadily acquiring a capacity to compete with 
the financial service industries of Hong Kong, Tokyo and Singapore. Just how did the Taiwan 
financial system move from virtual autarky to a largely open market for credit in just over half a 
decade? This policy shift is particularly intriguing when we consider that it occurred under the 
auspices of the same political regime that built the original financial system: i.e. the KMT. If 
financial liberalization involves at least some loss of authority or influence for a political regime 
(as I would argue it does -  see below), then why did the KMT choose to disempower itself in the 
late 1980s? If, as Stephan Haggard maintains, ‘No policy that is seen to weaken the political 
authority of a particular government is likely to be implemented,’3 why then did the KMT seek to 
pursue such a policy? We seem to be faced with the paradoxical situation of a proven 
monopolist in economic policy embarking on radical reform. How is this possible?
2 To use a term first coined by Fischer. See: Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise 
(Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), chp. 1.
3 Stephan Haggard, The Politics of Industrialization in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan’ in Helen 
Hughes (ed.), Achieving Industrialization in East Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
p. 281.
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While we have already floated a proximate answer to these questions -  financial reform 
occurred because an entrepreneurial technocracy decided to pick up the reform agenda and run 
with it -  the significance of this position only becomes clear when we consider what doesn’t 
explain the RoC case of financial opening. The standard analytical tools used to illustrate the 
process of international financial liberalization ultimately give us poor insight into the Taiwan 
experience. These theories or interpretations may be placed into four main schools: statist 
analysis, pluralism, the foreign pressures model and the market-driven approach.4 In brief: statist 
analysis emphasizes government (especially bureaucratic) power and will as explanatory 
variables; pluralism emphasizes the influence of big business interests; the foreign pressures 
model points to the nature of the international system of nation-states; and finally, the market- 
driven approach emphasizes the diminishing ability of governments to curb market forces over 
time. While all of these theoretical approaches have prima facie  relevance for the Taiwanese 
case of financial reform -  and therefore deserve to be taken seriously -  none of them is ultimately 
satisfactory. If we look at the process of reform in exacting detail (an important objective of this 
thesis), it becomes readily apparent that none of the usual theoretical suspects can adequately 
explain the timing and method of policy change. It is this inability of the mainstream theories of 
financial liberalization to explain the Taiwan case that makes an approach emphasizing 
‘technocrat leadership’ so appealing and ultimately necessary. After reviewing the facts, we soon 
find that to make any sense of financial opening in Taiwan during the late 1980s, we need to talk 
about proximate decision-makers5 and the opportunities and constraints they faced.
However, all of this will not be new to your average economic historian. Most economic 
historians are quite happy to give leadership practices (however defined) strong weighting in the 
determination of economic policy change. What these writers don’t do, however, is theorize such 
things. By contrast with the historical literature, in this thesis I will attempt to forward a model 
of technocrat leadership that is generalizable. Starting from the premise that leadership is a 
practice involving idea generation, creative effort, teamwork and opportunism,6 and then
4 Leading examples of these four theories include, respectively: Richard O’Brien, Global Financial 
Integration: The End of Geography (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992); Louis W. Pauly, Opening 
Financial Markets: Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); 
Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989); and Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods 
to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). For a simple introduction, see: Christopher Hood, 
Explaining Economic Policy Reversals (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994), chp. 2.
5 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1976), chp. 1.
6 See e.g.: Jameson W. Doig and Erwin C. Hargrove (eds.), Leadership and Innovation (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1987); William H. Riker, Ihe Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1986); Michael D. Cohen and James G. March, Leadership and Ambiguity, 2nd 
ed. (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1986); and Norman Fröhlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and 
Oran R. Young, Political Leadership and Collective Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1971).
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supplementing this with the insights of the literature on party politics and economic p o licy / I will 
develop a simple framework of technocrat constraints which suggests a variety of falsifiable 
outcomes in the process of financial policy change. This feature of the thesis places it firmly in 
the realm o f social science, rather than economic history. It is hoped, however, that I can 
produce a work of social science in which agency matters just as much as structural imperatives, 
and in which we can ‘take preferences seriously.’7 8
And herein lies the real contribution of this thesis. In the process of relating Taiwan’s story 
of financial liberalization, I will demonstrate that macro-policy effects are systematically 
dependent on the intimate world of group micro-politics. Reminiscent of Congressman Tip 
O’Neil’s reminder that ‘all politics is local politics,’ we will discover that ultimately the fate of 
national economies rest in the hands of a select few. It is my contention that if policy researchers 
are willing to dig deep enough, they will usually find a small assembly of key individuals at the 
center of policy change, and that frequently it is not just a question of who’s in power or where 
the buck stops. Unfortunately, the tools of political science and policy analysis rarely allow us to 
get this close, and in practical terms this kind of intimate inquiry is extremely difficult to 
perform In the present study, however, I have used theory and research methodology that 
necessitated ‘close-cut’ research. A large portion of the research for the thesis was based on 
interviews with policymakers, industry professionals, academics and politicians in Taiwan. I 
was able to secure insightful interviews with a number of the actual leaders who are the subject 
of this study, or with the personal friends and colleagues of these individuals. In total, I talked to 
around 80-100 people in Taiwan, on and off the record. Aside from oral sources, I also made 
use of a range of primary and secondary Chinese literatures. Most of this material, including a 
selection of government reports and several unpublished Masters and Ph.D. theses, are largely 
unknown to Western scholars. For basic details on the historical record, I relied on a number of 
local Taiwanese newspapers and magazines. Only a few recent political economy works on 
Taiwan can claim the same kind of access and attention to detail.9
But just as self-praise is ultimately no recommendation, so too we must be wary of the 
scholar who hesitates in defining his terms. The comments in the preceding paragraphs beg
7 The classic statement of the position is: Douglas Hibbs Jr., ‘Political Parties and Macroeconomic 
Policy’ in American Political Science Review Vol. 71, No. 4 (December 1977). Most recently, a small 
number of scholars have tried to link an understanding of political parties with economic reform. See 
e.g.: Javier Corrales, ‘Presidents, Ruling Parties and Party Rules’ in Comparative Politics Vol. 32, No. 2 
(January 2000).
8 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’ in 
International Organization Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997).
9 See for example: Cheng-tian Kuo, Global Competitiveness and Industrial Growth in Taiwan and the 
Philippines (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995); Gerald A. McBeath, Wealth and 
Freedom: Taiwan’s New Political Economy (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 1998); and Gregory W. Noble, 
Collective Action in East Asia: How Ruling Parties Shape Industrial Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1998).
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elaboration of some key concepts. A term we will see repeatedly throughout this thesis is the 
‘financial system of Taiwan,’ or words to that effect. Just what do we mean by this phrase? In 
the simplest of conceptions, ‘finance’ refers to the provision and use of unconsumed income. It is 
that proportion of aggregate income which households save rather than spend on final-use goods 
and services, and which businesses subsequently borrow to build up or maintain their stock of 
equipment, production facilities, human resources and real estate -  a tangible reserve otherwise 
know as ‘capital.’ A ‘financial system’ or ‘financial sector’ is the sum of all the institutional 
arrangements governing the provision and allocation of unconsumed income. It is a component 
of the broader economic system which also includes the government sector, private consumption 
and net export activity.10
Over the period of relevance to this thesis, the financial system in Taiwan was composed of 
two basic types of financial institution (see Table Intro. 1 for an overview).* 11 Intermediaries were 
the first type. Intermediaries issue indirect financial instruments like deposits, trust and insurance 
contracts or bank debentures, and in turn lend or invest the accumulated funds. Among Taiwan’s 
leading intermediaries over the time in question we can include domestic commercial banks, 
branch offices of foreign commercial banks, small-business banks, credit cooperatives, credit 
departments of industry associations, investment and trust companies, the postal savings system, 
insurance companies and venture capital firms. Non-intermediaries were the second broad 
category of financial institution in Taiwan. The function of non-intermediaries is to facilitate the 
sale of securities issued by ultimate borrowers (i.e. publicly issued companies), such as shares 
and bonds, to ultimate lenders (i.e. individual and corporate investors). Among Taiwan’s leading 
non-intermediaries we can count bills finance companies, securities firms (including brokers, 
dealers, underwriters and integrated securities houses), securities finance companies and 
securities investment trust enterprises. Financial intermediaries supplied in excess of half of all 
corporate funding in Taiwan in the late 1980s, while non-intermediaries supplied merely a fifth 
(details in chapter 1). The remainder was taken-up by another breed of institution...
Taiwan’s informal credit markets -  the curb or ‘underground markets’ -  were home to a set 
of financial institutions which were decidedly less stable but much more flexible than their legal 
counterparts. Among these twilight enterprises we can include moneylenders, pawnbrokers, 
rotating credit rounds, various underground investment companies and unofficial credit 
departments of erstwhile legitimate companies. Such operations had no established organization 
and were highly fragmented, but according to most estimates played a crucial role in the overall 
allocation of credit in Taiwan (upwards of 25%). Reflecting this important contribution, the
10 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), p. 88; and Charles R. Geisst, A 
Guide to the Financial Markets, 2nd ed. (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989), chp. 1.
11 I have borrowed this taxonomy from: Semkow, Taiwan's Financial Markets and Institutions, fn. 1, 
chp. 4.
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authorities usually refrained from actively suppressing the informal system, and kept a watchful 
eye on its interaction with the formal system.12
TABLE Intro.1 The financial system in Taiwan, institutional overview
Financial Intermediaries - 
Banks and Others
Non-intermediaries & Informal 
Institutions
Administrative Structure of the 
Financial System
Banks Non-intermediaries Supervisory Agencies
Domestic commercial banks. Bills finance companies Executive Yuan.
Branch offices of foreign Securities firms (brokers, Ministry of Finance.
commercial banks. dealers, underwriters). Central Bank of China.
Small to medium business Securities finance companies. Taiwan Stock Exchange.
banks. Securities investment trust Taipei Dealers Association.
enterprises. Central Deposit Insurance
Others (non-banks) Corporation, etc.
Credit cooperatives. Informal Institutions
Credit departments of Moneylenders. Finance Laws
industry associations. Pawnbrokers. National Bank Law.
Investment and trust Rotating credit rounds. Statute for the Administration
companies. Unofficial credit departments. of Foreign Exchange.
Postal savings system Underground investment Securities Exchange Law, etc.
Insurance companies. companies.
Venture capital firms.
Source: Sebastien Dessus, Jia-dong Shea and Mau-shan Shi, Chinese Taipei: The Origins of the
Economic ‘Miracle’ (Paris: Development Centre of the OECD, 1995), p. 90 with modifications and 
additions.
And finally, consider the administrative structure of Taiwan’s financial system All the 
financial institutions of Taiwan mentioned above were governed by a series of official regulators 
and laws. Among the key supervisory agencies we can include: the Executive Yuan, the Ministry 
of Finance, the Central Bank of China and the Securities and Exchange Commission. In addition 
to these formal regulators, a number of quasi-public sector agencies also performed regulatory 
functions. Some of the more important ones were the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation, the 
Taipei Dealers Association and the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation. Among the major 
laws governing the Taiwanese financial system we can include: the National Bank Law, the 
Statute for the Administration of Foreign Exchange and the Securities Exchange Law. Other
12 Sebastien Dessus, Jia-dong Shea and Mau-shan Shi, Chinese Taipei: The Origins of the Economic 
‘Miracle’ (Paris: Development Centre of the OECD, 1995), p. 94-95.
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laws of indirect importance for local finance included the Company Law of the RoC and the 
Central Bank of China Act.13
Other terms that will feature strongly in this thesis include ‘financial reform’ or ‘financial 
liberalization.’ Just what is meant by these particular phrases? Financial liberalization involves 
reformulating the basic conditions of financial repression, as first detailed by Ronald McKinnon 
and Edward Shaw in the early 1970s. McKinnon and Shaw juxtaposed two ideal types of 
financial system: a repressed financial system and a liberal one. In a liberal financial system, the 
demand for and supply of funds dictates how unconsumed income is utilized. By contrast, in a 
repressed financial system, the state enforces artificially low interest rates and is drawn into the 
process of rationing funds (either willingly or unwillingly), with a resulting drop in systemic 
efficiency.14 For McKinnon and Shaw, the liberalization, deregulation, reform or opening of 
financial markets ultimately refers to the shift in decision-making power over the allocation of 
funds from state agencies in a repressed financial system to the market in a liberal framework for 
finance. In the final analysis, the key issue for these economists is who decides where and how 
unconsumed income is utilized. Do state agents or market participants have the ultimate 
authority to make decisions about savings and investment? To the extent that countries empower 
the state to make these choices, their financial systems can be described as ‘repressed.’ To the 
extent that they give allocation powers to private individuals or companies through the market, 
their financial systems are ‘liberal.’ Various points in between these contrasting ideals we might 
call degrees of financial openness or liberalization.
Now despite the fact that the above may seem too obvious to warrant elaboration, it is not 
without its detractors. It assumes at least two things that are considered controversial by some 
analysts of financial policy change: first, that a regulatory framework of some description will be 
required to support either a repressed or a liberal financial system; and second, that 
liberalization, reform or deregulation do not necessarily involve eradicating legal strictures as the 
terms might seem to imply.15 A case can be made, for example, that financial liberalization and 
deregulation have quite distinct meanings. Steve Vogel argues that liberalization refers to the 
introduction of more competition within a market, while deregulation refers to the reduction or 
elimination of government regulations. He is adamant in making this distinction because in his 
view the latter term is actually a misnomer: deregulation has been closely associated with what
13 Brian Wallace Semkow, Taiwan ’s Capital Market Reform: The Financial and Legal Issues (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 23-30.
14 Ronald I. McKinnon, The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to a 
Market Economy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991), chp. 1. See also: Ronald 
McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 
1973); and Edward Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973).
15 Roger Noll, ‘The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy’ in K. McCubbins and T. Sullivan (eds.), 
Congress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 464.
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Vogel and others call ‘re-regulation,’ the reformation of old rules and the creation of new ones.16 
While Vogel’s distinction may represent a more accurate usage of these terms, in practice the 
activities of liberalization, deregulation and reregulation, if they are not uniformly synonymous, 
are usually linked. The analytical separation of the concepts assumes that there are universal 
measures for the ‘amount’ of regulation shaping financial systems. In reality, it is impossible to 
find clean-slate examples of ‘nil regulation’ or ‘full regulation’ against which we can compare 
various amounts of deregulation and reregulation. There is always a body of regulatory 
provisions to contend with -  it is the quality of regulations that counts, not their quantity. Some 
regulatory frameworks for finance empower the state to make allocation decisions, others the 
market. If s that simple.
Finally, some brief words on the structure of the thesis. Chapter 1 presents an overview of 
the Taiwan experience of financial reform in the late 1980s, and then compares this historical 
record to the theoretical debate on financial liberalization. A case for a technocrat leadership 
approach to financial reform is forwarded and the case studies of the thesis introduced. Chapter 
2 is a ‘nuts and bolts’ chapter that outlines the elements of RoC financial reform -  i.e. the 
economic technocrats and the ruling KMT. This chapter also includes a brief introduction to the 
general process of financial policy change in Taiwan. Chapters 3 to 5 are the core case studies 
of the thesis. Presented in chronological and processional order, these chapters review and 
analyze data on the three main episodes of financial reform in Taiwan as they unfolded over the 
course of the 1980s and beyond -  reform of securities, the foreign exchange system and banking, 
respectively. The conclusion of the thesis takes us beyond the immediate raison d ’etre of the 
project to briefly consider why policy change appeared to stagnate over the course of the 1990s.
***000***
16 Steven K. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). p. 3.
-S-
Chapter 1
-Chapter 1-
Financial reform in Taiwan and 
theoretical approaches to liberalization
Crafting Markets in Taiwan
Introduction
After decades of operating one of the most tightly controlled capitalist economies in the world, 
in the late 1980s the KMT regime commenced deregulation of Taiwan’s financial sector. 
Reform was introduced in three consecutive waves of legal amendment, including passage of 
new laws for the foreign exchange system, securities and banking in 1987, 1988 and 1989 
respectively.1 In many ways these three waves of reform represented the start of a whole new 
era of economic policy for Taiwan, foreshadowing a decade of respectable growth rates through 
the 1990s. They were as important for the course of RoC economic development as concurrent 
initiatives in the political sphere were for Taiwan’s democratization.
The key question or puzzle for this dissertation concerns this dramatic historical shift in 
financial policy of the late 1980s. Liberalization of the financial system was juxtaposed against 
a 40-year history of strong government intervention in all areas of finance. In the period prior to 
1987, for example, state agencies owned and directly operated the lion’s share of Taiwan’s 
banks, securities houses, bills finance institutions, insurance companies, venture capital firms -  
in fact just about anything that facilitated exchange between those with funds to spare and those 
in need of funds to invest. By the early 1990s, however, there were more than a dozen new 
private banks operating alongside the government owned institutions, and where there had once 
existed fewer than 20 securities houses, there were now more than 300. Financial opening 
implied the elimination of habits of administration that were so firmly entrenched in the 
thinking of government officials and market participants alike that as late as 1986, little room 
for adjustment seemed possible. Why, come 1987, did the KMT regime begin to change its 
mind? Why did the ruling party decide that from 1987 on, the state would begin to release its 
iron grip on ‘the commanding heights of the economy’?2
In this chapter I will begin by detailing the magnitude and significance of the shift from old 
to new financial administration in Taiwan. With this outcome as our starting point, I will then 
consider possible explanations of the late 1980s reform movement. Among the established 
theories that dominate much of the political economy debate about financial liberalization we 
can include the market-driven approach, statist analysis, pluralism, and the foreign pressures 
model. The details of each of these theories will be elaborated, and their general arguments 
subjected to a test. We will see that none of the established theories of financial reform can
1 The ‘waves’ metaphor is introduced in: Lawrence S. Liu, ‘Brave New World of Financial Reform in 
Taiwan, the Republic of China -  Three Waves of Internationalization and Liberalization and Beyond’ in
Chinese Yearbook o f International Law and Affairs Vol. 8 (1988-89).
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provide us with an adequate explanation of the Taiwan case. We will then turn to an alternative 
theory of financial policy change based on interaction between the leadership efforts of 
technocrats and party politics. This theory of technocrat leadership stems from an
amalgamation of some of the softer literature on leadership in public policy with the work on 
political parties and economic policy choice.
1. Financial reform in Taiwan: before and after the late 1980s
It is fair to suggest, after Robert Wade, that the post-war history of financial administration on 
Taiwan probably had more in common with the way communist countries managed their 
financial systems than with capitalist Western nations.3 The KMT regime firmly controlled 
amost every facet of the local financial system, and meddled in those parts that ostensibly were 
left free. RoC finance was, to use the language of McKinnon and Shaw, comprehensively 
repressed.4 In the period prior to the late 1980s, state agencies were dominant players in every 
najor market on the island -  banking, the primary and secondary markets for securities 
iistruments, the foreign exchange market and the money market. As suggested in the 
iitroduction to this chapter, the state owned and directly operated the great bulk of RoC 
tnancial institutions operating in these markets, from the commercial banks to venture capital 
Irms. In addition to direct state ownership of institutions, prices (i.e. interest rates) were fixed, 
tie range o f financial instruments was narrowly restricted, competition faced rigid geographical 
controls, and avenues for industry entry were tightly closed. While the aggregate level of 
swings and investment does not seem to have been harmed by the high level of repression (see 
"able 1.1),5 this was a financial system that economic planners in the former Eastern Bloc 
vould have been familiar with.6
But then came the financial reform movement of the late 1980s, and everything changed, 
nto the 1990s, a number of serious comparative studies placed the Taiwanese financial system 
s among the most open in the East Asian region.7 Anecdotal reports from foreign financiers
Tun-jen Cheng, ‘Guarding the Commanding Heights: The State as Banker in Taiwan’ in Stephan 
laggard, Cheng H. Lee and Sylvia Maxfield (eds.), The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries 
i.thaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
See: Robert Wade, ‘East Asian Financial Systems as a Challenge to Economics: Lessons from Taiwan’ 
l California Management Review Vol. 27 (Summer 1985), p. 114.
Ronald I. McKinnon, The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to a 
larket Economy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991), chp.l.
NB.: I make no claim for the level of performance of various policy frameworks in this thesis. My 
iterest is in explaining policy change and continuity, rather than trying to demonstrate which policies 
'ork the best. Table 1.1 is included simply for reference purposes.
By way of comparison, see: David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Creating a Market Economy in Eastern 
urope: The Case of Poland’ in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 1 (1990).
See the Taiwan sections in: Bryan T. Johnson, Kim R. Holmes and Melanie Kirkpatrick, 1999 Index of 
conomic Freedom (New York: Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal, 1999); James 
Iwartney and Robert Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World 1997 (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1997); 
nd James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr., and Ross Levine, ‘Banking Systems Around the Globe: Do 
Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?’ research paper prepared for the World 
iank, Working Paper No. 2325 (April 2000), available online at http://econ.worldbank.org/ [web page of 
ie economic research division of the World Bank] -  viewed on 5 October 2001.
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operating in and out of Taiwan confirmed these conclusions/ With the exception of the city- 
states of Hong Kong and Singapore (arguably atypical cases that prove the rule), Taiwan was 
fast developing a reputation as a beacon of liberal financial administration in a sea of more 
insular regimes. By virtually every measure, the financial system in Taiwan was more open 
after the reform push than before it. Interest rate controls were lifted, foreign financial 
institutions gained market access, regional monopolies were abandoned, a plethora of new 
financial instruments (from convertible bonds to credit cards) were allowed for the first time and 
entry reform was pursued in all of the key financial markets. While it is true that Taiwan still 
had some way to go to be considered a ‘free’ market for capital, in the wake of the late 80’s 
reform push comparisons with the financial systems of the (old) communist bloc were 
unthinkable.
TABLE 1.1 Taiwan savings and investment ratios (as % of GNP), 1950s-1990s
Period Savings Investment
1956-1962 11.1 18.0
1963-1973 24.3 23.9
1974-1978 31.9 31.7
1979-1983 32.2 29.0
1984-1988 35.7 20.2
1989-1992 29.5 23.1
Notes: Periods are selected to dampen the effects of major shifts in economic policy (e g. the shift to 
export orientated industrialization in the early 1960s), the oil shocks (1972-73, 1981-82), and growth 
spurts after recession (e.g. late 1970s, late 1980s).
Sources: Hang-sheng Cheng, ‘Financial Policy and Reform in Taiwan, China’ in Hang-sheng Cheng 
(ed.), Financial Policy and Reform in Pacific Basin Countries (Lexington: DC Heath & Company, 1986), 
p. 145; and Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1996 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and 
Development, 1996).
Just how did so radical a policy shift come about, and in such a short space of time? The 
regulatory realignment is particularly intriguing given the fact that reform occurred against a 
background of political continuity. Substantial evidence from North America, Europe, Latin 
America and Australasia suggests that financial liberalization tends to follow political change, 
or more specifically, change in governing parties.8 9 In the United States and Great Britain, for 
example, the ascendancy of Right-wing political parties saw the introduction of comprehensive 
reforms in the early to mid 1980s. Paradoxically, at around the same time, in Australia and New
8 Various interviews with foreign bankers in Taipei, 1996.
9 The literature here is extensive. Some examples will suffice: Edward L. Gibson, ‘The Populist Road to 
Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina’ in World Politics Vol. 49, No. 
3 (April 1997); Jacques Melitz, ‘Financial Deregulation in France’ in European Economic Review Vol. 34 
(1990); Herman Schwartz, ‘Small States in Big Trouble: State Reorganization in Australia, Denmark, 
New Zealand and Sweden in the 1980s’ in World Politics Vol. 46, No. 4 (July 1994); Suiwah Leung, 
‘Financial Liberalization in Australia and New Zealand’ in Sylvia Ostry (ed.), Authority and Academic 
Scribblers (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991).
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Zealand reform followed the ascendancy of social democratic parties. The Taiwanese 
experience of reform, however, presents a rare example of financial opening under continuous 
rule by the same political party -  i.e. the KMT.10 While financial reform was coincident with 
democratization of the Taiwanese political system, during the period in question the KMT at no 
point appeared to be under threat from opposition forces. Not until the late 1990s would the 50- 
year rule of the KMT face credible competition in domestic politics. Why would a governing 
party with no fundamental risk to its continued rule choose a radical policy option?
The weight of this question is all the more significant when we consider the character of the 
ruling party that presided over reform The political economy work on RoC industrial policy by 
writers such as Alice Amsden, Robert Wade and Chalmers Johnson* 11 tells us that the KMT was 
far from what we might call ‘naturally disposed’ toward economic liberalization. These writers 
argue that the KMT regime was heavy-handed in just about every area of national production 
and exchange, with upstream suppliers coming in for special attention. Aside from the usual 
assortment of public interest interventions in areas such as health and education, the KMT 
regime’s list of occupied industries also included: petrochemicals and plastics, mining and 
mineral processing, transport and communications, organic chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
construction, electronic and print media, trade and shipping, agriculture, shipbuilding, steel and 
iron production, alcohol and tobacco, the automotive industry, electricity, textiles and so on. 
Although some of these industry areas were, like finance, subject to various reform initiatives 
after the mid 1980s, many of them remained under state control up to the end of KMT rule in 
2000. In short, the KMT was a committed monopolist in the conduct of economic and 
commercial policy. Why, then, in the late 1980s did it choose to liberalize such a crucial area of 
economic administration as finance?
But before we move on to answer these questions, we are obliged to establish beyond 
reasonable doubt that regulatory change did in fact occur. This is an important task because 
casual comparisons with the degree of financial ‘openness’ in advanced industrial countries
10 Among the other outliers we can probably include Malaysia and India, although the former case never 
faced the level of financial repression extant in pre-reform Taiwan, and the latter case only saw financial 
opening after the dominant position of the ruling Congress Party had been critically challenged (early 
1990s). For India, see: Kunal Sen and Rajendra R. Vaidya, Financial Sector Reforms in India, 1991-94, 
Economics Division Working Papers, South Asia 96/5 (Canberra: National Centre for Development 
Studies, Australian National University, 1996); and Deepak Lai, ‘India and China: Contrasts in Economic 
Liberalization?’ in World Development Vol. 23, No. 9 (1995). For Malaysia, see: Natasha Hamilton- 
Hart, ‘States and Capital Mobility: Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in the Asian Region’ unpublished 
Ph.D. manuscript, Cornell University (1999), various sections.
11 See especially: Alice H. Amsden, ‘Taiwan’s Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to 
Dependency Theory’ in Modern China, Vol. 5, No. 3 (July 1979); Robert Wade, Governing the Market: 
Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1990); and Chalmers Johnson, ‘Political Institutions and Economic 
Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan’ in Frederic C. 
Deyo (ed.), The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1987).
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might suggest that reform was neither comprehensive nor permanent.12 Moreover, it is also 
possible that the financial reform effort was merely a clever public relations campaign; it is 
certainly true that many of Taiwan’s earlier attempts to liberalize the financial system were of 
this character.1̂ As briefly mentioned in the introduction, the main episodes of financial reform 
in Taiwan during the late 1980s were centered on three discernible ‘waves’ of legal amendment; 
new laws for the foreign exchange system, securities and banking were progressively introduced 
in 1987, 1988 and 1989 respectively. The focus of these reform efforts were three key statutes 
governing the financial sector: i.e. the Statute for the Administration of Foreign Exchange, the 
Securities Exchange Law and the National Bank Law. Soon after the amendment of these legal 
documents, significant and lasting changes in the flow of funds and the conduct of financial 
business on Taiwan became apparent. In both legal and substantive terms, the before and after 
picture across the three main areas of Taiwanese finance is quite striking. In the discussion that 
follows, we will consider these changes in some depth. It will be shown that change was real, 
not mere window-dressing (for a brief overview, see Table 1.2).
To begin with, consider the foreign exchange system Under the original Statute for the 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE -  Guanli Waihui Tiaoli),14 all private foreign 
exchange (forex) dealings were prohibited in principle, with exceptions made for a small list of 
key transactions. Chief among these exceptions were movements of currency arising from 
exports, or the import of goods required for export production. Foreign exchange dealings on 
the capital account were mostly forbidden. All forex transactions were subject to a defacto 
clearance system administered by the Central Bank of China. Exchange controls buttressed a 
fixed exchange rate mechanism that saw the New Taiwan dollar (NT$ -  Xin Taibi) pegged to 
the US dollar.15 As a partial result of these restrictions, Taiwan’s balance of payments tended to 
exhibit two features. To begin with, prior to the late 1980s there was a structural tendency for 
the trade account to record large surpluses. Taiwan’s trade profile was extraordinary by 
international standards. In 1986, the RoC’s trade surplus hit an all-time high at over 20% of 
GNP. In the years between 1983 and the end of the decade, the surplus ran at an average of 
13% per year.16 The other distinctive feature of Taiwan’s balance o f payments was the 
uncontrollable expansion of the Central Bank’s forex reserves. At the end of the 1970s, the
12 See for example: Brian Wallace Semkow, ‘Financial Reform in Taiwan’ in Butterworths Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law Vol. 7 (June 1992), p. 274.
13 See e.g.: Far Eastern Economic Review (23 April 1976), p. 117. Includes critical review of changes to 
the National Bank Law brought down in late 1975.
14 Guanli Waihui Tiaoli [Statute for the Administration of Foreign Exchange] (Taipei: Central Bank of 
China, 1970).
15 From: Zhonghua Minguo Zhongyang Yinhang zhi ZJiidu yu Gongneng (Taipei: Central Bank of China, 
1992); p. 98-108; or Central Bank of China: System and Functions [official translation] (Taipei: Central 
Bank of China, 1996), chp. 8, sec. 1.
16 In comparative terms, only a small number of OPEC countries have experienced surpluses as large or 
as long as those recorded by Taiwan before the late 1980s. Wing Thye Woo and Liang-Yn Liu, 
‘Taiwan’s Persistent Trade Surpluses: The Role of Underdeveloped Financial Markets’ in Joel D. 
Aberbach, David Dollar and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (eds.), The Role of the State in Taiwan’s Development 
(Armonk: M E. Sharpe, 1994).
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Central Bank’s reserves stood at US$1.5 billion; by 1984, the tally had increased tenfold, to 
US$15.6 billion. Thereafter, in the years 1985, 1986 and 1987 the Bank nearly doubled its 
forex holdings annually -  US$23 billion, US$46 billion and US$77 billion respectively.17 The 
flip side of these figures was unspectacular fluctuations on the capital account. With the bulk of 
incoming forex retained as reserves by the Central Bank, capital exports were insignificant.
Officially approved outward direct investment by Taiwanese citizens was less than US$1 billion
18for the entire period between 1952 and 1985.
After the reform push of July 1987, the central policy provisions of the foreign exchange 
framework became much more flexible. The inclusion of article 26-1 in the foreign exchange 
law authorized the government to suspend the application of core SAFE articles 6.1, 7, 13 and 
17,19 which in combination outlawed any private right to hold, use or trade foreign exchange.20 
The most immediate effect of this regulatory shift was a sharp turnaround in the accumulation 
of foreign currency assets by the Central Bank. No longer a clearing-house for forex, the CBC 
went from absorbing an additional US$28 billion in 1987 to off-loading around US$1.5 billion 
in 1988. As noted above, in the three years to 1987 the Central Bank nearly doubled its foreign 
exchange holdings annually, ending with a total of US$77 billion. For the following three 
years, however, the Central Bank’s accumulated forex remained relatively stable around US$75 
billion. The flip side of this turnaround was an increase in foreign asset holdings by RoC 
citizens. Direct investment abroad increased at a phenomenal rate. In the six years to 1987 
outgoing direct investment averaged a mere US$60 million per year. For the following six 
years, by contrast, the equivalent annual figure was US$4 billion.21 In time, the Central Bank’s 
reduced capacity to determine the direction of the NT dollar (which appreciated from 
US$1:NT$40 in the mid 1980s to an all-time high of US$1:NT$26 in 1989) also meant that the 
trade surplus subsided. From the giddy heights of over 20% of GNP in 1986, by 1989 the trade 
balance had decreased to 10% of GNP, and then 7% by 1991. Two years later in 1993, a 
plateau was reached with the surplus ‘stable’ at around 3% of GNP.22
17 Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1996 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1996), 
p. 4.
18 Tongji Yongbao [Statistics on Overseas and Foreign Investment, Outward Investment, etc.] (Taipei: 
Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1996), p. 1-2.
19 Article 6.1 covers the compulsory reporting system for foreign exchange earnings and debt. Article 7 
concerns the compulsory surrender or sale of forex earnings. Article 13 concerns the compulsory 
purchase of forex by the CBC to meet foreign payment obligations. And article 17 concerns the 
compulsory repurchase or resale of forex to the CBC or appointed banks. Guanli Waihui Tiaoli [Statute 
for the Administration of Foreign Exchange] (Taipei: Central Bank of China, 1987), art. 6.1, 7, 13, & 17.
20 C.V. Chen, ‘Legal Perspectives of the RoC’s Economic Development’ paper presented to the Second 
International Symposium on Finance, Trade and Investment in the Pacific Rim Region, Hong Kong (19- 
22 February 1989), p. 4.
21 Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1996, fn. 17, p. 4 & 181-184.
22 And remained at this level through the end of the 1990s. Calculated from figures in Taiwan Statistical 
Data Book, 1996, fn. 17, p. 1-4.
- 14-
Chapter 1 Crafting Markets in Taiwan
The second wave of financial reform in Taiwan during the late 1980s was securities 
liberalization.23 Under the original Securities Exchange Law (SEL -  Zhengquan Jiaoyi Fa), 
approval procedures for the issuance and listing of securities instruments were painfully slow, 
restrictive and unpredictable. The SEL provided for the registration and review of publicly 
issued companies while in most countries it has been common practice to regulate the actual 
offering and listing of securities. This gave the RoC Securities Exchange Commission onerous 
screening powers, and placed an unreasonable burden of proof on applicant companies. 
Secondary markets were segregated and tightly controlled. A strict demarcation of securities 
firms between underwriters, brokers and dealers was enforced, together with a freeze on firm 
licenses.25 This regulatory framework emasculated the local securities sector. One survey of 
the funding of RoC corporations in the years 1976-1989 reveals: around 56% of funds acquired 
by the business sector were supplied by formal financial institutions (banks, etc.), around 25% 
of funds were supplied through the curb market, and just under 20% of corporate funds came 
from the money and securities markets (roughly 9% and 11% respectively).26 As of 1987, only 
some 330 companies were publicly issued. In the same year, outstanding corporate bond issues 
came to a grand total of 33, with a face value of just NT$8 billion (US$280 million).27 While 
the primary markets were underutilized, the island’s main secondary market, the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange, regularly underwent growth cycles that saw the TSE index gain or lose more than 
half of its value in just 12 months. In some years shares changed hands up to five times, in 
others much less than 0.5. Trading occurred on an incredibly thin base of listings. In 1985 the 
total number of listed companies on the TSE was just 127, with 296 stock issues.28
23 Some brief definitional points are called for at the start of this section. Securities are those debt and 
equity instruments (i.e. various types of stocks, bonds and derivatives) issued by companies with 
maturities of 12 months or more. Primary markets are those in which securities are issued, or ‘sold,’ to 
first buyers, while secondary markets are those in which securities are traded. An issued company, or 
publicly issued company, is one which has issued securities instruments to raise capital, while a listed 
company is one which has moved to have these instruments registered on the secondary markets for 
trading. John O.E. Clark, Dictionary of Banking and Finance Terms (St. Leonards: Prospect Media, 
1999).
24 Zhengquan Jiaoyi Fa [Securities Exchange Law] (Taipei: Securities Exchange Commission, Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, 1968).
25 See: Paul S.P. Hsu and Lawrence S. Liu, ‘The Transformation of the Securities Market in Taiwan, the 
Republic of China’ in The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 27 (1988); and Lawrence Shao- 
liang Liu, ‘Recent Developments: Survey of Major Commercial Law Developments in the Republic of 
China, 1987-1988’ in Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs Vol. 7 (1987-1988).
26 Ya-Hwei Yang, Shyuan-Yi Shiau, Wen-Jeng Kuo, Lee-Rong Wang and Meng-Cheng Liu, The 
Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Republic of China, Volume 3, The Financing 
and Marketing Ability of Taiwan’s SMEs (Taipei: Pristine Communications, 1995), p. 27-29.
27 TSE Fact Book, 1995 (Taipei: Taiwan Stock Exchange, 1996), p. 51; and Caizheng Tongji Nianbao, 
Minguo 84 Nian [Yearbook of Financial Statistics of the Republic of China, 1995] (Taipei: Department of 
Statistics, Ministry of Finance, 1995), p. 298-299.
2h This figure represents less than a third of the companies on the South Korean exchange in the same 
year, even though Taiwan’s level of per capita income was considerably higher than Korea’s. Various 
statistics and observations from: Anthony Rowley, Asian Stockmarkets: The Inside Story (Hong Kong: 
Far Eastern Economic Review 1987); Brian W. Semkow, ‘A Synopsis of Current Financial Deregulation 
and Internationalization of Financial Markets and Institutions in Taiwan’ in Journal of International 
Banking Law Vol. 6, No. 9 (1991); and Taiwan Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Zhengquan Tongji Ziliao, Minguo 
84 Nian [Taiwan Stock Exchange Statistical Data, 1995] (Taipei: Taiwan Stock Exchange, 1996), p. 2-3.
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"ABLE 1.2 Major changes in Taiwan’s 3 waves of financial reform, late 1980s
Llevant Law Key Regulatory Changes Economic Effects
/mended Statute for Restrictions on right to hold and Leveling-off of the Central Bank
te Administration of trade forex suspended, most cross- of China’s foreign reserves,
breign Exchange. boarder remittances permitted in increase in private foreign asset
Itrd: July 1987. principle. holdings.
/mended Securities Offering and listing simplified, More publicly issued companies,
kchange Law. new disclosure rules, new more listings, radical increase in
Itroduced: January securities company licenses the number of securities
988. permitted, and greater powers. companies.
/mended National New private commercial banks 15 new commercial banks est.
hnk Law. permitted, scope and powers of 1991, deposit/loan margins
Ltroduced: July 1989. financial institutions extended, decreased, a range of new
interest rates liberalized. financial products intrd.
burces: Various, including Brian Wallace Semkow, ‘Financial Reform in Taiwan’ in Butterworths 
jurnal of International Banking and Financial Law Vol. 7 (June 1992); and Brian W. Semkow, ‘A 
bnopsis of Current Financial Deregulation and Internationalization of Financial Markets and Institutions 
i Taiwan’ in Journal of International Banking Law Vol. 6, No. 9 (1991).
However, with amendment of the SEL in January 1988,29 a more open regulatory 
avironment for securities emerged. The process of offering and listing was substantially 
amplified: an ex ante registration system was introduced so that most new issues by public 
ompanies were effective 30 days after notifying the Securities Exchange Commission. 
Jthough the regulatory onus of the listing process remained intact, the discretion of the 
fecurities Commission was substantially reduced and the entire listing process expedited with 
ie introduction of more transparent and consistent rules for disclosure. The amended legal 
*a me work also expanded the business powers of securities firms, and allowed the entry of new 
ompanies into the securities industry.30 Following these moves, more mature and inclusive 
scurities markets gradually began to develop in Taiwan. The number of publicly issued 
ompanies skyrocketed: from 339 in 1987, to 500 in 1989, and 947 two years later. By 1995, 
(ose to 1,500 companies had issued shares. Listed companies grew at a slower pace, but the 
•end toward greater participation is clear. By 1993, twice as many companies had listed on the 
'aiwan Stock Exchange as in 1987 (from 141 to 285). Even the sluggish bond market took off 
ventually, although it was well into the second half of the 1990s before most companies were 
billing to experiment with these instruments. On the supply side, the number of licenses
Zhengquan Jiaoyi Fa [Securities Exchange Law] (Taipei: Securities Exchange Commission, Ministry 
f Finance, 1988).
Brian Wallace Semkow, Taiwan ’s Capital Market Reform: The Financial and Legal Issues (Oxford: 
larendon Press, 1994), chp. 5, 6 and 7, various sections; and SEC Annual Report, 1989 (Taipei: Security 
nd Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, 1990), p. 7-10.
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ganted to new securities companies also expanded. From just 28 brokers in 1987 to an all-time 
hgh of 373 in 1990, sectoral growth was among the fastest Taiwan had ever experienced. The 
bckground to many of these improvements, however, was continued volatility in the stock 
rarket. Between 1986 and 1990, the Taiex grew sporadically from 2,135 points to an all-time 
hgh of 12,495 points, before plunging dramatically to 2,560 points in late 1990. Into the mid 
P90s, however, with improvements in market fundamentals, the stock market gradually began 
t stabilize. By this time, it was questionable whether the ‘casino’ label used by so many
31ommentators in the past could still be said to apply.
Taiwan’s third main wave of financial reform -  bank opening -  took place in mid 1989. 
like the early forex and securities laws, the old National Bank Law (NBL -  Zhonghua Minguo 
inhangfa) was more concerned with constraining markets than with cultivating their 
evelopment.32 Jointly administered by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, the 
rational Bank Law contained a blanket prohibition on new banks and specified state agencies 
s the legal custodian of a range of financial institutions. A host of other restrictions applied to 
banking practice: interest rates were subject to rigid controls, accounts managers were held 
ciminally liable for non-performing loans, and a vast range of business operations from credit 
ards to trust services were simply forbidden.33 The effects of this regulatory environment were 
pedictable enough. To begin with, fully 12 of the 16 commercial banks in Taiwan were state- 
fvvned, including the island’s four biggest banking operations.34 Moreover, the so-called 
brivate’ banks were really not so private. Bureaucrats or politicians were on the boards of all 
tiese institutions, and their categorization as private had more to do with public relations than 
vith who directed bank policy.35 Second, the business conduct of all banks was uniformly
' Kui-ke Wu, ‘The Securities Business in Taiwan: Back to Basics’ in China Post (30 September 1996), p. 
1; SEC Annual Report, 1989 (Taipei: Securities Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, 1990), p. 
'-9; RoC Securities Market Annual, 1993 (Taipei: Institute of Securities and Futures Markets 
)evelopment, 1993), p. 30-31; Taiwan Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Zhengquan Tongji Ziliao, Minguo 84 Nian 
[Taiwan Stock Exchange Statistical Data, 1995], fn. 28, p. 3; and Daniel Yu, ‘Why Taiwan Investors are 
Jetting on Bonds’ in Asiamoney Vol. 7, No. 6 (July-August 1996).
2 The National Bank Law was originally promulgated in March 1931 on Mainland China. By 1989 it 
lad been amended 7 times. Most of these amendments were regulatory adjustments and variations on the 
jre-established theme of ‘control.’ Zhonghua Minguo Yinhangfa [Bank Law of the Republic of China] 
iTaipei: Bureau of Monetary Affairs, Ministry of Finance, 1985).
1 Liu, ‘Brave New World of Financial Reform in Taiwan, the Republic of China,’ fn. 1, p. 195-201; 
inancial Market Integration in Chinese Taipei (Taipei: Bureau of Monetary Affairs, Ministry of 
linance, 1995), various sections, chp. 1-5; and Susan S. Chang, The Evolution and Reform of the 
'inancial System in the Republic of China (Taipei: Bureau of Monetary Affairs, Ministry of Finance, 
994), chp. 1-3.
’ The complete list of state-owned commercial banks was as follows: Chiao Tung Bank, the Farmers 
lank of China, the Land Bank of Taiwan, the Cooperative Bank of Taiwan, the City Bank of Taipei, the 
City Bank of Kaohsiung, the Bank of Taiwan, the Central Trust of China, the Export-Import Bank of 
China, the First Commercial Bank, the Chang Hwa Commercial Bank, and the Hua Nan Commercial 
lank. From: Kuo-shu Liang, ‘The Banking System and Financial Reform in Taiwan’ in Industry of Free 
■hina Vol. 78, No. 3 (September 1992). The island’s biggest banks were the Bank of Taiwan, First 
Commercial, Chang Hwa and Hua Nan.
5 The International Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) is the classic case here. ICBC was originally 
'esignated a state-owned bank until 1976 when in an effort to secure a foothold in the North American
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conservative; collateral was almost always required to secure bank funding. Hie commercial 
tanks tended to favor state-owned enterprises over big private companies, and then big 
companies over small to medium sized enterprises.76 Finally, with the formal banking system in 
srvile bondage, various black and grey markets for financial products became rife. We noted 
£>ove that so-called curb or underground financial markets (dixia shichang) in Taiwan provided 
«round 25% of the funds acquired by local enterprises. Other estimates suggest that at times, 
tie curb market accounted for nearly 40% of acquired credit. Much of this underground activity 
iicluded simple instruments such as employee deposits, credit rounds and post dated checks, but 
ome schemes were quite sophisticated. In the mid to late 1980s, for example, some 
‘inderground investment companies’ (dixia touzi gongsi) were starting to rival smaller banks as 
eposit takers.37
The amendment of the National Bank Law in 198938 saw the regulatory basis of many of 
tiese symptoms of repression eliminated. The most striking aspect of the reform initiative was 
tie decision to permit the establishment of new private commercial banks. The business scope 
aid powers of financial institutions were also extended and codified. Among other things, 
commercial banks were allowed to engage in the brokerage and dealing of short-term money 
narket instruments, and the draconian prohibitions on the accumulation of bad debt were 
crapped. Interest rates on deposits and loans were allowed to float, and banks were granted the 
iglit to establish additional branch offices throughout the island.39 With these changes, the 
lanking industry in Taiwan became far more efficient and user friendly. The most immediate 
efect was the introduction of more than a dozen new commercial banks. Pursuant to 
}romulgation of the new regulations, there were 19 applications for new bank licenses, and all 
lut four were accepted in 1991.40 The introduction of these institutions brought a new level of 
competition to Taiwan’s banking sector. Following an interest rate war through 1993-94, rate 
preads on loans and deposits declined by around a third. The oligopolistic profits of the old 
tanks fell to more reasonable levels, and a range of new bank products -  such as credit cards, 
mall business loans and auto teller machines -  were introduced. With the formal banking 
sctor increasingly sensitive to the needs of consumers, the informal financial sector soon 
©countered hard times; most of the underground investment companies either collapsed or 
vere absorbed by formal institutions. Finally, the 1989 reform agenda paved the way for the
narket it was ‘privatized’ to comply with US banking laws. See: International Commercial Bank of 
ihina, Annual Report 1995 (Taipei: ICBC, 1995).
J Ya-hwei Yang, ‘Taiwan: Development and Structural Change of the Banking System’ in Hugh T. 
’atrick and Yung Chul Park (eds.), The Financial Development of Japan, Korea and Taiwan: Growth 
lepression and Liberalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 294.
7 Jane Kaufman Winn, ‘Banking and Finance in Taiwan: The Prospects for Internationalization in the 
990s’ in The International Lawyer Vol. 25, No. 4 (Winter 1991), p. 916-920.
Zhonghua Minguo Yinhangfa [Bank Law of the Republic of China] (Taipei: Bureau of Monetary 
iffairs, Ministry of Finance, 1989).
1 Mu-Tsai Chen, ‘Financial Liberalization and the Planning (sic.) for Developing a Regional Financial 
Center,’ paper prepared for presentation at the 18th Joint Conference of USA-RoC and RoC-USA 
economic Councils, Taipei (December 5-7 1994), section 2.
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eventual privatization of the big state-owned commercial banks. Into the mid 1990s, the 
pvernment moved to complete the sale of First, Hua Nan and Chang Hwa.41
1 Theoretical approaches to Financial liberalization 
;nd Taiwan’s reform experience
1 is clear from the discussion above that both in terms of the legal framework governing 
"aiwanese finance and substantive economic outcomes, the KMT regime’s reform efforts of the 
lite 1980s were deep and enduring. Across the three key areas of RoC financial administration 
eviewed above, the difference in the situation before and after reform is undeniable -  changes 
vere real and purposeful, not merely an ephemeral reorganization of the status quo or an 
inintended consequence of some other policy process. The extent of financial reform pursued, 
f not striking by international standards, was a substantial deviation from Taiwan’s historical 
jattern of financial policy (from a highly repressive regulatory framework to something much 
nore liberal) and the flow of funds and structure of the local financial system reflected this.
And if these points are accepted -  with apologies to those readers who would have taken 
lieh observations on faith rather than wade through the some of the drier details of the first 
action of this chapter -  we are left with the questions raised earlier. Why did the KMT regime 
cecide in the late 1980s to radically reform its regulatory framework for finance? Why, given 
vhat we know about the dirigiste proclivities of the ruling party -  the KMT’s ‘will to control’ if 
;ou like -  did it choose to liberalize such a crucial area of economic administration? Luckily, 
ruestions such as these have been raised before about other episodes of financial reform in other 
(ountries; in theoretical and comparative terms at least, the questions are merely variations on a 
veil-established theme. The academic literature dedicated to explaining why financial 
iberalization occurs can be divided into four main schools of theorizing. They include: the 
narket-driven approach, statist analysis, pluralism, and the foreign pressures model. In the 
dscussion that follows, I will detail the philosophical basis of the four theoretical schools, the 
tredictions that the different theories yield, and the precision of each in the case of RoC 
inancial reform A number of quasi-theories or eclectic explanations that have been used to 
■xplain financial policy change (both in Taiwan and elsewhere) will not be considered.42 While 
uch explanations are often important for what they bring to light from an empirical point of 
'iew, they do not produce readily falsifiable statements.
The literature that falls within the gamut of the market-driven approach is expansive and has 
i variety of ideological homes. Nonetheless, the school is united in the proposition that the
0 A year later, a trust company was also granted a license bringing the total to 16.
1 Willis Ke, ‘High Hopes Amid Fiercer Competition’ in Financial and Investment Yearbook, RoC 1993 
Taipei: China Economic News Service, 1993); Willis Ke, ‘Diversifying Services, Enhancing 
Automation’ in Financial and Investment Yearbook, RoC 1995 (Taipei: China Economic News Service, 
995); Asia Yearbook, 1990 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1990), p. 232-233; and 
business Taiwan [a publication of the China Economic News Service! (23-29 June 1997), p. 2-3.
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international trend toward financial liberalization since the mid 1970s is largely explicable in 
terms of economic pressures to abandon bureaucratic controls on the allocation of savings and 
investment. According to mainstream neoclassical economists, technological development, the 
diminishing ability of established regulatory structures to cope with avoidance techniques, the 
expansion in the availability of financial instruments (financial innovation) and the increasing 
inefficiency of various kinds of financial repression have obliged governments everywhere to let 
the market decide where and how funds are allocated. In the economists’ scenario, there is a 
certain inevitability about the switch from old to new patterns of financial regulation due to 
changed economic fundamentals. To prove their case, economists study the performance of 
various kinds of old-style financial administration, a favorite being capital account controls. 
They often find that not only do such controls fail to achieve established policy goals, but 
outcomes may indeed be the direct opposite of what was sought in the first place. Beyond this, 
a few economists are also interested in just how unsatisfactory policy outcomes move from the 
‘problem stage’ to the introduction of new financial policy (i.e. liberalization). A small but 
important group of scholars have pointed to the key role of economic crises as a precursor to 
financial policy change.43
Although the jargon and analytical intent are quite different, the conclusions of mainstream 
economists are very close to that of a radical group of academic commentators: the regulation 
theorists. Regulation theory grew out of French Marxism during the late 1970s in response to 
the economic malaise of that decade. For regulationists, financial liberalization is simply one 
part of the broader realignment of capitalist states’ superstructure with changed economic 
fundamentals. Regulationists argue that the supporting institutional structures of a particular 
stage of capitalist development (the legal, cultural and political frameworks Marxist scholars 
call the superstructure) simply ‘wear out’ with changes in the mode of production (the economic 
substructure in Marxist parlance). New regulatory forms are required to replace older 
frameworks of administration that have become progressively more unstable in the face of a 
systematic crisis of the economy. Regulationists tend to see the policy process of installing new 
institutional frameworks as inherently problematic, and usually characterized by much groping 
in the dark. The regulatory needs of a particular historical phase of development are rarely
42 See, for example, Karl Field’s application of Peter Evans’ ‘embedded state’ approach in Karl J. Fields, 
Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
43 Richard O’Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography (London: Pinter Publishers, 
1992); Deepak Lai, ‘The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization’ in The World Bank Economic 
Review Vol. 1 (January 1987); Donald Mathieson and Liliana Rojas-Suarez, Liberalization of the Capital 
Account: Experiences and Issues, IMF Occasional Paper U103 (Washington: International Monetary 
Fund, 1993); Steven B. Kamin, ‘Devaluation, Exchange Controls, and Black Markets for Foreign 
Exchange in Developing Countries’ in International Finance Discussion Papers [a publication of the 
board of governors of the US Federal Reserve, Washington DC], No. 334 (October 1988); and Allan 
Drazen and Vittorio Grilli, The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms’ in American Economic Review 
Vol. 83, No. 3 (June 1993).
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olvious and may require a great deal o f experimentation before superstructure and substructure 
ac matched -  a coincidence that regulationists call an historical epoch.44
So given these theoretical tenets and observations, just what does the market driven 
ajproach actually predict and what does the Taiwan case of financial opening demonstrate? In 
esence, the market-driven approach predicts that financial reform will be preceded by unstable 
aid unsustainable financial conditions. At first glance, this prediction appears to hold true for 
tb  Taiwan experience. The accounts of liberalization forwarded by many of Taiwan’s 
academic economists, for example, point to Taiwan’s burgeoning trade surpluses as a major 
citalyst for reform One economist in Taiwan commented in an interview: ‘Taiwan had to 
liieralize its financial system; it really had no choice in the matter. In the past, because we had 
ai undeveloped economy, Taiwan had a lot of restrictions on things like forex trading, and bank 
ovnership and management. In the 1980s this changed rapidly as Taiwan became wealthy and 
we started to register huge trade surpluses with the US and the rest of the world. This was 
uisustainable and we had to change.’45 Another protagonist often emphasized is the so-called 
IIth Credit Cooperative scandal of 1985. This incident (which was basically a crisis of non- 
b;nk management and regulation -  more in chapter 5) preempted a crisis of faith in Taiwan’s 
dimestic financial institutions, and called into question the motives and performance of the RoC 
nonetary authorities. In quantifiable terms, it also lead to a loss of annual growth in the vicinity 
o 1% -  almost one quarter of the growth figure for 1985.46
But while these events were significant in and of themselves (for reasons we will discuss 
laer in the thesis), it must be remembered that in comparative terms Taiwan was never subject 
t( the kind of market pressures that other countries have endured prior to their reform programs. 
Tie kind of hyperinflation experienced in Latin America47 and the collapse of investment and 
g»vernment revenue experienced in Eastern Europe48 did not coincide with Taiwan’s reform 
tnnsition. Taiwan’s experience of ‘market pressure’ was mild by comparison. Indeed, at its 
nost extreme, the impact of market pressures on Taiwan’s financial system was fragmented and 
isolated. Some areas of financial administration, like the regulatory framework for foreign
4Among the classic texts we can include: Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US 
hperience (London: New Left Books, 1979); Alain Lipietz (trans. Ian Patterson), The Enchanted World: 
hflation, Credit and the World Crises (London: Verso, 1985); and Robert Boyer (trans. by Craig 
Ciamey), The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction (New York: Columbia University, 1990).
4 Emphasis in original statement. Interview in Taipei, 1996.
4 Far Eastern Economic Review (12 September 1985), p. 93; and Fields, Enterprises and the State in 
lorea and Taiwan, fn. 42, chp. 5.
4 Chile in the late 1960s, early 1970s is probably the most obvious case here. See for example: Laura 
fastings, ‘Regulatory Revenge: The Politics of Free Market Financial Reforms in Chile’ in Stephan 
laggard, Chung H. Lee and Sylvia Maxfield (eds.), The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries 
(thaca: Cornell University Press 1993); and Jeffrey Frieden, Debt, Development and Democracy: 
Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991), 
cip. 5.
4 See for example: Lipton and Sachs, ‘Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of 
FMand,’ fn. 6; and Zbigniew Fallenbuchl, ‘Poland: The Anatomy of Stagnation’ in Joint Economic 
Committee, Pressures for Reform in East European Economies, Volume 2 (Washington: Congress of the 
Inited States, 1989).
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exchange, were undoubtedly subject to considerable economic stress. Other areas, however, 
most notably securities administration, endured little if any pressure to speak of. And yet some 
commentators argue that the Securities Exchange Law amendments of 1988 were the most 
liberal, or at least extensive, of the policy reforms to be instituted in the late 1980s.49 If we 
accept the central tenants of the market-driven literature, we would expect the reverse outcome 
-  i.e. facing little market pressure on the established regulatory framework for securities, there 
would be little if any reform A similar argument could be mounted for aspects of banking 
reform as well. The decision to pursue entry deregulation as part of the 1989 New Bank Law 
was only remotely connected to questions of institutional performance. While the 10th Credit 
Cooperative scandal certainly underlined the need for reform of banking practices and 
administrative oversight, the link with the liberalization of bank entry is tenuous to say the 
least.50 In sum, the best the market-driven approach can do is provide a partial explanation of 
the Taiwan case of financial reform
Another popular approach to the questions surrounding the global trend toward financial 
liberalization is ‘statist analysis,’ a body of literature that has clear intellectual antecedents in 
the work of political scientists such as Stephen Krasner, Theda Skocpol and Eric Nordlinger.51 
Writers who adopt a statist account of financial reform generally maintain that any particular 
course o f liberalization is linked to the ascribed political will and priorities of state institutions -  
conceptions of governmental purpose which, in the final analysis, are divorced from sectarian 
social interests and personal interests (but which may include sectarian bureaucratic or 
executive interests). The ‘state’ in this scenario is usually defined after Weber as an 
administrative community claiming a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given 
territory.52 In turn, state preferences are contingent on the institutional mechanisms or policy 
tools which give rise to differential capabilities both between and within states. On a case-by­
case basis, if you understand the goals of the state, as well as the broad capabilities of state 
institutions, you will go some way toward explaining why and how financial reform unfolds.
49 Brian Wallace Semkow, Taiwan’s Financial Markets and Institutions: The Legal and Financial Issues
11.
’ fn. 1, p. 195-210
51 Among the classics, we can count: Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979); Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Stephen D. Krasner, ‘ Approaches to the State: Alternative 
Conceptions and Historical Dynamics’ in Comparative Politics Vol. 16, No. 2 (January 1984). See also: 
Peter Evans, Dietrich Reuschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), various chapters. The early article by Nettle is also worth reviewing 
-  arguably, this is where it all began: J.P. Nettle, ‘The State as a Conceptual Variable’ in World Politics 
Vol. 20, No. 4 (July 1968).
52 Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in Max Weber (trans. H. Gerth and C.W. Mills), Essays from Max 
Weber (London: Routledge, 1948), p. 78.
53 See: Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and US Foreign 
Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) p. 5; and Eric Nordlinger, ‘The Return to the State: 
Critiques’ in American Political Science Review Vol. 82, No. 1 (1988) p. 882. For a more straight­
forward saunter through the conceptual issues involved, see: Stephen Bell, ‘Statist Analysis’ in Andrew 
Parkin, John Summers, and Dennis Woodward (eds.), Government, Politics, Power, and Policy in 
Australia (Sydney: Longman Cheshire, 1994), p. 295-299.
of Deregulation and Internationalization (Westport: Quorum Books, 1992), chp. 
50 Liu, ‘Brave New World of Financial Reform in Taiwan, the Republic of China,
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Louis Pauly’s seminal work Opening Financial Markets and Steven Vogel’s more recent 
f  reer Markets, More Rules are some of the more consistent and rigorous examples of the statist 
literature on financial reform In Opening Financial Markets, the author suggests that while 
regulatory frameworks for finance ‘...have in recent years been converging in the direction of 
increasingly common [and liberal] regulatory standards.... the processes encouraging this 
evolution rest not on ineluctable economic forces but on political will.’ Focusing on the 
evolving regulatory treatment of foreign banks in four countries (the US, Japan, Canada and 
Australia), Pauly seeks to demonstrate that a ‘...global village does not spontaneously spring up; 
it must be created. Politics within state structures remains the axis around which international 
finance revolves.’54 Vogel takes Pauly’s analysis one step further by problematizing the 
dependent variable (i.e. financial opening). Drawing on case studies of Japan and the UK, 
Vogel distinguishes financial deregulation, liberalization and reregulation as separate processes 
under the overall rubric of reform He argues that states have combined these constituent 
processes in markedly different ways according to differences in the capacity and preferences of 
state actors. The final outcome, according to Vogel, is actually a three-way paradox: ‘A 
movement aimed at reducing regulation has only increased it; a movement propelled by global 
forces has reinforced national differences; and a movement purported to push back the state has 
been led by the state itself.’55
The statist literature predicts that while a myriad of incentives for change (including 
deteriorating economic circumstances) may indeed be apparent, financial reform will only occur 
where it is seen as supportive of a state’s goals, and where the arrangement of institutional 
powers allow for the pursuit of such reform The Taiwan case of financial opening reveals 
some support for this prediction. Evidence garnered by Robert Wade demonstrates that 
financial liberalization in the late 1980s occurred in the context of a purposive redirection of 
industry policy by the RoC state. Wade shows that in the 1970s and early 1980s, the state’s 
industry policy agenda (extant in key ‘pilot agencies’ such as the Industrial Development 
Bureau or Gongyeju of the Ministry of Economic Affairs) shifted from support of export 
oriented industrialization in general to promotion of high value-added areas of export 
production in particular. This shift in state goals preempted a shift in financial policy. While 
retention of a tight reign on the financial sector was once an important means of channeling 
scarce investment funds to export orientated manufacturing, in the transition to high-tech 
production, flexible financial products were required. Only mature financial markets can 
provide such products, and hence the state pursued financial reform in the late 1980s.56
54 Louis W. Pauly, Opening Financial Markets: Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), p. 2.
55 Steven K. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 5.
Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization, fn. 11, esp. chp. 4 and 6; and Wade, ‘East Asian Financial Systems as a Challenge to 
Economics: Lessons from Taiwan,’ fn. 3.
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But what may have been true for the RoC state overall (or indeed, for key people within the 
state -  more later in the thesis) was certainly not true for the state’s constituent parts. 
Regardless of the redirection of industry policy Wade alludes to, most of the monetary 
authorities in the RoC state continued to pursue a vision of the public interest which involved a 
resolutely dirigiste relationship with the economy at large and the financial sector in particular. 
The key institutions responsible for financial policy -  most importantly the Central Bank of 
China and the Ministry of Finance -  were unquestionably committed to strong intervention in 
the financial sector. Much of this commitment was driven by an extreme fear of insolvency and 
an institutional mindset which emphasized avoidance of any kind of disruption to market 
order/7 Although this position was more akin to a ‘default setting’ than a consciously derived 
objective, it was extremely entrenched and totally unconducive to the pursuit of radical policy 
change. Aside from these questions of intent, the institutional arrangement of financial policy 
administration in Taiwan was not supportive of the kind of cohesive and concentrated financial 
opening that occurred in the late 1980s. Responsibility for financial policy in Taiwan was
spread out over a series of government agencies. Into the late 1980s, for example, bank
supervision was the responsibility of not only the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, but 
also the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Taiwan Cooperative Bank and one or two 
other agencies.58 While under different circumstances this devolution of powers might have 
produced dynamism in the face of pressures for financial reform,59 in Taiwan it killed ideas for 
policy change before they had a chance to take hold. The lack of functional jurisdiction among
the RoC’s monetary agencies meant that gridlock was the most typical response to new
proposals. All in all, statist analysis gives us very little insight into the Taiwan case of financial 
liberalization.
The third school of theory that has been used to explain the origins of financial 
liberalization is pluralism. Writers who fall within this tradition tend to argue that reform is an 
outcome of the changing interests of private groups or coalitions. In an earlier era, regulated 
financial systems were in the perceived interest of domestically orientated business corporations 
and financial houses, and these groups lobbied governments everywhere for protection of local 
markets. In more recent years, however, corporations and financial concerns have developed 
global reach and have demanded -  and received -  more open regulatory arrangements for 
finance. The pluralist account of financial opening owes a large intellectual debt to political 
scientists such as Robert Dahl, Nelson Polsby, Aaron Wildavsky and Charles Lindblom.60
57 Interview in Taipei with Mr. Paul Hsu, Senior Partner, Lee and Li Attorneys at Law, 15 July 1999.
58 This unsatisfactory situation is an ongoing feature of bank supervision in Taiwan. See: CBC Annual 
Report, 1995 (Taipei: Central Bank of China, 1996), p. 91; and chapter 2, section one.
59 Arguably, such dynamism is a distinguishing feature of fragmented administrative systems like those in 
the US and Australia and may have been responsible for the decisive processes of financial opening that 
occurred in both countries. I am indebted to Malcolm Cook for this point.
<,l) See especially: Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 2nd ed.
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Tiese writers claim that government decision makers have relatively little control over their 
p»licy agendas, and that power within any given society tends to be dispersed among a plurality
0 competing social groups. ‘Power’ for the pluralists is understood largely in behavioural 
terns as the ability of A to affect B’s actions, regardless of B’s resistance/’1 In essence, the 
puralist account is a mid-range theoretical approach. Much of it assumes a political framework 
ii which group association is relatively unconstrained, and government action is in some sense 
United (i.e. constitutional) and open. These assumptions firmly ground the pluralist literature
01 financial reform in broader debates about the character of governance in democratic or 
d-.mocratizing polities.
Arguably the most theoretically parsimonious of the pluralist literature on financial reform 
is the work of the so-called Chicago school.62 Chicago school theorists argue that the collective 
a.tion dilemma first outlined by Mancur Olson in the 1960s63 implies that government 
rtgulation of industrial sectors inevitably reflects the interests of those who are regulated (since 
sich firms or producers are relatively few in number and have concentrated interests in 
rtgulatory outcomes). The access of industry representatives to the policy making process is 
u.ually assured through ‘captured’ regulatory agencies and vote-maximizing politicians. In this 
cintext, deregulation of finance emerges as a policy agenda when economic or technological 
cianges give financial institutions and major consumers of capital a narrow self-interest in 
pomoting the process. One of the more empirically impressive studies to make this case is 
Pances McCall Rosenbluth’s Financial Politics in Japan. Focusing on the development of 
stveral aspects of Japanese financial regulation during the 1970s and 1980s (including Japanese 
firex regulation, banking, the bond market and the postal savings system) Rosenbluth argues: 
‘Tie Japanese financial sector comprises several well organized interest groups that have 
siccessfully employed their political resources to influence financial policy.... Rules governing 
pivate finance are changing because shifts in Japan’s economic environment have rendered the 
iiitial regulatory structure no longer beneficial to these groups.’64 The main players in 
Fosenbluth’s account are Japanese banks, most importantly the 12 major ‘city banks’ which
(loston: Little & Brown, 1974); and Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: 
Fee Press, 1965).
6 Robert A. Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’ in Roderick Bell, David M. Edwards and R. Harrison Wagner 
(ds.), Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research (New York: Free Press, 1969). For the 
sandard critique, see: Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974).
6 See especially: James Wilson, ‘The Politics of Regulation’ in James Wilson (ed.), The Politics of 
Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980); George Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ in 
bll Journal of Economics and Management Science Vol. 2, No. 1 (1971); and Sam Peltzman, ‘The 
Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation’ in Brookings Papers on Economic 
Aetivity, Microeconomics (1989).
6 Olson argued that within any particular political community there will be strong demand for a class of 
pods that are not diminished with the addition of n extra consumers (the most extreme examples are 
cean air and water, but others such as policing and national defense come close). These ‘public goods’ 
Mil  be under-produced because self-interested individuals will avoid contributing to the provision of a 
pod that they could consume irrespective of their personal contribution. Mancur Olson, The Logic of 
Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
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dominate the local banking industry, and several large Japanese securities houses known 
ominously as the ‘Big Four.’
So what does the pluralist account actually predict? A pluralist account suggests that where 
large private financial institutions and/or consumers of capital exhibit a subjective interest in 
financial opening, and where such agents have access to centers of financial policy making, 
financial reform will be pursued. Chen Shang-mao’s impressive study of the evolution of RoC 
banking policy provides data suggesting that pluralist expectations were fulfilled in the decision 
to open up the banking sector in 1989. Chen attempts to demonstrate that in the period 
subsequent to the lifting of martial law in 1987, enterprise groupings (guanxi qiye or qiye jituan) 
were involved in a sophisticated campaign of political lobbying and executive infiltration that 
eventually saw the pattern of bank opening fashioned to suit their needs. Well-known industry 
conglomerates such as President Industries, Cathay Group, the Formosa Plastics companies and 
the Far Eastern Group were publicly and privately vocal in their desire or demand for entry into 
the banking sector. These preferences were communicated to the relevant authorities via a 
number of channels, one of the more important paths being informal networks between industry 
representatives and politicians in the Legislative Branch.65
The data on the guanxi qiye presented by Chen is certainly an important part of Taiwan’s 
financial reform story (and we will revisit it later in the thesis), but whether it is indicative of a 
pluralist account of liberalization is debatable. The influence of Taiwanese business interests on 
economic policy was liighly qualified. Tlirough the late 1980s and beyond, many (indeed, most 
of the important) large-scale enterprises in Taiwan were state-owned and operated. As noted 
above, a vast array of activities were subject to direct state intervention -  covering everything 
from agriculture to banking -  leaving Taiwan with more than 150 public enterprises.66 True, 
some of the guanxi qiye were impressive in their scope of operations -  Hamilton et.al. comment 
that the top 100 guanxi qiye had interests in an average of four unassociated industries67 -  but by 
international standards they were small concerns. They possessed nothing like the market
power of the Keiretsu in Japan or the Chaebol in South Korea, and were only considered 
significant in the Taiwan context due to the overwhelming domination of the local economy by 
small to medium sized enterprises.68 Further, there is a conjectural problem associated with
64 Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), p. 5.
65 Shang-mao Chen, ‘Taiwan Yinhang Zhengce de Zhengzhi Jingji Fenxi’ [The Political Economy of 
Taiwan’s Banking Policy], unpublished Masters manuscript, Department of Politics, National Cheng Chi 
University, Taipei (May 1998), see esp. chp. 4.
66 Chi Schive, ‘Experiences and Issues of Privatization in Taiwan’ in Industry of Free China Vol.83, No. 1 
(January 1995); and Alice H. Amsden, ‘Big Business and Urban Congestion in Taiwan: The Origins of 
Small Enterprise and Regionally Decentralized Industry (Respectively)’ in World Development Vol. 19, 
No. 9 (1991).
67 Gary G. Hamilton, Marco Orru and Nicole Woolsey Biggart, ‘Enterprise Groups in East Asia: An 
Organizational Analysis’ in Shoken Keizai No. 161 (September 1987).
6S See: Susan Greenhalgh, ‘Families and Networks in Taiwan’s Economic Development’ in Edwin 
Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh (eds.), Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan 
(Armonk: M.E. Sharp 1988).
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placing too much emphasis on the ‘access to centers of finance policy making’ of Taiwan’s 
larger industry players. During the key years of financial opening -  i.e. the last three years of 
the 1980s -  the RoC was a democratizing country, not a democracy per se. At least until 1992, 
when major constitutional revisions were completed, the KMT regime continued to exercise 
extra-legal powers and privileges. In this context, even though Taiwan business interests were 
represented in key policy networks, there was no guarantee that anyone was prepared to listen to 
them Well into the mid 1990s, the main administrative organs of financial policy -  most 
notably the Central Bank of China and the Ministry of Finance -  were kept well insulated from 
such influence.69 In sum, a pluralist account of RoC financial reform is open to question on 
interpretation of evidence and conceptual grounds.
The final school of theory that seeks to explain the international trend toward financial 
reform is the foreign pressures model. Writers who propound a foreign pressures approach to 
financial liberalization contend that deregulation is ultimately attributable to the character of the 
international system of nation states. This system leads to two kinds of external pressure for 
liberalization: (1) direct political lobbying from states who perceive some kind of national 
disadvantage in other countries maintaining a repressed regulatory framework for finance, and 
(2) policy-competitive pressures generated by the ready availability of foreign alternatives to 
domestic financial services. In the former instance, the threat of retaliation in the face of a 
perceived lack of reciprocity in market access is usually cast as the mechanism of policy 
change. In the latter instance, the wholesale exodus of domestic financial institutions to 
offshore capital markets is often depicted as the conduit of reform The foreign pressures model 
owes much to an economically sensitive strand of neo-realist international relations theory. 
This body of literature argues that a large part of what states do can be explained in terms of the 
unfettered competition among states for economic power, and the relative position of states 
within the international political economy. For these neo-realist writers, the international 
system is ultimately anarchic and hierarchically ordered; there is no overarching global 
authority and power is unevenly distributed among national actors.70
These various themes are comprehensively explored in Eric Helleiner’s definitive work 
States and the Reemergence o f  Global Finance. Helleiner’s book traces the development of the 
international financial architecture in the post-war years to the early 1990s. He presents three 
broad arguments. First, he contends that the old Bretton Woods financial order was retained 
until the early 1970s not because the restriction of finance was initially more efficacious or 
more economically rational, but because the US and other major powers were committed to it
69 See in particular: Yun-han Chu, The Realignment of Business-Government Relations and Regime 
Transition in Taiwan’ in Andrew MacIntyre (ed.), Business and Government in Industrializing Asia 
(Ithaca: New York, 1994); and Tun-jen Cheng, ‘Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan’ in 
World Politics Vol. 41, No. 4 (July 1989).
70 See for example: Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987); Klaus E. Knorr, Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International
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for shared political and ideological reasons. Second, Helleiner argues that historically the 
advanced industrial states were key agents in promoting financial opening by: granting 
increased freedom to market participants in the 1960s (resulting in the emergence of the 
Eurodollar market), choosing not to prevent the collapse of Bretton Woods in the 1970s, and 
preventing major international financial crises at strategic junctures in the mid 1970s and 1980s. 
Pursuit of these actions was contingent on a number of state-interest factors, including the 
hegemonic strategies of the US and Great Britain. And finally, Helleiner claims that contrasts 
between the finance and trade policies pursued by different nations demonstrates that states can 
and have tolerated restrictive practices abroad (e.g. in trade policy) when it has been in their 
perceived interest to do so.71
Simply put, the foreign pressures model predicts that a country’s experience of financial 
opening will be preceded by political or policy pressures from other nation states. There 
appears to be some support for this prediction in the Taiwan case of financial reform It is 
folklore in Taiwan’s expatriate business community that without the constant efforts of the 
United States and the American Institute in Taiwan, the financial reforms of the late 1980s 
would not have occurred, or at least would not have been as extensive as they were. In reply to 
a question about the likelihood of liberalization occurring in the absence of foreign pressure, 
one foreign banker replied: ‘Hell would probably [have frozen] over first. Without the US 
waving Super 301 [the trade sanctions bill introduced by Congress in the late 1980s to assist the 
President in dealing with US trade partners deemed to be ‘unfair traders’] in the face of 
Taiwanese officials there would have been no progress on the foreign exchange regime and 
insurance. Foreign lobbying is rarely 100% effective -  I would never claim that -  but it does 
count for a lot.’72
The impressions of Taiwan’s expatriate businessmen are drastically overstated. While the 
foreign pressures model probably holds true for the lonely example of insurance (the exception 
that proves the rule?),73 the model’s predictions are found wanting in all other areas. The reality
Power (London: Macmillan, 1973); and the all-time classic, Jacob Viner, ‘Power versus Plenty’ in World 
Politics Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1948).
71 Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), esp. ‘Introduction.’ For a brief overview of Helleiner’s central 
points, see: Eric Helleiner, ‘From Bretton Woods to Global Finance: A World Turned Upside Down’ in 
Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1994).
72 Interview with foreign banker in Taipei, 1996.
73 The complete exclusion of US and other foreign insurers from the domestic insurance market prior to 
1986 meant that it was a soft target during US-Taiwan trade negotiations. As a result of two rounds of 
talks, finance authorities in Taiwan eventually granted exclusive admission to American insurers at the 
rate of three new life and non-life companies per year, and permission to establish two branches of the 
same US company in Taiwan (i.e. head office and a subsidiary). These concessions were only a marginal 
win for US negotiators, but this was to be expected given that demands in this area were not made with 
the same gusto as on the trade front (see comments elsewhere in the paragraph). Once they had attained a 
minor presence in the local insurance market, the Americans were not prepared to debate the propriety 
and details of RoC insurance law. See: Business Taiwan [a publication of the China Economic News 
Service] (21-27 January 1991), p. 1. Includes extracts from a report compiled by the State Department on
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is that foreign pressures for financial opening were not significant during Taiwan’s late 1980s 
reform push. Regarding foreign political pressure, the regulatory structure of the financial 
system in Taiwan was never the direct target of foreign complaints. In the late 1980s, the US 
did lobby the KMT government fiercely on the issue of trade and the NT dollar exchange rate. 
Against the background of the Plaza-Louve currency realignment (1985-1987) and the passage 
of Super 301 (1986), the US went to some length to improve access for American products in 
the RoC market.74 While we might have expected at least some concern with the character of 
Taiwan’s financial sector during this period (especially the foreign exchange system), political 
pressure from the US simply did not include a focus on Taiwan’s internal institutional 
arrangements. The state of the Taiwan’s financial sector became the ‘dog that didn’t bark’ in 
US-Taiwan economic relations.75 Regarding foreign policy pressure, the RoC financial system 
was insufficiently linked to international markets to present the local finance authorities with 
any major threat of leakage. One commentator noted as late as 1995 that: ‘...Taiwan has 58 
foreign bank branches, compared to 138 in Hong Kong and 124 in Singapore. To date, Taiwan 
has less than five foreign securities firms and no majority owned fund management companies. 
Hong Kong and Singapore have about 40 each. All domestic banks together have less than 80 
branches abroad, while a single mainland [Chinese] bank boasts over 460 branches and offices 
in other countries.’76 In this context, the specter of Taiwan’s financial institutions running off to 
the Euromarkets was a remote possibility at best. All told, the foreign pressures model cannot 
provide a comprehensive explanation of the Taiwan case of financial opening.
3. Toward a new approach
The discussion above makes it abundantly clear that the established theories of financial 
liberalization can provide, at best, only partial explanations of RoC financial reform in the late 
1980s. We have seen that while there is at least some supportive evidence for each of the four 
theories -  a fact that indicates the previous section was not some hollow process of knocking 
down straw men -  none of the four theories can fully explain the detail and scope of the Taiwan 
case. For a parsimonious and complete explanation, we really need a new theory of financial 
policy change.
Taiwan’s bilateral trade surplus with the US. See also my Kui-ke Wu, ‘Foreign Policies: Foreign 
Insurance Companies in Taiwan’ in China Post (9 December 1996), p. 11.
74 Vincent C. Siew ‘Toward Liberalizing Trade and Improving Market Access’ in Economic Review [bi­
monthly magazine of the International Commercial Bank of China, Taipei, Republic of China] No.239 
(September-October 1987).
75 The reasons for this omission are not altogether clear. Perhaps the Americans had learnt from their bad 
experience in negotiating with the Japanese on similar matters. In that case, focusing on Japan’s domestic 
institutional arrangements had rendered the American position diffuse and incoherent -  with little 
concrete outcome. It is possible that with Taiwan, the US was trying to avoid making the same mistake 
twice. See: J. David Richardson, ‘US Trade Policy in the 1980s: Turns -  and Roads Not Taken’ in 
Martin S. Feldstein (ed.), Policy Change in the 1980s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
76 Christopher Ruhr, ‘Opportunity Cost: Can Taipei Build a Regional Financial Center Without 
Internationalizing the NT Dollar?’ in Topics [monthly magazine of the American Institute in Taiwan] 
(April 1995), p. 12.
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But where to look for u new approach? As a starting point, we should revisit our dependent 
variable. On a general level, the changes in Taiwan’s financial regulations and economic 
behavior that signified the reform moves of the late 1980s constitute a uniform shift from a very 
closed financial environment to quite an open one. We saw in section one of this chapter that in 
broad terms, change was comprehensive, enduring and above all real. However, if we examine 
more closely the three main waves of financial liberalization in Taiwan, we find that there is 
substantial variation in the process of reform in each case. While the legal amendments 
occurred in a manner that suggests they were part of a singular process -  it will be remembered 
that the three new laws were brought down successively in 1987, 1988 and 1989 -  this was far 
from what actually occurred. There were strong differences in the amount of time and attention 
dedicated to shaping new policies for banking, securities and the forex system Securities 
liberalization covered a total period of more than a decade, starting in 1980 when the KMT 
regime first experimented with margin financing on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. The road to 
February 1988 and the passage of the amended SEL was slow and methodical, and involved a 
series of contingent reform ‘experiments’ along the way. After the initial implementation of the 
amended SEL, consolidation of the new framework seemed to drag on forever: there were many
78loose ends and the project remained unfinished as late as 1992.
The pattern of forex reform couldn’t be more different. The entire process of foreign 
exchange liberalization occurred in the space of just three years or so, starting in early to mid 
1986 with the decision to open up the current account. The introduction of the amended SAFE 
in July 1987 was the culmination of a breakneck process of preparation, and the final product of 
reform was a surprise to major stakeholders and the general public. The reform process was 
assiduously concluded in mid 1989 with the introduction of a series of new forex institutions -  
most notably a genuine float of the NT dollar. Finally, the banking reform episode has points of 
contrast with both securities and foreign exchange liberalization. The agenda for bank 
liberalization got off the ground in early to mid 1985 after the infamous 10th Credit Cooperative 
scandal, and underwent a period of slow development until the middle of 1988. It then 
experienced a stage of intensive policy work before the amended National Bank Law was 
finally passed in July 1989. Reform consolidation dragged on into the 1990s, but was more or
77 With this slight shift in focus I am asking the reader to temporarily consider the question of how 
financial policy changed in Taiwan rather than why. I do this on the premise that questions regarding 
policy process both precede and preempt questions pertaining to the cause of policy transformation. That 
is to say, answering how a policy changes will put you on the right track to understanding the reason for 
such change. This view is broadly consistent with discussion on the theory of scientific inquiry in applied 
philosophy. See e.g.: Charles B. Cross, ‘Explanation and the Theory of Questions’ in Erkenntnis Vol. 34, 
No.2 (March 1991). I am grateful to Darshan Vigneswaran for walking me through the issues involved in 
distinguishing how versus why questions.
78 The overviews presented here are summaries of part one of chapters 3, 4 and 5 of the thesis -  the case 
study chapters. More in-depth information on the process (as opposed to outcome) of forex, securities 
and banking reform is included in these sections. Some preliminary detail can also be found in: Liu, 
‘Brave New World of Financial Reform in Taiwan, the Republic of China,’ fn. 1. See also various 
chapters in: Mitchell A. Silk (ed.), Taiwan Trade and Investment Law (Hong Kong: Oxford University 
Press, 1994).
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less complete with the granting of new bank licenses in late 1991 and the passage of follow-up 
legislation in early 1992.
TABLE 1.3 Process of Taiwan’s 3 waves of financial reform, through the late 1980s
Policy Area Time period Pattern of Development
Securities 1980 to 1992 and 
beyond.
Pattern is slow and methodical, and involves 
contingent reform experiments; concludes with a 
number of loose ends.
Forex Mid 1986 to mid 
1989.
Pattern of policy development is frenetic but 
involves few loose ends; new policy framework 
surprises an unsuspecting public.
Banking Mid 1985 to early 
1992.
Originally pattern of development is slow until mid 
1988 when the process gathers pace; largely 
concluded with new banks in 1991-92.
Sources: Various (see first sections of chapters 3 to 5 for details), but some introductory detail included 
in: Lawrence S. Liu, ‘Brave New World of Financial Reform in Taiwan, the Republic of China - Three 
Waves of Internationalization and Liberalization and Beyond’ in Chinese Yearbook o f International Law 
and Affairs Vol. 8 (1988-89). See also various chapters in: Mitchell A. Silk (ed.), Taiwan Trade and 
Investment Law (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994).
This variance across the three waves of financial reform in Taiwan raises a series of 
intriguing comparative questions. Why did securities emerge as the first site of policy renewal, 
while the move to reform forex had to wait another six to seven years? Why was securities 
policy development so gradual and incremental, while development of the new foreign 
exchange law was rushed and decisive? Why did the process of banking reform start-off in a 
lackluster manner, but pick up pace later in the day? More generally, why does bank opening 
appear to be a ‘cross’ between the securities and forex reform episodes? Are the three waves of 
liberalization variations on a theme or totally separate events? And so on.
The variance between the three main waves of financial reform in Taiwan demands an 
explanation that is sophisticated and inclusive (yet still parsimonious). In the introduction of the 
thesis I proposed that in order to make any sense of financial opening in Taiwan during the late 
1980s, we really need to study the leadership practices of technocrats within the KMT regime. 
Many readers, however, will see this proposition as the conceptual equivalent of looking for a 
needle in a haystack. Just what does ‘leadership’ mean? With the important exception of 
‘democracy,’ the notion of leadership is one of the most hotly disputed concepts in the social 
sciences. It has been variously described as a physical trait, a psychological quality, a style of 
dominance, a feature of organizational dynamics, a process of role differentiation, a function of
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different kinds of political regimes, and my personal favorite, the opposite of ‘follower.’79 Even 
more concerning than the cacophony of definitions is the apparent lack of accumulative 
progress in any of the sub-fields engaged in studying the leadership phenomena. As one writer 
has lamented, ‘the empirical regularities are neither robust nor compelling....’80 Most case 
study material on leadership has almost nothing in common with other work in the same 
disciplinary area. Each new project is a discreet story with little relevance beyond its own 
descriptive boundaries.
Despite this conceptual imprecision and lack of continuity, most understandings of 
leadership can be placed into one of two categories: those conceptions which characterize 
leadership as some kind of utility maximizing practice within a given (institutional) framework, 
and those which associate it with a level of entrepreneurial endeavor that is not reducible to 
structural constraints. While the former understanding is generally believed to produce more 
readily testable propositions, the latter conception more readily encompasses those practices of 
idea generation, creative effort, teamwork and opportunism that we typically associate with 
leadership.81 The problem for the latter term, of course, is using it to produce testable 
hypotheses that clearly delineate where agency is extant -  how can we know where structural 
constraints end and entrepreneurial activities begin? This difficulty seems to be especially 
intractable for two interrelated reasons. First, the notion of leadership is typically associated 
with one or more outstanding or pre-eminent individuals rather than a team or group of people. 
This presupposes that agency can only be tied to single persons, when in fact it is quite 
conceivable that like-minded people could be jointly engaged in an entrepreneurial project. 
Second, in designating particular individuals as leaders, analysts tend to work backwards to see 
how these people came to be given the title in the first place. This kind of thinking is self- 
fulfilling and probably even tautological. Why not identify a group of ‘could-be’ leaders and 
see how they perform under conditions in which we might expect them to be entrepreneurial?
In the case of Taiwan financial liberalization, the group I would select as potential leaders 
are the senior policy technocrats of the RoC economic ministries. There is sound precedent in
79 For a somewhat light-hearted review, see: Aaron Wildavsky, ‘A Cultural Theory of Leadership’ in 
Bryan D. Jones (ed.), Leadership and Politics: New Perspectives in Political Science (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University of Kansas Press, 1989).
80 Morris P. Fiorina and Kenneth A. Shepsle, ‘Formal Theories of Leadership: Agents, Agenda Setters 
and Entrepreneurs’ in Bryan D. Jones (ed.), Leadership and Politics: New Perspectives in Political 
Science (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1989), p. 17.
81 The former position has a natural constituency among strict adherents of rational choice theory. See, 
for example: Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); 
Charles Jones, ‘An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives’ in Journal of 
Politics Vol. 30 (1968); Randall Calvert, ‘Reputation and Legislative Leadership’ in Public Choice Vol. 
55 (1987); and Kenneth Shepsle and Brian Humes, ‘Legislative Leadership: Organizational Entrepreneurs 
as Agents’ paper presented at the Stanford Conference of Adaptive Institutions, Palo Alto (1984). The 
latter position has a mixed heritage. See e.g.: Jameson W. Doig and Erwin C. Hargrove (eds.), 
Leadership and Innovation (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987); William H. Riker, The Art 
of Political Manipulation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Michael D. Cohen and James G. 
March, Leadership and Ambiguity, 2nd ed. (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1986); and Norman
- 32 -
Chapter I Crafting Markets in Taiwan
the political economy literature on policy reform and the sociological literature on expertise for 
selecting this group.82 Further, anecdotal evidence from interviews in Taiwan suggests that 
practically as well as formally, the buck probably stops with these people. But what do we 
mean by a ‘technocrat’? The most common conception of the policy technocrat is a state 
official who uses their claim to knowledge in some specialist area, or their ability to perform 
some specified function, to affirm their right to public office.84 Beyond this minimalist 
definition, we can say that technocrats tend to place an emphasis on efficiency, meritocracy and 
the superiority of scientific rationality in policy making. This implies a rejection of the give and 
take of politics. Technocrats are likely to exhibit several shared values: prioritization of 
economic growth over other social ends, an acceptance of the need for political order, and a 
belief in the inevitability of social hierarchy. They are also likely to exhibit a similar 
intellectual pedigree: advanced university training, an in-depth understanding of (and probably 
direct experience of) policy-making in the advanced industrial countries of Europe and North 
America, and a fluency in internationalist discourses over nationalist ones.
So under what conditions would we expect technocrats to exhibit entrepreneurial patterns of 
behavior (i.e. ‘leadership’ on policy)? To answer this question, I propose that we take on board 
some of the findings of the literature on political parties and economic policy (hereafter ‘the 
party/policy literature’ -  with apologies to exponents and the English language).85 The 
party/policy literature has two major strands. The first of these includes the work of David 
Cameron, Douglas Hibbs, and R. Michael Alvarez et.al. Focusing primarily on a number of 
Western countries, these writers argue that economic policy choices are ultimately dependent on 
whether or not political parties of the Left or Right get into power. They present evidence 
confirming that Left-wing parties in government tend to increase public spending to reduce
Fröhlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer and Oran R. Young, Political Leadership and Collective Goods (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971).
82 For the former, see in particular: John Williamson (ed.), The Political Economy of Policy Reform 
(Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1994); and Miguel A. Centeno and Patricio Silva 
(eds.), The Politics of Expertise in Latin America (London: Macmillan Press, 1998). For the latter, see: 
Jean Meynaud (trans. P. Barnes), Technocracy (London: Faber and Faber, 1968); and Frank Fischer, 
Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990). Much of this 
literature seems to owe an intellectual debt to earlier work by Putnam and others on elites. See esp.: 
Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1976), chp. 1.
83 Popular opinion in Taiwan certainly gives the senior economic technocrats a large role to play in policy 
choice. Interviews in Taipei, 1996 and 1999.
84 Definition and following comments from: Miguel A. Centeno and Particio Silva, ‘The Politics of 
Expertise in Latin America: Introduction’ in Miguel A. Centeno and Patricio Silva (eds.), The Politics of 
Expertise in Latin America (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), chp. 1.
85 There are recent precedents for augmenting the work on leadership with insights from the party/policy 
literature. See esp.: Kaare Strom and Wolfgang C. Muller, ‘Political Parties and Hard Choices’ in 
Wolfgang C. Muller and Kaare Strom (eds.), Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western 
Europe Make Hard Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Kaare Strom, ‘Party 
Leadership in Theory and in Norway’ in Kay Lawson (ed.), How Political Parties Work: Perspectives 
from Within (Westport: Praeger, 1994).
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unemployment, while Right-wing parties tend to restrict public spending to rein-in inflation.*6 
Hans-Dieter Klingeman et.al. extend this analysis with the claim that the election platforms of 
parties on the Left and Right accurately predict post-election policy choices and economic 
outcomes.*7 The second strand of the party/policy literature includes some of the recent work 
on late development by writers such as Cheng Tun-jen, Stephan Haggard and Gregory Noble.*8 
In general, these authors suggest that there is a strong casual relationship between market 
structure and development strategies in late developing countries and the organization and 
ideology of attendant ruling parties. Variations in market structure and development strategy 
will be largely explicable in terms of party political differences. So in Japan, for example, rule 
by the fragmented Liberal Democratic Party favored the ascendancy of a strong Weberian 
bureaucracy and large, vertically integrated industry groupings (i.e. the Keiretsu). In Taiwan, 
by contrast, the undisputed hegemony of the KMT and the ruling party’s ideological disdain for 
big business favored the development of an economy largely composed of small to medium 
sized enterprises (zhongxiao qiye).89
The real contribution of this literature is that it confirms that political parties matter in the 
economic policy choices governments make. But what specific conceptual implications does 
this work hold for our notion of the would-be entrepreneurial technocrat? A series of 
propositions follow from bringing together the concept of technocrat leadership with the 
findings of the party/policy literature. For our purposes, two of the most interesting ones 
concern when and how technocrats can be expected to engage in leadership on policy questions. 
First, we would expect that reformulation of, or threats to, a governing political party’s social 
support base will generate opportunities for entrepreneurial technocrats to initiate policy change. 
Continuity in social support, by contrast, will restrict entrepreneurial activities. This broad 
proposition has antecedents in the earlier work of Lipset and others who argue that changes in
86 See: David R. Cameron, ‘The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis’ in 
American Political Science Review Vol. 72, No. 4 (December 1978); Douglas Hibbs Jr., ‘Political Parties 
and Macroeconomic Policy’ in American Political Science Review Vol. 71, No. 4 (December 1977); and 
R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, ‘Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, 
and Macroeconomic Performance’ in American Political Science Review Vol. 85, No. 2 (June 1991). 
Most recently, a number of scholars have been examining the impact of party politics on economic 
reform. See e.g.: Javier Corrales, ‘Presidents, Ruling Parties and Party Rules’ in Comparative Politics 
Vol. 32, No. 2 (January 2000).
87 Hans-Dieter Klingeman, Richard I. Hofferbert, Ian Budge, et al., Parties, Policies and Democracy 
(Boulder Col.: Westview Press, 1994).
88 See for example: Tun-jen Cheng, ‘Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and 
Taiwan’ in Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman (eds.), Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of 
Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1990); Stephan Haggard and Tun-jen Cheng, ‘State and Foreign Capital in the East Asian NICs’ in 
Frederic C. Deyo (ed.), The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1987); Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, ‘The Political Economy of Financial 
Internationalization in the Developing World’ in International Organization Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 
1996); Stephan Haggard and Gregory W. Noble, ‘Power Politics: Democracy and Electricity in Taiwan,’ 
Working Papers in Taiwan Studies [published under the sponsorship of the APSA Conference Group on 
Taiwan Studies] No. 20 (1996); and Gregory W. Noble, Collective Action in East Asia: How Ruling 
Parties Shape Industrial Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
89 The nexus of Noble’s argument in Collective Action in East Asia, fn. 88.
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the ideology, strategy or organization of a political party are tied to shifts in the socio-economic 
environment.'10 Second, we would expect that failure of established policy to deliver outcomes 
in accord with a governing political party’s strategic goals will also create opportunities for 
entrepreneurial technocrats to revise policy settings. Where such incongruence between party 
goals and policy outcomes is not apparent, however, we would anticipate limited entrepreneurial 
behavior. This narrower proposition, with its emphasis on perceived policy failure as a 
precursor of change, is reminiscent of the historical work of Hall and others on the rise and fall 
of Keynesian economics.91 Together, these two simple propositions can be best understood as 
party political ‘windows of opportunity’ -  political portholes through which entrepreneurial 
technocrats and their ideas for policy change can pass.92 For want of better titles, we can refer 
to them respectively as the socio-political window and the sectoral-strategy window. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it will be assumed that these two windows represent the totality of 
opportunities for policy change facing technocrats. It will also be assumed that they are 
sufficiently rare as to open just once each in the short term, and are accumulative in their effect 
-  i.e. the potential for technocrat leadership is greatest with both windows open.
So what predictions about any single case of financial reform can be derived from the 
various theoretical tenets and observations given above? Can we distill a unified theory of 
technocrat leadership that speaks both to the general phenomena of financial reform in Taiwan 
during the late 1980s, and to the alternative patterns of change within the various subsectors of 
RoC finance? In essence, the theoretical points outlined in the preceding paragraphs lead us to 
two contingent hypotheses. First, a theory of technocrat leadership predicts that in any given 
episode of financial opening we will be able to distinguish the presence of a core group of 
technocrats with an ex ante or independent plan for financial reform Further, with the 
emergence of a window of opportunity within the governing political party, we will observe this
90 See for example: Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (London: Heinemann, 
1960); and Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross- 
National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967), various chapters.
91 Peter Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in 
Britain’ in Comparative Politics Vol. 25, No. 3 (April 1993); G. John Ikenbury, ‘Creating Yesterday’s 
New World Order: Keynesian “New Thinking” and the Anglo-American Post-war Settlement’ in Judith 
Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political 
Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Peter Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic 
Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), various chapters.
92 The concept of the window of opportunity owes much to the work of Jeff Checkel on ideas and foreign 
policy change. See: Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian 
Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), esp. chp. 1. While I 
am strongly attracted to Checkel’s appeal for the reintroduction of agency into questions of policy 
change, I part company with his focus on individual ‘policy entrepreneurs.’ At least in the Taiwan 
context, concentrating on individual ‘leaders’ as opposed to groups of activists leads to a dead end (I tried 
it...). This may be culturally related, although I find it difficult to believe that groups of technocrats do 
not behave in a concerted and entrepreneurial manner in a cross-section of other countries. In some of his 
later work, Checkle engages with broader debates on normative change and idea generation in 
international politics. See e.g.: Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging 
the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide’ in European Journal of International Relations Vol. 3, No. 4 
(1997). After Checkel, in this thesis ideas are regarded as an attribute of particular agents rather than
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group ‘seize the day’ and attempt to implement their plan for policy change. Second, behind a 
full cycle of financial reform we should be able to observe the successive emergence of both 
party political windows of opportunity (i.e. the socio-political window and sectoral-strategy 
window). Further, the temporal distribution of these two windows will influence the way 
technocrats pursue reform objectives: a wide distribution of windows will mean reform efforts 
are slow and incremental, while a narrow distribution will mean reform is fast and decisive.
A cursory review of the Taiwan reform experience suggests that our theory of technocrat 
leadership is probably on the right track.93 The key to this conclusion -  as implied in our 
examination of the processes of RoC financial reform above -  lies in seeing the Taiwan case of 
liberalization as three distinct episodes conducted under the leadership of three factions or sub­
groups within the technocracy. Although the senior policy technocrats of the RoC economic 
ministries were united in being more liberal in their outlook on policy matters than the final 
arbiter of state authority in Taiwan -  i.e. the ruling KMT -  there were divergences within the 
group which implied a differentiated role in financial opening. The slow process of securities 
reform owed much to the work of the so-called ‘development technocrats,’ especially 
technology guru Li Kwoh-ting.94 This group was motivated by a belief that technological 
upgrading in Taiwan was strongly dependent on the development of more mature capital 
markets on the island. The development technocrats were able to launch their policy agenda in 
the early 1980s as the KMT came to see securities reform as an efficient means of co-opting 
support among the growing urban middle class (socio-political window opens). Securities 
reform peaked and then gradually consolidated after 1987 because the uncontrollable growth 
and emerging complexity of the local securities sector at that time was unacceptable to the 
ruling party (sectoral-strategy window opens). The long lead time between these two windows 
of opportunity meant that the development technocrats were obliged to make securities 
liberalization a gradual and methodical process.
The speedy pattern of forex reform was tied to the ideas and effort of the ‘finance 
technocrats’ -  a small circle of officials loyal to finance expert and long-term policy practitioner 
Yu Kuo-hwa.95 Yu and his cohort were driven by a firm conviction that the established forex 
system had outlived its original purpose. Early into 1986, the finance technocrats’ reform 
agenda was assured the attention of the KMT as it became an effective means of shoring up
free-floating proposals waiting for adoption (a.k.a. the ‘garbage can model’). We return to some of the 
thorny debates surrounding ideas and policy/political change in the conclusion.
93 Information included below is a summary of data from sections two, three and four in chapters 3 to 5 of 
the thesis.
94 The development technocrats were a latter-day version of the ‘industrializing reformers’ -  a group that 
had been influential during the shift to export industrialization in the early 1960s. The leading light of 
this earlier group was K.Y. Yin, generally acknowledged as the architect of Taiwan’s economic miracle. 
See: Stephan Haggard and Chien-kuo Pang, ‘The Transition to Export-Led Growth in Taiwan’ in Joel D. 
Aberbach, David Dollar and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (eds.), The Role of the State in Taiwan ’s Development 
(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 68-69.
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party support among Taiwan’s ailing small to medium sized enterprises (socio-political window 
opens). Within the space o f a year, the technocrats’ reform program received full backing from 
the ruling party because the established foreign exchange system was beginning to threaten the 
KM T’s priorities for monetary policy (sectoral-strategy window opens). The negligible period 
of time between these two windows meant that the finance technocrats were able to make 
foreign exchange liberalization an expeditious course o f action.
Finally, the middling process of bank liberalization was closely associated with the so- 
called ‘young reformers,’ an emergent group of younger technocrats that included the likes of 
Shirley Kuo and Wang Chien-shien.96 The young reformers were motivated by two related 
factors: a belief that the local banking sector was grossly inefficient and uncompetitive, and a 
vision that Taiwan’s financial system could one day compete as a regional or global financial 
center. From early 1985, the young reformers commenced their campaign for bank reform as 
the KMT reeled from the effects of the 10lh Credit Cooperative scandal (sectoral-strategy 
window opens). They were given full reign to implement their plans after mid 1988 because the 
KMT saw bank reform as a way of sidetracking or diffusing the influence of the newly assertive 
guanxi qiye (socio-political window opens). The median period of time between these two 
windows meant that the young reformers crafted a style of bank reform that had features of both 
the securities and forex episodes (i.e. neither incremental nor rapid but somewhere in between 
these two extremes).
4. A brief note on evidence
Of course, the brief review of the evidence considered above raises just as many questions as it 
answers. What were the KMT’s original goals for financial policy? As an authoritarian regime, 
what was the nature of the ruling party’s social support base? What was the basic character of 
the relationship between the technocrats and the KMT? How can we actually ‘observe’ the 
motives for technocrat leadership? Is it possible to predict ex ante when and where the KMT 
windows of opportunity might open? And finally, to rephrase the question posed above, how 
can we know for sure where KMT political structures end and technocrat agency begins?
Before moving on to answer these questions and others, a few notes on methodology are 
called for. While it is not my intention herein to engage in a wide-ranging discussion on 
epistemological issues,97 it is important to lay some preliminary ground rules for what will count
95 Indeed, the key role of Yu among the finance technocrats occasionally led to them being referred to as 
the Yu Faction or Yu Xi. See: Jun Wang, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [A Master of 
Finance: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Career and Travels] (Taipei: Sunbright Publishing Company, 1999), p. 248.
96 Also known as the NTU Gang (i.e. National Taiwan University) or Taida Bang. See: Cong-rong Li, 
‘Guojia yu Jinrong Ziben: Weiquan Shicong Zhuyi xia Guomindang Zhengquan Yinhang Zhengce de 
Xingcheng yu Zhuanxing’ [The State and Financial Capital: KMT Bank Policy Form and Development 
under Authoritarian Rule] unpublished Masters manuscript, Department of Sociology, Tunghai 
University, Taiwan (1994), p. 108.
97 With apologies to those interested in the philosophy of the social sciences. This is not to say that I am 
unconcerned with such matters. For want of more in-depth reading, my own approach to research has
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us evidence in this thesis. Generally speaking, I will use three different kinds of evidence, the 
first two of which are relatively uncontroversial, and the last of which is a topic of hot debate in 
the social sciences. To begin with, for evidence on the character, ideas and subjective motives 
of the technocrats, I make strong use of secondary and primary-source biographical material. 
Focusing on biographical material is an established tradition in political science, and some of 
the most insightful analyses of leadership have been biographical case studies. While many of 
these works overemphasize the role of the individual in creating history, insofar as they bring 
the analyst close to the subject matter of decision-making, they make a crucial contribution to 
the discipline.98 The measure of proof in this body of work generally echoes the rules of 
historiography: if an event, decision or proposal can be substantiated with reference to at least 
two sources, or can be shown to correlate with parallel historical facts, then it may be accepted 
as true. Some of the biographical material referred to in this thesis is fairly simple resume-type 
information garnered from Who’s Who reference texts, while elsewhere I make use of interview 
data and articles from the popular press (including local newspapers and magazines in Taiwan). 
Many of the technocrats who are the subject of this thesis have themselves written academic 
articles or books, and there are also a small number of biographies covering the life histories of 
several key technocrats.
Second, for evidence on the political economy of the KMT and the emergence of the 
windows of opportunity, I rely chiefly on a cross-section of materials garnered from mainstream 
political science and economics. This work is united in the priority given to broad social, 
economic or political forces over purposive action. The founding fathers of this systemic 
literature include the likes of Alfred Marshall (for economics), Robert Michels (for political 
science) and Joseph Schumpeter (for both disciplines).99 In and of itself, much of this work 
does not inspire us with ‘gripping tales of derring-do,’ although I intend to demonstrate that it 
can and should be incorporated into our analysis in interesting ways. The standard of proof in 
this literature is simple enough: if variation in a structure, institution or tendency is readily 
observable and may be shown to be statistically or comparatively significant, then it may be 
admitted as evidence. Much of the social science material used in this thesis is acquired from 
the healthy stock of works on Taiwan’s political and economic development (both English and 
Chinese). Where appropriate, I have supplemented this material with interview and media data.
been strongly informed by some of the early historical sociology of writers like C. Wright Mills. See 
esp.: C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).
98 I’m thinking here of works such as: Robert A. Caro, The Path to Power (New York: Knopf, 1982), 
which focuses on the rise to office of Lyndon Johnson; and Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New 
York: Free Press, 1961), a study of the controversial Mayor of Chicago Richard Daley.
99 The classic texts include: Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics: An Introductory Volume, 8th ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1927); Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchial 
Tendencies of Modern Democracy (Glencoe: Free Press, 1915); Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1943); and Joseph A. Schumpeter (R. Aris 
trans.), Economic Doctrine and Method: An Historical Sketch (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954).
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Further, the RoC government publishes a plethora of statistical reference texts; I have made full 
use of these publications.
And finally, for evidence on the association between technocrat leadership and the KMT 
windows of opportunity, I make use of a mix of ‘soff or speculative evidence that in part relies 
on counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactuals are ‘what if  experiments conducted by 
researchers to assess the extent to which specified outcomes are fixed or unavoidable. They are 
usually performed in the face of conflicting or insufficient evidence, and can include a broad 
range of speculative tests: from the eminently plausible ( Would the First World War have 
occurred if Archduke Ferdinand had returned safely from Sarajevo?) to those which verge on 
the incredible (Would the Cuban missile crisis have ended in a Soviet backdown if there had 
been no nuclear weapons?). In the last decade or so a resurgence of interest in counterfactuals 
has lead to increasing refinement in their use, and a gradual increase in their respectability 
among social scientists.100 The measure of proof when using counterfactual evidence is tied to 
the extent to which it may be deemed reasonable or logical: if a counterfactual story is 
unambiguous, internally and analytically consistent, entails a minimal rewrite of history and 
allows for unanticipated or contingent outcomes, then we may accept its conclusions as 
accurate. In this thesis, the counterfactual evidence I will be using is largely negative and ad 
hoc. That is, to strengthen my interpretation of events, I will couch alternative counterfactual 
explanations with a view to dismissing them -  of course, if they cannot be dismissed, then my 
interpretation must be flawed. They will be ad hoc in the sense that they will be derived on a 
case-by-case basis and not intentionally linked to any particular theoretical approach. The use 
of counterfactual evidence in this thesis will be sparse -  an adjunct to the conventional data 
considered above. In this context, I see the application of counterfactual reasoning as an 
extension of factual reasoning; neither a replacement to be given analytical priority, nor an 
inferior version of the truth.
Conclusion
In the last years of the 1980s, the conduct of financial policy in Taiwan underwent a dramatic 
shift toward a more open, market oriented approach. In the years prior to the late 1980s, all 
three key areas of financial policy -  i.e. the foreign exchange system, securities and banking -  
were subject to harsh repression. The forex system virtually precluded the export of capital, the 
securities sector was rendered a sideline to the investment decisions of most firms, and banking 
regulations enforced a strict government monopoly on financial intermediation. By the early to 
mid 1990s, however, the situation had changed radically. Foreign capital remittances were an
100 Various points and comments from: James D. Fearon, ‘Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in 
Political Science’ in World Politics Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991); Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin 
(eds.), Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and 
Psychological Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); and Richard Ned Lebow, 
‘What’s So Different About a Counterfactual?’ paper prepared for the 2000 annual meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park (August-September, 2000).
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option for all RoC citizens, there were more than a dozen new private banks operating alongside 
the old state-owned banks, and local securities markets were fast becoming a serious vehicle for 
raising corporate capital. This experience of financial opening implied a fundamental 
turnaround in the KMT regime’s approach to financial policy -  an approach that as late as 1986 
seemed unshakable. Why, come 1987, did the government begin to change its mind? Why did 
the KMT decide that from 1987 on, the state would gradually begin to release its vice-like grip 
on one of the most important areas of economic management?
The literature on financial liberalization provides us with a number of plausible answers to 
these questions. The four major theoretical approaches within this body of work -  the market- 
driven approach, statist analysis, pluralism, and the foreign pressures model -  all provide at 
least some insight into the Taiwan case of financial opening. But despite the prima facie 
relevance of these models, it is apparent that none of them stand-up under close scrutiny. 
Further, a cursory review of the process of financial reform in Taiwan reveals that policy change 
in the late 1980s was infinitely more complex than the overall regulatory shift indicates -  a fact 
that demands a fresh and theoretically sophisticated approach to solving the original puzzle. For 
a comprehensive and parsimonious explanation of events, I have proposed that we adopt an 
approach based on the notion of ‘technocrat leadership.’ The theory of technocrat leadership 
holds that financial reform is a function of the leadership practices and party political 
opportunities of policy technocrats. Toward the end of the chapter, we saw some preliminary 
evidence suggesting that technocrat leadership was an important factor in Taiwan’s reform 
process. The task before us now is to conduct a rigorous review of the three major episodes of 
financial opening. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of the thesis are dedicated to this undertaking.
Our immediate task, however, is somewhat more mundane. Before we can go on to talk 
about entrepreneurial projects and opportunities, we need to have more detail about the people 
and the party concerned. Just who were these mysterious policy technocrats mentioned above? 
And what of the political party to which they owed their allegiance, the KMT? As yet, we still 
know very little about these elements of reform. In the next chapter of the thesis we will take a 
first look at these elements with a view to laying the ground for analysis in subsequent chapters. 
We will also review the broad process of policy change under the KMT regime -  a process that 
turns out to be a lot more complicated than the often-used title ‘authoritarian’ would seem to 
suggest.
***000***
Chapter 2
-Chapter 2- 
The elements of reform
Crafting Markets in Taiwan
Introduction
In chapter 1 we saw how Taiwan’s experience of financial liberalization in the late 1980s 
resulted in a radical transformation of the local financial system. The three main waves of legal 
amendment -  that is, liberalization of the foreign exchange system, the securities sector and 
banking -  heralded a plethora of new regulatory initiatives. Change was comprehensive, 
enduring and above all real. We also saw in chapter 1 that none of the established theories of 
financial liberalization forwarded in the contemporary political economy literature offer 
satisfactory explanations of the Taiwan reform experience. While the market-driven approach, 
statist analysis, pluralism and the foreign pressures model offer plausible accounts, they fall far 
short of a comprehensive explanation of the Taiwan case. Having made this argument, toward 
the end of chapter 1 I proposed that the focus of our research question should be slightly 
modified -  from financial policy change per se, to the process of policy change -  and a new 
theoretical approach adopted. As an alternative to the established theories of financial 
liberalization, I tentatively forwarded a new theory of technocrat leadership. This theory 
implies that Taiwan’s reform effort was a function of the ideas and efforts of local economic 
technocrats, and the party political constraints and opportunities they faced within the ruling 
KMT.
But before we commence with the task of examining case studies, we are obliged to cover 
some descriptive material. This chapter is dedicated to providing an overview of the basic ‘nuts 
and bolts’ information that underpins analysis in subsequent chapters of the thesis. Most of the 
content is relatively uncontroversial, although I rely strongly on interview material for 
significant portions of it. Our principal task is to clearly detail the independent variables in the 
Taiwan reform story. The theory of technocrat leadership outlined in chapter 1 suggests two 
such variables: the economic technocrats of the RoC state as the primary agent1 of change, and 
the KMT regime as a crucial intervening variable. While we have already referred to both 
entities extensively in the introduction and chapter 1 of the thesis, our knowledge of either is 
still limited. Just who were the economic technocrats that presided over Taiwan’s various 
episodes of financial liberalization? How did this group link up to the ruling party’s structure of 
command? What was the ideology, organization and composition of the KMT? What was the
1 I use the terms ‘agent’ and ‘agency’ fairly loosely herein, nonetheless some brief definitional comments 
are probably warranted at the outset. By agents, I refer to social, political and economic actors (not 
exclusively individuals) that are distinguished by their capacity to interpret events, and the power to 
choose among behavioral options. By agency, I refer to the attribute of being able to interpret events and 
choose among options. See: Gil Friedman and Harvey Starr, Agency, Structure and International 
Politics: From Ontology to Empirical Inquiry (London: Routledge, 1997), chp. 1-2. While I appreciate 
the theoretical debates surrounding the use of these terms, the definitions used here are forwarded merely 
as a preliminary guide for discussion, and are not intended to contribute to any semantic disputes in the 
literature.
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nature of the ruling party’s brand of authoritarian rule, and how did it change over time? 
Finally, how did these two elements of the reform story relate to the old financial system, and 
what were their policy preferences (and were these preferences distinct)? In this chapter we will 
attempt to answer these background questions with a view to laying the groundwork for inquiry 
in later chapters. We begin the discussion with a brief review of the institutional context of 
financial policy in the RoC state. This material is presented merely in order to clarify where 
financial policy reform took place in Taiwan -  i.e. the site or location of policy change. The 
substantive flesh on this organizational skeleton is presented in sections two and three of the 
chapter, respectively entitled ‘The KMT regime’ and ‘The economic technocrats.’
1. The administrative machinery of financial policy in Taiwan
For most of the period of concern to us here (i.e. up to and just beyond the late 1980s), the RoC 
state was identifiable as the five-branch (yuan) and four tier structure of government 
administration stipulated by the RoC Constitution.2 The five branches of administration 
combined features of Western and imperial Chinese practice, and included: the Presidential 
Office and Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Control Yuan and the 
Examination Yuan. The four tiers of government included the central, provincial, county and 
special municipal (Taipei and Kaohsiung) governments. To the casual observer, all this may 
appear somewhat congested, a case of administrative overkill. Such an impression is quite 
appropriate: the RoC state on Taiwan was a system of government administration designed for a 
national polity the size of greater China. The events surrounding the KMT’s retreat to Formosa 
in the late 1940s, however, saw it compressed and applied to the island of Taiwan and a few 
small remnants of nearby Fujian province (including the islands of Matsu and Kinmen off the 
mainland coast).3 Generally speaking, policy development and implementation within this 
institutional structure was highly fragmented and often incoherent.4 Effective policy 
performance was usually dependent on autocratic direction from the center -  an attribute that 
prior to the democratization of Taiwanese politics, was partially supplied by martial law and the 
extra-constitutional edifice known as the ‘Temporary Provisions.’5
2 Which remained essentially unchanged from its promulgation in 1947 till 1991 when the National 
Assembly passed the first round of major constitutional reforms. See: Constitution of the Republic of 
China (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1992).
3 Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1989), chp. 5 & 6.
4 Milan Tung-wen Sun, ‘Public Administration in Taiwan: The State of the Art,’ unpublished Ph.D. 
manuscript, Kent State University, Ohio (1992). See also: Gregory W. Noble, Collective Action in East 
Asia: How Ruling Parties Shape Industry Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 38-40.
5 In full, the ‘Temporary Provisions During the Period of National Crisis under the Communist Rebellion’ 
(Dongyuan Kanluan Shiqi) -  the legal edifice of executive privileges that the government assumed to 
monopolize power between 1949 and the early 1990s. Among these privileges was a suspension of 
regular elections. The Temporary Provisions are to be distinguished from martial law (jieyan), which was 
the basis of the intelligence operations performed by the dreaded Taiwan Garrison Command and curbs 
on due process in the courts. Martial law was lifted in mid 1987.
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finance responsibility in the 
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Sources: Taiwan Zhinan [Directory of Taiwan] (Taipei: China News Publications, 1999); Republic 
of China Yearbook, 1996 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1996); Zhi-heng Yang, Yusuan 
Zhengzhixue de Gouzhu [Towards a Politics of Budgets] (Taipei: National Institute of Policy 
Research, 1991); and interviews in Taipei, 1996 and 1999.
Nowhere was this institutional imprecision more clearly demonstrated than with the 
administration of financial policy. Among those state authorities that were directly involved in 
the regulation of the RoC financial sector we can specify, as detailed in Diagram 2.1, nearly 20 
distinct government agencies. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate the role of some of 
the more obscure ones: the Examination Yuan, through its powers governing civil service 
recruitment and promotion, was responsible for personnel appointments in state-owned banks; 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications, through its responsibility for the Directorate 
General of Posts, was accountable for the Postal Savings System (with some 15-20% of total 
demand deposits by the late 1980s); County Governments, with mandates to assist local industry 
and to supervise community financial institutions, often directly dictated the portfolio decisions
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of credit cooperatives and credit departments of industry associations; and the various organs of 
the Taiwan Provincial Government directly owned and managed some of the most profitable 
banking institutions on the island, including the ‘Big 3 ’ commercial banks (i.e. Chung-Hwa, 
Hua Nan and First). Add to these state institutions a series of quasi-public sector agencies such 
as the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Taipei Dealer’s Association and the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange, and the list of official regulators soon becomes very long and diffuse indeed. 
In this context, policy change was often ‘messy’ and implied a large amount of coordination 
work.6
At the center of this institutional milieu, however, we can point to four key regulatory 
authorities: the Executive Yuan, the Central Bank of China, the Ministry of Finance and the 
Securities Exchange Commission. Historically speaking, each of these institutions had a major 
role to play in the liberalization of Taiwanese finance during the late 1980s, although their 
respective interests in the process varied greatly. The Executive Yuan (Xingzheng Yuan) 
consisted of the Premier, the Vice-premier, ministers, and chairs of government commissions 
and councils. Convening regularly as the ‘Executive Council’ or Cabinet, the Executive Yuan 
officially exercised the ultimate powers of government in Taiwan: the power of supervision and 
authorization of subordinate agencies; the power to draft legislation on all matters of importance 
to the government, including financial policy; and the right of approval over laws and directives 
passed by the legislature.7 In the heyday of authoritarian rule in Taiwan, however, the RoC 
President often assumed these various powers, and the Executive Yuan was restricted in what it 
could do independently. This observation should not be overstated. Policy areas requiring 
strong technocratic expertise -  e.g. finance -  were less subject to Presidential discretion than 
others. Regarding the Executive Yuan’s broad approach to policy making (i.e. its institutional 
character or ‘temperament’), the Executive Yuan tended to be no more than the sum of its parts. 
With some notable exceptions -  i.e. the Council for Economic Planning and Development - the 
concentration of research and policy review functions within the ministries meant that the 
Executive Yuan’s planning and development capabilities were actually quite limited.8
The Central Bank of China (Zhongguo Zhongyang Yinhang), originally established in 
Canton Province in 1928, was resurrected on Taiwan in the early 1960s. Its broad functions 
included: ‘to promote financial stability; to guide sound banking operations; to maintain the 
stability of the internal and external value of the currency; and to foster economic development 
within the scope of the preceding objectives.’9 The Bank’s specific policy responsibilities
6 Brian Wallace Semkow, Taiwan ’s Financial Markets and Institutions: The Legal and Financial Issues 
of Deregulation and Internationalization (Westport: Quorum Books, 1992), chp. 3; and Brian Wallace 
Semkow, Taiwan’s Capital Market Reform: The Financial and Legal Issues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), p. 23-30; and various interviews in Taipei with government officials, 1996 & 1999.
7 Brief Introduction to the Republic of China (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1993), chp. 3; and 
Republic of China Yearbook, 1996 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1996), p. 75-76.
8 Interview in Taipei with Mr. Lin Huan, Coordination and Service Officer for APROC Window, Council 
for Economic Development and Planning, Executive Yuan, 26 March 1999.
9 Central Bank of China Act (Taipei: Central Bank of China, 1979), art. 2, p. 1.
- 44 -
Chapter 2 Crafting Markets in Taiwan
included the usual assortment of central bank duties: currency issue, banker to other banks, 
implementation of monetary policy, management of national reserves, oversight of financial 
institutions and administration of the foreign exchange system.1(1 Strongly motivated by the 
belief that the KMT’s loss of the Chinese Civil War was tied to its appalling record of financial 
mismanagement on the mainland (more below), the government conferred on the Central Bank 
a level of institutional autonomy unparalleled anywhere else in the RoC state system While 
concerns were occasionally raised about the Bank’s lack of legal independence,* 11 in practice, 
external interests of a group-pluralistic or sectional nature were never allowed to compromise its 
integrity.12 This autonomy was coupled with an obdurate conservatism on all financial policy 
matters. At various points in the 1970s and 1980s, the Central Bank’s conservative outlook 
meant that it came into conflict with more progressive government agencies. Subterranean 
differences of opinion with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Council for Economic 
Planning and Development and the Ministry of Finance occasionally surfaced to remind 
observers just how seriously the Central Bank was about its self-proclaimed role as an ‘insurer’ 
of the Taiwan economy.13
If the Central Bank represented the conservative end of opinion on financial policy within 
the RoC state, the Securities Exchange Commission (Zhengquan Guanli Weiyuanhui) was the 
radical alternative. The Securities Commission was originally established in 1960 as an 
autonomous department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (and subsequently moved to the 
Ministry of Finance in 1982). Formally speaking, the Securities Commission counted among its 
administrative responsibilities: regulation of the local stock exchange; administration of the 
offering, issuance and trading of securities; supervision of all financial institutions participating 
in Taiwan’s securities markets; oversight of listed firms; co-ordination of securities financing 
activities; and drafting of securities regulations.14 Despite the impressive list of formal powers, 
the Securities Commission was a relatively weak organization when compared to the other key 
financial regulators. Its existence reflected a desire for administrative specialization by the
10 Details can be found in any CBC annual report. See for example: CBC Annual Report, 1995 (Taipei: 
Central Bank of China, 1995), chp. 12-14.
11 Notable here are economist S. C. Tsiang’s concerns regarding the transfer of the CBC’s formal line of 
authority from the President to the Executive Yuan in 1979. See: S.C. Tsiang, ‘Monetary Policy of 
Taiwan’ in Kwoh-Ting Li and Tzong-Shain Yu (eds.), Experiences and Lessons of Economic 
Development in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1982).
12 That is, the Central Bank maintained a very high level of what Sylvia Maxfield has called ‘defacto 
authority.’ Sylvia Maxfield, ‘Financial Incentives and Central Bank Authority in Industrializing Nations’ 
in World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July 1994).
13 As one academic in Taipei remarked in an interview: ‘The CBC saw itself as a national insurer of sorts 
which not only had economic priorities to take care of, but political goals to attend to as well. This placed 
the Bank in a unique position when compared to other central banks from either developed or developing 
countries.’ Interview in Taipei with Dr Ray B. Dawn, Director of Financial Research Division, Taiwan 
Institute of Economic Research, 19 June 1996
14 Available from any SEC annual report. See for example: SEC Annual Report, 1995 (Taipei: Securities 
Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, 1996), p. 8-9.
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government rather than a conscious attempt to maintain a distinct financial authority.15 While 
less influential than the other regulators, the Securities Commission was seen as one of the most 
progressive government agencies responsible for finance. At its inauguration in the early 1960s, 
it was charged with developing the securities sector in Taiwan, a task it pursued with a ‘pilot 
agency’ mentality and an organizational culture that stressed individual performance over 
bureaucratic conformity.16 As a result, by the early 1980s the Securities Commission and 
attendant agencies were often the organizations of career choice for aspiring finance personnel 
returning from a period of work and study abroad (an issue we return to below).17
And finally, the Ministry of Finance (Caizhengbu). The Ministry of Finance had a long 
heritage that dated back to the early years of the establishment of the RoC on the mainland. 
Soon after the KMT retreated to Taiwan in the late 1940s, the Ministry of Finance was 
resurrected to look after the central government's taxation and expenditure requirements, 
customs and tariff administration, and several matters related to the planning and administration 
of financial policy and oversight of financial institutions. To perform this wide spread of tasks, 
the Finance Ministry had four relatively independent departments (Monetary Affairs, Taxation, 
National Treasury and Customs) that individually and together commanded less status and 
authority in the administration of financial matters than the Central Bank. The autonomous 
structure of these various departments tended to leave the overall Ministry with a schizophrenic 
quality, and created strong incentives for interdepartmental competition (a.k.a. bureaucratic 
politics).18 This organizational disposition was strongly reflected in the way the Finance 
Ministry handled policy implementation. To a significant extent, slow progress on the reduction 
of import barriers in the mid 1980s reflected the Ministry’s inability to reconcile the general 
policy of tariff liberalization with the specific and divided claims of the Customs and Taxation 
Departments.19
As suggested above, the financial policy process within and between these various 
institutions was fragmented and often incoherent. The institutional imprecision of the RoC state 
and the vagaries of authoritarian rule on Taiwan make it difficult to comment with any certainty 
on the precise path of financial policy change. With this in mind, I rely on specific material in
15 Indicative of the SEC’s organizational weakness was the composition of its committee of directors: in 
addition to four or five positions drawn from within the SEC, it also maintained five ex-officio positions 
for representatives from the Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of 
Justice and Executive Yuan. SEC Annual Report, 1994 (Taipei: Securities Exchange Commission, 
Ministry of Finance, 1995), p. 7
16 Interview in Taipei with former Chair of the Securities Exchange Commission, Dr Gordon Chen, 20 
July 1999.
17 Some of these ‘returnees’ now hold many of the most important positions in Taiwan’s post-reform 
financial industry. See my newspaper interview with Benny Hu: Kui-ke Wu, ‘New Directions, Here and 
Abroad’ in China Post (11 November 1996), p. 11.
lx For details on the structure and operation of the MoF, see: Government Finance of the Republic of 
China (Taipei: Ministry of Finance, 1990), p. 1-3. In 1991, the number of departments within the Finance 
Ministry was increased from four to five with the addition of the Department of Insurance: Insurance 
Annual Report of the Republic of China, 1995 (Taipei: Department of Insurance, Ministry of Finance, 
1995), p. 31.
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the case study chapters to build up a map of the specific patterns involved. This being said, the 
financial policy process exhibited some measure of formal regularity that can be described up 
front. In the first instance, we know that initiatives for policy change emerged from the relevant 
financial regulators and were subsequently tendered to the Executive Yuan for approval 
(typically in the form of a proposal for a statute amendment, a budget change or a jurisdictional 
dispute).20 Decision-making within the Executive Yuan was always consensus oriented; policy 
debates or controversy were deliberately avoided and therefore very rare. If a finance policy 
issue before the Executive Yuan generated internal disagreement, then Cabinet would typically 
submit it to an executive council (e.g. the Council for Economic Planning and Development) for 
further consideration. In due course, the designated council would convene an ad hoc 
committee including all the relevant bureaucratic players (and occasionally those from outside 
government) to discuss the matter and come up with a compromise decision. The ad hoc 
committee was obliged to continue deliberations until a resolution acceptable to all participants 
was reached -  the Executive Yuan would not accept a split decision. Sometimes it took months 
or years to arrive at a final resolution.21 Once the committee reached a consensus, however, the 
decision was submitted to the Executive Yuan for immediate authorization. At this stage in the 
process, the Executive Yuan’s role was largely that of a rubber stamp.
Once Executive Yuan authorization was achieved, and an amendment to RoC financial law 
deemed necessary, draft legislation was submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review. After the 
first of three readings, the proposed law was often given over to an internal legislative 
committee that included all those lawmakers with a declared interest. Despite the limits implied 
by authoritarian rule on Taiwan, these meetings often degenerated into a political free-for-all. 
Legislative committees were permitted to discuss a wide range of matters, and frequently 
lawmakers raised concerns only distantly related to the draft law at hand. Sometimes the 
lawmakers behaved in this manner in order to extract personal benefit out of the proposed 
policy change; other times committee debate was used as a means to draw attention to some 
external issue. However, as the Legislative Yuan lacked its own internal research and 
administrative support staff, policy committee meetings were often expedited with the 
assistance of appointees from the Executive Yuan. This gave officials from the relevant 
regulatory agencies a chance to have direct input into the legislative process: in exchange for
19 Suggested in an interview with bank officers from Taishin International Bank, Taipei, 1 October 1996.
20 Most of the descriptive comment below is based on interview material. I am particularly indebted to an 
interview in Taipei with Mr Lin Huan, Coordination and Service Office for the APROC program, Council 
for Economic Development and Planning, Executive Yuan, 26 March 1999.
21 The political and strategic use of a decision-making process which relies on consensus is the matter of 
considerable debate in the literature. Most writers, however, point to the role of consensus as a 
conservative force in decision-making, and the manipulation of consensus to discredit dissent. There 
were certainly aspects of both motivations in the Taiwan policy process. We return to this issue at 
various points later in the study. For more on the theory and practice of consensus decision-making, see: 
Serge Moscovici and Willem Doise (W.D. Halls trans.), Conflict and Consensus: A General Theory of 
Collective Decisions (London: Sage Publications, 1994); and Seymour M. Lipset, Consensus and 
Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985).
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their material support, they were permitted speaking rights and the right of reply.22 Committee 
deliberations were concluded once a consensus decision (to support or reject the proposed 
legislation) was reached. Like the ad hoc committees of the Executive Yuan, sometimes this 
took an inordinate amount of time to achieve. But once again, with a consensus reached, the 
legislative committee’s decision was regarded as final. As soon as the legislation was returned 
to the tloor of the Legislative Yuan it would rarely evoke further debate. Second and third 
readings of the draft legislation usually followed in quick succession resulting in the statute’s 
ultimate passage into law.
From here, a new financial policy had only two more hurdles to navigate. Once the 
Executive Yuan received the new law it would consider any changes included by the Legislative 
Yuan. Under strongman rule, such changes were typically minimal and more than likely 
negative (i.e. involving the removal of statute clauses rather than additions). If the Executive 
Yuan was unsatisfied with the new law, it might be sent back to the legislature (up to three 
times), or left in abeyance (potentially forever). If on the other hand, the Executive Yuan was 
satisfied that the original intent and purpose of the law was intact, it could immediately pass the 
document on to the President. At this point in the process, the President’s duty was largely 
ceremonial. Within a short period of receiving the new law, the President would sign-off on the 
document and declare it effective (an act known as ‘promulgation’ -  gongbu or fabu). 
Promulgation opened the way for the new financial policy to be implemented. The agency 
originally responsible for initiating the policy change then proceeded to put the new law into 
effect.
2. The Kuomintang regime
While the comments above indicate where and to some degree how financial policy was devised 
and implemented on Taiwan, the question of why is obviously left wanting. To put political 
flesh on the bare bones of the regulatory framework described above, we have to look further 
afield. And in the first instance, that means examining the role and nature of the KMT regime.23
22 With the transition to democracy in Taiwan, the ad hoc legislative committees have been formalized as 
the Party Conciliation Committee (Zhengdang Xieshang Weiyuanhui). This standing committee of the 
Legislative Yuan includes representatives from each of the major political parties, with the committee 
chair chosen on a rotating basis. Most of the points raised here for the informal legislative committees are 
also valid for the new standing committee, although the salience of interest-based politics in the new 
forum, predictably enough, has increased. There is little secondary literature on Taiwan’s Legislative 
Yuan committees, either contemporary or historical, in English or Chinese. For one lone example which 
at least broaches the subject, see: Lang Gao, ‘Congtong, Xingzheng Yuan, Lifa Yuan zhi Guanxi Wenti’ 
[Problems in Relations Between the President, the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan], paper 
presented at an academic seminar, National Chengchi University, Taipei (November 1991).
23 I use the term ‘regime’ when describing the KMT to indicate I am referring to something greater than 
both the Nationalist political party and the RoC state. It is also a reference to the style of power wielded 
by the KMT. The terminology is in line with the work on democratic transition of writers such as 
Fishman. See for example: Robert Fishman, ‘Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe’s 
Transition to Democracy’ in World Politics Vol. 42, No. 3 (April 1990).
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The KMT regime that tied to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese Civil War was based on the 
political party first established by Dr Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhong-shan) in the early 1920s. To the 
degree that the KMT prioritized control over mobilization and emphasized pragmatism over 
ideological correctness, the ruling party was highly authoritarian at times but not fundamentally 
totalitarian.24 The KMT claimed a tutelage role in the implementation of Dr Sun’s Three 
Principles of the People (Sanmin Zhuyi - nationalism, democracy and people’s livelihood). The 
Three Principles were an eclectic mix of political ideas, cobbled together in response to the sad 
events that befell China during the 19th Century (the so-called ‘100 years of shame’ -  bainian 
chiru). At a rudimentary level, they were simply a call for decency and minimum standards: a 
free and united China, constitutional government and the rule of law, and provision for the 
necessities of life. However, a more sophisticated appraisal of the Three Principles reveals their 
wide application and ambiguity. Nationalism could be used to rally opposition against the 
Chinese communists just as much as the Japanese; democracy could be portrayed as simply a 
set of values or aspirations rather than a tangible system of government; and people’s livelihood 
could be used to justify everything from a command economy to free market capitalism. The 
Three Principles were not quite all things to all people, but very nearly. After the retreat to 
Taiwan in the late 1940s, the KMT leadership headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek {Jiang 
Jie-shi) choose to interpret Dr Sun’s ideas in a pro-Western light; however there was nothing 
inevitable about this turn.25
The KMT’s experience of government on mainland Cliina was a stern lesson in what not to 
do when in power, and had a strong impact on the ruling party’s understanding of its mission 
once ensconced on Taiwan. From the 1920s to 1945 the party fought a secession of conflicts 
with the warlords of northern China, the communists and then the Japanese. Soon after the end 
of the Second World War, conflict with the communists broke-out anew, occasioning a general 
loss of confidence in the KMT’s ability to rule and the retreat to Taiwan Province.26 For many 
in the Nationalist Party, including Chiang Kai-shek himself, the Communist victory was due to 
the party’s own ‘tragic failure’27 to govern effectively. Nowhere was this more apparent than in 
the area of economic management. Due to proliferate government spending, administrative 
ineptitude, corruption and factional infighting, the KMT presided over some of the worst 
inflation the world has ever seen. Over the second half of the 1940s, the Chinese National
24 A distinction based on Linz’s classic work. See: Juan Linz, ‘Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes’ in 
Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Vol.3, Macropolitical Theory 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
25 Various points from: Sun Yat-sen, Sanmin Zhuyi [The Three Principles of the People) (Chungking: 
Ministry of Information of the RoC, 1943); Marie-Claire Bergere [trans. Janet Lloyd], Sun Yat-sen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Xiao-buo Wang, Sun Zhong-shan Xuanji [Sections of the 
Work of Sun Yat-sen] (Taipei: Pamierh Book Company, 1984); and Anthony James Gregor, Maria Hsia 
Chang and Andrew B. Zimmerman, Ideology and Development: Sun Yat-sen and the Economic History of 
Taiwan (Berkeley: UCLA Institute of East Asian Studies, 1981).
26 From: Gong-an Wang, Guogong Liangdang Guanxi Shi [A History of Kuomintang-Communist Party 
Relations] (Wuhan: Wuhan Chubanshe, 1987).
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Currency (CNC - Fabi) depreciated from around CNC2,000:US$ 1 in 1946 to over CNC23 
million:US$l just three years later. Towards the end of this debacle, more than half of 
government expenditure was funded with the printing press; in some provinces the KMT was 
forced to resort to the death penalty to prevent currency substitution and hoarding.28 After the 
flight to Taiwan and the party reforms of the early 1950s (more below), the KMT leadership 
started to listen to its cohort of economic advisors and gradually elevated the cause of 
developing Taiwan to a position above that of military and political objectives (or at least 
commensurate with these goals). In the shadow of the ‘unfinished war’ with the mainland 
communists and under the relative safety of the US security umbrella,29 economic policy on 
Taiwan became an end itself. This reordering of priorities was eventually solidified in the 
adoption of externally oriented industrialization -  a policy strategy that set the RoC on the path 
of rapid growth and, into the 1980s, gave rise to Taiwan’s wide acclaim as a miracle economy.30
The organizational structure of the ruling party as it developed on Taiwan was rigidly 
hierarchical, but also composed of multiple and occasionally competing interests.31 Power 
within the KMT was focused in the Chairman (Zhuxi) and the Central Standing Committee 
(.Zhongchenghui), with the latter firmly subordinate to the former.32 In the early 1950s, under 
the guise of reform, Chiang Kai-shek purged the party of any internal opposition and sought to 
entrench a system of corporatist decision-making. Thereafter the Chair of the KMT stood at the 
apex of a quasi-Leninist organization (see Diagram 2.2 for a visual representation of Leninist 
organizational principles), with decision-making as well as appointment and promotion subject
27 To use Chiang’s own words; see: Milton J.T. Shieh, The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents, 
1894-1969 (St. John’s University Press, 1970), p. 213.
28 Kia-ngau Chang, The Inflationary Spiral: The Experience in China, 1939-1950 (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1958); and Shun-hsin Chou, The Chinese Inflation, 1937-1949 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1963).
29 See esp.: Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); Neil H. 
Jacoby, US Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self Help and Development (New York : F.A. 
Praeger, 1967); and Chiao-chiao Hsieh, Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations 
of the RoC on Taiwan (London: Sherwood, 1985).
3 Tun-jen Cheng, ‘Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan’ in Gary 
Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman (eds.), Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin 
America and East Asia (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Yong-jing Jiang, 
Bainian Lao Tian: Guomindang Cansang Shi [One Hundred Year Store: The Kuomintang’s Turbulent 
History] (Taipei: Chuan Chi Wenhsueh Publishers, 1993).
31 As this statement suggests, the structural organization and functional composition of the KMT were 
somewhat contradictory. To my knowledge, only one writer has attempted to show how party structure 
and composition were integrated. See: Edwin A. Winckler, ‘Institutionalization and Participation on 
Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?’ in China Quarterly No. 99 (September 1984). The current 
study builds on Winckler’s central insight that the formal hierarchy of the KMT encompassed far more 
intra-party dynamism (both lateral as well as vertical) than is usually acknowledged.
32 Although in principle, the Kuomintang Chair was not supreme within the ruling party, the sum-total of 
the Chair’s special privileges over the National Representative Conference, the Party Central Committee, 
and the Central Standing Committee gave that individual extraordinary structural power. See the Party 
Constitution in: Teng-hui Lee, Zhigong Zhicheng de Zhongguo Guomindang [The Nationalist Party: 
Unbiased and Complete] (Taipei: KMT Party History Committee, Kuomintang, 1994), p. 309-330. This 
remained a constituent feature of intra-KMT politics well into the late 1990s.
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to a strict line of command extending all the way to the top.3< With the introduction of these 
elements, the Generalissimo eradicated any remnant of internal democracy in the party’s system 
of ‘democratic centralism,’ overcoming what many in the KMT saw as the basic schizophrenia 
of Sun Yat-sun’s original model.34 While the Chair’s position of ultimate power implied that 
the individual preferences of Chiang Kai-shek, and later Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang Jing-guo) 
and Lee Teng-hui (Li Deng-hui),33 had a strong impact on policy choice, this power was never 
arbitrary and self-referential in the mode of Hitler, Stalin or Mao. The role was more akin to 
what I would call an ‘authoritative balancer.’ Within a limited range, the supreme leaders of the 
KMT tolerated intra-party competition on policy questions, and in exercising choice sought to 
justify their decision and placate intra-party rivals.36 Official KMT ideology, the experience of 
the party’s rule on the mainland and to some degree the personalities of the individuals 
concerned meant that the KMT Chair ruled through the party rather than over it.37
The centralist structure of the ruling party shadowed the various levels of the state and the 
security apparatus on Taiwan, and dominated the decision making process at each level. 
Personnel in the RoC government were usually the same in corresponding offices such that 
positions within the party and state hierarchies were often distinguishable only in name. That is 
to say, the KMT Chairman was typically the RoC President, the Standing Committee of the 
KMT typically included most of the key personnel in the Executive Yuan, and so on down the 
line.38 The party organization within the security apparatus included partisan operatives in the 
military and the infamous Taiwan Garrison Command. Established on the principle of ‘the
33 After Cheng, I use the term ‘quasi-Leninist’ as the Kuomintang differed from other Leninist parties in 
some important respects. While in organizational terms the ruling Party bore strong resemblance to other 
Leninist parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Kuomintang was not as attached to the cause 
of revolution as these sibling parties, nor was it as ideologically driven. See: Tun-jen Cheng, 
‘Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan’ in World Politics Vol. 42, No. 4 (July 1989), esp. 
p. 475-480.
34 Cheng Wang, The Kuomintang: A Sociological Study of Demoralization (New York: Garland 
Publishing Inc., 1982), p. 166.
35 And we do have some knowledge of what these preferences actually were. For material on economic 
policy, see respectively: Kai-shek Chiang, ‘Zhongguo Jingji Jieshuo’ [Theory of the Chinese Economy] 
in Jiang Congtong Ji [President Chiang Kai-shek’s Collected Works], Vol. 1 (Taipei: Guofang 
Yanjiuyuan Chuban, 1963); John Fei, ‘The Taiwan Economy in the Seventies’ in Shao-chuan Leng (ed.), 
Chiang Ching-kuo’s Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan, Vol. 3 of the 
Miller Center Series on Asian Political Leadership (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 
1993); and Yang-gang Lin, Teng-hui Lee, Chuang-huan Qiu (eds.), Chongxiu Taiwansheng Tongzhi 
[Revitalizing Taiwan’s Common Vision], Vol. 4 (Taichung: Taiwan Wenxian Weiyuanhui, 1989), pts. la 
& lb.
36 The term ‘authoritative balancer’ implies that while the KMT Chair had an undisputed capacity to bring 
his preferences to the decision-making process, this capacity coexisted (perhaps uncomfortably) with an 
important arbitrating and mediating role. I introduce the term to get away from the perception of the 
KMT Chair as a dictator. Clearly, none of the individuals mentioned above ruled in a fashion similar to 
Stalin, Hitler or Mao. Comparisons with the wily Bismarck are probably more appropriate. I am 
indebted to various discussions with Heather Rae, Chris Rhys-Smit and Greg Noble for development of 
the concept.
37 See: Peter R. Moody Jr., Political Change on Taiwan: A Study of Ruling Party Adaptability (New 
York: Praeger, 1992), esp. p. 25-31. Of the literature that addresses the issue of the KMT Chair’s level 
and style of authority, Moody’s work is probably the most convincing, and certainly the most pleasing in 
an aesthetic sense.
3S Tien, The Great Transition, fn. 3, chp. 1 & 4.
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party leads the forces’ (yidang lingjun), party ties to the security apparatus were far more 
encompassing than arrangements in the civilian bureaucracy. Implemented with the assistance 
of a corp of committed political officers, these links ensured that party-military relations were 
remarkably peaceful and stable over time. With only one short-lived exception -  i.e. General 
Wang Sheng in the early 1980s -  the military remained politically quiescent during the entire 
period of KMT rule on Taiwan.39 The ruling party’s shadow character was affected little by the 
passage of time. While the Nationalists presided over major changes in the procedural form of 
the party, state and security apparatus -  most notably the process of ‘Taiwanization’ 
commenced by President Chiang Ching-guo during the 1970s, and the democratic reforms of 
the 1980s -  well into the late 1990s the KMT hierarchy remained the unofficial locus of power 
and the final arbiter in matters of policy choice.
DIAGRAM 2.3 Leninist 
organization theory
In a Leninist political party, 
appointment to positions in 
any sub-division of the party 
is performed by an 
immediate superior. This 
raises problems regarding 
selection of the top post. 
Decision-making follows a 
chain of referral from the 
bottom up. This generates a 
continual search for the 
authority to act.
Appointment Decision Making
Sources: Marcel Liebman [trans. Brian Pearce], Leninism Under Lenin (London: Merlin Press, 
1980), esp. chp. 2; John P. Roche, The History and Impact of Marxist-Leninist Organizational 
Theory (Washington: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1984), esp. 13-27; and Melvin Croan, 
‘The Leading Role of the Party: Concepts and Contexts’ in Andrew C. Janos (ed.), Authoritarian 
Politics in Communist Europe: Uniformity & Diversity in One-party States (Berkeley: Institute of 
International Studies, 1976).
Internally and externally, the primary mechanism of organization and control employed by 
the KMT was the party cell (Guomindang xiaozu). This was an organizational form the KMT 
leadership copied from the Chinese communists and used to penetrate virtually every group in 
Taiwan civil society. Where civic organizations did not exist to be penetrated by party cells, the 
KMT often created them from scratch to ensure maximum control over all established and
,9 Hsiao-shih Cheng, Party Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 
esp. chp. 2 & 6.
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emergent social groups. The most obvious of these KMT ‘front organizations’ were the 
plethora of industrial associations created to incorporate business, the professions and labor, but 
the party also manufactured passive civic organizations in the arts, entertainment, education and 
sport.40 KMT cells received logistical and material support from party headquarters 
(Guomindang Zhongyangdangbu) -  the ruling party’s secretariat and brains trust. Links 
between the coffers of party headquarters and those of the state -  based on the assumption that 
the material resources of the country were in large measure the resources of the party (guoku 
tong dangku) -  furnished the cells with a variety of positive incentives to keep party members in 
check.41 The KMT’s emphasis on control and pragmatism rather than mobilization and 
ideology, meant that party membership through cell ties was fairly loose for most people. 
Indeed, occasionally cell ties and organizational activities produced adverse and unintended 
effects. Local factions (difang pixi) were an outcome of the party’s early decision to allow a 
semblance of democracy on the island, and arose spontaneously as party cells strived to develop 
close ties at the community level. Often organized around important local families and cliques, 
most factions were blissfully unconcerned with the ruling party’s national agenda and focused 
entirely on issues of importance to local party members. Despite numerous attempts over the 
years to bring them closer to the KMT at the national level, local factions became increasingly 
independent and in many instances tainted with corruption (so-called ‘black-gold’ heijin 
politics).42
In chapter 1 I introduced the concept of the party political ‘window of opportunity’ and 
briefly mentioned how the emergence of these fractures within the KMT influenced the course 
of RoC financial liberalization. In light of the general remarks on the character of the KMT 
given above, what can we say about the original context of these windows? Two points 
regarding the KMT’s dirigiste policy preferences are worthy of comment. To begin with, 
although senior figures within the KMT were more receptive to calls for responsible economic 
management after the flight to Taiwan, this proclivity was limited by the KMT’s need to create 
and maintain a social support base on the island. The circumstances of the ruling party’s retreat
40 There is only one major study of Taiwan’s multitude of industry organizations and other ‘non­
government organizations’ covering the period of relevance to the present work. See: Cheng-tian Kuo, 
Global Competitiveness and Industrial Growth in Taiwan and the Philippines (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1995). Kuo argues that after the 1970s the activities of Taiwan’s peak industry 
associations were essentially the product of corporate demands rather than KMT directives. However, 
Kuo’s analysis has difficulty divorcing the associations’ behavior from KMT preferences. For a critical 
review of Kuo’s book, see: Stephan Haggard, ‘Review of Global Competitiveness’ in Pacific Affairs Vol. 
69, No. 3 (Fall 1996).
41 See for example: Bruce, J. Dickson, ‘The Kuomintang before Democratization: Organizational Change 
and the Role of Elections’ in Hung-mao Tien (ed.), Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic 
Transition: Riding the Third Wave (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).
42 Work on KMT local factions is a growth industry. See esp.: Ming-tong Chen, Paixi Zhengzhi yu 
Taiwan Zhengzhi Bianqian [Factional Politics and Taiwan’s Political Development] (Taipei: Mingdan 
Chubanshe, 1995). See also: Ming-huang Liu, ‘Zhongyang yu Difang Zhengzhi Quanli Guanxi zhi 
Zhuanbian: Guomindang Weiquan Zhengti de Gonggu yu Zhuanxing’ [Change in Center-Local Power 
Relations: The Consolidation and Development of KMT Authoritarianism], unpublished PhD manuscript, 
National Chengchi University, Taipei (1996).
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to Taiwan in the late 1940s meant that the KMT regime was an emigre administration.43 To 
some extent this was an asset. The KMT’s limited connection to the local Taiwanese population 
(benshengren) gave the ruling party a level of policy autonomy that it had not enjoyed on the 
mainland. But this detachment also meant that the party did not have much of a social 
foundation to legitimate and perpetuate its rule. The party’s mainland experience -  in particular 
the neglect of land reform for the vast population of Chinese peasants -  suggested the political 
folly of disenfranchising the citizenry for too long. The regime knew that to retain power on 
Taiwan, eventually it had to pursue a course of selective social inclusion.44
In part, the KMT’s response to this imperative was to construct a broad ‘distributional 
coalition.’45 Although this coalition changed over time as the RoC economy matured and 
diversified, the proclivity to ‘buy in’ or ‘pay o ff  key social groups on Taiwan was a 
distinguishing and enduring feature of KMT rule. Early on, a critical member of the 
distributional coalition was the large population of mainland immigrants (xvaishengren) who 
followed the ruling party to Taiwan at the close of the Civil War. The KMT regime provided 
for this group through employment in government bureaucracies, the security apparatus and 
state-owned enterprises.46 To offset the lower salaries offered in these often-bloated hierarchies 
compared to the private sector, mainlanders were given job security and limited social welfare 
provisions. Another early group in the KMT’s coalition was Taiwanese farmers. The land 
reforms of the early 1950s established a system of rural ownership and production that rapidly 
increased farmers’ living standards. In the 1970s, the KMT regime deepened the commitment 
to rural assistance with a comprehensive program of agricultural protection -  a move which 
locked in farmers as cast-iron votes (or tiepiao) for the KMT at a time when elections were 
becoming increasingly important.47 One final group that the KMT sought to ‘buy in’ was labor, 
although the policies it implemented in relation to tliis coalition partner were initially circuitous. 
While labor unions were politically muted by the regime, wages were not suppressed and the 
ruling party allowed wage gains to keep pace with productivity increases. In the early to mid 
1980s, the party moved to expand the provisions for workers’ welfare. Much to the chagrin of
43 That is, a government in exile with limited ties to the host society. See for example: Yun-han Chu, 
Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research 1992), p. 17. Other writers 
have claimed that the KMT regime was a colonial power without a metropolitan domicile. This 
conception, however, begs comparisons with the apartheid government of South Africa -  a regime that 
had no intention or need of building support within the local population. The KMT was far more 
interested in incorporating the Taiwanese people than the notion of a colonial government suggests.
44 Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, ‘Regime Transformation and Comparative Perspectives’ in Tun- 
jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (eds.), Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1992).
4:1 A term coined by Cheng Tun-jen in: Cheng, ‘Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South 
Korea and Taiwan,’ fn. 30, p. 168.
46 See for example: Yun-han Chu, ‘State Structures and Economic Adjustment in the East Asian Newly 
Industrializing Countries’ in International Organization Vol. 43, No. 4 (1989).
47 Hsiaofen Hemstock, ‘Economic Development: Strategies and Policies in Postwar Taiwan,’ unpublished 
Ph.D. manuscript, Ohio State University (1990), p. 65-92. More on the KMT’s agricultural policies in 
chapter 3.
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Taiwan’s business interests, severance payments, superannuation, medical care and so on were 
introduced as a means to keep the labor force happy and pro-KMT.4H
The KMT regime was more than willing to lend the instruments of financial policy to the 
task of building social support on Taiwan. The ruling party used financial repression to bolster 
those industries and commercial pursuits that were mainstays of the party’s distributional 
coalition, and undercut those economic groups that resided outside. We know, for example, that 
state-owned enterprises, as a key employer of mainland emigres and their offspring, received 
preferential access to the national savings pool. Anecdotal reports and quantitative studies both 
confirm that Taiwan’s state-owned banks provided credit at discount rates to public enterprises 
and offset these outlays by imposing premium rates on corporate customers.49 Distrust and 
distance were key features of the KMT’s relationship with business on Taiwan, and the island’s 
leading entrepreneurs paid for this political exclusion with (comparatively) expensive capital. 
Elsewhere, farmers and fishermen’s associations, as a key organizational site for Taiwan’s rural 
community, were given exclusive rights to operate community credit cooperatives. These 
institutions were used and abused in a most imprudent fashion; coop funds were poured into 
everything from local election campaigns to private construction projects for leading district 
personalities (the crossover with local factions here is important and will be explored later). Not 
surprisingly, the credit cooperatives carried the bulk of bad loans in Taiwan’s financial system -  
a condition that was further entrenched with every successive government bailout.50
The discussion above confirms that the KMT’s concern with building a social support base 
on Taiwan informed at least some of the ruling party’s outlook on financial policy (with 
decidedly illiberal results). This broad socio-political calculus was, however, only part of the 
story. The other half of the equation was more narrowly defined and tied to the KMT’s specific 
sectoral agenda for finance. The history and character of the ruling party implied that it 
prioritized financial stability and control as systemic goals. This policy approach was 
constructed negatively: volatility in financial markets and the loss of administrative prerogative 
were evils to be avoided at all costs. The desire for stability was closely tied to the KMT’s 
mainland experience. As noted above, the KMT’s economic mismanagement on the mainland 
was largely responsible for the hyperinflation of the 1940s and, in turn, defeat in the Chinese 
Civil War. On the ground, this monetary environment produced a permanent state of financial 
insecurity. Runs on financial institutions and capital flight were commonplace as the public 
sought a safe haven for their savings. The inability of the RoC monetary authorities to rectify
4b Cheng, ‘Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan,’ fn. 30, p. 168-169. 
See also: Far Eastern Economic Review (6 September 1984).
49 Ya-hwei Yang, ‘Taiwan: Development and Structural Change of the Banking System’ in Hugh T. 
Patrick and Yung Chul Park (eds.), The Financial Development of Japan, Korea and Taiwan: Growth 
Repression and Liberalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 294; and interviews in 
Taipei with officials from various public and private banks, 1996 & 1999.
50 Ming-hui Wang, ‘Cong Wanglu Guanxi Tantao Nonghui Xinyongbu zhi Yunzuo’ [A Network Analysis 
of the Use and Manipulation of Credit Departments in Farmers Associations] in Si yu Yan [Ideas and 
Words] Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1993).
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the mess lead to a loss of business confidence and the cessation of productive investment. The 
desire for strong control of the financial sector was conditioned by organizational imperatives. 
As Leninist, covert and authoritarian, the ruling party found that direct administrative control of 
saving and investment dovetailed well with the overall pattern of KMT rule on Taiwan. The 
notion of prudential oversight of the financial system would have been an anathema to the 
regime. Among other things, the ruling party sought to manipulate the Taipei trade in bean curd 
(through the Taibeishi Doufu Shangye Tongye Gonghui). Why would it adopt a hands-off 
policy towards banks and other financial institutions?51
The flipside of the KMT’s emphasis on financial stability and control was that questions 
regarding systemic efficiency and the cultivation of the financial sector as an independent 
industry were largely ignored. While economic growth became a vital policy goal for the KMT 
after the 1950s, the particular kind of economic development Taiwan experienced was also 
important. Expansion of production in tangible goods was encouraged, while growth in 
intangible services, particularly financial services, was frowned upon. On the mainland, the 
KMT’s reputation had suffered badly through its association with a fledgling class of private 
financiers. This group, located in the international center of Shanghai, accumulated vast 
reserves of wealth during the 1930s and 1940s, much of it secured through speculative 
endeavors and occasionally less than legal means. On Taiwan, commercial vocations (banker, 
accountant, etc.) were considered of lowly status and typically faced tight curbs on professional 
conduct. Speculation, whether in the stock market or in real estate, was seen as an illegitimate 
means of making an income (the Chinese term for speculator, toujizhe, is particularly 
derogatory), and something to be confined to small pockets of the economy. These 
experiences and perceptions, according to one interviewee, saw the financial sector turned into 
an armored tank -  ‘. . .a system intended to withstand the worst of economic crises, but 
incapable of doing much more than 20 mph on the freeway.’54
The KMT’s pursuit of the goals of financial stability and control was apparent in a broad 
cross-section of financial policies prior to the late 1980s. Consider one particularly extreme 
example. It was briefly noted in chapter 1 that prior to financial liberalization, accounts
51 The financial goals of stability and control are enduring themes in the literature. See esp.: Karl J. 
Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), chp. 1 & 
3; and Tun-jen Cheng, ‘Guarding the Commanding Heights: The State as Banker in Taiwan’ in Stephan 
Haggard, Cheng H. Lee and Sylvia Maxfield (eds.), The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). See also: Fu-ming Xu, Zhongguo Guomindang de Gaizao [The 
Reform of the Kuomintang] (Taipei: Zhenzhong Shuju Chubanshe, 1986), esp. chp. 5. Supplemented 
with material from an interview in Taipei with Chan Chuen-po, Chair of the Taipei Municipal Committee 
and ex-member of the KMT Central Finance Committee, 16 January 1997.
52 On the business-KMT relationship on the mainland see: Parks M. Coble Jr., The Shanghai Capitalists 
and the Nationalist Government, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); and 
Richard C. Bush, Hie Politics of Cotton Textiles in Kuomintang China, 1927-1937 (New York: Garland, 
1982).
33 Interviews in Taipei with economists and finance industry personnel, 1996 & 1999.
'>4 Interview with Dr Ray B. Dawn, Director of Financial Research Division, Taiwan Institute of 
Economic Research, 19 June 1996.
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managers in RoC banks were held criminally liable tor non-performing loans. Predictably 
enough, banks preferred collateral in any credit assessment process (and the more liquid the 
better) and completely ignored business performance and potential as criteria. The rationale for 
this severe restriction was to prevent the accumulation of bad debt by local banks (a perceived 
threat to systemic stability) and to reduce the range of independent activity by the employees of 
these institutions (thus maximizing executive control). The outcome of this regulatory approach 
was in keeping with original intentions. Even in years of poor economic performance and 
financial turbulence, non-performing loans among the state-owned commercial banks (but only 
the state-owned banks) were rarely greater than 0.2% of total loans outstanding. In 1985, with 
the economy sluggish and the Tenth Credit Cooperative scandal in full swing, bad loans for 
these particular institutions came in at just 0.16% (with total loans of NT$ 1.189 trillion and bad 
loans of NT$1.64 billion). The flipside of these figures was that many efficient and deserving 
companies were starved of funds, even while a huge pool of bank deposits lay idle.55
3. The economic technocrats
Although examining the role and nature of the KMT regime gives us considerable insight into 
the question of who governed in financial policy, it leaves us with little indication of how 
financial policy might have changed over time. Where is the potential for dynamism in this 
model? How did new policy ideas arise? To address these queries, we need to look at one key 
constituency in the KMT’s liierarchy of power: the economic technocrats.
Located within the upper-reaches of the RoC state’s administrative machinery was a small 
but respected group of technocrats in control of economic policy -  a group I have chosen to call, 
after Samuel Ho, the ‘economic technocrats.’56 As noted by Wade, economic policy making in 
Taiwan during the post-War era was ‘...dominated by scarcely more than a dozen people.’57 
The economic technocrats (jingji guanliao or jishu guanliao) were a fluid group of ‘proximate 
decision makers’ occupying government economic portfolios or in positions closely related to 
these offices.58 In the period of relevance to this thesis, we can point to three main sub-groups 
within the general category. First, there were those core members of the economic technocracy 
who maintained formal responsibility for a small number of key economic ministries and 
commissions. This group included the Ministers of Finance and Economic Affairs, the 
governor of the Central Bank of China and the Chair of the Council for Economic Planning and
55 See esp.: Willis Ke, ‘Slowed Economy, Scandals Affect Profits But Also Speed Reform’ in Financial 
and Investment Yearbook, RoC 1986 (Taipei: Central Economic News Service, 1986). See also: Willis 
Ke, ‘Earnings are Down, But Improvements Under Way’ in Financial and Investment Yearbook, RoC 
1985 (Taipei: Central Economic News Service, 1985).
56 Samuel P.S. Ho, ‘Economics, Economic Bureaucracy and Taiwan’s Economic Development’ in Pacific 
Affairs Vol. 60, No. 2 (Summer 1987).
5 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 217.
58 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1976), chp. 1.
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Development. Surrounding this core were officials hailing from a series of government 
agencies with tangential or contingent responsibility for economic issues. Among this 
peripheral group of elites we can include the Director General of Budgets, Accounts and 
Statistics, the Minister of Transport and Communications, the Chair of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Commissioner of the Provincial Government Department of 
Finance, and one or two others. And finally, in addition to the elites described above, there 
were also several ‘shadowy’ individuals who drifted in and out of the sub-groups already 
described. We can include in this floater group the Premier, a number of senior ‘Ministers of 
State,’ a number of exceptional junior technocrats (including vice ministers, divisional directors, 
bureau chiefs, etc.) and several economic advisors (usually academic economists) drawn into 
the policy process on a case-by-case basis.59
It is tempting, like Wade and Ho, to see the economic technocrats first and foremost as 
exceptional civil servants with an unqualified commitment to good policy (however defined).60 
It is also tempting, after Liang and others, to see the group as a simple extension of KMT 
politics and power.61 However, both of these interpretations oversimplify the reality of the 
economic technocrats’ vocation. The truth is much more complicated and much more 
interesting: the economic technocrats were at one and the same time competent and independent 
policy technicians and partisan cadres. That is, the technocrats were both white and expert (in 
contrast to the ‘red over expert’ bias extant in communist China). On the one hand, the high 
level of competence of the economic technocrats cannot be denied. While specific quantitative 
data on the group is difficult to assemble, sufficient biographical information exists to make the 
case that they were highly educated and experienced in their areas of policy interest. Consider 
the profiles of three technocrats mentioned by name in chapter 1 -  Li Kwoh-ting, Yu Kuo-hua 
and Shirley Kuo.62 Li Kwoh-ting, prior to retiring from the limelight in the late 1970s, was 
Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance from 1965 to 1976, and throughout the 1980s held a 
number o f positions on distinguished advisory committees. His educational background was in 
science and included exchange positions at the Royal College in London, Cambridge University 
and a dozen other leading international universities. By the time he became Premier in 1984,
59 These groups are variously suggested in: Ho, ‘Economics, Economic Bureaucracy and Taiwan’s 
Economic Development,’ fn. 56; Walter Arnold, ‘Bureaucratic Politics, State Capacity and Taiwan’s 
Automobile Industry Policy’ in Modem China Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1989); Y. Dolly Hwang, The Rise of 
a New World Economic Power: Postwar Taiwan (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), chp. 5; and 
Gregory W. Noble, ‘Contending Forces in Taiwan’s Economic Policymaking: The Case of Hua Tung 
Heavy Trucks’ in Asian Survey Vol. 27, No. 6 (June 1987).
60 Wade, Governing the Market, fn. 57, p. 217; and Ho, ‘Economics, Economic Bureaucracy and 
Taiwan’s Economic Development,’ fn. 56.
61 Shuang-lian Liang, ‘Zhongyang Xingzheng Jiguan Gongwu Ren yuan Zhizu Rentong de Yanjiu’ [Party 
Identification of Public Servants in the Central Administration] unpublished Ph.D. manuscript, 
Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, Taipei (1984).
62 The purpose of this chapter’s discussion is to briefly introduce the economic technocrats as a group. 
As a consequence, only passing reference will be made to particular individuals where appropriate. More 
detail on specific members of the technocrats will be provided in the case study chapters -  including 
additional information on the three individuals mentioned here.
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Yu Kuo-hwa had 14 years experience in the finance industry (both in the RoC and elsewhere); 
20 years as Central Bank governor, Minister of Finance and chair of the Council for Economic 
Planning; and periods as director of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. He held an 
honorary doctorate in finance from St. Johns University in New York, and earlier in his career 
had been a visiting fellow to Harvard and the London School of Economics. Finally, despite 
being a relative latecomer on the scene, Shirley Kuo had a dynamic career as an economics 
professor, deputy chair of the Council for Economic Planning and deputy governor of the 
Central Bank before becoming Finance Minister in 1988. Her educational background was in 
economics, and included a Ph.D. from Kobe University in Japan conferred in the early 1980s.63
Beyond these brief biographical histories, the broad data on personnel in the RoC civil 
service also suggests the economic technocrats were a team to be reckoned with. We know, for 
example, that the public sector in Taiwan (including central government ministries, 
commissions and public enterprises) persistently absorbed greater numbers of Masters and 
Doctoral graduates than the private sector throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In the early to mid 
1980s, for example, around 23-26% of higher-degree graduates entered government service, as 
compared with 20-23% for business and around 40% for academia (the remainder described as 
‘others’ including positions taken up abroad). Further, we also know that around 50% of staff in 
the economic ministries possessed a Bachelors degree or better (compared to 10% for the 
population as a whole at that time). We could justifiably assume that this ratio was considerably 
higher in the upper reaches of the bureaucratic pyramid. Moreover, tire ratio of civil service 
absorption of students returned from overseas study (so-called haiwai xuereri) was between 10- 
15% in the first five years of the 1980s (a group which represented much less than 0.01% of 
Taiwan’s population). This figure was commensurate with the absorption rate of the private 
sector, but well behind academia. Correlating estimates provided in interviews place the 
number of senior staff who were returned students in the order of 50-60%, although it was noted 
that these figures were declining through the 1980s and beyond (as increased opportunities 
opened up in the private sector).64 Taken together, these figures suggest that the average 
member of the economic policy elite was at least a university graduate, and more than likely a
63 From: Zhonghua Minguo Mingrenlu, Minguo 88 Nian [Who’s Who in the RoC] (Taipei: Central News 
Agency, 1999). See also: Republic of China Yearbook, 1996 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 
1996).
64 See variously: Wade, Governing the Market, fn. 57, p. 217-224; Chien-kuo Pang, ‘The State and 
Economic Transformation: The Taiwan Case,’ unpublished Ph.D. manuscript, Brown University (1988), 
esp. p. 62-63; Minguo 73-74 Nian Daxue yu Zhuanke Biyesheng de Zhiye Baogao [Report on the 
Employment of University and College Graduates, 1984-85] (Taipei: National Youth Commission, 
Executive Yuan, 1987); Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1996 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and 
Development, Executive Yuan, 1996); and various personnel statistics from Central Bank of China, 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Affairs -  see for example Caizhengbu ji  Suoshu Jiguan Linian 
Gongfu ji Shiye Renyuan Renshu [Personnel Statistics of the Ministry of Finance and Subsidiary Agencies 
in Recent Years] (Taipei: Department of Personnel Affairs, Ministry of Finance, 1995). Augmented with 
interviews with civil servants in Taipei, 1996 and 1999.
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holder of a higher degree. The KMT regime did not simply promote ignorant cronies: the 
economic technocrats were among the best and the brightest Taiwan had to offer/’5
On the other hand, the strong partisan character of the economic technocrats cannot be 
denied either. To begin to appreciate the truth of this statement, we need to distinguish theory 
from practice in technocrat recruitment and promotion. According to formal government 
regulations, RoC ministries and executive commissions were constructed along classical 
Weberian lines similar to Japan. The Examination Yuan and the Central Personnel 
Administration of the Executive Yuan were supposed to have comprehensive responsibility for 
appointment and promotion of all RoC civil servants. In theory, this was to be conducted 
strictly on the basis of performance in entrance exams and periodic review. The only exceptions 
were supposed to be the minister and political vice-minister at the very top. These positions 
were always assumed to be political appointees in line with established ideas about responsible 
government.66
But despite the best intentions of government propaganda, very few people in Taiwan 
actually believed any of the above. In reality, the average ministry or commission was divided 
into three semi-institutionalized strata, with radically different processes of recruitment and 
advancement at each level (see Diagram 2.3 for an overview). At the very bottom of the 
pyramid there were the basic line staff that entered the bureaucracy with a high school diploma 
or better. They were recruited to the civil service on the basis of the annual ‘common exam’ 
(putong kaoshi or just pukao) managed by the Examination Yuan, and moved up according to a 
mix of seniority and merit. There was little lateral movement of these individuals between 
departments, and they were rarely invited to move into the second tier of the bureaucracy. This 
first tier best exemplifies the Weberian model propounded in government regulations and 
publicity. The second tier -  mostly middle management positions and researchers -  was 
reserved for university graduates with a ranking score in the annual ‘high-level exam’ (or 
gaokao). For these people, however, the entrance test was only partially important. Technical 
skills, performance in an interview, and to some degree political affiliation to the KMT were 
ultimately determinant. Second tier bureaucrats could expect to move up into the third tier 
given good performance and the right aptitude (i.e. pro-KMT), and occasionally sideways into 
other government departments. Finally, the third tier was usually reserved for highly qualified 
and highly experienced personnel from elsewhere in government. It included the minister, the
65 This point cannot be over-emphasized: KMT stalwarts without sufficient qualifications or experience 
were never promoted over the best and brightest -  i.e. there were limits to the extent to which the party 
‘shadowed’ the state. The classic example here is Ma Ying-jeou’s father, Ma He-ling. Despite rising to 
senior positions within the party hierarchy, the elder Ma failed to ascend the ranks of the state apparatus. 
I am indebted to Dr Kuo Chiang-tian for bringing this example to my attention.
66 As laid out in the various rules, regulations and reports of the two personnel agencies mentioned. See 
for example: Renshi Xingzhengju Jianjie [Introduction to the Central Personnel Administration of the 
Executive Yuan, RoC] (Taipei: Central Personnel Administration, Executive Yuan, 1998); andZhonghua 
Minguo Renshi Faze [Personnel Regulations of the RoC] (Taipei: Central Personnel Administration, 
Executive Yuan, 1998), esp. sect. 1.
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political and administrative vice ministers, directors of ministerial departments and a significant 
number of policy support staff. Although it is difficult to demonstrate quantitatively, everyone 1 
interviewed agreed that appointment and promotion in the illusive third tier virtually always had 
a political component. Non-KMT personnel would occasionally be admitted, but those with 
dissenting views would stand no chance. Third tier personnel would often rotate between 
ranking positions in other government departments, academia, policy think tanks, state-owned 
enterprises and various internal commissions of the ruling party. This career loop rarely 
included a period in private industry, although this pattern had begun to change by the early 
1990s.67
The patterns of recruitment and promotion outlined above confirm that while many 
personnel decisions in the RoC state were guided by merit and seniority, party politics strongly 
dictated choice in at least the top third of the civil service. As members of the top strata, the 
economic technocrats invariably had ties to the ruling party, and ultimately owed their career 
progress to KMT affiliation. What was the nature of this link to the ruling party? From the 
point of view of many if not most economic technocrats, KMT membership was not a matter of 
heartfelt ideological or nationalist commitment (of a type we might expect from party affiliation 
in other developing countries or communist China). The technocrats saw membership of the 
ruling party largely as a question of career advancement and elite admission. In colloquial 
terms, KMT affiliation was ‘a good way to make money and contacts’68 rather than a means to 
promote some abstract political agenda. Just so long as KMT members were prepared to toe the 
party line when called upon to do so, they were permitted considerable latitude to think and say 
what they wished. In response to a question about the nature of KMT membership, Professor 
Chen Ming-tong from National Taiwan University commented: ‘Only a small proportion of 
KMT members actually consider themselves party identified; around 15%.... It’s probably best 
to think of the KMT as a small central core surrounded by a mass of fragmented supporters with 
only passing interest in the party’s platform or ideological concerns.’69 This ‘tacit’ character of 
KMT membership meant that the ruling party could accommodate a wide cross-section of 
people within its ranks -  including a cohort of capable and independently-minded technocrats.
67 For these points, I am especially indebted to: Prof. Ye Kuang-shi, Lecturer in Organization and Human 
Resources at the Department of Business Management, National Sun Yat-sen University -  interview in 
Taipei, 28 February 1999; and Dr. Wang Hong-zen, Official from the Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry 
of Economic Affairs -  interview in Taipei, 5 March 1999. For more general points along the same theme, 
see also: Jun-shu Chang and Jermain Lam, ‘Public Administration in Taiwan: Development, Challenges 
and the Future’ in Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, Jermain T.M. Lam and Jane C.Y. Lee (eds.), Public 
Administration in the NICs: Challenges and Accomplishments (New York: St. Martins, 1996); and Milan 
Tung-wen Sun, ‘Public Administration in Taiwan: The State of the Art,’ unpublished Ph.D. manuscript, 
Kent State University, Ohio (1992). Note also Lien Chan’s career path as outlined in: Chan Lien, 
Heading for the 21st Century (Taipei: Government Information Office, Executive Yuan, 1994), p. i-vi.
68 As one party member remarked (somewhat disconcertingly) in an interview. Interview in Taipei with 
Lin Zong-jie, Party Historical Committee, Kuomintang, 6 May 1999.
69 Emphasis added. The low figure for party identification Chen quotes is quite astonishing -  in most 
Western countries this level of party identification is probably more indicative of the whole population
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As one policy cominentator in Taiwan remarked in an interview: ‘It must be emphasized that 
the ruling party had no real problem filling these positions [senior economic portfolios! with its 
own. Throughout government and academia there were literally hundreds of potential 
candidates; why would the KMT choose a person who wasn’t a party member?!’70
But what did the technocrats’ partisan ties ultimately mean for the group’s policy outlook? 
Regardless of the tacit character of KMT affiliation, loyalty to the ruling party often meant that 
the economic technocrats’ were presented with a philosophical and practical policy dilemma. 
Just as an ambassador is a ‘an honest man sent abroad to lie for his country,’71 the technocrats 
were a group often at odds with the dirigiste economic policies placed in their care. As 
previously described and explained, the KMT regime traditionally favored the maintenance of a 
high level of government control over the economy and a highly repressed financial system. 
Indeed, the political priorities of the ruling party meant that it was decidedly illiberal in many of 
its policy preferences. The same cannot be said, however, for the economic technocrats within 
the ruling party’s ranks. Although this group by no means favored Taiwan becoming a laissez- 
faire economy in the style of Hong Kong or Singapore, it is apparent that they did not have the 
same ‘fear and loathing’ (or at least chronic disregard) of markets that distinguished the KM T’s 
overall outlook. By the early to mid 1980s, tire economic technocrats were marked by three 
consistent principles of economic and financial policy -  principles which confirm the group had 
a lot more in common with Adam Smith than is usually acknowledged,72 and placed these elites 
at a distance from tire political party to which they owed their allegiance.
To begin with, the economic technocrats were strong believers in the utility of an economic 
system based on free enterprise. They saw private property, the price mechanism, the profit 
motive, competition and voluntary exchange in goods and factor markets as fundamental 
building blocks of a prosperous economy. While many of the technocrats saw market failure 
and the circumstances of late development as important factors requiring qualification of free 
enterprise -  arguments especially typical of K.Y. Yin’s generation of policy elites -  the group 
was adamant that such curbs on economic freedom should be limited in scope and only 
admissible on strict economic criteria.73 Insofar as free enterprise was the ultimate source of 
national prosperity, the technocrats placed great emphasis on prudent monetary and fiscal policy
rather than actual members of a particular party. Interview in Taipei with Professor Chen Ming-tong, Sun 
Yat-sen Graduate Institute, College of Law, National Taiwan University, 5 March 1999.
70 Interview in Taipei with Professor Ye Kuang-shi, Lecturer in Organization and Human Resources at the 
Department of Business Management, National Sun Yat-sen University, 28 February 1999.
71 A famous line by British poet Sir Henry Wotton, 1568-1639.
72 There is a tendency for analysts to try and find a ‘different’ (read ‘non-Westem’) model of capitalism in 
the technocrats’ ideas and works. Often they succeed by virtue of reifying KMT preferences, or 
overemphasizing some of the more exotic thinking that occasionally held currency in the group. See for 
example: Alan P.L. Liu, Phoenix and the Lame Lion: Modernization in Taiwan and Mainland China 
1950-80 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1987), chp. 3.
77 Chung-yung Yin, Wo Dui Taiwan Jingji de Kanfa [My Views on Taiwan’s Economy], Vol. 1 (Taipei: 
Economic Planning Council, Executive Yuan, 1973), chp. 1, esp. p. 29. See also: Mo-huan Xing, 
Tongshu Jingji Jianghua: Guannian yu Zhengce [Popular Lectures on Economics: Concepts and Policies] 
(Taipei: Sanmin Chuban, 1986), various chapters.
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to provide a stable basis for entrepreneurial activity, and were extremely reluctant to 
compromise such prudence with grandiose plans of development (a la South Korea in the 
1970s). Tied to this position, the technocrats were strong advocates of the view that interest 
rates should approximate the real cost of capital, and saw allocation of subsidized funds as a 
policy deviation not a standard. Although it is true the technocrats believed financial
institutions were a special category of enterprise -  possibly requiring government ownership -  
they were equally committed to the notion that banks and other financial concerns should be 
economically efficient and effective. That is, even if they were not private enterprises, they 
should strive to achieve the same level of competitiveness.74
Second, by and large the economic technocrats were even-handed on the desirability of 
government intervention in the economy. They saw a major role for government in human 
resource development (education and health services), and deemed the provision of 
infrastructure (from business law to port facilities) as among the most important of public tasks. 
Beyond these basics, however, the technocrats believed that government intervention should be 
decided strictly on a case-by-case basis where market failures or unequivocal development 
interests could be demonstrated. Even those technocrats with a strong commitment to
(indicative) planning -  e.g. Li Kwoh-ting -  assumed that government intervention had a use-by 
date. It was probably not justifiable over the long term, and certainly not commensurate with 
the RoC’s ultimate transition to a developed economy.75 This agnosticism on government 
intervention is exemplified in the technocrats’ attitude toward the key flows of the financial 
system -  i.e. savings and investment. Beyond the question of fiscal policy, the technocrats 
approached the issue of savings in terms of indirect government encouragement (witness the 
postal savings system) rather than forced collection (as promoted in Singapore, Malaysia and a 
host of Western countries). As for investment, by the early 1980s the technocrats had lost much 
of their earlier enthusiasm for large-scale public projects (e.g. the 10 Major Projects, Shida 
Jianshe) and were calling for a significant and enduring increase in the private allocation of 
funds.76
74 Kuo-ting Li, The Evolution of Policy Behind Taiwan ’s Development Success, 2nd ed. (Singapore: World 
Scientific Publishing Company, 1995), esp. chp. 2, 3 and 9; and Kuo-ting Li, ‘The Evolution of Fiscal 
Policy in Taiwan’ in Industry of Free China Vol. 80, No. 5 (1993). See also: personal interview with Yu 
Kuo-hwa in Diane Ying (ed.), Juecezhe [Decision Makers] (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing Co., 
1983), esp. p. 23-26.
75 Kwoh-ting Li, Economic Transformation of Taiwan, RoC (London: Shepheard-Walwyn Publishers, 
1988), esp. various chapters in section 1. See also: Philip Li, ‘A Conversation With T.H. Lee, Minister of 
Economic Affairs’ in Financial and Investment Yearbook, RoC 1987 (Taipei: Central Economic News 
Service, 1987).
76 Shirley W.Y. Kuo, The Taiwan Economy in Transition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), chp. 2 & 15; 
Shirley W.Y. Kuo, ‘The Taiwanese Economy in the 1990s’ in Gary Klintworth (ed.), Taiwan in the Asia- 
Pacific in the 1990s (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994), esp. p. 92-99; Paul C.H. Chiu, ‘Money and 
Financial Markets: The Domestic Perspective’ in Gustav Ranis (ed.), Taiwan: From Developing to 
Mature Economy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); and Li-teh Hsu, ‘Wo Guo Caizheng Yinggai Nuli de 
Fangxiang’ [Priority Tasks for Finance Policy -  a public lecture presented at National Chengchi 
University] in Li-teh Hsu, Xiandai Caizheng Zhengce Lunshuo [Fiscal Policy] (Taipei: Ministry of 
Finance, 1984).
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In ‘Tier 3’ positions in the RoC civil service, KMT links 
featured strongly in the appointment and promotion ot 
personnel. Staff often entered and existed via a lateral
#2 In ‘Tier 2 ’ positions, party political affiliation and 
links featured alongside merit and seniority in 
\  appointment and promotion. Staff generally moved 
\  ‘in and up.’ Some lateral movement.
In ‘Tier 1’ positions, merit and seniority 
were primary in appointment and 
promotion. Staff could only expect to 
move ‘in and up’ to top of the tier.
Sources: Interviews in Taipei, 1999. See aiso: Jun-shu Chang and Jermain Lam, ‘Public 
Administration in Taiwan: Development, Challenges and the Future’ in Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, 
Jermain T.M. Lam, and Jane C.Y. Lee (eds.), Public Administration in the NICs: Challenges and 
Accomplishments (New York: St. Martins 1996); and Milan Tung-wen Sun, ‘Public Administration 
in Taiwan: The State of the Art,’ unpublished Ph.D. manuscript, Kent State University, Ohio 
(1992). Compare with various regulations in Zhonghua Minguo Renshi Faze [Personnel 
Regulations of the RoC] (Taipei: Central Personnel Administration, Executive Yuan, 1998).
Finally, the economic technocrats exhibited a strong faith in good science as the basis for 
good policy. Much has been made of the fact that there were divergent streams of thinking on 
economic policy among the technocrats based on disciplinary boundaries. They came to the 
task of policy management with backgrounds in engineering (e.g. Sun Yun-suan), social science 
and economics (Yu Kuo-hua) and the hard sciences (Li Kwoh-ting), a fact which occasionally 
lead to disagreement.77 This said, my research reveals that such disputes were insignificant 
when compared to the sense of esprit de corps generated by a shared experience of advanced 
education (still rare in Taiwan in the early to mid 1980s) and a common dedication to public 
service. Faith in scientific method also lead to mutual respect among the various streams; they 
were more often than not inclined to see each other as complimentary rather than competing.78 
Applied to the realm of financial administration, the ideological attachment to science gave rise 
to an almost obsessive desire to accumulate research about the RoC financial system. Often 
facilitated through the group’s links with academia, the technocrats conducted a plethora of 
studies into the local financial sector and had a firm grasp of the system’s ignoble character and
77 Wade, Governing the Market, fn. 57, p. 217-224.
Various interviews in Taipei with officials from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Central Bank of China, and Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1996 & 1999.
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operations.79 When financial reform became a real possibility in the late 1980s, the technocrats 
were well armed with the latest research and statistics.
Although the comments above imply a basic unity in the outlook of the economic 
technocrats, members of the group approached specific policy issues -  including financial 
liberalization -  in different styles, and with different resources and concerns. We will see in the 
case study chapters that the technocrats had specialized roles in financial opening, dividing 
roughly into three subgroups over the three main waves of reform Nonetheless, the team was 
united in their fundamental philosophical position. As we have seen, this position was quite 
liberal on rudimentary questions regarding ‘good’ economic and financial policy. Accepting 
this point leaves us with one final, somewhat speculative question: Why were the economic 
technocrats more liberal in their policy outlook than the political party to which they were 
ultimately responsible? To some degree, the policy preferences of the technocrats were simply 
an outcome of their education and training. Many of the group, as previously noted, were 
returnee students and professionals from the US and Europe -  a background which gave them a 
strong theoretical and working knowledge of the relatively open economies and financial 
systems of the West. Although it is by no means axiomatic that this insight would translate into 
more market-orientated policy preferences, my research interviews suggest that there was 
indeed some link between the two. This may explain the tendency for returnees to gravitate 
toward more liberal government agencies -  for example, the Securities Exchange Commission -  
rather than conservative ones.80
Another reason for the technocrats’ comparatively liberal outlook was more practical: the 
day to day administration of the KMT’s dirigiste priorities created real problems for those who 
actually had to translate preferences into policy. In large measure, the ruling party’s policy 
agenda was a negative guide on what to avoid, rather than a positive prescription of what to do -  
a recipe for indecision and vacillation highlighted in every management text since Drucker 
wrote his seminal book.81 As one senior policy commentator remarked with reference to the 
recent past: T think [the bureaucrats responsible for finance have been] confused about what 
they are doing, and as such they seem to continually fall back on this idea that they have to 
avoid any kind of disruption to market “order.” This damage control mentality is in fact self- 
fulfilling: by refusing to provide direction and constantly looking for the next disaster they
79 Indicative of this thoroughness, the technocrats even had a firm grasp on the nature of Taiwan’s black 
and grey financial markets. For many years, the government published figures on interest rates in the 
curb market and commissioned regular studies on the operation of various underground financial 
institutions. See for example: Taiwan Diqu Minjian Hehui Xiankuang zhi Yanjiu [Research Report on the 
Current Condition of Rotating Credit Rounds in Taiwan] (Taipei: Ministry of Justice, 1985).
80 Various interviews in Taipei with civil servants in the Central Bank of China, Ministry of Finance and 
Securities Exchange Commission, 1996 & 1999. See also my newspaper articles broaching this topic: 
Wu, ‘New Directions, Here and Abroad: An Interview with Benny Hu,’ fn. 17; and Kui-ke Wu, ‘Foreign 
Policies: Foreign Insurance Companies in Taiwan’ in China Post (9 December 1996), p. 11.
81 That is: Peter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management (London: Heineman, 1956).
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actually create new problems.’82 We can reasonably assume that the smarter members of our 
economic technocracy would have found this lack of direction rather burdensome.
Conclusion
In the broader scheme of this study, the purpose of the present chapter is really quite pedestrian: 
that is, to provide an overview of the basic ‘nuts and bolts’ information which underpins the 
story of Taiwan’s three waves of financial liberalization in the late 1980s. In the first section of 
the chapter I conducted a brief review of the institutional context of financial policy in Taiwan. 
This section included general material on the character of the RoC state, the regulatory 
authorities immediately responsible for finance and the formal process of financial policy 
change. The second section of the chapter was dedicated to introducing the KMT, the ruling 
political regime in Taiwan over the period of financial reform and beyond. In this section I 
presented information on the ideology, structure and composition of the ruling party, and 
examined in some depth the party’s dirigiste financial policy preferences. Material on the 
policy preferences was offered in the context of the two ‘policy windows’ detailed for the first 
time in chapter 1 -  the socio-political window and the sectoral-strategy window. And finally, in 
the last section of the chapter I considered some of the key features of the economic technocrats. 
In particular, I assessed the academic debate surrounding their general character -  experts 
versus party stalwarts -  and gave due attention to their policy preferences. It was noted in this 
section that the policy outlook of the economic technocrats was considerably more liberal than 
that of the overall KMT regime.
Having considered this background information, we can now turn our attention to more 
engaging matters. The task before us is to test the technocrat leadership theory of financial 
liberalization. In chapters 3 to 5 I will examine in detail the evidence presented by the three 
waves of financial reform -  i.e. reform of securities, foreign exchange and banking respectively. 
While our primary interest is in overall outcomes, I will spend considerable time in the case 
study chapters teasing out the detail of the process of reform In the belief that ‘the devil lies in 
the detail,’ we will attempt to gauge the extent to which the technocrat leadership approach 
accurately describes the timing and development of the three episodes of liberalization. Due 
attention will be given to other theoretical explanations where appropriate. Our burden of proof 
is in-keeping with the ‘messy center’83 of political science: Does our theory provide a better 
account of events than the alternatives?
***000***
82 Interview in Taipei with Mr. Paul Hsu, Senior Partner, Lee and Li Attorneys at Law, 15 July 1999.
83 See symposium articles on the role of theory in comparative politics in World Politics Vol. 48, No. 1 
(October 1995).
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-Chapter 3-
The long march: securities reform 
through the 1980s and beyond
Crafting Markets in Taiwan
Introduction
In the years prior to 1988, when the Securities Exchange Law was finally amended, Taiwan’s 
markets for equity and debt were regularly the subject of joke and scorn. Dismissed as a 
‘casino’ by most foreign commentators,1 the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE -  Taiwan 
Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo) was simply a sideline in the investment decisions of the island’s largest 
companies. As one market analyst remarked in an interview: ‘The TSE was more a question of 
face for most companies; firms would seek to be listed largely as a means to gain public 
recognition. It was also a good way to reward employees: annual bonuses were often given in 
the form of equity which most employees would quickly place on the secondary market to 
convert into cash....’2 Few people took Taiwan’s securities markets seriously, least of all the 
government. The shabby building on Yen-ping South Road in Taipei that housed the stock 
exchange was more of an embarrassment for the local monetary authorities than a respected 
meeting place for representatives of the RoC’s entrepreneurs and investors. But despite this 
official contempt, the story of securities reform in Taiwan holds a place which is no less 
important, or for that matter less intriguing, than liberalization of the island’s banking industry 
or foreign exchange system Indeed, according to some economists, domestic capital market 
reform is the linchpin of all other financial reform efforts. Serious studies fust published in the 
mid 1980s, for example, argue that a lack of securities development can turn any other financial 
reform initiative into a second-best option.3
In the previous chapter of the thesis we examined the general character of the KMT regime 
and the policy elites who aspired to work within the ruling party. In the present chapter we are 
putting our theory of technocrat leadership to the test for the first time -  one of three such case 
study chapters in this thesis. Our focus of inquiry starts with the process of securities reform 
that lasted from around 1980 to the early 1990s. This remarkably slow and incremental pattern 
of reform initially arose because the so-called ‘development technocrats’ -  a loosely organized 
group of state officials lead by technology guru Li Kwoh-ting -  choose to take up the 
liberalization agenda in the early 1980s and run with it. This much of the story is an historical 
tale of individual ideas and effort. However, the story of when and how Li’s team of 
technocrats was able to act is part of a generalizable account of KMT preferences and strategies.
1 See for example: Anthony Rowley, Asian Stockmarkets: The Inside Story (Hong Kong: Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 1987), chp. 4.
2 Interview in Taipei with John Pickles, Director of Research, Asian Pacific Research Ltd., Pacific 
Consulting Group, 24 April 1996.
3 Yoon Je Cho, ‘Inefficiencies from Financial Liberalization in the Absence of Well-Functioning Equity 
Markets’ in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Vol. 18, No. 2 (May 1986).
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In chapter 1 of the thesis I argued that for technocrats4 to be ultimately successful with financial 
reform, two kinds of ‘policy window’ need to be open within their referent political party: a 
socio-political window generated by a reconfiguration of, or challenge to, the ruling political 
party’s social support base; and a sectoral-strategy window created by any perceived failure of 
established financial policy to realize the party’s sectoral goals.5 In this chapter, I will 
demonstrate that the pattern of securities reform in Taiwan was long and measured because 
these two policy windows opened almost eight years apart. As we will see in later chapters of 
the thesis, this temporal spread of opportunities was radically different to reform efforts in the 
fields of foreign exchange administration or banking -  a critical difference which explains the 
alternative processes of change experienced in those two areas.
The chapter is composed of four main parts. In part one we review in some depth the 
process of securities policy reform I include an account of major steps in the reform cycle, and 
give due attention to institutional procedure so as to contextualize the raw regulatory data. In 
part two of the chapter we look behind the outcomes detailed in part one and commence our 
analysis of causal factors. This section includes an examination of the ideas and capabilities of 
the development technocrats, especially Li Kwoh-ting -  the original ‘policy hero’ of the 
securities reform story. Part three of the chapter examines the policy windows that emerged 
within the KMT over the course of the 1980s. In this section we temporarily sidestep the role of 
the development technocrats in reform and examine why KMT policy windows opened in 1980 
and 1987. Finally, part four of the chapter considers how the development technocrats 
capitalized on the KMT policy windows as they arose. This section includes an examination of 
the micro-politics of securities reform
1. The process of securities reform
We saw in chapter 1 that Taiwan’s shift in securities policy in the late 1980s was comprehensive 
and genuine, and similar in overall effect to reforms undertaken in the fields of foreign 
exchange and banking at around the same time. In terms of the way in which securities reform 
unfolded, however, the process of securities liberalization could not have been more different 
from the reform efforts undertaken in either of these other areas. In stark contrast to either forex 
or bank reform, the planning and execution of securities policy change was slow, methodical
4 From chapter 1: a technocrat is a state official who uses their claim to knowledge in some specialist 
area, or their ability to perform some specified function, to affirm their right to public office. See: Miguel 
A. Centeno and Particio Silva, ‘The Politics of Expertise in Latin America: Introduction’ in Miguel A. 
Centeno and Patricio Silva (eds.), The Politics of Expertise in Latin America (London: Macmillan Press, 
1998), chp. 1. See also: Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications, 1990), chp. 1.
3 A policy window is a political porthole or aperture through which entrepreneurial technocrats and their 
ideas can pass. The notion comes from: Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: 
Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), esp. 
chp. 1
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and pursued in an incremental fashion. Indeed, it took almost as much time and effort to reform 
the regulatory structure of securities in Taiwan as it did to set it up in the first place.
TABLE 3.1 Process of securities policy reform, 1980 to early 1990s
P h a se P e r io d R e g u la to r y  I n i t i a t i v e
T a k e o ff Apr 1980 
Jul 1981
Establishment of Fuh Hwa Securities Company. 
SEC moved from MoEA to MoF.
Late 1982 Plan to open TSE to foreign investment launched with SITEs.
D e v e lo p m e n t Early 1983 
Early 1984 
Aug 1985- 
Dec 1985 
Aug 1986
Committee review of SEL launched.
Institute of Securities Market Development established. 
New emphasis on market safety enters reform equation. 
Draft SEL submitted to EY.
EY backs Go-listed Campaign & Pre-listing Task Force.
Feb 1987 EY approves draft SEL. Presented to LY.
A p e x Jan 1988 SEL passed by LY and new law promulgated.
C o n s o lid a tio n May 1988 
Dec 1990- 
Late 1991
‘Criteria for the Establishment of Securities Firms’ issued. 
Foreign investment plan to 2nd & 3rd phase.
Local SITEs permitted.
Notes: TSE is the Taiwan Stock Exchange, SEC is the Securities Exchange Commission, MoEA is the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, MoF is the Ministry of Finance, SEL is the Securities Exchange Law, EY 
is the Executive Yuan, LY is the Legislative Yuan, and SITEs are securities investment trust enterprises. 
Sources: various, see especially: SEC Annual Report (Taipei: Securities Exchange Commission, Ministry 
of Finance, various issues), TSE Fact Book (Taipei: Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation, various issues); 
and Taiwan Zhengquan Shichang Ziyouhua yu Guojihua Yinying zhi Dao [The Purpose and Process of 
Liberalization and Internationalization of Taiwan’s Securities Markets] (Taipei: Zhonghua Minguo 
Zhengquan Shichang Fazhan Jijinhui, 1990), esp. chp. 1 & 3.
It is useful to see the historical process of securities liberalization in Taiwan as passing 
through four main phases of change (for a condensed catalogue, see Table 3.1).6 These include 
the takeoff phase (1980-83), the development phase (1983-88), the apex of reform (January 
1988), and the consolidation phase (1988-91 and beyond). The takeoff phase was a transitional 
period in which the regulatory authorities in Taiwan started to see securities liberalization as a 
serious policy option. Prior to 1980, securities regulation in Taiwan was a seesaw of market 
challenge and official crackdown in which wild gyrations in various legal and illegal securities 
markets were met with the introduction of progressively more restrictive laws and 
administrative standards. Historically, this balancing game had culminated in the passage of the 
Securities Exchange Law (SEL) of 1968. As we saw in chapter 1 of the thesis, the original SEL
6 Interpreting policy change as a process of distinguishable phases is a well-established tradition in the 
political and policy sciences. See esp.: David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); and Brian W. Hogwood and Lewis A. Gunn, Policy 
Analysis for the Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). I use the model purely as a 
heuristic ordering device and make no claim for its theoretical merit.
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was an illiberal document that rendered the issuance and trading of securities in Taiwan a highly 
exclusive practice. Despite the semblance o f development that the introduction of this legal 
framework symbolized, it placed a tight cap on securatization in the RoC. Over the 1970s, the 
authorities occasionally tinkered with the SEL, however, no major change was ever seriously 
contemplated.7
In the three years from 1980 to 1983, official thinking gradually congealed around the idea 
that the regulatory framework for securities had to change. This adjustment in outlook was 
marked by three discontinuous reform moves. The first sign of a break with the past came in 
April 1980 with the establishment of the Fuh Hwa Securities Finance Company (Fuhua 
Zhengquan Jinrong Gongsi). Fuh Hwa was introduced as part of an overhaul of margin 
transactions on the local bourse. The old restrictive arrangement with the state-owned banks 
was replaced with a system which made licensed brokers commissioned agents of Fuh Hwa -  a 
move which legitimated illegal broker assisted stock purchases and preempted a dramatic 
increase of margin financing.8 The flurry of activity that surrounded the introduction of Fuh- 
Hwa was followed by more than 12 months of inactivity. In July 1981, however, the Executive 
Yuan transferred the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) from the control of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs (MoEA) to the Ministry of Finance (MoF). While no specific reason was 
given for the initiative, most observers believed that it was a prelude to a comprehensive 
overhaul of the securities sector. Finance commentators reasoned that the Ministry of Finance, 
with its oversight responsibilities for RoC financial institutions, was a more appropriate base for 
planning the expansion of securities finance.9 And finally, in late 1982, a staggered opening of 
the TSE to foreign investment was announced. In the first step of a three stage process of 
liberalizing the market,10 four ‘securities investment trust enterprises’ (SITEs -  zhengquan touzi 
xintuo gongsi) were to be established to issue beneficiary certificates abroad and invest in the 
local stock exchange. These mutual funds would be managed by foreigners but retain majority 
local ownership.11
7 For a review of these early developments, see: Antoine W. van Agtmael, Emerging Securities Markets: 
Investment Banking Opportunities in the Developing World (London: Euromoney Publications, 1984), p. 
88; and Securities Markets in Asia and Oceania, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Asian Securities Analysts Council, 
1988), p. 515.
8 See: Fuhua Zhengquan Jinrong Youxian Gongsi, 84 Niandu [Fuh Hwa Securities Finance Company, 
Ltd. Annual Report 1995] (Taipei: Fuh Hwa Securities Finance Company, 1995), p. 9; Far Eastern 
Economic Review (5 December 1980), p. 117-118; and RoC Securities Market Annual, 1992 (Taipei: 
Institute of Securities and Futures Markets Development, 1992), p. 79.
9 RoC Securities Market Annual, 1993 (Taipei: Institute of Securities and Futures Markets Development, 
1993), p. 68; Far Eastern Economic Review (28 August 1981), p. 87; and Far Eastern Economic Review 
(20 November 1981), p. 84.
10 Under the plan, local securities markets were to be opened in the following order: first to foreign 
mutual funds, second to foreign institutional investors, and third to individual foreign citizens. For 
details, see: Introduction to the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (Taipei: Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Corporation, 1993), p. 18-19.
11 The preparatory work involved in this cautious policy shift dragged into late 1983, and in November 
the now famous ‘Taiwan RoC Fund’ was launched under the management of the International Investment 
Trust Company. As stage one of the liberalization plan commenced, no specific timetable for the 
implementation of stages two and three was given. King Pu, ‘Prospects are Bright for Foreign Investment
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In the development phase of securities reform (1983-88) the regulatory authorities in 
Taiwan gradually constructed a cohesive strategy for change. Just as the takeoff phase of 
reform had been protracted and discontinuous, so too was this second stage, however the 
development phase was marked by a heightened sense of purpose. In early 1983, after receiving 
the go-ahead from the Executive Yuan, the Ministry of Finance and the Securities Exchange 
Commission invited a number of scholars and finance practitioners to conduct workshops on 
improving the Securities Exchange Law. It was hoped that the outcome of the workshops 
would be a comprehensive rewrite of the existing legal framework.12 The committee review 
process proceeded in a staggered manner over the next three years, taking on board new players 
and incorporating new interests along the way. In the second half of 1983 the general upsurge 
in the economy and the stock exchange generated demands among Taiwan’s small collection of 
brokers for an increase in commission fees.13 Seizing the opportunity to link this lobby effort to 
the reform agenda, the Securities Exchange Commission tied increases in brokers’ commissions 
to the creation of a new industry association, funded by mandatory broker contributions. The 
Institute of Securities Market Development (Zhengquan Shichang Fazhan Jijinhui) opened its 
doors in early 1984 and became actively involved in the on-going review of the SEL.14 
However, the boom conditions that had emboldened local brokers came to an abrupt end in 
early 1985. The 10th Credit Cooperative scandal (an event which we will examine in more 
depth in chapter 5) placed the question of market safety on the agenda. Stronger penalties for 
insider trading and market manipulation were included in the evolving draft of the SEL, as were 
greater policing powers for the Securities Exchange Commission. Dovetailing with these legal 
provisions, a program to computerize TSE trading was launched in August 1985 (and concluded 
in May 1987).15
While computer assisted trading was being introduced, a final draft of the new Securities 
Exchange Law was produced. After nearly three years of committee work, the Ministry of
in the Local Stock Market’ in Financial & Investment Yearbook, RoC 1983-84 (Taipei: China Economic 
News Service, 1984); and Far Eastern Economic Review (20 October 1983), p. 13.
12 The topics broached within these hearings covered the full spectrum of potential securities market 
reform. Official aims included: (1) improving Taiwan’s primary markets for stocks and bonds so that 
they may be utilized more effectively as a means for companies to raise funds, (2) improving the 
secondary markets so that they may become a more desirable avenue for individual and corporate 
investment, and (3) raising the quality of service provided by companies in the securities industry to 
increase general market participation by both investors and issuing companies. See: RoC Securities 
Market Annual, 1993, fn. 9, p. 69.
13 Far Eastern Economic Review (22 March 1984), p. 63-64.
14 Interview in Taipei with Dr Chung-hsing Chen, President, Institute of Securities and Futures Markets 
Development, 30 August 1996. The Institute of Securities Market Development was renamed the 
Institute of Securities and Futures Markets Development in 1992 with the introduction of the Foreign 
Futures Trading Law. Information on its current activities can be found at http://www.sfi.org.tw/newsfi/ 
[home page of the Institute of Securities and Futures Markets Development] -  viewed on 2 September 
2000 .
lr> Claire Chen, ‘Only a Healthy Market Can Guarantee Progress: Interview with Shen Pe-ling, Chairman 
of the Securities Exchange Commission’ in Financial and Investment Yearbook, RoC 1987 (Taipei: China 
Economic News Service, 1987), p. 107. For information on the computerization of the TSE, see: Taiwan
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Finance submitted the amended law to the Executive Yuan for approval in December 1985. For 
much of the following year, the Executive Yuan held the document in abeyance while the stock 
market and the wider economy began to experience a dramatic upturn.16 However, as a signal 
that the government had not lost sight of the reform agenda, in August 1986 the Executive Yuan 
issued a call for more companies to list on the stock market.17 Immediately after this edict, the 
Securities Exchange Commission launched the so-called ‘Go-listed Campaign’ and established 
the ‘Pre-listing Orientation Task Force.’18 Several months later (5 February 1987) the 
Executive Yuan approved the draft Securities Exchange Law. Cabinet revisions had been 
minimal, and it was now up to the Legislative Yuan to decide the fate of securities reform in 
Taiwan.19 Upon reaching the Legislative Yuan, passage of the new law became politicized, 
leading to one final addition to the document. The freeze on brokerage licenses became a major 
issue of contention between the Executive Yuan and the legislators, tying-up passage of the 
statute for the next 12 months. The Executive Yuan resisted the Legislative Yuan’s requests to 
grant new licenses, and legislators responded by refusing to vote on the new securities law. 
Eventually Cabinet adopted a carrot and stick strategy: it gave ground on the license question, 
but threatened an investigation of business activities on the TSE. As a number of legislators 
were major players in the stock market, the Legislative Yuan soon moved to ratify the bill.20 
The amended Securities Exchange Law was finally passed on 12 January 1988 and promulgated 
almost immediately thereafter.
The passage of the new Securities Exchange Law heralded the apex of securities reform in 
Taiwan and, as shown in chapter 1, foreshadowed the beginning of a more open, more inclusive 
securities sector. The final document contained less than the early reform workshops had hoped 
for due to legal restrictions on the extent of permissible amendment.21 It was also a slightly 
different animal to the law originally envisaged: various changes along the way had added new
Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo, 76 Niandu Nianbao [Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Annual Report 1987] 
(Taipei: Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation, 1987), p. 22.
16 For an overview of the wacky economics of the TSE during this period, see: Jih-chu Lee, ‘Taiwan 
Gupiao Shichang Chigu Xingwei zhi Shizheng Yanjiu’ [An Empirical Study of Stock Holding Behavior 
in the Taiwan Stock Market: 1986-90] in Journal of Financial Studies Vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1995).
17 SEC Annual Report, 1986 (Taipei: Security and Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, 1987), p. 
83.
18 The ‘Go-listed Campaign’ called for a doubling of listed companies in five years. The ‘Pre-listing 
Orientation Task Force’ was an incubator-style resource to provide advice and support to potential listees. 
See: Taiwan Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo, 77 Niandu Nianbao [Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Annual 
Report 1988] (Taipei: Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation, 1988), p. 17.
19 See: Taiwan Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo, 76 Niandu Nianbao [Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Annual 
Report 1987], fn. 15, p. 38.
20 Details of these events are recorded in: Mark Tung, ‘Stock Brokerage Houses: Time to Lift the License 
Ban’ in Financial and Investment Yearbook, RoC 1988 (Taipei: China Economic News Service, 1988), p. 
118; and Claire Chen, ‘Boom, Bust and Recovery: A Year to Remember, or Forget’ in Financial and 
Investment Yearbook, RoC 1988 (Taipei: China Economic News Service, 1988), p. 108. See also: 
Zhongguo Shibao [China Times] (16 September 1987), p. 2.
21 ‘The reforms that were made to the SEL represented no more than one third of the total document as 
changes in excess of this proportion require the development and passage of a new law. The 1988 
changes were, therefore, only a portion of what we wanted to achieve.’ Interview in Taipei with Dr 
Chung-hsing Chen, President, Institute of Securities and Futures Markets Development, 30 August 1996.
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issues and new players to the text of the document. In the end, however, the proposed changes 
encompassed more than one third of the original Securities Exchange Law, or some 60 new 
articles. Upon receipt of the revised law, the Securities Exchange Commission outlined the 
eight key areas of reform These included new provisions for: company disclosure, auditing, 
issuance of stocks and bonds (together with a range of new instruments), margin transactions, 
illegal transactions, insider trading, punishment of securities-related offences, and securities 
underwriting, dealing and trading.22 In total, these changes represented a radical break with the 
past. After nearly five years in development, and a further three years prior to that surveying 
the options, Taiwan could finally claim to be taking the issue of securities reform seriously.
In the consolidation phase of the reform process, the regulatory authorities in Taiwan 
gradually moved to strengthen and secure the new regime. In early May 1988 the Securities 
Exchange Commission promulgated the Criteria for the Establishment of Securities Firms and 
began accepting applications for new securities company licenses.23 By the end of 1989 there 
were more brokers in Taiwan than companies listed on the stock exchange - 3 7 3  licensed 
brokers and 41 integrated securities houses.24 Thereafter, the collapse of the stock market in 
February 1990 saw nearly 100 securities firms close their doors; the fledgling securities 
business would face hard times well into the middle of the 1990s. As the decade progressed, 
however, lackluster activity in local markets occasioned a series of follow-up reforms. These 
episodes of regulatory change were the logical conclusion of the reform process started more 
than a decade before with the introduction of the Fuh Hwa Securities Finance Company. In 
December 1990, for example, the government sought to expedite plans to allow foreign 
portfolio investment in local markets. The Executive Yuan promulgated an amended version of 
the Regulations Governing Securities Investment by Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investors, 
and in the new year the Securities Exchange Commission began accepting applications from 
foreign institutional investors. With these players firmly established in local markets by the 
middle of the decade, individual foreigners were also given access.25 A similar story can be told 
for mutual funds. In late 1991, the Securities Exchange Commission sought to expand the role 
of the securities investment and trust enterprises in the local market. After receiving permission 
from the Executive Yuan, the Commission started accepting applications for the establishment 
of domestic enterprises. In January 1992 the Securities Commission nominally approved the 
entry of 11 new enterprises, all owned and operated by local consortiums.26
22 From: Zhongguo Shibao [China Times] (13 January 1988), p. 1.
23 Gongshang Shibao [Commercial Times] (3 May 1988), p. 17; and Gongshang Shibao [Commercial 
Times] (6 May 1988), p. 16.
24 For details see: TSE Fact Book, 1990 (Taipei: Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation, 1991), p. 55.
25 See: Peter Harmsen, ‘Foreign Funds to Change Taiex’ in China Post (5 August 1996), p. 12.
26 See: Danny Chan, T992 Exposed: The Stockmarket’s Hidden Structural Problems’ in Financial and 
Investment Yearbook, RoC 1993 (Taipei: China Economic News Service, 1993), p. 65-66.
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2. The development technocrats and the rationale for change
The account of securities reform in Taiwan given above confirms that the process of policy 
change was remarkably slow and incremental. While the final passage of the new Securities 
Exchange Law in early 1988 was somewhat more significant than other steps in the process, the 
sequence of four phases took more than a decade to complete and comprised no sharp, 
unexpected climax. This course of policy adjustment stands in sharp contrast to the remaining 
episodes of financial reform As we shall see in the next chapter, for example, the liberalization 
of the foreign exchange system covered a period of just three to four years, and was pursued in 
an urgent and energetic manner. There is, therefore, nothing intrinsic to Taiwan that implied 
that securities opening on the island had to be slow and incremental. Further, there is nothing 
intrinsic to securities administration per se that suggests reform in Taiwan had to follow this 
pattern. In countries such as the United Kingdom and France (countries with financial systems 
substantially more complex than Taiwan’s), securities reform was pushed through with all the 
Taylorite efficiency of an industrial assembly line.27 Compared with these expeditious 
examples, securities liberalization in Taiwan was not so much a big bang as a protracted 
whimper.
So what explains the process of securities reform in Taiwan? To be sure, aspects of the 
reform process can be explained with the standard theoretical tools we reviewed earlier in the 
study.28 This being said, the established theoretical approaches all fail dismally in explaining 
why the overall pattern of securities reform was slow-paced rather than a sharp spike of activity. 
They are particularly poor in explaining why the combined period for the takeoff and 
development phases of securities reform totaled nearly eight years, and simply ‘melded’ into the 
apex of reform with seamless continuity. Indeed, when the amended Securities Exchange Law 
was finally passed in 1988, the reform process had been going on so long that the introduction 
of the new regulatory framework appeared inevitable and therefore unspectacular.29 It is a 
broad theme of this study that liberalization of financial regulation occurs because of 
‘technocrat leadership.’ Reform first arises as a conceptual strategy because well-positioned
27 As recorded respectively in: Steven K. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in 
Advanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), chp. 5; and Jacques Melitz, 
‘Financial Deregulation in France’ in European Economic Review Vol. 34 (1990).
28 The theories include: the market-driven approach, statist analysis, pluralism and the foreign pressures 
model. See chapter 1, part two. Leading examples of these four theories include respectively: Richard 
O’Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992); Louis 
W. Pauly, Opening Financial Markets: Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1988); Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989); and Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From 
Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
29 Newspaper articles in Taiwan regarding the passage of the amended SEL were inclined to be simple 
information reports (of the this-is-what’s-happened variety) rather than analyses of the implications of the 
new legal framework. There were no editorials on the topic, no lead-up stories, and front-page coverage 
was only attained in most major newspapers on the single day after the event. It is fairly obvious from 
reading the few available reports that by 1988, the press in Taiwan saw securities reform as an old issue. 
See for example: 7.hongguo Shibao [China Times] (13 January 1988), p. 1; and Jingji Ribao [Economic
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public officials decide to take up the reform agenda and run with it. We will see below that the 
development of the securities reform agenda owed much to the ideas and effort of the 
‘development technocrats’ -  a loosely bound group of officials that counted among their 
number technology guru Li Kwoh-ting. These individuals were motivated by a belief that 
technological upgrading in Taiwan was strongly dependent on the development of more mature 
capital markets on the island. This thinking had gelled into a cohesive strategy as the 1980s 
opened, and was subject to refinement and revision as the decade progressed.
But while the origin of securities reform is a tale of technocrat ideas and effort, the story of 
when and how these individuals were able to act is a study in KMT politics. In chapter 1 of the 
thesis I argued that for technocrats to be ultimately successful with financial reform, two kinds 
of ‘policy window’ need to be open within their referent political party: a broad socio-political 
window and a narrow sectoral-strategy window. I argue below that the pattern of securities 
reform in Taiwan followed the course detailed in part one of this chapter because insofar as this 
sub-sector of finance was concerned, these two windows o f opportunity opened almost eight 
years apart. In a manner that compares starkly with forex reform and to a significant extent 
with bank liberalization, the temporal spread of party political opportunities that faced the likes 
of Li Kwoh-ting was wide and discontinuous. The development technocrat’s reform agenda got 
off the ground in 1980 because it was seen as an effective means of securing middle class 
support for the KMT in the face of growing competition from the opposition dangwai (socio­
political window opens). Reform reached its apex and moved to the consolidation phase after 
1987 because the systemic character of local securities markets at that time radically breached 
the ruling party’s preference for a stable and controllable financial system (sectoral-strategy 
window opens). The amount of time involved between these two windows meant that the 
development technocrats had no other choice but to make securities liberalization a measured 
and methodical exercise.
The development technocrats30 were distinguishable as a group by their exclusive interest in 
the growth and structural upgrading of Taiwan’s real economy. For them, the object of 
economic policy in general and financial policy in particular was to improve the basic 
conditions of production in tradable and non-tradable goods. Although they differed widely on 
policy prescriptions, they were united in seeing Taiwan’s central economic task as industrial 
catch-up -  first with Japan and then economies outside the region.31 The role of the financial
Daily News] (13 January 1988). The contrast with newspaper and magazine coverage of the banking and 
forex reform episodes could not be more pronounced.
30 As noted in chapter 1 of the study, the development technocrats were a latter-day version of the 
‘industrializing reformers’ -  a group that had been influential during the shift to export oriented 
industrialization in the early 1960s. See: Stephan Haggard and Chien-kuo Pang, ‘The Transition to 
Export-Led Growth in Taiwan’ in Joel D. Aberbach, David Dollar and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (eds.), Hie 
Role of the State in Taiwan’s Development (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 68-69.
31 Elements of the ‘flying geese’ theory of industrialization are apparent here. See esp.: Bruce 
Cummings, The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sector, 
Product Cycles and Political Consequences’ in International Organization Vol. 38, No. 1 (Winter 1984).
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sector (and the service industry more broadly) in this process was subordinate, and revolved 
around one key goal: sustaining investment in progressively more sophisticated manufacturing. 
By the end of the 1970s, the development technocrats had acquired a spiritual mentor in 
technology expert and seasoned economics administrator Li Kwoh-ting (Li Guo-ding), and were 
occasionally referred to as the ‘KT Faction’ (AT Pa/).32 While similar to the rest of Taiwan’s 
senior technocrats in their level of competence, relationship to the KMT regime and overall 
outlook (see arguments in chapter 2, section three), they differed from other technocrats in 
several important ways. They were usually distinguishable as officials with: (1) an academic 
background in science, law, humanities or engineering, but rarely economics and almost never 
finance economics; (2) extended experience in the Ministry of Economic Affairs or the Ministry 
of Finance, but rarely the Central Bank of China or the economic commissions of the Executive 
Yuan; and (3) experience as a manager in one of Taiwan’s state-owned enterprises, typically 
those with large economies of scale such as Cliina Steel (Zhong Gang) but only rarely the state- 
owned banks. In a manner that seems to have eluded the other policy elites covered in this 
study, a small number of the development technocrats managed to acquire a high level of public 
respect and admiration in Taiwan. They were held in high regard for their ability to link 
economic progress with nationalist sentiment, their disregard for the personal costs associated 
with holding office, and their understanding of the need to be inclusive when pursuing policy 
change. There are parallels here with Arnold Harberger’s ‘policy heroes,’ although Harberger 
would have been uncomfortable with the sympathy for economic planning exhibited by some
-3-5
members of the group.
Beyond these broad similarities in policy outlook and career paths, the development 
technocrats were a diverse and fragmented group encompassing elites with a notable dirigiste 
bent as well as those with a far more liberal approach to economic management. Among those 
with statist leanings -  aside from Li Kwoh-ting himself -  we can count the likes of Chao Yao- 
tung, Y.S. Sun and Lee Ta-hai. Occasionally these individuals and their immediate followers 
were called the qiangguo pai (the strong country faction), although by the mid to late 1980s this 
title had begun to sound a little passe and was less and less relevant to the policy agenda they 
advanced.34 Among the development technocrats with less faith in the efficacy of state 
intervention we can include Hsu Li-teh (more on him below), Loh Jen-kang, Wang Chou-ming 
and quite a few younger officials, including such aspirants as Patrick Pai, Shen Pe-ling and C.P.
Debate on the accuracy of Cuming’s product cycle hypothesis has attracted some interesting research on 
regional development in Pacific Asia. See for example: Mitchell Bernard and John Ravenhill, ‘Beyond 
Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionalization, Hierarchy and the Industrialization of East Asia’ in 
World Politics Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1995).
32 Jun Wang, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [Finance Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and 
Travels] (Taipei: Sunbright Publishing Company, 1999), p. 248.
33 Arnold C. Harberger, ‘Secrets of Success: A Handful of Heroes’ in The American Economic Review 
Vol. 83, No. 2 (May, 1993).
34 See: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 June 1986), p. 12-20.
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Chang.?s For many of these latter individuals, association with the development technocrats 
was probably as much a question of strategic identification as a matter of policy preference. 
With little or no economic training and none of the social network ties that defined other 
factions within Taiwan’s technocracy (more in the following chapters), association with the 
development technocrats was in large measure a default position. Reflecting the development 
technocrats’ diverse constitution, the group maintained an eclectic mix of relationships with 
Taiwan’s academic community. Occasionally they sought the advice of high profile neo­
classical economists such as Liu Ta-chung, Tsiang Sho-chieh and John Fei, while at other times, 
economists with near-structuralist leanings like Wang Tso-jung were invited into the circle.36 
By and large, there was little formal pattern in the character of these links, and nothing that 
approached the form of a permanent institutional connection.
The leading light of the development technocrats and the man singularly most responsible 
for securities reform in Taiwan was the charismatic Li Kwoh-ting. Li was a Renaissance man 
with interests and capabilities in an incredibly wide range of areas. His academic interests 
stretched from theoretical science and civil engineering on the one hand, to development 
economics and social ethics on the other. Although his only formal qualification was an 
undergraduate science degree attained on the mainland in the 1920s, at various times Li held 
research and teaching positions at Cambridge University, King’s College in London, the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, New York State University, Sung Kyun Kwan University in 
South Korea, National Taiwan University and many others. Over his career, he was granted 
more than half a dozen honorary degrees, including a Doctor of Science from National 
Chengchi University in Taipei (awarded in 1983), a Ph.D. in engineering from National Chiao 
Tung University in Hsinchu (1989) and a Doctor of Laws from Boston University (1991).37 
Li’s employment history was typical for a member of the development technocrats. Before 
being promoted to the position o f Minister of Economic Affairs in 1965, Li held senior positions 
in the Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation (a state-owned enterprise), the Industrial Development 
Commission, the Council for United States Aid and the Council for International Economic 
Cooperation and Development. After serving for four years as Minister of Economic Affairs 
(1965-69), he was appointed to the position of Minister of Finance, a post he held till 1976. In 
subsequent years, Li ascended to the murky heights of the KMT policy machinery, taking up a
35 See personal interviews with these individuals in: Financial & Investment Yearbook, RoC (Taipei: 
China Economic News Service, various issues, 1980s).
36 The ideological gulf between these two groups should not be exaggerated, but it remained a significant 
feature of the economics profession through the late 1980s. See John Fei’s elaboration of the key 
disagreements between himself and Wang Tso-jung in: John C.H. Fei, ‘Wang Zuo-rong Xiansheng he Wo 
de Shier Da Guannian Tuili’ [An Examination of the Twelve Ideological Differences Between Mr Wang 
Tso-jung and Myself] in Lianhe Yuekan [United Monthly] Vol. 14 (1982). For an interesting article on 
the intluence of structuralism in Taiwan (and its ultimate rejection by policy makers) see: Chi-ming Hou, 
‘The Structuralists, the Neoclassicists and Industrial Upgrading in the Republic of China’ in Industry of 
Free China Vol. 63, No. 2 (February 1985).
37 From: Republic of China Yearbook, 1996 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1996), p. 516.
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position as Minister of State on the Executive Yuan (X'ingzhengyuan Zhengwu Weiyuan).3* 
Retaining this position until the late 1980s, Li concurrently held posts on the Central Advisory 
Committee of the KMT, the Council for Economic Planning and Development and seemingly 
countless other consultative committees and boards.39
Apart from senior statesman Li Kwoh-ting, it is difficult to point to any other key player 
within the development technocrats who had sustained involvement in securities opening (it will 
be remembered that the securities reform process covered more than a decade -  we might 
expect individuals to come and go over this timeframe). While the development technocrats as 
a group were the driving force behind the overall securities reform story, the actual ‘policy 
heroes’ among them were few in number. This being said, one other player is certainly worthy 
of mention up front: the enigmatic Hsu Li-teh (Xu Li-de). The historical record of Hsu Li-teh’s 
contribution to financial reform in Taiwan has been sadly obscured by the 10th Credit 
Cooperative scandal of 1985, an event that Hsu had the misfortune to be strongly connected 
with. This incident cost Hsu his job as Minister of Economic Affairs in March of that year, and 
cast a black cloud over his time as Minister of Finance in the early years of the decade.40 To 
this day, it is not clear whether the 10th Credit Cooperative scandal had any direct link to Hsu 
per se -  he resigned taking ‘moral responsibility’ for the incident -  or was simply a case of guilt 
by association.41 Either way, Hsu never fully recovered the public’s trust over the matter, and 
failed to receive due recognition for his exceptional administrative work in the first half of the 
1980s.
In both thought and deed, Hsu Li-teh was a generalist civil servant driven by a sincere 
desire to serve the nation. Academically, Hsu saw the world through the eyes of an 
administrative analyst. In the late 1950s, he completed a Bachelor of Laws in public 
administration at the Taiwan Provincial College of Law and Commerce, and thereafter attained 
a Masters in Law at National Chengchi University. During a period of academic work in the 
1960s he produced a number of publications on public sector management.42 Some years later 
in his career, Hsu undertook an MPA at Harvard, and wrote prolifically on topics as diverse as
38 Zhengwu Weiyuan is often translated as ‘Minister Without Portfolio,’ a title that in my view demeans 
the respect and seniority associated with the Chinese term. Unless otherwise noted, I substitute the phrase 
Minister of State for Minister Without Portfolio.
39 Zhonghua Minguo Mingrenlu, Minguo 88 Nian [Who’s Who in the Republic of China, 19991 (Taipei: 
Central News Agency, 1999), p. 57.
40 Far Eastern Economic Review (21 March 1985), p. 150-153.
41 I am inclined to believe the latter. On more than one occasion, Hsu demonstrated poor judgment and 
bad timing. In a typical example, the defeat of Kuomintang candidate Lien Chan in the 2000 presidential 
election saw Hsu dragged from his car and beaten by an angry mob of Nationalist Party supporters. 
Whatever was he doing there?! See headline story from Taipei Times (20 March 2000) at 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/03/20/story/0000028484/ -  viewed on 9 September 2000.
42 Some of these publications became standard reference texts in public administration courses at RoC 
universities. See in particular: Li-teh Hsu, Renyuan Guanxi yu Guanli 3rd ed. [Personnel Relations and 
Management! (Taipei: Zhonghua Qiye Guanli Fazhan Zhongxin, 1985); and Li-teh Hsu et.al., Ruhe Zuo 
Lianghao de Zhuguan [How to Be a Good Director] (Taipei: Zhongguo Gonggong Xingzheng Chuban, 
1964).
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financial policy and development, consumer protection and the distribution of income.43 While 
Hsu was not drawn toward finance in the academic world, his career path through the RoC state 
and ruling party certainly prepared him for high-level work in that area. After four years 
working as a senior official in the Executive Yuan (where Hsu first met and befriended the elder 
Li Kwoh-ting), in 1976 Hsu was recruited to the position of Administrative Vice Minister in the 
Ministry of Finance. He held this position for just two years before being made Commissioner 
of the Department of Finance in the Taiwan Provincial Government. Having proved his metal 
in that job, Hsu then took up the Finance Minister’s position in 1981 and stayed there till 1984, 
when he was made Minister of Economic Affairs. Interrupted by the 10th Credit Cooperative 
scandal in 1985, Hsu’s hitherto spectacular career then underwent a brief hiatus before being 
‘restored’ toward the end of the decade. After that, he held numerous positions inside the 
government and ruling party, including chair of the Central Finance Committee of the KMT, 
Vice Premier of the Executive Yuan, chair of the Council for Planning and Economic 
Development and member of the KMT Central Standing Committee.44
As some of the more dirigiste policy makers among Taiwan’s technocracy, the development 
technocrats may seem an unlikely group to have played a starring role in the process of 
securities reform. Indeed, Li Kwoh-ting, as a long-time advocate of economic planning,45 only 
ever publicly addressed the issue of financial policy opening on a handful of occasions over the 
1980s.46 This said, the broader program for industrial development advanced by Li directly 
implied that the shackles on securities issuance and trading -  shackles Li himself had helped put 
in place during the 1960s while he was Minister of Economic Affairs -  had to come off. Over 
the decade of the 1970s, the development technocrats gradually constructed a rounded and 
coherent vision of the nation’s industrial future. They believed that the days when Taiwan 
could rely on low value-added manufacturing (clothing and textiles, toys, household electrical
43 For these topics, see respectively: Li-teh Hsu, Jinrong Shichang de Fazhan yu Fawang [Development 
and Prospects of the Financial Markets] (Taipei: Wenhua Chuban Zhongxin, 1994); Li-teh Hsu, 
Xiaofeizhe Baohu Linian yu Fawang [Consumer Protection: Concepts and Prospects] (Taipei: 
Xingzhengyuan Xiaofezhe Baohu Weiyuanhui, 1997); and Li-teh Hsu, Pingdeng yu Xiaolu [Equity and 
Efficiency] (Taipei: Guanta Chuban, 1989).
44 For a brief English overview, see CV material: ‘New Members of the Cabinet, Vice Premier, RoC, Mr 
Hsu Li-teh’ at http://park.org/Taiwan/Government/Events/June_Event/html/2e.html -  viewed on 9 
September 2000.
45 See esp.: Kwoh-ting Li and Wan-an Yeh, ‘Economic Planning in the Republic of China’ in Kwoh-ting 
Li and Tsong-shian Yu (eds.), Experiences and Lessons of Economic Development in Taiwan (Taipei: 
Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1982).
46 After the 1980s, however, Li wrote extensively on the topic. The content of these later publications 
demonstrate that while publicly Li gave the issue of financial reform an analytical backseat, he was fully 
aware of its importance and repercussions. Looking back in 1995, Li wrote: ‘Before the 1970s, the 
government employed strict regulations and administrative directives to ensure that limited resources 
were allocated in line with its development strategy and thereby achieve national goals. And the results 
were very encouraging. As the level of economic development got closer to the developed one [sic.], 
however, such an interventionist approach seemed less successful in accelerating the pace of 
development, but even squandered the economic potential. Therefore, when several factors promoted 
financial reform during the 1980s, the government took steps to liberalize its financial system.’ Kuo-ting 
Li, The Evolution of Policy Behind Taiwan ’s Development Success 2nd ed. (Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing Company, 1995), p. 124.
- 79 -
Chapter 3 Crafting Markets in Taiwan
appliances, etc.) to deliver the high export and high growth figures of the 1960s and early 1970s 
were fast drawing to a conclusion. Pointing to Taiwan’s rising cost structure, Li and others 
argued that the island had to make a conscious leap into the world of high-tech manufacturing, 
or run the risk of increasingly sluggish economic performance.47 By 1980, this message had 
become a refined marketing slogan that the development technocrats sold to just about anyone 
who would listen. In his capacity as senior minister, Li Kwoh-ting gave literally hundreds of 
guest speeches outlining his plans for Taiwan’s emergence as a leading international supplier of 
cutting-edge manufactures, including computers and electronics, biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical products, machine tools and advanced composite materials, among many 
others.48
This development agenda not only implied a need for new types of companies in Taiwan 
and a concerted national push on research and development (R&D) and higher education,49 it 
also implied that the RoC develop a radically different financial system Firms producing 
technology intensive products requiring long lead times, often with large economies of scale, 
have complex and variable financial needs. Typically, innovative companies will pass through 
four stages of enterprise development utilizing four different kinds of financial service: (1) the 
start-up phase, where innovative firms require venture capital support, (2) the growth phase, 
where they need so-called ‘mezzanine financing,’ usually through a limited dispersal of firm 
equity, (3) the consolidation phase, where they seek to have securities publicly dispersed and 
traded, and (4) the diversification stage, where they utilize the funds of standard financial 
intermediaries such as banks.50 At the start of the 1980s, Taiwan only possessed institutional 
facilities that could provide financial services at the fourth stage in the lifecycle of a technology 
intensive enterprise. Services relevant to the first three stages were either extremely poor or 
non-existent. While it is conceivable that direct government intervention could partially 
substitute for a venture capital industry, financing in the growth and consolidation phases of a 
high-tech firm’s development would need well-functioning primary and secondary markets for 
debt and equity. All things being equal, Taiwan’s leap into the world of high-tech
47 Initially, Li’s call for high-tech industrial upgrading was also tied to a call for ‘backward integration’ -  
i.e. more heavy industry, especially petrochemicals and metal processing. It is very conspicuous in Li 
Kwoh-ting’s writing that this associated agenda was dropped at the start of the 1980s. It is possible that 
the second oil shock had encouraged Li to reconsider his plans. See esp. the latter chapters of: Lu-dao 
Kang, Li Guo-ding Koushu Lishi, Huashuo Taiwan Jingyan [Li Kwoh-ting’s Oral History of the Taiwan 
Experience] (Taipei: Zhuoyue Publishing, 1993), esp. 10-12.
48 Kwoh-ting Li, Economic Transformation of Taiwan, RoC (London: Shepheard-Walwyn Publishers, 
1988), sect. 4, chp. 20-28.
49 See for example: Kwoh-ting Li, ‘New Business Concepts for the Dynamic 80s’ in Industry of Free 
China Vol. 56, No. 2 (August 1981).
50 For this process model of high-tech firm development and financial services, I am indebted to 
comments made by Mr Paul Hsu. Interview in Taipei with Mr Paul Hsu, Senior Partner, Lee and Li 
Attorneys at Law, 15 July 1999. For more information on the link between high-tech enterprises and 
securities markets in the Taiwan context, see: Kuo-shu Liang and Jin-ying Hou, ‘Wo Guo Jinrong Zhidu 
yu Jinrong Zhengce’ [RoC Financial System and Financial Policy] in Ziyou Zhongguo zhi Gongye 
[Industry of Free China] Vol. 61, No. 4 (April 1984); and An-ye Lin and Shi-wan Sun, Ruhe Xiezhu Wo
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manufacturing required a new securities sector. The development technocrats’ industrial policy 
agenda had inadvertently created urgent demand for securities reform.
But implied demand did not instantaneously equate to a comprehensive plan for securities 
policy change. It took time for the implications of the development technocrats’ industrial 
agenda to become apparent. Publicly at least, Li Kwoh-ting himself was not at the forefront of 
this process of ‘lateral’ policy innovation, but other development technocrats certainly were, 
most notably Hsu Li-teh.51 In ideational terms, the main contribution of Hsu and those close to 
him was to put flesh on the development technocrat’s implied securities reform agenda -  to 
describe what securities reform would actually look like and where it would fit in with other 
areas of RoC economic policy. In the opening years of the 1980s, Hsu and others were making 
strident calls for improving the ‘...financial system so that it can better support the growth and 
development of [the RoC] economy.’ Though he conceded Taiwan had the basic institutions 
of a modern securities sector (a stock market, a securities commission, a network of brokers, 
dealers and underwriters, etc.), Hsu saw these as wholly inadequate to the task of supporting 
industrial upgrading. He called for a radical overhaul of the existing framework: ‘We need 
more and better support systems and institutions, including a better defined legal framework for 
securities, better accounting standards and procedures, and more qualified CPAs, financial 
analysts, brokers, dealers and underwriters. In short, we need a whole new system of 
institutions and a variety of professionals to serve the needs of our capital market.’53 For Hsu 
and other development technocrats, the introduction of a new framework for securities issuance 
and trading was a central piece in a larger policy puzzle. The other pieces of this puzzle 
included comprehensive tax reform, a redefinition of the role of state-owned enterprises in the 
economy (including widespread privatization), and a total rethink of the conduct of monetary 
and fiscal policy on Taiwan. These pieces would gradually come together over the course of the 
1980s, forming a unified whole in which expanded private investment would gradually replace a 
shrinking government sector. Sometime in the 1990s, Taiwan would emerge as an advanced 
industrial economy with a finite role for government in the development process -  a vision that, 
in a number of fundamental ways, was ultimately realized.54
Guo Gao Keji Gongsi Shangshi Shanggui zhi Yanjiu [A Study of the Ways of Helping High-tech 
Companies List in the Taiwan Stock Market] (Taipei: Chunghua Institute for Economic Research, 1999).
51 Indeed, the clearest statement I could find of this issue-linkage was a speech delivered by Hsu in 1983: 
Li-teh Hsu, ‘Financial Reform in the RoC -  Employing a Financial System Designed to Spur the 
Development of Science and Technology’ [text of a speech delivered at the VIP Dinner of the US-RoC 
Economic Council in Phoenix, November 1983] in Li-teh Hsu, Xiandai Caizheng Zhengce Lunshuo 
[Fiscal Policy] (Taipei: Ministry of Finance, 1984). I am grateful to Mr Hsu Li-teh for bringing this 
article and other materials to my attention. Correspondence with Mr Hsu Li-teh, 20 July 2001.
52 Li-teh Hsu, ‘Current Initiatives of the Ministry of Finance’ in Industry of Free China Vol. 58, No. 1 
(July 1982), p. 15.
53 Hsu, ‘Current Initiatives of the Ministry of Finance,’ fn. 52, p. 16.
34 See esp.: Li-teh Hsu, ‘Dangqian Caizheng Sichao yu Wo Guo Caizheng Zhengce’ [Current Financial 
Trends and RoC Financial Policy] in Taiwan Zhengquan Shichang [Securities Markets of Taiwan] 
(Taipei: Ziyou Xinwen She, 1982).
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3. The KMT policy windows for securities reform, 1980 and 1987
While many of the ideas Li Kwoh-ting, Hsu Li-teh and the development technocrats were 
promoting seem perfectly reasonable now, for the time and context they were counterintuitive if 
not radical. On the face of it, the Taiwan economy had performed very well in the 1960s and 
1970s with a highly repressed securities sector. Was radical policy adjustment in the 1980s 
really so necessary? Although there was strong sympathy among other members of the 
economic technocracy for the program forwarded by Li and Hsu, at the start of the decade many 
insiders were urging caution.55 And not without good reason. The economic technocrats were 
well aware that securities reform in Taiwan was never going to be possible unless: (1) the KMT 
regime could see socio-political points to be scored by the exercise, and (2) reform could be 
shown to buttress the ruling party’s conservative finance goals. At least up to 1979, the 
prospects for the development technocrats to introduce their program for change looked less 
than ideal.
In due course, however, both of these ‘policy windows’ would open -  although much 
further apart than those seeking change would have liked. The first of the opportunities for 
reform came in 1980 when securities liberalization began to assume an air of political 
expediency for the ruling party. This emergent prospect had deep roots in Taiwan’s changing 
socio-economic structure. In the two decades to 1980, Taiwan recorded an average growth rate 
of an incredible 9.5% per annum -  among the highest in the world for those years.56 This 
sustained period of rapid development radically reconfigured the contours of the island’s 
economy, starting out as rural, agricultural and insular in the 1950s, by the late 1970s the 
Taiwan economy had become urban-centered, industrial and externally oriented (see economic 
indicators in Table 3.2). These broad socio-economic changes occasioned the emergence of a 
burgeoning middle class on the island. By 1980, measured in terms of income, more than half 
of the population could claim to be comfortably average.57 With a GNP per capital of around 
US$2,500 and the GINI coefficient at a very respectable .303, most people on Taiwan had 
transcended the widespread deprivation of the early 1950s and were exhibiting rising standards 
of consumption. At the start of the 1980s, for example, more than one in four people on the 
island maintained a registered motor vehicle, and there were more television sets than 
households.58 In addition to having satisfied basic material wants, Taiwan’s emerging middle
55 See comments by Premier Y. S. Sun. Yun-shuan Sun, ‘Science and Technology in Taiwan’s Future 
Development: Promise and Challenge’ in Industry of Free China Vol. 59, No. 4 (April 1983). 
i6 For a good overview of this period from an economic history perspective, see: Cal Clark, Taiwan’s 
Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1989), p. 174-196.
57 Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1986), p. 112. 
Gold cites a two-part magazine article on the emergence of Taiwan’s middle class and its political 
interests that is also worth reviewing. See consecutive issues of: Shibao Zazhi [Sunday Times Chinese 
Weekly] (25 July and 1 August 1984).
58 From: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1996 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
Executive Yuan, 1996), various sections; and Report on the Survey of Family Income and Expenditure in
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class was also increasingly well educated. By the end of the 1970s, nearly two thirds of those 
who finished nine years of compulsory education in Taiwan went on to senior high school, and 
around 45% of senior high graduates went on to tertiary education. In 1979, there were more 
than 100 institutions of higher learning on the island -  for a population of under 18 million, one 
of the largest number in the world at that time. 9
TABLE 3.2 Economic transformation on Taiwan -  GDP growth rates, sectoral 
composition and trade as percentage of GDP (selected years 1952-1980)
Period GDP Growth Agriculture Industry Services Total Trade
1952 12.0 32.2 19.7 48.1 22.1
1955 8.1 29.1 23.2 47.8 20.9
1960 6.3 28.5 26.9 44.6 30.5
1965 11.1 23.6 30.2 46.2 41.8
1970 11.4 15.5 36.8 47.7 60.8
1972 13.3 12.2 41.6 46.2 78.2
1974 1.2 12.4 40.7 46.9 96.6
1976 13.9 11.4 43.2 45.5 93.5
1978 13.6 9.4 45.2 45.4 98.5
1980 7.3 7.7 45.7 46.6 106.4
Sources: Statistical Abstract of National Income, Taiwan Area, RoC (Taipei: Directorate General of 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1996), various sections; and Quarterly National 
Economic Trends, Taiwan Area, RoC (Taipei: Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan, 1996), various sections.
While the emergence of a middle class in the mid to late 1970s by no means guaranteed the 
emergence of political activism on Taiwan -  i.e. there were plenty of other things that were 
driving people onto the streets -  the strong temporal correlation of these social phenomena 
cannot be dismissed as mere coincidence. Over the course of the 1970s, a new group of middle 
class intellectuals gradually came of age in Taiwan, and provided an ideational framework for 
popular discontent against the KMT’s authoritarian rule. Many of this new elite were ethnically 
Taiwanese from rural villages, had received training in the social sciences (in particular political 
science, law and economics) from universities in North America, and were strong advocates of 
Western democratic ideals.60 Their outspoken criticism of the government (typically channeled 
through quasi-legal journals and magazines like Xuezhe and Meilidao) struck a cord not only
Taiwan Area, RoC 1994 (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive 
Yuan, 1994).
59 Otto C.C. Lin, ‘Science and Technology Policy and Its Influence on Economic Development in 
Taiwan’ in Henry S. Rowen (ed ), Behind East Asian Growth: The Political and Social Foundations of 
Prosperity (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 188-190; and Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1987 (Taipei: 
Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, 1987), various sections.
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among the island’s dissident elements (including, at the extremes, advocates of Taiwanese 
independence), but also among the KMT’s own ranks. The internal reforms of the KMT that 
followed the rise to power of Chiang Ching-kuo -  first Premier in 1972, chair of the ruling party 
after Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 1975, and President of the RoC in 1978 -  inadvertently 
spawned a large group of talented Taiwanese technocrats and politicians within lower levels of 
the party. This group saw political opening as in their interest, and as the 1970s progressed, a 
number of them left the KMT to take up leading positions within the developing opposition 
movement.61
Loosely assembled under the banner of the dangwai (those political activists and local 
politicians literally ‘outside the party’), the opposition movement was emboldened by the RoC’s 
diplomatic setbacks over the 1970s, and found a practical outlet for its activism in the small 
number of competitive elections permitted by the ruling party. The RoC’s severance of formal 
ties with some 45 countries between 1970 and 1977 (from 68 to 23) and the loss of United 
Nations membership in 1971 was a challenge to the KMT’s exclusive right to govern, and made 
the ruling party an easy target for criticism by opposition intellectuals. Against this background, 
the November 1977 Provincial Assembly elections saw around 30% of the seats taken by 
dangwai delegates, and unexpectedly gave radicals within the opposition movement a 
predominant voice in strategy-making. Twelve months later, the US withdrew its recognition of 
the RoC and established full diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China. In response to 
this turn of events, the ruling party suspended a planned national election in late 1978, a 
decision that the opposition took to be an indefinite postponement. Over the course of 1979, the 
dangwai staged a series of increasingly heated demonstrations against the KMT regime’s 
decision, culminating in a violent confrontation with police in Kaohsiung at the end of the year. 
The regime responded swiftly and harshly to the incident by jailing the most radical of the 
opposition leaders. The upshot of this move was twofold: it strengthened the hand of moderate 
elements within the opposition movement, and at the same time increased broad sympathy for 
the dangwai's aims.62
The opening years of the 1980s witnessed the gradual consolidation of the dangwai as an 
enduring feature of Taiwan politics. Content that the opposition’s radical voice had been 
subdued with the Kaohsiung incident, in the middle of 1980 the KMT leadership sought to 
reinstate elections. In December, a ballot for supplementary seats in the Legislative Yuan was
60 See esp.: Mab Huang, Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-73 (Ann Arbor: 
Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976); and Tun-jen Cheng, ‘Democratizing the 
Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan’ in World Politics Vol. 41, No. 4 (July 1989), p. 483.
61 For detail on the organizational and personnel reforms of the Kuomintang initiated by Chiang Ching- 
kuo over the 1970s, see: Bruce J. Dickson, Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of 
Leninist Parties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 116-126.
62 See esp.: Huai-en Peng, Taiwan Fazhan de Zhengzhi Jingji Fenxi [The Political Economy of Taiwan’s 
Development] (Taipei: Fengyun Luntan Chubanshe, 1990), p. 216-220. See also: Ralph N. Clough, 
Island China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 153-154; and Cheng, 
‘Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,’ fn. 60, (July 1989), p. 486-487.
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held with dangwai and independent candidates gaining a quarter of the popular vote and 18% of 
the contested seats. Two years and several successful local elections later, the opposition 
movement went into another national election and walked away with a similar result. Fearing 
that the ruling party was becoming adept at manipulating internal divisions within the dangwai, 
in May 1984 the opposition leadership established a defacto secretariat -  the Association for 
Public Policy Research. This institute, while only quasi-legal, functioned to coordinate 
opposition election strategies and standardize internal policy making. To most onlookers, the 
formation of the Association was the first step toward the founding of a genuine opposition 
party on Taiwan; a precursor of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP -  Minjindang) formally 
established in late 1986 (see chapter 5, section three for these later developments).63
The rise of middle class opposition to KMT rule detailed above is often portrayed in the 
literature as one part of a larger account of democratization in Taiwan. While it is not the 
purpose of this study to delve too deeply into Taiwan’s ‘great transition,’64 a few comments on 
the broader process of political change are probably warranted before proceeding further. After 
O’Donnell and Schmitter, democratization may be understood to be a process in which the 
conventions and procedures of democratic rule are applied to political institutions previously 
subject to authoritarian or arbitrary means of control.65 Depending on where you start and finish 
the story, Taiwan’s process of democratization covers some of the 1970s, all of the 1980s, and 
most of the 1990s. Key transition points included the decision to lift martial law in 1987 (which 
confirmed the rights of free speech and due process in the courts) and the constitutional reforms 
of the early 1990s (which occasioned the return of elections for all political offices in the RoC 
state).66 In searching for an explanation of Taiwan’s democratic transition, authors have utilized
63 Several clarifications are warranted here. First, in the early 1980s, fear of government suppression 
meant that the distinction between dangwai and independents was often unclear. Particularly in the 1980 
election, only the very brave were willing to openly wear the dangwai label. For this reason I have 
included ballot results as a combined figure. This reduction becomes less justifiable as the decade 
progresses. Figures from: Yun-han Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National 
Policy Research, 1992), p. 53-58. Second, some scholars trace the organizational origins of the DPP to 
the establishment of the Taiwan Dangwai Corps on the eve of the aborted 1978 election rather than the 
establishment of the Association for Public Policy Research in 1984. Unless one is content to adopt a 
very open conception of a political party, the extremely loose structure of the Dangwai Corps (more an 
alliance than an organization) and its transient character make such an assertion questionable. For a view 
counter to the one put forward here, see: Xiao-feng Li, Taiwan Minzhu Yundong 40 Nian [Taiwan’s Forty 
Year Democratic Movement] (Taipei: Independent Evening News, 1988).
64 The title of Tien Hung-mao’s classic study: Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social 
Change in the Republic of China (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989).
65 From: Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, ‘Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain 
Democracies’ in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 
8. This definition conveniently bypasses the question of ‘What is democracy?’ For all its faults, the 
definition offered by Huntington still seems to me the most convincing. He defines a democratic political 
system as one in which ‘...the most powerful decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and 
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes in which virtually all the adult population 
is eligible to vote.’ Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the iMte Twentieth 
Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 7.
66 The list of works that provide an empirical record of Taiwan’s democratic transition is long. Among 
the classic studies in English we can include: Tien, The Great Transition, fn. 64; Chu, Crafting
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the full range of analytical tools, including: economistic arguments about the demand for 
political opening following a rise in living standards; quasi-constructivist arguments about 
governments’ long-term need to attach a sense of social legitimacy to their decisions; meso- 
level institutional arguments which point to the path-dependence of political reform while 
sidestepping the issue of ultimate cause; and ‘pure’ politics arguments about the strategic 
interaction between governing and opposing groups.67 Of these four explanations, the final one 
has proved the most popular, both in Taiwan and elsewhere.6X More so than any of the 
alternative explanations, it gives a crucial role to party politics in Taiwan’s democratization -  a 
position that best accords with empirical observation, and is, incidentally, broadly 
commensurate with the argument of this study.
But to return to more immediate concerns; the story of the rise of the dangwai on Taiwan 
portrayed above is in many ways an ironic tale. The KMT’s foresight in listening to the ‘right’ 
policy advice in the 1950s was at least partially responsible for Taiwan’s outstanding economic 
success, and it was this success that in turn led to middle class intellectual ferment in the 1970s 
and organized opposition in the early 1980s. While economic success sowed the seeds of 
opposition to KMT rule, it also opened up avenues for co-opting and manipulating such 
resistance. This convergence of events set the stage for the opening of a policy window for 
securities policy change. We noted in chapter 2 that the KMT’s social support base on Taiwan 
included an eclectic combination of socio-economic groups such as mainland immigrants, 
Taiwanese farmers and labor. The ruling party had learned quite early that these groups could 
be bought off or distracted with the appropriate mix of economic and financial policies (from 
chapter 2, section two). With the rise of the dangwai, the KMT moved to reconfigure its 
distributional coalition to include those agitated segments of the middle class. In the rural areas, 
this strategy was closely associated with the ruling party’s agricultural featherbedding. In 
addition to being a palliative for farmers, the decision to deepen the commitment to rural 
protection in the 1970s was also an effective means to win over the rural communities that were 
home to many dangwai intellectuals and activists. Although originally designed by technocrats 
from the Ministry of Agriculture as a legitimate rationalization of the industry, the so-called 
Second-stage Agricultural Land Reform (Dierge Nongye Ludi Gaige) ended-up as a vast slush- 
fund. By the early 1980s, virtually everyone living outside Taiwan’s main urban centers
Democracy in Taiwan, fn. 63; Peter R. Moody Jr., Political Change in Taiwan: A Study of Ruling Party 
Adaptability (New York: Praeger, 1992); Alan Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization 
(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe 1994); and Steven J. Hood, The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan 
(Boulder: Westview Press 1997). The 1992 Cheng and Haggard edited work is also widely regarded as a 
key contribution to the debate on Taiwanese democratization: Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard 
(eds.), Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder: Lynne Reinner 1992).
67 For overviews, see: Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan, fn. 63, p. 2-7.
And includes the exhaustive study by Professor Ji from the National Defence Administration College: 
Kuang-yu Ji, Zhonghua Minguo de Zhengzhi Fazhan: Minguo 38 Nian Lai de Bianqian [Political 
Development of RoC] (Taipei: Yangzhi Wenhua Chubanshe, 1996), esp. chp. 1.
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(Taipei, Kaohsiung, Tainan and Taichung) could expect to benefit from some form of ‘rural’ 
subsidy.69
While ‘buying in’ the rural middle class was largely a question of direct subsidization, 
bringing the richer and more sophisticated urban middle class into the ruling party’s 
distributional coalition was a tougher exercise. Co-opting this group required more subtle 
means. In this context, from the first year of the 1980s on, the ruling party began to look very 
seriously at the Taiwan Stock Exchange as a store of valuable social support among urban 
middle class Taiwanese. There were two aspects to this shift in political outlook. On the one 
hand, the plethora of individual investors in the local securities sector made it ideally suited to 
orchestrating an indirect side payment to the target group. In 1979-80, around 54% of investors 
on the Taiwan Stock Exchange were domestic individuals without any corporate connection, 
with the remainder shared between government agencies (around 25%), domestic corporate 
investors (18%) and foreign corporates (3-4%).70 By comparison, Western stock markets 
typically make-do with 15-20% individual investors; the lion’s share of investment is usually 
taken up by large mutual funds, pension funds and the like. Moreover, over the decade of the 
1970s, investors with portfolios valued between NT$1 and NT$ 10,000 (roughly US$250) held 
an average of more than 55% of the total market -  around a quarter of a million people in 1980. 
Investors with between NT$ 10,000 and NT50,000 held around 34% (around 200 thousand 
people), with the rest taken up by ‘big players.’71 Any regulatory change that could improve the 
investment opportunities of small participants in the market would have instant and wide appeal. 
Securities reform held extraordinary political potential for the KMT regime.
On the other hand, securities reform also held the potential to deliver more bang for fiscal 
outlay than just about any other form of accommodation strategy. In 1980-81, as Taiwan was 
reeling from the effects of the second oil shock, the capacity for engaging in a fiscal expansion 
to offset the rising demands of the urban middle class was decidedly limited. Bleak 
expectations about future domestic and world growth meant that a repeat of the Ten Major 
Development Projects of the 1970s was dismissed early on. Also out of the question was 
another program of direct subsidization ä la the Second-stage Agricultural Land Reform, or 
more preferential tax deals of the kind reserved for RoC military personnel and teachers. The
69 See esp.: Irene Bain, Agricultural Reform in Taiwan: From Here to Modernity? (Hong Kong: Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, 1993), chp. 2-4. See also: Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, ‘Agricultural Reforms 
in Taiwan and South Korea’ in John Borrego, Alejandro Alvarez Bejar, and Jomo K.S. (eds.), Capital, the 
State and Late Industrialization: Comparative Perspectives on the Pacific Rim (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1996).
70 As most companies in Taiwan at this time were family firms, we can legitimately assume that the figure 
for domestic corporate investors mentioned here actually included a large proportion of individual 
investors. Such people would have faced strong incentives to use their company name as a legal cover for 
their TSE investments so as to reduce personal liability and decrease tax. This implies that the already 
high figure for individual investors quoted here is probably strongly understated. Interviews in Taipei, 
1996 and 1999.
71 Figures from SEC Annual Report, 1984 (Taipei: Security and Exchange Commission, Ministry of 
Finance, 1985), p. 38; and TSE Fact Book, 1989 (Taipei: Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation, 1990), p. 
56.
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onset of recession in 1982 merely reinforced the unrelenting fiscal conservatism that had 
informed these policy choices.72 By contrast, securities reform was an easy option for the ruling 
Party. Simply by loosening the strictures on the issuance and listing of securities, and allowing 
more investors into the market, the government could preside over a major expansion of the 
sector with virtually no budgetary sacrifice. Further, while I can find no serious econometric 
analyses conducted on this question at the time, it is well understood in the economics literature 
that a rapid expansion of the stock market soon leads to improved overall economic 
performance. Dollar for dollar invested, the short-term multiplier effect of money poured into 
bonds and shares is consistently greater than similar quantities of investment in real estate, 
infrastructure, plant and equipment, or human capital development.73 Securities reform was not 
only politically palatable, it was also potentially efficient and effective as well.
It is apparent from the discussion above that a socio-political window of opportunity for 
securities reform gradually opened within the KMT regime at the start of the 1980s. For the 
first time in the history of RoC securities administration, reform became an important political 
tool for the ruling party; as a means to provide side payments to Taiwan’s newly politicized 
middle class, securities liberalization held enormous potential. We will examine in the 
following section of this chapter just how the development technocrats turned this chance for 
change into a discernible reform program, but for now the question remains: If securities reform 
became politically palatable for the ruling party around 1980, why did the actual reform process 
drag out for more than a decade? The short answer to this question is that there was nothing 
intrinsically wrong with the securities sector when reform first started. In purely economic 
terms, of course, Taiwan’s securities markets were an unmitigated disaster. They were totally 
inadequate to the task o f financing most established firms in Taiwan, not to mention the new 
breed of high-tech companies our development technocrats were eager to encourage. Local 
securities markets were also an extraordinarily risky place to store one’s savings; with no 
reliable way of assessing the performance of listed firms, investment decisions were more often 
than not purely a function of the herd instinct.74 However, in terms o f the sectoral priorities of
72 Various interviews with MoF and CBC officials in Taipei, 1996 and 1999. See also: CEPD, 
‘Macroeconomic Planning for Taiwan, Republic of China’ in Industry o f Free China Vol. 53, No. 6 (June 
1980), esp. p. 18-19 & 24; CEPD, ‘Prospects for Economic Development, Targets and Measures’ 
[excerpts from the RoC’s Four-Year Development Plan, 1982-‘85] in Industry of Free China Vol. 57, No. 
3 (March 1982); and Cheng-chi Chang, ‘RoC Fiscal Policy and Development Financing’ in Industry of 
Free China Vol. 52, No. 6 (December 1979). For a critique of the government’s fiscal conservatism at 
this time, see: Ching-huei Chang, ‘Public Finance’ in Gustav Ranis (ed.), Taiwan: From Developing to 
Mature Economy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
73 Indirectly, I am indebted to Dr. Cheng You-ping from Chung-hsing University for this point. Although 
Dr Cheng raised the issue in connection with government interventions in the stock market during the late 
1990s, the idea that there is a strong multiplier effect from an upturn in securities investment is basically 
the same. Interview in Taipei with Dr. Cheng You-ping, Associate Professor, Department of Public 
Administration, National Chung-hsing University, 26 March 1999.
74 According to mainstream economic theory, securities markets have two purposes: (1) to provide 
companies with a way of issuing shares, bonds and other financial instruments to people with funds to 
invest, and (2) to provide investors with a safe and reliable avenue for the buying and selling of shares 
and other securities instruments. Data provided in chapter 1, section one of this study and below suggest
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the ruling party, the local markets tor debt and equity were quite satisfactory. Insofar as 
securities transactions on Taiwan were diverted into relatively ‘safe’ channels, and the sector 
was comparatively small and isolated from the rest of the economy, the KMT regime’s 
preferences for a stable and controllable financial system were satisfied. That is to say, at the 
start of the 1980s, the ‘sectoral-strategy window’ for securities policy change was well and truly 
closed. Even though securities reform at that time had become expedient in a socio-political 
sense, it would take another eight years before reform would become an entirely judicious 
strategy for the ruling party.
For most onlookers, the operation of Taiwan’s securities markets in the pre-reform era was 
exemplified by the island’s main secondary market, the wild and unruly Taiwan Securities 
Exchange. From its establishment in the 1960s through the late 1980s, the TSE routinely 
exhibited strong fluctuations on all major trade indicators (see Table 3.3 for select TSE trade 
data).75 These figures give credence to the popular view of the old TSE as a ‘casino,’ a 
reputation that was well established by the time the development technocrats began talking 
about securities liberalization at the start of the 1980s.76 However, while the internal flows of 
the Exchange were chaotic, in broad structural terms Taiwan’s securities sector was consistent 
with the ruling party’s sectoral goals of stability and control, at least up to 1987. As suggested 
above, there were two features of the local securities sector that ensured this congruence. 
Firstly, the KMT regime had had considerable success domesticating or ‘sublimating’ the local 
trade in securities services. Usually this involved taking a widespread but illegal securities 
practice and transforming it into a tightly managed but legal process. This diversionary method 
had its origins in the 1950s.77 The virtual ban on securities trading at that time had ironically 
generated a thriving but illegal over-the-counter market in equities and bonds. Some of the 
most prized instruments in this spontaneous free market were, paradoxically, government 
securities issued as part of the monetary stabilization plan of the early 1950s (so-called
that in the early to mid 1980s, Taiwan’s securities markets failed dismally in performing either function. 
See: Edward W. Davis and John Pointon, Finance and the Firm: An Introduction to Corporate Finance, 
2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), esp. chp. 21 & 22.
75 For those interested in the economics of TSE volatility at this time, see: Si-cong Lin and Song-nan 
Chen, ‘Taiwan Gushi Gao Fudu Biandong deZhuyin yu Qidui Shehui Caifu ji Fuli Cuoshi de Yingxiang’ 
[The Real Causes of High Volatility in Taiwan’s Stock Market and its Impact on the Social Wealth and 
Welfare], report commissioned by the National Science Commission of the Executive Yuan, produced 
under the auspices of the Department of Finance Administration, National Zhongshan University (31 
January 1995).
76 See comments by Caldwell in the mid 1970s: J. Alexander Caldwell, ‘The Financial System in Taiwan’ 
in Asian Survey Vol. 16, No. 7 (August 1976), p. 742.
77 The practice of co-optation and diversion was not restricted to finance. Any outsider who has spend 
much time in Taiwan knows that the visa laws follow a similar pattern of evolution. A more transparent 
and closely researched case is policy for television and broadcasting. Early attempts to limit TV 
ownership and distribution (including an unwieldy TV licensing process) in the 1950s and 60s, for 
example, were scrapped when they were discovered to be unenforceable. Instead the government opted 
for control over broadcasting and maintained a controlling interest in the three free-to-air TV stations. 
See in particular: Fu-chu Li, ‘The Development of Television Broadcasting in Taiwan, RoC’ unpublished 
Masters manuscript, University of North Texas (1983); and Shi-guang Wen, Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi 
Fazhan Shi [The Development of Television Broadcasting in the RoC] (Taipei: Sanmin Shuju, 1983).
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Patriotic Bonds’) and the ‘land to the tiller program’ of 1954. Instead of cracking down on this 
emerging market, however, the KMT regime choose to channel it into a centralized institution -  
hence the Taiwan Securities Exchange was born. In terms of tlexibility, access and allocative 
efficiency, the new Exchange proved a poor substitute for the original over-the-counter market, 
but it was docile and easy to supervise. Over the 1960s, ‘competition’ from the centralized 
market partially offset the need for illegal alternatives, and securities trades in the underground
78economy gradually wound-down as a result.
TABLE 3.3 Summary trade data, TSE index, 1972-1993
Period Year Index High/Low Period Year Index High/Low
1972 161.15 228/125 1983 654.28 766/435
1973 371.73 515/226 1984 872.51 969/765
1974 349.20 498/189 1985 745.62 841/636
1975 317.48 429/190 1986 944.74 1,039/840
1976 343.04 417/258 1987 2,135.03 4,673/1,063
1977 362.45 450/314 1988 5,202.21 8,790/2,341
1978 554.13 689/448 1989 8,616.14 10,773/4,873
1979 560.51 659/502 1990 6,775.32 12,495/2,560
1980 564.91 560/480 1991 4,928.83 6,305/3,316
1981 548.84 601/503 1992 4,271.63 5,392/3,328
1982 477.20 546/421 1993 4,214.78 6,071/3,136
Notes: High/Low figures have been rounded to the nearest unit. TSE Index = (Pt*Qt/P0*Qt)* 100. Pt*Qt 
is the daily closing price listed stocks multiplied by the daily trading volume of those stock. P0*Qt is the 
daily trading price of listed stocks on the base year of calculation (1966) multiplied by the trading volume 
of those stock on the base year.
Source: Taiwan Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Zhengquan Tongji Ziliao, Minguo 84 Nian [Taiwan Stock 
Exchange Statistical Data 19951 (Taipei: Taiwan Stock Exchange, 1996).
The second feature of the local securities sector that ensured congruence with the ruling 
party’s finance goals concerned the sector’s size and external linkages. The Taiwan Securities 
Exchange and sibling markets were simply too small and detached to affect the remainder of the 
RoC financial system, much less the overall economy. We noted in the first chapter of the 
thesis that stocks and bonds constituted a very small proportion of the funds sourced by publicly 
issued corporations on Taiwan prior to the late 1980s (around 11%).79 As of 1985, the number 
of firms listed on the local exchange was just 127. From 1970 to 1985, new listings averaged no 
more than five per year (see Table 3.4 for details). The comparative figures for market
78 SEC Annual Report, 1994 (Taipei: Securities Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, 1995), p. 7- 
8; TSE Fact Book, 1995 (Taipei: Taiwan Stock Exchange, 1996), p. 6; and RoC Securities Market Annual, 
1992, fn. 8, p. 13-18.
79 See: Ya-Hwei Yang, Shyuan-Yi Shiau, Wen-Jeng Kuo, Lee-Rong Wang and Meng-Cheng Liu, The 
Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Republic of China, Volume 3, The Financing 
and Marketing Ability of Taiwan’s SMEs (Taipei: Pristine Communications, 1995), p. 27-29.
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capitalization to GDP also leave little doubt that the securities sector in Taiwan was radically 
undeveloped (see also Table 3.4). In the 15 years to 1985, TSE capitalization to GDP averaged 
just 13.3% (with 12.5% for the decade of the 1970s, and 14.0% for the years 1980 to 1985). 
Figures such as these place Taiwan firmly among those countries with developing stock markets 
in the early to mid 1980s (not to be confused with the stock markets of developing countries per 
se -  note the following country case studies). Utilizing time series data from the International 
Finance Corporation’s Emerging Markets Data Base, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic point to 
a large gap between the capitalization ratios of developing stock markets (including markets in 
Mexico, Jordon, India, Norway, Austria, France, Spain, New Zealand, Belgium, Italy, Finland, 
Zimbabwe, Pakistan and Turkey) and those of well established markets (including Hong Kong, 
Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, the US, Singapore, Switzerland, South Africa, Malaysia, 
Korea, Thailand, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada and Sweden).80 As can be seen from 
Diagram 3.1, Taiwan was very much a member of the former group up to 1986-87. Finally, 
reflecting the weak links between local securities markets in Taiwan and the domestic and 
international economies, asset pricing in the Taiwan Stock Exchange only tacitly reflected peaks 
and troughs in external markets. Indicative of this variance, at least one study has suggested 
that at various times similar assets in US stock markets and the TSE differed by as much as a 
factor o f 75.81
But as the 1980s progressed, the KMT regime’s satisfaction with the old regulatory 
arrangements for securities altered radically. Around 1987, the structure of Taiwan’s securities 
markets changed in ways that totally undermined the ruling party’s finance goals -  a sectoral- 
strategy window of opportunity for securities reform was about to open. There were two 
aspects to this. On the one hand, illegal practices once again became a systemic characteristic 
of the securities sector. Although by the early years of the 1980s illicit trading on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange (stock manipulation, insider dealing and so on) had become increasingly 
prevalent, transactions were still safely channeled through the centralized institutions 
established some two decades before. Around 1983-85, however, a new group of underground 
investment firms came into being. Utilizing a loophole in the Banking Law that blurred the 
distinction between deposits and smallholder investment, quasi-legal companies such as Hung 
Yuan, Fortune, Yuan Ann and Cheng Wei gradually became major players on the TSE and 
spawned a variety of black derivative markets. Around 1987, spurred on by the appreciation of
80 The initial split between developing and developed stock markets was based on a composite index of 
stock market capitalization to GDP, total value of shares traded to GDP, and the total value of shares 
traded to capitalization. See: Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic, ‘Stock Market 
Development and Financing Choices of Firms’ in World Bank Economic Review Vol. 10, No. 2 (1996), p. 
348 & 359.
81 See: Robert A. Korajczyk, ‘A Measure of Stock Market Integration for Developed and Emerging 
Markets’ in World Bank Economic Review Vol. 10, No. 2 (1996). Supplemented with historical and 
anecdotal data from: Taiwan Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Zhengquan Tongji Ziliao, Minguo 84 Nian [Taiwan 
Stock Exchange Statistical Data 1995] (Taipei: Taiwan Stock Exchange, 1996), p. 2-3; and interviews 
with economists in Taipei, 1996.
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DIAGRAM 3.1 Market capitalization, Taiwan vs developed and undeveloped markets
150 -
140 -
Taiwan stock market130 -
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100 -
Developed 
stock markets
Developing 
stock markets
Notes: Developing stock markets include those of: Mexico, Jordan, India, Norway, Austria, France, 
Spain, New Zealand, Belgium, Italy, Finland, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, and Turkey. Developed stock 
markets includes: Hong Kong, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, the US, Singapore, Switzerland, 
South Africa, Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, and Sweden.
Sources: Robert A. Korajczyk, ‘A Measure of Stock Market Integration for Developed and Emerging 
Markets’ in World Bank Economic Review Vol. 10, No. 2 (1996); and Taiwan Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo 
Zhengquan Tongji Ziliao, Minguo 8 Nian [Taiwan Stock Exchange Statistical Data 1995] (Taipei: 
Taiwan Stock Exchange, 1996). The author is grateful for assistance from Kay Dancey for the 
production of this chart.
the NT dollar and increasing media attention, these firms shrugged off any pretense of being 
secretive and began appealing directly to the public for funds. And despite the highly suspect 
nature of the firms’ business dealings (most were little more than ponzi schemes), the public 
came in droves. Before reaching the height of their business activities in early 1989 and then 
gradually imploding thereafter, the underground firms amassed an estimated NT$220 billion in 
accumulated ‘deposits’ from over 400,000 people in Taiwan. Analysts estimated that as the 
stock market took-off through 1987-88, about 30% of the TSE’s daily trading volume came 
from orders placed by these firms. The local stock exchange was no longer a docile avenue for
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securities trading. Illegal securities practices had become a major part of the very fabric of the 
m arket/2
On the other hand, the size and external linkages of the securities sector grew in an 
extraordinary fashion. From 1987 on, the assumption that Taiwan’s securities markets were 
small and would remain that way indefinitely ceased to hold. After a spike in trading activity in 
late 1986, the level of capitalization of the Taiwan Stock Exchange jumped from an 
accumulated total of around 20% of GDP at the end of 86 to 42.8% in 1987 (see Table 3.4). In 
1988 and 89, the ratio of market capitalization to GDP expanded to unbelievable heights -  96% 
and 156.7% respectively. For the entire period from 1986 to 1990, the ratio of TSE 
capitalization to GDP was an average of 75.3%, a fivefold increase over the 14% average for the 
period 1980-85. As can be seen from Diagram 3.1, this dramatic increase in market size lifted 
Taiwan into the ranks of those countries with developed stock exchanges -  a position it more or 
less retained after the collapse of stock trading in 1990 (for the years 1990-95 the TSE 
capitalization to GDP ratio averaged 73.2% per annum).
At around the same time as this huge leap in market size was occurring, the stock market 
was beginning to interact with the rest of the economy in new and unpredictable ways. The 
bubble in the TSE during this period was closely associated with a bubble in the real estate 
sector, one of the few markets in Taiwan that could claim to be almost totally unregulated at the 
time. In the two and half years to October 1989, housing prices rose by almost 250% in some 
areas of Taipei and Kaohsiung. Anecdotal evidence suggests that even small-time investors 
were managing a sophisticated portfolio of property, stocks and other assets. One story reported 
in a local magazine has a small businessman dedicating his mornings to the stock exchange, his 
afternoons to the property market, and his evenings to his clothing store.83 Perhaps more 
worrying for the ruling party, however, was the emerging connection between the appreciation 
of the NT dollar, the inward flow of speculative ‘hot money,’ and the increase in TSE trading 
volume. Faced with strong expectations of NT dollar appreciation, speculators were making a 
killing buying in and out of the local currency, and taking the opportunity to play the stock 
market in the interim While there are no reliable statistics for the amount of money doing this 
circuit, estimates suggest that around US$10 billion in hot money flowed into Taiwan in the 12
82 Data and comments from: Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (13 September 1989), p. 2; Henny 
Sender, ‘Taiwan: The Wild East’ in Institutional Investor [international edition] (October 1989); Xin 
Xinwen [The Journalist] (15 January 1990), p. 10-31; and Chun-I Chen, ‘Underground Investment Firms 
in the Republic of China on Taiwan: A Comparison with the Development of Banking Law in the United 
States’ in Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs Vol. 10 (1990-1991). Supplemented with 
interviews in Taipei, 1996. Especially grateful to Dr Chung-hsing Chen, President, Institute of Securities 
and Futures Markets Development, 30 August 1996.
83 Story from: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 October 1988), p. 168-171. Figures on 
housing prices from: Asia 1990 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1990), p. 232.
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months to June 1987 and maybe halt of this amount found its way into the TSE (more on the 
appreciation of the NT dollar and the influx of hot money in chapter 4).M
TABLE 3.4 TSE size -  market capitalization and listings, select years 1970-1995
Period Market Capitalization Capitalization 
to GDP
Number of 
Listed Firms
Number of Listed 
Shares
1970 16,970 7.4% 42 1,262
1975 73,959 12.5% 68 3,458
1980 219,053 14.6% 102 10,659
1981 201,331 11.3% 107 12,805
1982 203,111 10.6% 113 15,144
1983 305,956 14.5% 119 16,716
1984 390,260 16.6% 123 19,039
1985 415,706 16.8% 127 21,345
1986 548,436 19.2% 130 24,082
1987 1,386,065 42.8% 141 28,735
1988 3,383,280 96.0% 163 34,358
1989 6,174,164 156.7% 181 42,130
1990 2,681,911 62.2% 199 50,643
1995 5,108,437 73.9% 347 132,462
Sources: Taiwan Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Zhengquan Tongji Ziliao, Minguo 86 Nian [Taiwan Stock 
Exchange Statistical Data 1995] (Taipei: Taiwan Stock Exchange, 1998) and Taiwan Statistical Data 
Book, 1996 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1996). Calculations on the ratio 
of capitalization to GDP performed by the author.
In sum, through 1987 Taiwan’s securities sector became structurally unstable and 
uncontrollable. The second KMT policy window- i.e. the sectoral-strategy window -  had 
finally opened reinforcing the socio-political imperative to reform the securities sector. After a 
hiatus of nearly eight years, complete reform of the securities sector was at last a serious 
political option.
4. Leading the long march
In the discussion above we have seen how, in 1980 and then again in 1987, securities reform 
gradually emerged as a prudent political strategy for the ruling party. The correlation of the 
KMT’s two policy windows with the process of securities reform detailed in section one of this 
chapter is readily apparent: reform starts after 1980 as the socio-political window opens, and 
then climaxes (and ultimately concludes) in the wake of the 1987 opening of the sectoral- 
strategy window. But while the opening of the two policy windows in 1980 and 1987 was a
*4 Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine) (1 June 1987), p. 94; and Far Eastern Economic Review (18
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necessary precondition tor securities reform, it did not guarantee that reform would 
automatically occur. For that, sustained and calculated effort by interested technocrats was 
required. At this point in the reform story, our development technocrats re-enter the analysis. I 
would argue that Li Kwoh-ting, Hsu Li-teh and the other development technocrats seized these 
two opportunities to launch and eventually conclude their agenda for securities reform What 
evidence do we have to support this claim?
To substantiate the argument, I point to three items of evidence, based on criteria that we 
will return to throughout the course of this thesis. These criteria include: (1) evidence of 
increased reform effort on behalf of the technocrats concerned at the time when the relevant 
policy windows opened, (2) evidence of technocrat awareness of the relevant policy windows,
85and (3) counterfactual evidence discounting the influence of alternative actors or social forces. 
To begin with, it is clear that immediately after the two KMT policy windows opened in 1980 
and 1987, the development technocrats became more active in their pursuit of securities reform 
At the start of the decade, this change in behavior can be observed in the reform efforts of a 
number of the group (e.g. it was Suan Yun-suan’s decision to loosen margin financing on the 
TSE in April 1980), but was most pronounced with the ascendancy to Cabinet of Hsu Li-teh in 
1981. Hsu was made Minister of Finance in October and his appointment presaged a period of 
Executive Yuan dominance by the friends of Li Kwoh-ting.86 Upon assuming office, Hsu 
immediately poured his enthusiasm into a range of policy initiatives, including everything from 
tax reform to the establishment of a local venture capital industry.87 Opening up the stock 
market was a primary concern for the new Finance Minister. In November, Li gave the nod to 
the Securities Exchange Commission to draw up a schedule for market opening, and just less 
than 12 months later he launched the plan to permit foreign investment in the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange.88 While Hsu enjoyed the limelight at this time, his mentor Li Kwoh-ting was content 
to work quietly behind the scenes ‘smoothing over’ intra-KMT opposition to reform and 
advising the other technocrats. On at least one occasion in early 1983, this entailed twisting the 
arm of military strongman Soong Chang-chih to loosen controls on cross-boarder 
telecommunications, a key adjunct to foreign financial transactions. Elsewhere, press reports
June 1987), p. 58-59.
85 It is intended that these three items of evidence be viewed as a package. Taken together, they present a 
strong case for some form of agency, while apart they may appear nondescript or even trite.
86 This left the Executive Yuan with four development technocrat heavy-weights: Suan Yun-suan as 
Premier, Hsu Li-teh as Minister of Finance, Chao Yao-tung as Minister of Economic Affairs, and Li 
Kwoh-ting as Senior Minister of State. Far Eastern Economic Review (30 April 1982), p. 49-51.
87 See esp.: Li-teh Hsu, ‘Dangqian Caizhengbu Jidai Tuidong de Gongzuo’ [Current Tasks Urgently in 
Need of Pursuit by the Ministry of Finance -  originally for a press conference conducted in December 
1981] in Li-teh Hsu, Xiandai Caizheng Zhengce Lunshuo [Fiscal Policy] (Taipei: Ministry of Finance, 
1984).
88 Which lead to the establishment of the Securities Investment Trust Enterprises in the middle of 1983. 
From: Zhongyang Ribao [Central Daily News] (16 July 1983), p. 1; Zhongguo Shibao [China Times] (26 
July 1983), p. 1; and interview in Taipei with Dr Chung-hsing Chen, President, Institute of Securities and 
Futures Markets Development, 30 August 1996.
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and rumor maintained that Li was the ‘inspiration’ behind the decisions to establish the Fuh 
Hwa Securities Company and open the stock market/9
Increased reform effort is also observable after 1987, although by this time such effort was 
largely specific to those development technocrats closely engaged with the securities sector, 
particularly those located within the Securities Exchange Commission. Some of this reform 
activity is difficult to observe due to the institutional subservience of the SEC to the Ministry of 
Finance (review Diagram 2.1 in chapter 2, section one). Often, actions taken within the former 
institution were officially ascribed to the latter,90 concealing some interesting behavioral 
patterns among SEC personnel. This said, at least two development technocrats within the SEC 
quite visibly stepped up their participation in reform: consecutive SEC Chairmen Shen Pe-ling 
and C.P. Chang. Shen was SEC chairman from 1984 to early 1988 and had a major role to play 
in the drafting of the new Securities Exchange Law. The events beginning in 1987 saw Shen 
involved in efforts to jostle the new law through the Legislative Yuan (finally passed in January 
1988), and prepare the SEC for a substantial increase in administrative responsibilities and 
functions.91 C.P. Chang, SEC chairman from early 1988 to 1993, is the technocrat most closely 
associated with the decision to allow new securities companies into the market in mid 1988. 
Journalists and coworkers attribute Chang with the very liberal admission standards contained 
within the ‘Criteria for the Establishment of Securities Firms,’ and the subsequent flood of new 
firms into the industry.92 Meanwhile, moral support for the efforts of these development 
technocrats was forthcoming from a number of old hands, including: Chao Yao-tung, Lee Ta- 
hai, soon-to-be retired Li Kwoh-ting and even the outcast Loh Jen-kang (who fell from grace 
along with Hsu Li-teh in 1985).93
89 Far Eastern Economic Review (25 August 1983), p. 98; Far Eastern Economic Review (10 March 
1983) p. 39; and Zhongguo Shibao [China Times] (5 July 1981), p. 6. See also: The Free China Journal 
(29 January 1999), includes an article on the development of high-tech firms in Taiwan, available online 
at http://www.teco.org.au/whatnew_990138.html -  viewed on 9 September 2000. Supplemented with 
interviews in Taiwan, 1996.
90 A situation that SEC technocrats occasionally found intolerable enough to complain to the press about. 
See e.g.: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 October 1988), p. 152.
91 Compare interviews with Shen in 1986 and late 1987: Chen, ‘Only a Healthy Market Can Guarantee 
Progress: Interview with Shen Pe-ling, Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission,’ fn. 15; and 
Claire Chen, ‘With Deregulation, Securities Houses Can Operate More Efficiently: Interview with Shen 
Pe-ling, SEC Chairman’ in Financial and Investment Yearbook, RoC 1988 (Taipei: China Economic 
News Service, 1988). In the former Shen talks about planning for securities reform, while in the latter he 
describes efforts to implement reform measures.
92 Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 October 1988), p. 162, includes personal interview with 
Chang. Supplemented with interviews in Taipei, 1996 and 1999, esp. interview with Gordon S. Chen, 
Director of the 4th Department, Executive Yuan (and ex-Chair of the Securities Exchange Commission), 
20 July 1999.
93 See variously: Philip Liu, ‘Economic Policy to Emphasize Imports, Quality and Services: Interview 
with TH. Lee, Minister of Economic Affairs’ in Financial and Investment Yearbook, RoC 1988 (Taipei: 
China Economic News Service, 1988); Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 June 1987), p. 91- 
103; Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 January 1988), p. 79; Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth 
Magazine] (1 October 1988), p. 188-190; and Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 April 1989), 
p. 69-70. Includes quotes and commentary from said individuals. Supplemented with interviews in 
Taipei, 1996 and 1999.
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The second item of evidence to confirm the case for leadership by the development 
technocrats concerns their awareness of the KMT policy windows after 1980 and 1987. 
Specifically, the way in which the development technocrats sought to market their securities 
reform efforts at these two junctures reveals a lot about the political context in which they 
operated. Among Li Kwoh-ting’s public presentations of the early 1980s, for example, we find 
that there is almost always an appeal to the middle class, often portrayed heroically as the 
backbone of the new economy. This group is invariably included alongside a more natural 
audience for his development ideas: the captains of industry in Taiwan, the science 
establishment, government agencies and academic economists. Although Li had always shown 
a concern for the social aspects of economic development, after 1980 this issue linkage became 
more concerted and more direct. In a speech presented in 1981, for example, Li expressly 
targeted white-collar workers, saying:
Our economy in the 1980s is going to be market-oriented. I cannot overstress the 
importance of the salesman [in this new economy], especially in view of the rapidly 
changing international business environment, with its many uncertainties. The new 
salesman must be well educated, knowledgeable in modem business developments and 
practices, and well informed of local market conditions in different countries. He is a 
new creature -  no longer the kind which has been manipulated and exploited by foreign
i 94traders....
Elsewhere, Li even spoke to the moral sensibilities of the emergent middle class. In a 
newspaper article in 1981, he addressed widespread fears of a decline in social ethics amidst 
Taiwan’s newfound prosperity. He claimed that traditional Chinese culture, with its emphasis 
on community harmony and family, would keep a check on some of the more undesirable 
effects of material affluence and urbanization.95 Pandering to the middle class was also a tactic 
Hsu Li-teh employed around this time, although somewhat less subtly than his mentor. In a 
speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in May 1982, for example, the Minister 
commenced with an extended treatise on social change in Taiwan. Some of the topics covered 
in this unusual section of an otherwise standard ministerial address included the emergence of 
new vocational attitudes among professionals on Taiwan, the rise of social pluralism and the 
decline in traditional modes of authority. Naturally, mindful of the need to push through his 
reform program, the Minister welcomed these changes with open arms.96
The development technocrats’ rhetoric after 1987 confirms a similar appreciation of KMT 
sensibilities. Dovetailing with their substantive efforts at this time, the development technocrats
94 Li, Economic Transformation o f Taiwan, RoC, fn. 48, p. 99-100.
93 Lianhe Bao [United Daily News] (28 March 1981), p. 3.
96 Hsu, ‘Current Initiatives of the Ministry of Finance,’ fn. 52, p. 11-12. This was not just a case of 
indulging a foreign audience. See similar comments in: Li-teh Hsu, ‘Zhengfu de Zhichu Ji Renmin de 
Fudan’ [Government Expenditure to Support the Burden of the People -  an address to staff at Taiwan 
Normal University in January 1983] in Li-teh Hsu, Xiandai Caizheng Zhengce Lunshuo [Fiscal Policy] 
(Taipei: Ministry of Finance, 1984).
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almost exclusively presented securities reform as an attempt to rein in industry excesses. 
Indeed, given their public announcements, one could be forgiven for thinking that the 1988 
Securities Exchange Law (and subsequent ordinances) was simply a reactionary crackdown77 on 
illegal or unregulated securities issuance and trading. In press interviews and media reports, the 
development technocrats rarely celebrated securities reform as a new dawn for securitization 
and sectoral development in Taiwan; the official focus was market stability and control. In a 
newspaper interview in late 1988, C.P. Chang claimed that one of the key improvements of the 
new Securities and Exchange Law was the fact that it contained
‘...far more complete regulations concerning insider trading. Aside from the original 
Article 157, which stipulates that all profits from short-swing purchases or sales 
conducted on inside information shall be returned to related companies, Section 1 of the 
article poses criminal liability as well. Now, any director, officer or beneficial owner 
who unlawfully manipulates the market and earns profits by using unrevealed inside 
information will be liable to imprisonment for up to two years.’
Twelve months later, in another interview, Chang continued the theme, although this time he 
was adamant to demonstrate that the new regulatory structure was getting results. He 
commented that ‘[sjince the revised Securities and Exchange Law took effect in February 1988, 
we have uncovered over 500 cases involving the illegal transfer of shares by board members, 
insider trading and manipulation.’99 Although this symbolic appeal to stability and control 
ensured an audience for securities reform within the KMT regime, it must be remembered that 
the new regulatory system put in place after 1988 was far from a tool of repression (we have 
seen elsewhere just how much it served to open up the securities sector). For the development 
technocrats selling the new regulatory scheme, however, the larger agenda of securities 
liberalization and expansion was seldom articulated voluntarily.
And finally, consider the counterfactual question: what if the development technocrats were 
not the agents responsible for securities liberalization? Answering this question implies we look 
at two things: (1) possible alternative actors within the KMT regime, and (2) possible alternative
97 It strikes me that the regulatory changes involved in securities reform can be broken down into two sub­
categories, preemptive and remedial. Preemptive regulatory change is an administrative means to a 
market end, and is concerned with: (1) defining and creating new markets, and (2) placing limits on 
anticipated market behavior. It is forward looking and novel. This kind of regulatory activity attracts a 
lot of interest from authors who are surprised by just how extensive the body of new rules can be -  see 
esp. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules, fn. 27, chp. 5. Remedial regulatory change, by contrast, is 
concerned with cleaning-up the excesses of an existing securities sector that is perceived to be in some 
sense intrinsically ‘problematic.’ This kind of rule making is backward looking and reactive. The 
proportion of preemptive versus remedial regulatory change in any one case of securities opening tells us 
something about the initial politico-economic context of reform. I am indebted to a discussion with 
Sandra Eccles for these points.
98 Tian Hsueh, ‘The Question is How to Implement New Rules Against Insider Training’ in Financial and 
Investment Yearbook, 1989 (Taipei: Central Economic News Service, 1989), p. 92.
99 William Yang, ‘Investors Should Have the Concept of Long-Term Investment’ in Financial and 
Investment Yearbook, 1990 (Taipei: Central Economic News Service, 1990), p. 79.
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actors or social forces external to the KMT regime.100 The case for an alternative agent for 
change emerging within the KMT regime appears, superficially at least, quite strong. We know 
that in March 1981, President Chiang Ching-kuo delivered a very public call for the 
development of a ‘healthy and active capital market’ in Taiwan101 -  at least insofar as the 
securities reform initiatives of the early 1980s are concerned, perhaps the buck stops with CCK. 
Although plausible, attributing securities reform to President Chiang fails on two counts. First, 
the timing is suspect. While CCK’s early call for reform certainly preempted the decision to 
reorganize the Securities Exchange Commission in July 1981, it occurred fully 12 months after 
the decision to establish the Fuh Hwa Securities Company. Securities reform was well into the 
takeoff phase by the time the President’s order came through; the order buttressed an existing 
process rather than triggering a new course of action.102 Second, it is very unlikely that, absent 
advice from the development technocrats, CCK would have independently embarked upon a 
policy of securities reform (much less understood the political potential of such a strategy). We 
know that on more than one occasion CCK admitted that he was ‘not an economist,’ and 
understood his own strength in economic policy formulation as a willingness to listen to the 
good counsel of others.103
But what of other technocrats or, indeed, other Presidents? We know that after 1987, the 
development technocrats were not in the ascendancy within Cabinet. Around this time, the 
finance technocrats and then the young reformers were the preeminent factions.104 Furthermore, 
unlike the situation with President Chiang Ching-kuo, the inauguration of Lee Teng-hui in early 
1988 brought a ruler to office who understood the technical issues at hand. Li was an economist 
by training and held a PhD from Cornell University -  perhaps he initiated the securities reform 
push after 1987.105 While it is almost certain that other policy elites assisted the development 
technocrats with securities reform, there is little evidence to suggest that the likes of Robert 
Chien (Finance Minister from 1985 to mid 1988) and Shirley Kuo (Finance Minister from mid
100 Again, we will return to these sub-categories throughout the course of the case-study chapters. 
Readers will note that some of the evidence we will examine under these two categories is partially 
derived from the four theoretical approaches to financial liberalization considered in chapter 1 of the 
thesis.
101 This was the one and only time that CCK spoke-out publicly on the issue of securities reform. As 
recorded in: Far Eastern Economic Review (28 August 1981), p. 87.
102 Far Eastern Economic Review (28 August 1981), p. 87-88; and Far Eastern Economic Review (9 
October 1981), p. 78-81. Supplemented with interviews with finance officials in Taipei, 1996 and 1999.
103 Indeed, CCK was disinclined to talk in specific terms about any particular aspect of economic policy. 
His determination not to repeat his regrettable experience with the Shanghai capitalists in the 1930s, and 
his faith in the ability of senior policy makers like Li Kwoh-ting left the younger Chiang with a broad 
figurehead role in economic policy making. In a discussion with renowned Chinese-American economist 
John Fei, CCK commented: ‘Please tell your economists that CK [referring to himself in the third person] 
is a layman in economics and made many mistakes during my lifetime. What I can only claim is a 
salvaging virtue of learning from my mistakes.’ John C.H. Fei, ‘The Taiwan Economy in the Seventies’ 
in Shao-chuan Leng (ed.), Chiang Ching-kuo’s Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China 
on Taiwan, Vol. 3 of the Miller Center Series on Asian Political Leadership (Lanham, Maryland: 
University Press of America, 1993), p. 86.
104 For more detail on these two groups of technocrats, see chapters 4 and 5, sections two.
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1988 to 1990) were the prime movers behind it. As we will see in subsequent chapters, these 
individuals simply had interests elsewhere; press and personal interviews reveal a distinct lack 
of concern with the long-term development of the securities sector.1(K> As for Lee Teng-hui’s 
part in securities reform, the key question is ‘Why?’ In and of itself, securities reform did not 
serve Li’s personal agenda immediately after taking office -  i.e. consolidating his position as 
RoC President and KMT Chairman -  and consequently he made no direct mention of it.1(17 
Bank reform, by contrast, did serve Li’s immediate ambitions, and predictably enough the new 
President intervened on this issue during the first half of 1988108 (more detail on this fascinating 
episode in chapter 5, section four). In sum, within the KMT hierarchy the only likely agents of 
securities reform were the development technocrats.
Outside the KMT regime, however, it seems plausible that in the early 1980s representatives 
of Taiwan’s middle class directly petitioned for securities liberalization. As our discussion in 
section three demonstrates, this social group had a strong objective interest in reform: increasing 
the size and scope of the Taiwan Stock Exchange would directly benefit the market’s plethora 
of small, individual investors. But despite the objective interest in opening, we find little hard 
evidence of a declared or subjective interest in policy change. Even at temporal junctures in 
which we might expect small investors to increase their advocacy -  e.g. the sharp downturn in 
the stock index of 1982-83 that accompanied the slump in the local economy and world 
recession -  there was no direct outcry from the group.109 This ‘dog that didn’t bark’ is simple 
enough to explain: the island’s small investors were organizationally dispersed and fragmented. 
This state of social affairs was in large measure a side-effect of the KMT’s authoritarian rule, 
although it is probable that even in an open political environment Taiwan’s small investors 
would have faced little incentive to organize.110 Articulating the implicit link between middle
105 Yu-ming Shaw, Dr Lee Teng-hui: President of the Republic o f China (Taipei: Government 
Information Office, Executive Yuan, 1990), esp. p. 7-8.
106 In an interview with the author, Shirley Kuo gave long and largely unprompted descriptions of foreign 
exchange and bank reform in Taiwan during the late 1980s -  more in subsequent chapters. The issue of 
securities opening was not even referred to in passing. Interview in Taipei with Professor Shirley Kuo, 
Minister Without Portfolio, RoC Cabinet, 4 December 1996. In several press interviews, Robert Chien 
appears oblivious not only to the securities reform initiatives being undertaken in his name within the 
Ministry of Finance and Securities Exchange Commission, but also to the increasingly perilous state of 
the stock market. See, e.g.: CENs staffwriter, ‘Breakthroughs in Financial Management are Needed: 
Interview with Robert C. Chien, Minister of Finance’ in Financial and Investment Yearbook, RoC 1988 
(Taipei: China Economic News Service, 1988). This wide-ranging interview, conducted in late 1987, is 
particularly intriguing: Chien talks about the importance of government bond issues to soak up excess 
liquidity in Taiwan at that time, and yet doesn’t even consider the question of how these instruments will 
be sold and traded in local securities markets.
107 Yu-kou Zhou, Li Deng-hui de Yiqian Tian: 1988-92 [A Thousand Days of Lee Teng-hui: 1988-92] 
(Taipei: Maitian Chuban, 1993), esp. chp. 1-3.
108 See e.g.: China News (10 May 1988), p. 4.
109 Assessment based on a review of stock market reports in Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] 
(various editions, 1982-83). Supplemented with interviews in Taipei, 1996 and 1999.
110 Based, of course, on a Chicago School proposition that large groups with diluted interests face less 
incentive to lobby for policy change compared to small groups with concentrated interests. From: Roger 
G. Noll, ‘Government Regulatory Behavior: A Multidisciplinary Survey and Synthesis’ in Roger G. Noll 
(ed.), Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 44.
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class interests and securities opening was a task that was orchestrated from within the KMT 
regime itself.111
While external influences were not a factor in the early 1980s, it seems at least probable that 
business interests were involved in the latter phases of securities opening. As mentioned in 
section one of this chapter, the freeze on brokerage licenses became a major issue of contention 
between the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan through 1987, and eventually Cabinet 
gave ground permitting the entry of new securities firms. Business interests may have had a 
hand in this series of events: we know that various corporate groups were big winners when new 
securities companies were allowed into the market after May 1988.112 There is some reason to 
believe, however, that the legislative proceedings of 1987 were simply part of an ambit-claim 
strategy orchestrated by the Executive Yuan. To successfully maneuver the amended Securities 
Exchange Law through the legislature, the Executive Yuan deliberately left the question of new 
licenses in abeyance (in the knowledge that the Legislative Yuan would bauk at this omission 
and that some form of compromise would be necessary to get the bill passed). The final 
regulatory product was no more or less than had been intended at the outset.113 Further, as will 
be shown in more depth later in the thesis, business advocacy was not a major factor in 
legislative politics at least until mid to late 1988. Even after this time, it is doubtful that it had a 
major impact on the substance of finance policy choice; at most, the business lobby in the 
Legislative Yuan was a negative, reactive voice.114 In the final analysis, the initiative on 
securities reform remained in the hands of the KMT regime, and who else but the development 
technocrats had a cause to pursue in this policy area?
Conclusion
It has been the argument of this chapter that the process of securities reform on Taiwan through 
the 1980s and beyond was ultimately driven by the ideas and exploits of the development 
technocrats, and followed a pattern dictated by the long temporal spread of opportunities 
presented within the KMT regime. Securities reform initially arose as an ideational imperative
111 See esp. government declarations and media comment in: Zhongguo Shibao [China Times] (5 July 
1981), p. 6; Zhongyang Ribao [Central Daily News] (16 July 1983), p. 1; and Zhongguo Shibao [China 
Times] (26 July 1983), p. 1 -  contain reports on the establishment of Fuh Hwa in 1980 and the launch of 
the first Securities Investment Trust Enterprise in 1983.
112 With six of the top ten firms on the island possessing a license by August. Tianxia Zazhi 
[Commonwealth Magazine] (1 August 1988), p. 95.
113 Comments in interviews in Taipei, 1996 and 1999. I am particularly grateful for a discussion 
regarding the politics of EY-LY relations with Mr Lin Huan, Coordination and Service Office for the 
APROC Program, Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, 26 March 1999. 
These interpretations correspond with the fact that new licenses had been on the securities reform agenda 
since the early 1980s -  the Legislative Yuan had good cause to believe that it would be a part of the final 
package of statutory amendments. See e.g.: Li-teh Hsu, ‘Dangqian Caizheng Gongzuo de Zhongdian’ 
[Current Important Tasks in Finance -  Sun Yet-sen memorial lecture] in Li-teh Hsu, Xiandai Caizheng 
Zhengce Lunshuo [Fiscal Policy] (Taipei: Ministry of Finance, 1984), esp. p. 61-63. Although contorted 
and opaque in parts, this speech is significant because of the audience: President Chiang Ching-kuo was 
present. To my knowledge, this represents the first occasion in which the detail of securities reform was 
publicly spelled out to CCK.
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because the development technocrats came to see it as a precondition of technological 
upgrading on Taiwan. It became a practical reality -  i.e. a distinguishable process -  as party 
political ‘windows of opportunity’ opened up in 1980 and 1987. In a manner that compares 
starkly with forex reform and to a significant extent with bank liberalization, the temporal 
spread of party-political opportunities that faced the development technocrats was wide and 
discontinuous. The development technocrat’s reform agenda got off the ground in 1980 because 
it was seen as an effective means of securing urban middle class support for the KMT in the 
face of growing competition from the opposition dangwai. Reform reached its apex and moved 
to the consolidation phase after 1987 because the systemic character of local securities markets 
at that time radically breached the ruling party’s preference for a stable and controllable 
financial system The pattem of securities opening on Taiwan was long and measured precisely 
because these two policy windows opened almost eight years apart.
The chapter was composed of four main parts. In part one we reviewed the process of 
securities policy reform This section focused on the procedural effect of securities 
liberalization rather than the cause. In part two of the chapter we looked behind the outcomes 
detailed in part one and sought to analyze why it all happened. This section included an 
examination of the ideas and interests of the development technocrats -  including ‘policy 
heroes’ Li Kwoh-ting and Hsu Li-teh. Part three of the chapter was dedicated to the policy 
windows that emerged within the KMT regime over the course of the 1980s. In this extended 
section of the chapter we examined how and why these windows opened when they did. 
Finally, in part four of the chapter we considered the ways and means in which our development 
technocrats capitalized on the respective opportunities, and looked at alternative reform agents. 
In the next chapter of the study I will investigate the process of foreign exchange reform which 
commenced in 1986 and concluded around three years later. The pattern of reform in this 
instance was fast, abrupt and managerial (i.e. not at all incremental); the contrast with the case 
of securities reform could not be greater. We will find, however, that once again a small group 
of technocrats was at the center of the process, and KMT politics was crucial to its ultimate 
outcome.
***000***
114 See discussion in chapter 5, section three.
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The great leap forward: foreign 
exchange liberalization, 1986-89
Crafting Markets in Taiwan
Introduction
For many years, the foreign exchange (forex) market in Taiwan and the reserve management 
practices of the island’s central bank, the Central Bank of China (CBC), were one and the same. 
Despite the vital role played by the foreign exchange system in oiling the wheels of Taiwan’s 
small, externally dependent economy, ‘[t]he central bank alone was authorized under exchange 
controls to hold foreign exchange and conduct foreign exchange transactions, and to designate 
commercial banks as agents. All foreign exchange transactions had to be conducted through the 
designated banks at the official exchange rate.’1 In mid 1987, however, the floodgates were 
opened.2 After nearly four decades of maintaining a tight monopoly on all foreign exchange 
transactions, on 15 July the CBC announced that the control system embodied in the Statute for 
the Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) would be abandoned, and that henceforth all 
RoC citizens would be entitled to hold and trade foreign currency. The initiative was greeted 
with wild enthusiasm by Taiwan’s emergent service sector, and created a furor as businesses 
and the general population strived to come to terms with the new regulatory regime. Banks 
were bombarded with questions from perplexed customers. Even the government was unsure 
what of it all meant. In the days immediately following the reform move, questions were raised 
by various government agencies about the continuing relevance of a multitude of commercial 
laws and regulations. The regulatory changes were not only radical, but chaotic as well.3
In chapter 3 of the thesis we saw how the theory of technocrat leadership applied to the case 
of securities reform The process of change in that area of financial administration was 
remarkably slow and incremental, indicative of the wide spread of party political opportunities 
facing activist technocrats. In this case, those concerned were the ‘development technocrats,’ a 
loose grouping of state officials who looked to industry guru Li Kwoh-ting for direction and 
inspiration. In the present chapter we will be examining the case of foreign exchange reform 
In many ways, this episode of financial opening was the direct opposite of the securities case. 
Forex reform was fast, concerted and, as the brief introductory comments given above suggest, 
almost totally unanticipated by major stakeholders. The pattern of change covered a period of 
just three or four years after 1986, and involved none of the experimental ‘learning-by-doing’ of 
the securities episode. But if we look behind the process of forex reform, we find that once
1 Hang-sheng Cheng, ‘Financial Policy and Reform in Taiwan, China’ in Hang-sheng Cheng (ed.), 
Financial Policy and Reform in Pacific Basin Countries (Lexington: D C. Heath and Company, 1986), p. 
155.
2 To paraphrase one foreign journalist’s appraisal of the policy shift: Far Eastern Economic Review (23 
July 1987), p. 52.
2 Various points and observations from: Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (16 July 1987), p. 1-2; and 
Zhongguo Shibao [China Times] (16 July 1987), p. 1-2.
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again the initiative and energy for change was tied to a select group of concerned technocrats.4 
Foreign exchange liberalization initially got off the ground because the ‘finance technocrats’ -  a 
tightly composed group of state officials who owed their allegiance to senior finance 
administrator Yu Kuo-hwa -  became convinced some years prior to the late 1980s that the 
internal and external circumstances of Taiwan’s economy rendered the old forex system 
obsolete. The story of when and how Yu’s team of officials was able to act is part of a 
generalizable account of KMT politics. In chapter 1 of the thesis I argued that for technocrats 
ultimately to be successful with financial reform, two kinds of ‘policy window’ need to be open 
within their referent political party, a broad socio-political window and a narrow sectoral- 
strategy window.5 In this chapter I will demonstrate that the pattern of foreign exchange reform 
in Taiwan was distinctly short and decisive because these two policy windows opened almost 
simultaneously. This temporal spread of opportunities was the inverse of that which we can 
observe over the course of securities opening. The variance in when and how respective 
technocrats were permitted to act explains the alternative processes of policy change.
Following the pattern established in chapter 3, the present chapter is composed of four main 
parts. In part one we review the process of foreign exchange reform I include an account of 
the principal steps in the forex reform cycle, and give due attention to the institutional context. 
In part two of the chapter we look behind the outcomes detailed in part one and seek to analyze 
why it all happened. This section includes an examination of the character and ideas of Yu 
Kuo-hwa’s finance technocrats, the enigmatic entrepreneurs of the forex reform story. Part 
three of the chapter is dedicated to the windows of opportunity that emerged within the KMT 
over the course of 1986. In this section we examine in some depth why and how these windows 
opened. Finally, part four of the chapter considers the response of the finance technocrats to the 
KMT policy windows described in part three. This section includes an examination of the 
micro-politics of forex reform
1. The process of forex reform
While Taiwan’s shift in foreign exchange policy of the late 1980s was similar in extent and 
direction to the reforms undertaken in securities and banking at that time, the process of forex 
policy change was in a league of its own (for a condensed overview, see Table 4.1). Forex
4 To recap the definition given earlier in the study: a technocrat is a state official who uses their claim to 
knowledge in some specialist area, or their ability to perform some specified function, to affirm their right 
to public office. From: Miguel A. Centeno and Particio Silva, T he Politics of Expertise in Latin 
America: Introduction’ in Miguel A. Centeno and Patricio Silva (eds.), The Politics o f Expertise in Latin 
America (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), chp. 1. See also: Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics 
of Expertise (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), chp. 1.
5 It will be remembered from chapter 1 that the socio-political window is generated by a reconfiguration 
of, or challenge to, the ruling political party’s social support base, and the sectoral-strategy window is 
created by any perceived failure of established financial policy to realize the party’s sectoral goals. The 
notion of the policy window is borrowed from: Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political 
Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997), esp. chp. 1
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reform was sharp, distinct and discontinuous -  spanning a total period of just over three years. 
Almost no time at all was allowed for the planning and execution of regulatory change, and 
there were few loose ends once the reform process was finally completed in mid to late 1989. 
Further, the decisiveness of the policy shift had few precedents within the field of RoC foreign 
exchange administration; the establishment and fine-tuning of the original SAFE was a slow and 
tedious affair spanning nearly two decades.
TABLE 4.1 Process of foreign exchange reform, 1986-89
Phase Period R eg u la to ry  In itia tive
Takeoff 14 May 86 
Oct 1986 
12 Mar 87
CBC commences current account reform. Announced July.
EY & MoF declare gold no longer subject to trade restrictions. 
CBC announces duo of new remittance regulations.
Development 27 Mar 87 
Apr-Jun 87 
16 Jun 87 
9 Jul 87 
12 Jul 87
CBC and EY announce major change to SAFE.
CBC prepares for regulatory change -  extremely rushed. 
Amended SAFE passes the LY. Reform rendered irreversible. 
EY passes reform package.
CCK promulgates new SAFE.
A p ex 15 Jul 87 New regulatory framework for forex officially launched.
Consolidation 1988 
Apr 89 
May 89 
Aug 89
Period of forex policy review.
Genuine float of NT$ launched.
Supplementary investment regulations updated. 
Inter-bank foreign currency loan market established.
Notes: CBC is the Central Bank of China, EY is the Executive Yuan, MoF is the Ministry of Finance, 
SAFE is the Statute for the Administration of Foreign Exchange, LY is the Legislative Yuan, CCK is 
Chiang Ching-kuo and NT$ is the New Taiwan dollar.
Sources: Various. See: Central Bank of China Annual Report (Taipei: Central Bank of China, various 
issues); and Zhonghua Minguo Zhongyang Yinhang zhi Zhidu yu Gongneng (Taipei: Central Bank of 
China, 1991), esp. p. 98-115; or Central Bank of China: System and Functions [official trans.] (Taipei, 
Central Bank of China, 1996), esp. chp. 8. See also: Far Eastern Economic Review (various issues, ^SÖ­
ST).
In chapter 3 of the thesis, I introduced data on the process of securities reform within the 
context of a four-phase progressive model. I utilize this framework in the present chapter as 
well. The four phases of forex liberalization covered the following junctures: the takeoff phase 
from May 1986 to March 1987, the development phase from March to June 1987, the apex of 
reform in July 1987, and the consolidation phase from July 1987 to August 1989. Prior to the 
takeoff phase -  understood as the transitional period of forex reform -  a general notion of 
‘restricted in principle’ was the guiding standard of foreign exchange regulation in Taiwan. For 
almost 40 years following the retreat to Formosa, forex dealings were prohibited as a general 
rule, and exceptions made for only a small number of specified transactions (including 
movements of currency arising from exports, or imports of capital goods and production
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components). As we saw in chapter 1 of the thesis, these principals and provisions were 
incorporated into a strict foreign exchange clearing system and a fixed exchange rate 
mechanism, and were eventually codified in the 1970 SAFE. Over the years, the SAFE 
framework underwent a series of minor modifications, including the introduction of a managed 
float of the NT dollar in December 1978 and the establishment of the Taipei offshore banking 
market in April 1984. While heralded as major reforms at the time, all of these adjustments 
were merely variations on the theme of restriction.6
As 1986 unfolded, however, the traditional policy stance rapidly changed. The adjustment 
in official thinking on forex administration was marked by three hastily conceived reform 
moves. The first of these transitional initiatives came in early to mid 1986. After receiving the 
go-ahead from the Executive Yuan on 14 May, the CBC set about redesigning the regulatory 
provisions for trade. Two months later, the Central Bank announced the Regulations Governing 
Foreign Exchange Reporting in Respect of Exports and Imports, a move which substantially 
relaxed current account transactions.7 The second transitional initiative had implications for the 
capital account. In October of 1986, the Executive Yuan and Ministry of Finance announced 
that gold and silver would no longer be regarded as so-called ‘general mobilization goods’ 
(guojia zongdongyuan wuzi) and therefore subject to a wholesale ban on trading. As of 1 
November 1986, designated banks and jewelry stores were given the authority to conduct over- 
the-counter trade in precious metals.8 In theory, this initiative provided a means by which RoC 
citizens could import and export investment funds. Finally, on 12 March 1987, the CBC 
introduced the Regulations Governing the Review of Non-Governmental Inward Remittance 
and the Regulations Governing Payments Resulting from Intangible Trade Transactions. This 
regulatory initiative (or rather, duo of initiatives) was something of a mixed bag: it partially 
reversed the earlier flirtation with decontrolling the current account, but removed limitations on 
the amount of outgoing foreign exchange that could be settled in respect of intangible trade. For 
the first time in RoC history, payments such as outward-bound company royalties were no 
longer subject to quantitative restrictions.9
Just two weeks after this somewhat ambiguous regulatory move, the forex reform process 
suddenly became more strategic and concerted -  the start of the development phase of foreign 
exchange reform On 27 March, the Central Bank and the Executive Yuan announced that they
6 From: Lawrence S. Liu, ‘Brave New World of Financial Reform in Taiwan, The Republic of China -  
Three Waves of Internationalization and Beyond’ in Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 
Vol. 8 (1988-89), p. 136-140; Far Eastern Economic Review (11 May 1979), p. 40-41; and Kuo-Shu 
Liang and Ching-Ing Liang, ‘Challenges in the 1990s for Banking and Financial Markets in Taiwan’ in 
Journal of Asian Economics Vol. 2, No. 2 (1991), p. 406.
7 Philip Liu, ‘Mounting Forex Reserves Prompt Rethinking of Economic Strategy’ in Financial and 
Investment Yearbook, RoC 1987 (Taipei: China Economic News Service, 1987).
h Willis Ke, ‘Strength of NT Dollar Bringing Forex Banks to Their Knees’ in Financial and Investment 
Yearbook, RoC 1987 (Taipei: Central Economic News Service, 1987), p. 35.
4 Zhonghua Minguo Zhongyang Yinhang zhi Zhidu yu Gongneng (Taipei: Central Bank of China, 1991), 
p. 103-104; or Central Bank of China: System and Functions [official Irans.] (Taipei, Central Bank of 
China, 1996), p. 133-134. See also: Far Eastern Economic Review (26 March 1987), p. 74.
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would be lifting all remaining current account restrictions, as well as most controls on the 
capital account. Described as a ‘deathbed conversion to foreign exchange liberalization’ by one 
foreign banker, the announcement took most people in finance circles by surprise.10 In the 
weeks following the decision to lift forex controls, the CBC embarked upon a lightening 
program of preparation. It was anticipated that the Legislative Yuan would pass the Central 
Bank’s amendment bill sometime before the end of June, and this would allow controls to be 
lifted around the start of July. The extremely short period of policy development -  around 12 
weeks from late March to June -  had few precedents in Taiwan’s administrative history. 
Central Bank officials were working around the clock to meet the deadline.* 11 Indicative of the 
degree of haste (indeed, panic) involved, there was considerable public disagreement among 
finance officials on the details of reform During one particularly embarrassing press 
conference, a Central Bank representative commented that the reform measures would apply 
uniformly to ‘all cross-border flows.’ Soon after, a CBC colleague remarked that capital 
account deregulation would only apply to personal remittances such as ‘small amounts of 
money for students studying abroad.’12 This was not the stuff of patient and meticulous policy 
change.
Against this disconcerting background, on 16 June the Legislative Yuan passed the CBC’s 
reform bill. The passage of the new SAFE13 was remarkably speedy. At the same time as the 
forex bill was being considered, the Legislative Yuan also had its hands full with the abolition 
of martial law; the fact that the foreign exchange reform bill only took three months to traverse 
the legislature was surprising indeed. But there was a sting in the tail of this efficiency. The 
legislators had added a clause to the amended SAFE obliging the Executive Yuan to submit any 
future proposal to reintroduce forex controls to the Legislative Yuan.14 The financial authorities 
were taken aback by the Legislative Yuan’s mischievous addition. Knowing that lifting controls 
might well be irreversible, the CBC and the Executive Yuan moved quickly to finalize the 
reform plan. On 9 July, Cabinet passed the reform package and sent the new law off to 
President Chiang Ching-Kuo for promulgation. CCK performed his presidential duty on 12 
July, and three days later the reform package was implemented.15
The introduction of the amended Statute for the Administration of Foreign Exchange 
signaled the apex of forex reform in the RoC. The final product was not, it must be said, as 
liberal as some would have liked. Shortly before the implementation of the SAFE reform 
package, the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) drafted a plan for the
10 Jingji Ribao lEconomic Daily News], (28 March 1987), p. 1; and Far Eastern Economic Review (9 
April 1987), p. 119-121.
11 Far Eastern Economic Review (9 April 1987), p. 120.
12 Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (27 June 1987), p. 1.
13 The changes actually amounted to little more than the addition of a simple moratorium clause giving 
the CBC the power to bypass forex controls. See: Guanli Waihui Tiaoli [Statute for the Administration of 
Foreign Exchange] (Taipei: Central Bank of China, 1987), art. 26-1
14 China News (17 June 1987), p. 8.
15 China Rost (15 July 1987), p. 12.
- 107-
Chapter 4 Crafting Markets in Taiwan
complete internationalization of the NT dollar. Under the CEPD proposal, foreigners were to be 
afforded equal rights with RoC citizens to hold and trade the local currency.16 While the CEPD 
model was ultimately rejected, the amended SAFE was still far more accommodating than its 
predecessor. Upon implementing the new regulatory scheme, the Central Bank presented the 
major areas of reform. These included: trade of foreign currency in spot markets, forward 
transactions, non-governmental inward remittances, non-governmental outward remittances, the 
establishment and operation of foreign currency cashiers, the administration of foreign credit 
cards, the management of foreign debt incurred by private enterprises, and the administration of 
foreign currency deposits at banks and other financial institutions. In total, these changes gave 
RoC citizens the unprecedented right to hold and freely exchange all trade-related funds and 
most cross-border investment funds. They provided for the construction of a completely new 
set of markets, institutions and property rights on Taiwan.17
In the two years or so after the launch of the new forex system, the financial authorities 
introduced a series of follow-up reforms to consolidate the regime. Following a period of policy 
review over 1988, in early to mid 1989 a triad of regulatory changes was introduced in quick 
succession. The first of these changes was the introduction of a genuine float of the exchange 
rate in April. Since the late 1970s, the CBC had experimented with a number of ‘managed 
float’ systems. All of these mechanisms were little more than a rearrangement of the Central 
Bank’s original administrative prerogative. Once RoC citizens had obtained the right to own 
and trade foreign currency, however, this monopoly was no longer practicable. After April 
1989, supply and demand in the new interbank and bank-customer markets for foreign exchange 
largely determined the forex rate.18 In May, the government sought to update a number of the 
supplementary regulations for inward and outward investment. Three key statutes administered 
by the Ministry of Economic Affairs -  the Regulations Governing the Handling of Outward 
Investment and Technical Cooperation, the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, and the 
Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese -  were reviewed to harmonize their operation with 
the new SAFE. Major changes included the adoption of negative vetting fists, and an ex post 
facto assessment procedure for most categories of cross-border investment.19 Finally, in
16 Wo Guo Guanli Waihui Tiaoli Quanpan Xiuzheng Yanjiu Baogao, #2001 [Research Report Number 
2001 on the Complete Revision of the RoC Statute for the Administration of Foreign Exchange] (Taipei: 
Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, 1987).
17 See esp.: Lawrence S. Liu, ‘Republic of China’s Deregulation of Foreign Exchange Control’ in Chinese 
Yearbook o f International Law and Affairs Vol. 6 (1986-87), p. 300-305; and Jingji Ribao [Economic 
Daily News] (16 July 1987), p. 2. This issue of JR includes a number of good articles on the new SAFE, 
including analysis of economic and policy aspects.
18 Financial Market Integration in Chinese Taipei (Taipei: Bureau of Monetary Affairs, Ministry of 
Finance, 1995), p. 71.
19 Dui Wai Touzi ji Keji Hezuo Shenhe Chuli Banfa [Regulations Governing the Handling of Outward 
Investment and Outward Technical Cooperation Projects] (Taipei: Industrial Development and 
Investment Center, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1989); Wairen Touzi Tiaoli [Statute for Investment by 
Foreign Nationals] (Taipei: Industrial Development and Investment Center, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, 1989); and Huaqiao Huiguo Touzi Tiaoli [Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese] (Taipei: 
Industrial Development and Investment Center, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1989).
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August, the financial authorities moved to create a genuine interbank foreign currency loan 
market in Taiwan. Established as a separate entity from the Taipei offshore banking market 
(briefly mentioned above), the new loan facility allowed banks in Taiwan to independently take 
a long position on foreign currency for the first time. The new market was launched with seed 
money from the Central Bank and offered borrowing and lending in all major currencies.20
2. The finance technocrats and the rationale for change
It is apparent from the regulatory data reviewed above that the process of foreign exchange 
reform in Taiwan during the late 1980s was extraordinarily fast and energetic. The phasal 
sequence of policy change progressed like a Hong Kong action film; the whole course of 
activity took only three years to complete and encompassed a sharp, dramatic climax. The 
contrast with the process of securities reform that we reviewed in chapter 3 of the thesis could 
not be starker. That reform process was painfully slow and incremental, spanning a total period 
of over a decade. The difference in the two cases demonstrates quite clearly that there is no 
single process of financial policy change intrinsic to Taiwan -  that is to say, it cannot be 
suggested that forex opening followed some kind of inherent ‘Taiwanese path.’ Further, it must 
be noted that a fast and furious pattern of foreign exchange liberalization is not typical of most 
forex reform episodes. Generally speaking, the reverse is true. For most countries, forex 
opening has involved considerable muddling through -  an extreme example being set by 
Taiwan’s regional neighbors Japan and Korea.21 In terms of process, the Taiwan case probably 
sits closer to some of the more dramatic examples of forex opening such as Chile or New 
Zealand.22
So what explains the process of foreign exchange liberalization in Taiwan? Certainly, 
aspects of the reform experience can be illustrated with the established theoretical tools we saw 
earlier in the thesis.23 However, none of these competing approaches gives a satisfactory 
account of why the forex reform process took the form of a sharp spike of activity rather than 
some alternative pattern. The theories are particularly poor in explaining why the
20 Kuo-shu Liang, ‘The Banking System and Financial Reform in Taiwan’ in Industry of Free China Vol. 
78, No. 3 (September 1992), p. 36.
21 See respectively: Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press 1989), chp. 3; and Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, ‘The Political 
Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World’ in International Organization, Vol. 
50, No. 1 (Winter 1996).
22 See respectively: Laura Hastings, ‘Regulatory Revenge: The Politics of Free Market Financial Reforms 
in Chile’ in Stephan Haggard, Chung H. Lee and Sylvia Maxfield (eds.), The Politics of Finance in 
Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), chp. 7; and Suiwah Leung, ‘Financial 
Liberalization in Australia and New Zealand’ in Sylvia Ostry (ed.), Authority and Academic Scribblers 
(San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991), chp. 8.
23 The theories include: the market-driven approach, statist analysis, pluralism and the foreign pressures 
model. See chapter 1, part two. Leading examples of these four theories include, respectively: Richard 
O’Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992); Louis 
W. Pauly, Opening Financial Markets: Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1988); Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan, fn. 21; and Eric Helleiner, States
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implementation of the amended SAFE in July 1987 (i.e. the apex of reform) was such a shock to 
everyone concerned.24 It is a broad theme of this thesis that the liberalization of finance is 
generally linked to the leadership efforts of elite technocrats. In the first instance, liberalization 
arises as a conceptual strategy because members of this group decide to take-up the reform 
agenda and run with it. In this context we will see below that the initial motive for forex reform 
owed much to the experience and thinking of the ‘finance technocrats’ -  a small circle of 
officials loyal to finance expert and long-term policy practitioner Yu Kuo-hwa. Yu and his 
supporters were driven by a firm conviction that the established forex system had outlived its 
usefulness. By the early 1980s, they believed that Taiwan’s economy had surpassed the need 
for a restrictive system of forex controls, and considered that the system’s retention was likely 
to produce perverse effects. This conviction had evolved from their combined experience as 
senior administrators over the 1970s and early 1980s, and was well entrenched in their outlook 
on policy matters by the start of forex reform in 1986.
The story of when and how Yu and his cohort of technocratic insiders were able to act is 
one of KMT political preferences and strategies. In chapter 1 of the thesis I argued that for elite 
technocrats to be ultimately successful with financial reform, two kinds of policy window need 
to be open within their referent political party: a broad socio-political window and a narrow 
sectoral-strategy window. I demonstrate below that the pattern of forex reform in Taiwan 
evolved the way it did simply because, insofar as this subsector of finance was concerned, these 
two policy windows opened almost simultaneously. In a manner that contrasts strongly with 
securities liberalization, the temporal distribution of party political opportunities facing the 
relevant technocrats was extremely narrow -  indeed so narrow that in many respects they 
overlapped. Early 1986, the finance technocrat’s agenda for forex policy change was assured 
the attention of the KMT regime as it became an effective means of shoring up party support 
among small to medium sized manufacturers -  a category of traditional party support which was 
suffering badly from a dramatic rise in the NT dollar exchange rate (socio-political window 
opens). Very soon afterwards, the technocrats’ reform program received full backing from the 
KMT because the established foreign exchange system was inadvertently generating an 
explosion in the domestic money supply -  evoking the threat of inflation and therefore a breach 
of the ruling party’s preference for a stable and controllable financial sector (sectoral-strategy 
window opens). The negligible period of time between these two windows meant that Yu and 
his cohort of reformers were able to make foreign exchange liberalization an expeditious course 
of action.
and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994).
24 See press comment in: Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (16 July 1987), p. 1-2 & editorial; and 
Zhongguo Shibao [China Times] (16 July 1987), p. 1-2. The sense of surprise is palpable here. The 
contrast with equivalent press commentary coinciding with the introduction of the new Securities 
Exchange Law is stark indeed.
25 From chapter 1, section three.
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We saw in chapter 3 that the technocrats initially involved in guiding the process of 
securities policy change were strongly influenced by the development agenda of technology 
guru Li Kwoh-ting. These elite economic policymakers -  dubbed the ‘development 
technocrats’ or the ‘KT Faction’ by outsiders -  were primarily interested in Taiwan’s transition 
from low to high technology manufacturing. For them, securities reform was a by-product of 
their concerns with the evolving nature of Taiwan’s real economy. The technocrats behind the 
process of foreign exchange liberalization, however, were far more interested in the operation of 
the financial sector as an independent entity. This group of technocrats took their cue on 
financial policy matters from senior economics administrator Yu Kuo-hwa, and came to be 
known in policy circles as the ‘Yu Faction’ (Yu Xi) or simply the ‘finance technocrats’ (caijing 
guanliao).26 While similar to KT Li’s band of technocrats in a broad systemic sense (see 
arguments in chapter 2, section three), the finance technocrats differed from Li’s followers in 
some important respects. They were typically technocrats with: (1) an academic background in 
economics rather than engineering, law, science or the humanities; (2) extended, but not 
exclusive experience as an official in the Central Bank of China; and (3) considerable 
professional experience at one of Taiwan’s state-owned banks, typically at senior levels, but 
only rarely at any other state-owned enterprise. As a rule, Yu’s technocrats were keen to 
portray themselves as finance specialists first and political functionaries second -  perhaps the 
closest thing in Taiwan to the disinterested ‘econocrat’ referred to in various academic studies 
of policy reform in Latin American and Eastern Europe.27
Reflecting this desire to rise above politics, the finance technocrats fostered an elitist 
character and kept the internal dynamics of the group out of the public eye. The most glaring 
example of this exclusivity was the Freemason-like influence Yu and his followers maintained 
'over appointments within the local finance industry. Throughout the 1970s and much of the 
1980s, the Yu Faction was directly involved in virtually every senior appointment in RoC 
banking. The most prominent bankers of the day -  such as Ronald Ho, C.D. Wang, Y.D. Hsu, 
L.S. Lin and Sun I-shuan -  were all strongly indebted to Yu and his cohort of technocrats for 
their impressive career paths. Likewise, an increasing number of the up and coming finance 
administrators of that era -  rising stars like Liang Kuo-shu, Paul Chiu, Shirley Kuo, Samuel 
Shieh and Yu Chen -  owed their career successes to Yu Kuo-hwa or the friends thereof.28 The
26 Jun Wang, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [Finance Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and 
Travels] (Taipei: Sunbright Publishing Company, 1999), p. 248.
27 The ideal type image is of an academic economist who reluctantly gets involved in the policy process 
for fear of ‘bad’ policy being implemented if he doesn’t. For a discussion of the intellectual heritage of 
this ideal type, see: Miguel A. Centeno, ‘The Politics of Knowledge: Hayek and Technocracy’ in Miguel 
A. Centeno and Particio Silva (eds.), The Politics of Expertise in Latin America (London: MacMillan 
Press, 1998), chp. 36.
28 The complete list of those that received the Yu Faction’s blessing can be found in: Wang, Caijing Jubo: 
Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [Finance Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and Travels], fn. 26, esp. section 2. 
Supplemented with English language material in: Financial & Investment Yearbook, RoC (Taipei: China 
Economic News Service, various issues, 1980s), see esp. bibliographic information in the back of this 
publication.
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elitist character of the finance technocrats was further reinforced by the highly selective 
relationships the group maintained with Taiwan’s community of academic economists. The Yu 
clan relied heavily on advice from just a handful of senior lecturers at National Chengchi 
University (the most important among them Professor Zhang Zi-kai), individuals who were 
often ex-CBC officials themselves. Only rarely did the group seek assistance from, or openly 
engage in public debate with, high profile economists like T.S. Tsiang and T.C. Liu from 
National Taiwan University. The advice of Professors Tsiang and Liu, like many of their 
colleagues in Taiwan at the time, was regarded as simply too ‘theoretical’ to be of any use in the 
real world of monetary administration.29
During the forex reform process of the late 1980s the core of the finance technocrats 
consisted of Yu Kuo-hwa (Yu Guo-hua) himself, Robert Chien and Chang Chi-cheng. With Yu 
at the head of the group, these three elite technocrats were almost entirely responsible for the 
content of forex reform At least initially, however, Yu Kuo-hwa’s educational background did 
not prepare him for a position as a finance administrator. At Tsinghua (Qinghua) University in 
Peking during the 1930s, Yu had studied political science with the intention of taking up a 
defense-related position in the Nationalist government. A decade of experience as Chiang Kai- 
shek’s personnel assistant, however, convinced the young civil servant that he needed a more 
specialized education. In the 1940s, Yu attended Harvard and the London School of Economics 
with the express intention of developing an expertise in finance. After three years as a research 
student at both institutions, Yu attained senior positions as an RoC representative in the newly 
formed World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In 1955, upon Chiang Kai-shek’s 
request, Yu returned to the RoC -  by then, an outpost confined to the island of Taiwan -  and 
took up a position as President of the Central Trust of China (a government trust bank with wide 
administrative duties at that time). Thereafter, Yu’s career went from strength to strength: 
Director of the China Development Corporation and Chair of the Bank of China, 1961-67; 
Minister of Finance, 1967-69; governor of the Central Bank of China, 1969-84; Chair of the 
Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1977-84; and finally RoC Premier, 1984-89. 
During these later appointments, Yu also became a member of the Central Standing Committee 
of the KMT (1979) and a senior advisor to President Chiang Ching-kuo. In the ensuing years, 
Yu’s personal influence in economic policy circles became increasingly strong and entrenched. 
Few policy changes of that period saw the light of day without his consent, and a good number, 
like forex reform, were directly his own initiative.30
29 See, for example, career review article on T.S. Tsiang in Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 
February 1986), p. 40-49. Augmented with various interviews in Taipei 1996 & 1999; esp. interviews 
with Paul C.D. Lei, Senior Economist, Department of Foreign Exchange, Central Bank of China, 28 
August 1996, and Dr Yen Tzung-Da, Assistant Director General, Economic Research Department, 
Central Bank of China, 3 June 1996.
20 Wang, Caijing Juho: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [Finance Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and Travels], 
fn. 26, esp. section 1. Supplemented with English language material from: Republic of China Yearbook, 
1996 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1996), p. 592-593.
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Among Yu’s band of technocrats, his most trusted ally was undoubtedly Robert Chien 
(Qian Chun). The two first met in the mid 1950s while Chien was working in the Ministry of 
Education, temporarily on secondment to China Trust as part of a personnel-sharing 
arrangement. Over the next 30 years, they were virtually inseparable as they rapidly rose to 
senior positions within the RoC state. Referring to each other endearingly as ‘comrades in 
arms’ (zhanyou), Yu and Chien formed a formidable team as master and apprentice in the art of 
finance administration.31 Chien’s educational background ensured that, like Yu, he was hot 
property in Taiwan during the impoverished years of the 1950s: he studied undergraduate 
economics at National Taiwan University in the late 1940s, and earned a Masters in economics 
from the University of Minnesota in 1957. After a brief period of academic work,32 in 1963 
Chien took up a post as Director of Research at the Bank of China. Five years later, he was 
made Executive Secretary of an Executive Yuan special committee on tax reform, before being 
poached by Yu Kuo-hwa in 1970 to commence a decade and a half of work in the Central Bank. 
His positions in the Bank included: Secretariat Director, 1970-73; General Manager of the 
Banking Department, 1973-77; and Deputy Governor, 1972-85. In 1985, Chien left the Central 
Bank to become Minister of Finance -  the pinnacle of his career. Thereafter, he held a series of 
largely ceremonial positions in Taiwan’s banking industry, and was appointed a member of the 
Central Committee of the KMT.33
Chang Chi-cheng’s (Zhang Ji-zheng) career path did not place him as close to Yu Kuo-hwa 
as Robert Chien, and to some degree the core of the finance technocrats functioned as ‘two plus 
one.’ Media reports typically portrayed Chang as something of a loner in his professional life.34 
Probably the most important factor that separated Chang from Yu and Chien was his academic 
background; initially, Chang seemed more likely to be associated with KT Li’s band of 
technocrats. Over the 1940s, he earned a Masters of Science from Tongji University in 
Shanghai, and a Ph.D. in civil engineering from Cornell, Upon returning to the RoC, Chang 
held a series of academic positions culminating in a chair at National Taiwan University. With 
a well-established academic reputation behind him, in the late 1950s Chang commenced a 
career in government. Over the next decade and a half, he tried his hand at a mixed bag of 
senior appointments before developing an interest in finance. His career highlights included: 
Vice Minister, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1965-69; Minister of Communications, 1969-71; 
and Chair of the Economic Planning Committee, Executive Yuan, 1971-76. In 1978, Chang
31 Wang, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [Finance Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and Travels], 
fn. 26, p. 253-254.
32 During which time he co-authored two works of note. Both ran into multiple editions and printings, 
and one became a standard local textbook in second-year money and banking courses at universities 
around Taiwan. See: Xian-zhong He and Robert C. Chien, Chuxu Touzi yu Zhengquan 2nd ed. [Savings, 
Investment and Securities] (Taipei: Taiwan Lianhe Chuban, 1964); and De-le Qiang, Shao-rong Li, 
Robert C. Chien, and L. V. Chandler, Huobi Yinhang Xue 6th ed. [Money and Banking] (Taipei: Shangfu 
Chuban, 1972).
33 Zhonghua Mitiguo Mingrenlu, Minguo 88 Nian [Who’s Who in the Republic of China, 1999] (Taipei: 
Central News Agency, 1999), p. 264; and Republic of China Yearbook, 1996, fn. 30, p. 465.
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was appointed Minister of Finance (which he held until 1981), and in the ensuing years his 
relationship with Yu Kuo-hwa and the finance policy community gradually solidified. This 
period included his time as governor of the Central Bank ( 1984-89), as well as a number of 
appointments in the banking industry.35 Over the 1980s, Chang also rose through the ranks of 
the KMT, becoming a National Advisor to the President in the mid 1980s and a member of the 
Party Central Committee later in the decade/6
On the face of it, the Yu Faction was not the obvious group of technocrats to lead the way in 
foreign exchange liberalization. On most policy matters, observers considered Yu and his 
entourage highly conservative. Press comments on the role of Yu Kuo-hwa in the various 
liberalization initiatives of the late 1980s typically portray him as an arch reactionary rather than 
an architect of reform One foreign journalist remarked that: ‘Yu...stoutly resisted calls for 
faster action on trade and financial liberalization, until the weight of international and domestic 
pressure overwhelmed the former central bank governor’s innate conservatism’37 Some of this 
reputation was a natural function of the group’s traditional policy concerns -  central bankers 
everywhere tend to be seen as guardians of the status quo38 -  and it is probably true that Yu, 
Chien and Chang had grown accustomed to managing the economy with dirigiste policy tools. 
This said, much of the finance technocrats’ conservative reputation was attributable to a 
misinterpretation of their motives and operational context. Yu’s band of technocrats were in 
fact political pragmatists rather than policy conservatives: they were not opposed to financial 
reform per se, merely to reform measures which they knew the KMT regime would never be 
able to accept. And regarding foreign exchange reform that included just about anything more 
than modest tinkering. When the Yu Faction poured cold water on demands for financial policy 
reform -  as they did on a number of occasions before the late 1980s39 -  they were merely 
relaying the party line. Privately and on a professional level, they knew only too well that the 
financial system in Taiwan had to change, and nowhere was this more apparent than in the area 
of forex administration.
34 Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 May 1989), p. 86.
35 It also included an intermittent return to academic studies (for the purposes of honing his finance 
credentials), and the publication of a number of finance-related articles. See for example: Chi-cheng 
Chang, ‘Financial Liberalization in the Republic of China’ in S.G. Rhee and R.P. Chang (eds.), Pacific- 
Basin Capital Markets Research, Volume II (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1990).
36 Bibliographic information from: Gendai Chugoku Jinmei Jiten 1991 Nenban [Who’s Who of 
Contemporary China, 1991] (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1991), p. 2048. Augmented with interview material, esp. 
interview in Taipei with Professor Cheng You-ping, Associate Professor, Department of Public 
Administration, National Chung-hsing University, 26 March 1999.
37 Far Eastern Economic Review (23 July 1987), p. 52.
38 See for example: Arthur F. Burns, The Anguish of Central Banking (Washington: Per Jacobsson 
Foundation, 1979); Eugenia F. Toma and Mark Toma (eds.), Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives 
and Monetary Policy (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986); and Martin Marcussen, Central 
Bankers, The Ideational Life-Cycle and the Social Construction of the EMU (San Domenico: European 
University Institute, 1998).
39 For a particularly zealous example regarding bank privatization, see personal interview with Yu Kuo- 
hwa in Diane Ying (ed.), Juecezhe [Decision Makers] (Taipei: Common wealth Publishing Co., 1983), 
esp. p. 23-26.
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The truth of the Yu Faction’s political pragmatism has only recently come to light. Yu, 
Chien and Chang’s public pronouncements on foreign exchange policy during much of the 
1980s seem to indicate that they resisted regulatory change well into the takeoff phase of reform 
in 1986.40 However, in Wang Jun’s revealing biography of Yu Kuo-hwa’s life and career, it is 
apparent that Yu had decided very early on that Taiwan’s original forex system was living on 
borrowed time. According to Wang’s account, the Central Bank governor believed that in terms 
of economic efficiency and policy efficacy, Taiwan had actually outgrown the old forex regime 
by the end of the 1970s. Yu recalls that around 1968-69, the RoC’s trade position shifted from 
deficit to surplus, and by the end of the 1970s the Central Bank had accumulated a healthy stock 
of foreign reserves. This meant that in principle at least, the country no longer needed 
comprehensive exchange controls and that their retention was increasingly a threat to monetary 
stability and an unwanted burden on the Central Bank of China (more on the technical aspects 
of this issue in the next section of the chapter). The experience of 1974 underlined this new 
reality when loose monetary conditions combined with a spike in oil prices to produce an annual 
inflation rate in excess of 40% -  a level not seen since the late 1940s. Although skillfully 
handled at the time, the price spike of 1974 was a shock to Yu and the rest of the finance 
technocrats, and a sober warning of what could go wrong with the established forex system 
The introduction of the managed float of the NT dollar in 1979 (and also, to some degree, the 
interbank money market in 1976) provided a short-term means of offsetting the pressures 
involved, but was only ever a partial solution. It offered no insulation whatsoever against the 
second oil shock of 1979-81 -  a fact not lost on Yu as he and others struggled to manage the 
stagflation of the early 1980s. Indeed, in a sense the experiment with a managed float was 
probably worse than no adjustment in policy at all: the initiative engendered expectations of 
future forex reform, and encouraged discontentment among the commercial sector with the 
established system41
Yu’s early private analysis of the state of Taiwan’s forex system dovetailed smoothly with 
his public analysis of the international economy in the late 1970s and early 80s. In Yu’s 
description of the international economic system at this time he emphasized that the basic 
assumptions and institutions of the post-War boom -  e.g. stable energy prices, decreasing trade 
protection, fixed exchange rates, the collaborative adjustment of fiscal and monetary policy, etc. 
-  could no longer be relied upon. The new world economy was recession and inflation prone,
40 For Robert Chien and Chang Chi-cheng, see Far Eastern Economic Review (3 October 1985), p. 67; 
and for Yu Kuo-hwa, see personal interview in Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 June 1986), 
esp. p. 25-26.
41 The points raised here are a condensed summary of Yu Kuo-hwa’s thinking on forex matters over the 
1970s and early 1980s as outlined in: Wang, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [Finance 
Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and Travels], fn. 26, esp. p. 237-238, 244, 256-251, 268-276, 323-325, 358- 
360, 378-385 & 455-461. Supplemented with various interviews in Taipei, 1996 & 1999. See also: 
interview with Yu Kuo-hwa in Ying (ed.), Juecezhe [Decision Makers], fn. 39; and Xin-rong Xue, Bianju 
Zhong de Yuejin: Yu Guo-hua de Zhengyuan Wunian [In the Midst of Critical Change: The Five Year 
Cabinet of Yu Kuo-hwa] (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1996), chp. 4 and 5.
- 115-
Chapter 4 Crafting Markets in Taiwan
and the short to inedium term outlook tor growth very poor. Yu stressed on numerous public 
occasions as governor of the Central Bank of China and Chair of the Council for Economic 
Planning and Development that in the context of this pervasive uncertainty, domestic policy 
‘flexibility,’ ‘discipline’ and ‘self reliance’ were paramount. While these speeches and 
presentations were often long on rhetoric and short on detail, they leave little doubt that Yu was 
aware of the fact that Taiwan had to adapt to a new, riskier international environment.42 When 
Yu was appointed Premier of the RoC cabinet in mid 1984, he incorporated this realization into 
his program for ‘liberalization, internationalization and systemization’ (ziyouhua, guojihua  and 
zhiduhua). Many commentators were cynical about this policy agenda for it was again long on 
rhetoric but short on actual policy prescriptions. Invariably, however, ‘pushing forward foreign 
exchange liberalization’ (tuidong waihui ziyouhua) received a mentioned in all the associated 
planning documents and position papers. Although Yu was very tight-lipped about the 
particulars, he undeniably saw forex reform at the forefront of Taiw an’s external adjustment
43process.
It is apparent that privately at least, Yu Kuo-hwa had long appreciated the need to update 
Taiw an’s foreign exchange system  But even if we accept that Yu and his followers held such 
views, what evidence do we have that their public reticence on forex reform was a reflection of 
KMT preferences rather than their own? In addition to the material we will see in the next 
section of this chapter, three interrelated points are worthy of mention up front. Firstly, we 
know for certain that the reticence exliibited by Yu and his entourage regarding forex reform 
was in large measure a part of a conscious strategy o f  concealment. In an interview with 
Professor Shirley Kuo, deputy governor of the Central Bank of China while both Yu Kuo-hwa 
and Chang Chi-cheng were governor, the senior stateswomen commented: ‘...[I]n  my opinion 
the way the government [pursued forex reform] was very intentional....The level of intention 
involved was not seen by most people as we wanted to keep our aims quiet. Once you say a 
policy will be changed, you will meet obstacles, expectations and side effects which will 
undermine your efforts.’44 These comments confirm that the finance technocrats’ private 
rationale for forex reform cannot be explained away as a passing opinion, or an ex post facto  
rationalization: it was widely shared and deliberately disguised.
42 See for example: Kuo-hwa Yu, ‘RoC Economic Development in the 80s’ in Industry o f Free China 
Vol. 53, No. 4 (April 1980); Kuo-hwa Yu, ‘New Challenges to Our Economy’ in Industry o f Free China 
Vol. 54, No. 4 (October 1980); Kuo-hwa Yu, ‘Dangqian Jingji Qingshi yu Zhanwang’ [Current Economic 
Situation and Prospects] in Ziyou Zhongguo zhi Gongye [Industry of Free China] Vol. 59, No. 2 (February 
1983); and Kuo-hwa Yu, ‘Joint Efforts for Narrowing the RoC-USA Trade Gap’ in Industry o f Free 
China Vol. 60, No. 6 (December 1983).
43 See: Yau-tung Chao, ‘Liberalization, Internationalization and Systemization: New Currents in Taiwan’s 
Economic Development’ in Industry o f Free China Vol. 68, No. 3 (March 1985); CEPD, ‘Mingguo 74 
Nian Taiwan Jingji Jianshe Jihua’ [Taiwan’s Economic Development Plan for 1985] in Ziyou Zhongguo 
zhi Gongye [Industry of Free China] Vol. 63, No. 2 (February 1985); and Asian Wall Street Journal (5 
November 1984), p. 3, includes personal interview with Yu Kuo-hwa.
44 Interview in Taipei with Professor Shirley Kuo, Minister Without Portfolio, RoC Cabinet, 4 December 
1996.
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Secondly, Yu Kuo-hwa’s finance team was in a better position than most technocrats to 
understand the limited scope within the ruling party for forex policy change. By the mid 1970s, 
Yu had established a close association with Chiang Ching-kuo, and discussed the full range of 
state issues with the Premier and later President. This relationship became stronger still as 
CCK’s health declined through the early to mid 1980s, and when Yu became Premier in 1984.4' 
Chang Chi-cheng’s father Zhang Qun was a member of the KMT’s aging strata of party seniors 
(the so-called zhengdang dalao), a group that retained a level of status and authority in the 
ruling party even though many of its number were senile or bed-ridden.46 As we saw in chapter 
2, the Leninist character of the KMT meant that such high connections did not necessarily47 
translate into increased influence -  although a greater understanding of party preferences and 
opportunities would inevitably have followed.
Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, the finance technocrats’ declared reasons for limiting 
forex policy change really only made sense to the KMT faithful -  even casual outside observers 
could see they were drastically over-determined. A typical rationalization included fear of 
mainland China; Yu occasionally argued that an open capital account would leave the RoC 
vulnerable to manipulation by the Chinese communists.48 While there may have been some 
basic truth to this view, it assumes that capital controls were effective and that regulatory 
restrictions were synonymous with economic security. The reality was, however, that Taiwan’s 
forex controls existed alongside a large illegal outflow of funds,49 and that the established forex 
regime actually increased the mainland Chinese economic threat by (potentially) rendering all
45 Yu had been the Chiang household’s personal financial advisor since the 1930s, and was one of the few 
people that managed to cultivate a close relationship with both Chiang Kai-shek and his son CCK. Yu’s 
first real taste of Ching-kuo’s patronage, however, came in 1973 when he was appointed convener of a 
high-level advisory group -  the ‘five man finance and economics small group’ or wuren caijing xiaozu -  
which stood above all other policy committees and reported directly to the new Premier. Thomas B. 
Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), p. 92.
46 Yu-kou Zhou, Li Deng-hui de Yiqian Tian: 1988-92 [A Thousand Days of Lee Teng-hui: 1988-921 
(Taipei: Maitian Chuban, 1993), p. 99.
47 I say ‘not necessarily’ here as under the right circumstances (i.e. the opening of a window of 
opportunity) high connections did most certainly make for increased influence on policy outcomes. The 
point is that influence was temporally as much as structurally specific.
48 And on at least one occasion in the late 1990s, argued that a decrease in the security threat around 1987 
was linked to the passage of foreign exchange reform. See: Wang, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya 
Xingjiao [Finance Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and Travels], fn. 26, p. 385. This claim, like the broader 
proposition that Taiwan’s security situation prohibited forex opening, needs to be taken with a large grain 
of salt. Yu’s pronouncements at the time leave little doubt that, as far as he was concerned, there was no 
change in the security relationship with mainland China over the course of his Premiership. See: Xue, 
Bianju Zhong de Yuejin: Yu Guo-hua de Zhengyuan Wunian [In the Midst of Critical Change: The Five 
Year Cabinet of Yu Kuo-hwa], fn. 41, p. 91-96 & 243-259; and China News (9 May 1988) [personal 
interview with Yu Kuo-hwa], p. 12. In this latter article, Yu stated categorically: T must first point out, 
up to present, there has been no change in the attitude of the government of the RoC toward the Chinese 
Communist regime.... Their basic formula is to “appeal to emotions and entice with profit” in hopes of 
changing people’s impressions of the Chinese Communist regime and increasing Taiwan’s dependence 
on the mainland, then to use Taiwan’s residents to influence the government’s policies. However, in 
actual practice, the Chinese Communists back up all their actions, both the indirect strategy of isolation 
and the direct one of enticement, with a hidden iron fist. This threat has never diminished, and will not 
diminish in the future.' Emphasis added.
49 According to one estimate, illegal capital exports were in the order of US$3 billion per year by 1985. 
See: Far Eastern Economic Review (3 October 1985), p. 67.
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RoC assets held abroad sovereign property. 0 Yu’s team knew ot these practical shortcomings, 
and yet publicly chose to ignore them. This was more the stuff ot political apology than a 
defensible statement of policy principle.
3. The KMT policy windows for foreign exchange reform, early and late 1986 
And so, convinced that the KMT would never countenance extensive foreign exchange 
liberalization, the pragmatic technocrats of the Yu Faction concealed their private assessment of 
the established exchange system, and feebly made the case for going slow on forex policy 
change. In so doing, the group had the pleasure of bearing the full burden of criticism 
forwarded by reform advocates. For the better part of a decade prior to 1987, a loose alliance of 
journalists, foreign bankers and economists targeted Yu and other ‘protectionist policymakers’ 1̂ 
as the chief obstacle on the road to forex reform Little did this coalition realize, however, just 
how politically entrenched the old forex system actually was. Policy insiders like Yu, Chien 
and Chang, however, were keenly aware that forex liberalization would never be an option 
unless it could impress the KMT as a sound strategy (1) to secure socio-political support for the 
party, and (2) to buttress the party’s cautious finance goals. Up to the end of 1985, the 
successful fulfillment of both criteria seemed too much to hope for.
As 1986 unfolded, however, both of these windows of opportunity opened, and opened far 
more rapidly and in-concert than anyone could have imagined. The first of the chances for 
change came in the early months of 1986, when the rising NT dollar began to put pressure on 
Taiwan’s legion of small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs -  zhongxiao q iye)52 This was at
50 This latter point requires some elaboration. Following the RoC’s string of diplomatic setbacks during 
the 1970s, the monetary authorities in Taiwan became extremely concerned about the status of RoC 
financial institutions abroad. It was feared that because these institutions were state-owned enterprises, 
their assets might be unilaterally claimed as sovereign property by Peking. As a consequence the 
government moved to distance itself from these institutions via privatization and a ‘buyback’ ot 
instruments held overseas. While these issues were being discussed, it became apparent that all capital 
exports from the RoC potentially faced the same kind of threat from mainland China. Under the old 
system of forex controls, RoC citizens could only purchase overseas assets with the permission of the 
Central Bank of China; foreign exchange could only be held and traded by government authorities and 
after acquiring foreign currency from the Central Bank, citizens were effectively operating as government 
agents. This meant that in principle if not in practice, RoC capital held abroad was sovereign property 
and might be reclaimed as such by the Peking government. All things being equal, this was a more real 
economic threat than the ‘manipulation’ so often cited as a reason for retaining forex controls. Various 
interviews in Taipei, 1996 & 1999. For an introduction to the issues involved in this policy debate, see: 
R.B. Greenburgh, ‘Sovereign Debt and the Republic of China’ in Chinese Yearbook o f International Law 
and Affairs Vol. 6 (1986-87); and Wang, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [Finance Master: 
Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and Travels], fn. 26, p. 325-328.
51 A term used with considerable disdain in S.C. Tsiang, Wen-lang Chen and Alvin Hsieh, ‘Progress in 
Trade Liberalization, Taiwan, Republic of China’ in Economic Review [a bi-monthly journal published by 
the International Commercial Bank of China] No. 230 (March-April 1986), p. 5-6.
52 The definition of a small to medium sized enterprise is not consistent across nations, and even within 
Taiwan there are multiple classifications based on industry sector. See: Zhongxiao Qiye Rending Biaojun 
[Criteria for Identification of Medium and Small Enterprises] (Taipei: Industrial Development and 
Investment Center, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1995). More often than not, however, the ‘rule of 
thumb’ definition used by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and other international agencies is 
also adhered to in Taiwan. This definition stipulates that a firm may be regarded as an SME simply if it
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first a major socio-political problem tor the ruling party, but was soon reduced to a policy 
question when forex reform was proposed as an adjustment palliative. The backdrop to this 
episode can be traced to the early 1960s when the KMT regime first launched Taiwan along the 
path of export oriented industrialization (EOI). EOI was, at least initially, the KMT’s response 
to a range of negative economic and political incentives that emerged in the 1950s: the failure of 
the old import industrialization strategy to deliver sustainable growth, rampant rent seeking 
around the established arrangements for trade and foreign exchange, pressure from the US for 
Taiwan to decrease its dependence on American aid, and the increasing realization that the 
ruling party’s goal of ‘retaking the mainland’ (fangong dalu) would never be achieved.53 Once 
launched, however, EOI proved even more successful than the ruling party could ever have 
hoped. Not only did it facilitate a massive improvement in Taiwan’s economic performance 
(performance statistics included in chapter 3, section three), it also contributed to a style of 
development that the KMT regime could happily live with. As noted earlier in the thesis, the
TABLE 4.2 Number of SMEs and proportion of total firms, select years
1961 1971 1981 1989
178,916 | 99.6% 274,362 98.3% 508,784 ! 99.1% 778,042 97.4
Source: Zhonghua Minguo Taiwan Diqu Zhongxiao Qiye Tongji [Small and Medium Enterprise Statistics, 
Taiwan Area, RoC] (Taipei: Medium and Small Business Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
various issues).
ruling party was not a natural friend of business interests on Taiwan, and the larger the business 
interests, the more unfriendly the relationship. The entrenchment of EOI in the 1960s and its 
maturation through the 1970s and 1980s occurred in tandem with a vast expansion in the 
number of SMEs on the island (from 178,916 in 1961 to 778,042 in 1989; see Table 4.2). These 
enterprises concentrated their production on the North American and European markets, and 
soundly dominated national exports (the proportion of RoC exports attributable to SMEs 
averaged around 62% for the 1980s; see comparative figures in Table 4.3). With the passage of 
time, a symbiotic relationship grew up between the SMEs and the ruling party. The SMEs were 
indebted to the KMT government for upstream supplies, a suppressed exchange rate, help with 
market entry and, more generally, the opportunity to do business and prosper; and the KMT 
came to depend upon the SMEs as a key group in its ‘distributional coalition’54 of party 
supporters.
has 100 employees or less. In the discussion that follows, we will use this basic definition unless 
otherwise noted.
53 See esp.: Stephan Haggard and Chien-kuo Pang, ‘The Transition to Export-Led Growth in Taiwan’ in 
Joel D. Aberbach, David Dollar and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (eds.), The Role of the State in Taiwan’s 
Development (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 69-83.
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TABLE 4.3 Ratio of SME exports to total exports of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, 
1980-87
Period RoC Korea Japan
1980 66.7% 15.4% N/A
1981 74.8% 14.5% N/A
1982 75.9% 14.1% 22.1%
1983 73.3% 14.5% 20.0%
1984 71.8% 13.5% 25.4%
1985 70.0% 13.3% 27.8%
1986 66.4% 12.7% 35.2%
1987 62.5% 12.6% 37.7%
Source: Pang-tien Liu, Ying-che Sun and Pei-hsuan Chou, The Development of Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises in the Republic of China, Volume 5 [final part of a five volume series edited by the Chung- 
hua Institute of Economic Research] (Taipei: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1995), p. 65.
It is worthwhile briefly considering the character and demographics of the KMT’s army of 
petite capitalists. Writing in the mid to late 1980s, Western scholars such as Susan Greenhalgh 
and Gordon Redding described the typical small to medium sized enterprise in Taiwan as: an 
owner-operator firm with weak horizontal and vertical links, ethnically Taiwanese, based on a 
simple family organizational structure with fused management and proprietorship, and 
extremely price sensitive. Usually Taiwan’s SMEs concentrated their production on labor 
intensive goods like toys, footwear, clothing, textiles, sporting goods, household appliances and 
so on. Firms with the above characteristics constituted around 98% of all enterprises in the 
RoC. While some SMEs managed to pass the test of time, most were disbanded within a 
generation; bankruptcies were common. As a group, they were utterly dependent on upstream 
producers for basic inputs like petrochemicals, steel, electricity, telecommunications, cement 
and, of course, finance -  concerns which were almost invariably government-owned and 
operated.55 More recent studies of Taiwan’s leading export industries published in Chinese 
(including textiles, machine tools and consumer electronics) generally confirm the image of the 
island’s SMEs forwarded by Greenhalgh and others. Nonetheless, these works point to a 
number of caveats. They emphasize two things which qualify any presumption of acute market 
weakness among the SMEs: the importance of intra-industry networks between Taiwan’s small 
enterprises as a possible substitute for firm size and organizational capacity, and the key role
54 The term first coined by TJ Cheng in: Tun-jen Cheng, ‘Political Regimes and Development Strategies: 
South Korea and Taiwan’ in Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman (eds.), Manufacturing Miracles: Paths 
of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
55 See esp.: Susan Greenhalgh, ‘Families and Networks in Taiwan’s Economic Development’ in Edwin A. 
Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh (eds.), Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan 
(Armonk: East Gate, 1988); Susan Greenhaugh, ‘Networks and Their Nodes: Urban Society on Taiwan’ 
in China Quarterly No. 99 (September 1984); and S. Gordon Redding, 77te Spirit o f Chinese Capitalism 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990).
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played by geographical location in Taiwan as a determinant of enterprise bargaining power vis- 
a-vis suppliers and distributors. 6
TABLE 4.4 NT dollar/US dollar exchange rate, select years 1960-90
Period Exchange Rate Period Exchange Rate
1960 36.23 1978 36.00
1965 40.05 1979 36.03
1966 40.05 1980 36.01
1968 40.05 1981 37.84
1969 40.05 1982 39.91
1970 40.05 1983 40.27
1971 40.05 1984 39.47
1972 40.05 1985 39.85
1973 38.00 1986 35.50
1974 38.00 1987 28.55
1975 38.00 1988 28.17
1976 38.00 1989 26.16
1977 38.00 1990 27.11
Sources: Yu-jen Chou, ‘US-Taiwan Trade Conflicts (1984-1989): The Political Economy of Accelerated 
Trade Liberalization in Taiwan’ unpublished Ph.D. manuscript, Ohio State University (1990), p. 205-206; 
and Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1996 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
1996).
For a quarter of a century after 1960, Taiwan’s small to medium-sized enterprises received a 
helping hand in international export markets via a stable and undervalued exchange rate (see 
Table 4.4 for exchange rate data). The New Taiwan dollar was pegged to the greenback at 
NT$40:US$1 in the early years of EOI, and only underwent two episodes of appreciation in 
1973 and 1976 (leaving the rate at around NT$36:US$1 by the end of the 1970s). These upward 
revaluations were later undone, and by 1982 the exchange rate had returned to its earlier level. 
Thereafter, the rate remained largely unchanged until late 1985 when, in tandem with the Plaza- 
Louvre revaluation of the US dollar, the RoC was forced to strengthen its currency.57 Under the 
Plaza-Louvre agreements (covering the period between late 1985 and late 1987), the US 
compelled its major trading partners to devalue the greenback by more than 35% in international
56 See for example: Chih-ming Ka, Taiwan Dushi Xiaoxing Zhizaoye de Chuangye, Jingying yu 
Shengchan Zuzhi [ Market, Social Networks and the Production Organization of Small-scale Industry in 
Taiwan] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1993); and Jie-xuan Chen, Xieli Wangluyu Shenghuo Jiegou: Taiwan 
Zhongxiao Qiye de Shehui Jingji Fenxi [Cooperative Networks and the Structure of Livelihood: A Socio­
economic Study of Taiwan’s Small to Medium Sized Enterprises] (Taipei: Lianjing Publishers, 1994). 
These works raise the prospect of seeing business entities on Taiwan as something more than detached 
and distinct corporations. In the chapter 5 we turn to the issue of Taiwan’s guanxi qiye or related 
enterprises.
- 121-
Chapter 4 Crafting Markets in Taiwan
currency markets.SH During this period, Taiwan’s volumous trade surplus with the US made it 
an easy target tor American pressure on the exchange-rate issue -  indeed, quite out of keeping 
with the RoC’s comparative economic size. In the three years to 1987, the bilateral trade 
imbalance came in at a colossal US$10 billion, US$13.5 billion and US$16 billion respectively 
-  the culmination of nearly two decades of ever-increasing surpluses. The image of Taiwan as 
an ‘unfair trader’ which these figures elicited in Washington was compounded by a high 
concentration of Taiwan exports in American markets: Taiwan’s export dependency attained its 
peak in 1984-85, when just less than 50% of total RoC exports went to the US.59
The course and character of NT dollar appreciation after 1986 was a function of US threats 
and lobbying on the one hand, and stalling by the KMT regime to shield Taiwan’s SMEs on the 
other. From a baseline of approximately NT$40/US$1 (following figures from Table 4.4), 
appreciation occurred in three main ‘surges’ over the ensuing three to four years.60 These 
periods of intense appreciation roughly covered early to mid 1986, mid to late 1987, and early to 
mid 1989 -  the second surge being the largest. Over all, the local currency appreciated some 
40% against the greenback, leaving an average exchange rate of around NT$26/US$1 in the last 
year o f the decade. Apart from the implied pressure for NT dollar appreciation engendered by 
the plunge in the greenback on international markets, US demands for currency realignment 
were typically conveyed to the RoC government within the context of the Sino-American 
Exchange Talks (Zhong-Mei Huilu Tanpan) -  a feature of US-RoC economic relations that 
commenced in early 1986 and dovetailed with ongoing bilateral trade negotiations.61 These 
talks were backed up with the threat of retaliatory action in the event of non-compliance, and on 
at least two occasions (mid 1986 and early 1987) elicited the direct intervention of President 
Reagan.62 Despite the intensity of US pressure, the KMT regime firmly resisted calls for a one- 
off increase in the NT$/US$ exchange rate. In an effort to absorb the worst effects of the 
currency realignment on Taiwan’s SMEs, the Central Bank of China publicly committed itself
57 This brief history of NT dollar exchange rate movements is taken from: Bela Balassa and John 
Williamson, Adjusting to Success: Balance of Payments Policy in the East Asian NICs (Washington: 
Institute for International Economics, 1987), p. 60.
58 And of course the classic here is: Yoichi Funabashi, Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the 
Louvre (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1988). For a broader view of America’s 
‘aggressive unilateralism’ of this period, see: Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘Aggressive Unilateralism: An 
Overview’ in Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh T. Patrick (eds.), Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s 301 
Trade Policy and the World Trading System (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1990).
59 Figures and comments from: Yu-jen Chou, ‘US-Taiwan Trade Conflicts (1984-1989): The Political 
Economy of Accelerated Trade Liberalization in Taiwan’ unpublished Ph.D. manuscript, Ohio State 
University (1990), p. 205-206 & 222-264.
60 Following points and observations garnered from: Tianxia Txizhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (various 
issues, 1986-89).
61 For more on the trade negotiations, see esp.: Chou, ‘US-Taiwan Trade Conflicts (1984-1989),’ fn. 59; 
Chung-li Wu, ‘Some Measures to Promote a More Balanced Bilateral Trade Relationship Between the 
RoC and the USA: Economic and Political Implications’ in Industry of Free China Vol. 67, No. 3 
(September 1987); and Vincent C. Siew, ‘Toward Liberalizing Trade and Improving Market Access’ in 
Economic Review [a bi-monthly journal published by the International Commercial Bank of China] No. 
239 (September-October 1987).
62 Lianhe Bao [United Daily News] (11 September 1987), p. 1-3.
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to a measured increase in the rate (throughout most of 1986, a daily rise ot NTS0.01) and 
conducted offsetting purchases of foreign exchange for the entire period ot revaluation. This 
was an expensive tactic: at the end of 1987, the government revealed the Central Bank had 
already made a paper loss on its mounting pile of forex to the tune of US$12.2 billion.67
The forced increase in the NTS exchange rate set the stage for the first policy window for 
securities reform. Despite the KMT regime’s best efforts to postpone the inevitable, SME 
representatives and their friends complained bitterly about the rising NT dollar. They channeled 
their anger through the media, legislators, industry associations and various government 
agencies, in particular the Medium and Small Business Administration of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (Jingjibu Zhongxiao Qiye J u ) M And not without some justification: the 
economic impact of the appreciation of the NT dollar was decidedly painful for many of 
Taiwan’s SMEs. As overseas orders for Taiwan’s low value-added products began to decrease, 
a pattern of disinvestment or ‘hollowing out’ gathered pace with negative implications for the 
island’s small firms. Although this process was masked by continuing strong demand in the US 
and strong overall economic performance at home, traditional SME industries gradually lost 
ground to a range of capital-intensive industries with large economies of scale. As of May 
1987, for example, value-added electronics and machinery grew by 32% and 24% respectively 
on the same period for 1986. For garments and textiles, however, it was another story entirely: 
these sectors increased by a modest 4.9% and 6.2% respectively over the same time frame. 
These were poor results indeed in an economy that expanded by greater than 11% in 1986 and 
more than 12% in 1987. Behind these figures, SME industry representatives reported that their 
already slim profit margins (e.g. for most shoe manufacturers, typically around 2-3%) had 
disappeared entirely. They maintained that any output or export growth recorded in the short to 
medium term was attributable to firms dumping their product at below cost -  a last-ditch effort 
aimed at preserving market share abroad. Attempts to diversify export markets were slow and 
had met with limited success. While Europe and Japan were now more attractive destinations 
for RoC products due to the US dollar exchange rate realignment (which left the Yen and 
Deutsch-mark stronger against the NT dollar), these markets were not as well understood by 
Taiwan’s small-scale entrepreneurs, and were more protectionist than the US. Market 
diversification, much less product diversification, was simply too expensive for many family 
firms. For a significant number, cutting back production was a natural first choice, and after 
that, industry exit.65
63 Taiwan Country Report, No. 1, 1988 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988), p. 15.
64 Various interviews in Taipei and Taichung with small business proprietors. For information on the 
sensitivity and response of SMEs to exchange rate movements, I am especially indebted to interviews in 
Taichung County with Mr Tong Su, Export Vice Manager, and Yen-ping Huang, General Manager, Chen 
Ho Iron Works, 13 April 1996.
65 We will never know just how much Taiwan’s SMEs were burned by the NT$ appreciation of the late 
1980s, as statistics on individual SME performance in Taiwan were and remain notoriously unreliable. 
Some economists at the time suggested in fact that the rate rise merely ‘trimmed the fat’ of these firms 
leading to widespread cost cutting rather than production cutbacks or industry exit. See for example
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Through early 1986, as Taiwan’s small to medium sized enterprises cried foul, foreign 
exchange reform rapidly took on the form of a convenient policy placebo for the KMT -  a 
palliative with the potential to reaffirm the social contract between the ruling party and the 
SMEs. There were at least two sides to this emergent incentive for reform Firstly, real forex 
reform (as opposed to the tinkering which had characterized ‘liberalization’ initiatives in the 
past) held the potential to reward SMEs with a foreign currency side payment of no direct fiscal 
cost to the government.66 Under the pre-1987 foreign exchange regime, the great bulk of 
foreign currency earned abroad had to be traded at the border for NT dollars. Ultimately, the 
official custodian of all foreign funds in Taiwan was the Central Bank of China; foreign 
currency could not be held or traded by anyone on the island apart from the Central Bank or its 
agents. Naturally, this scheme severely restricted the financing and expenditure options of 
Taiwan’s SME exporters. Usually too small to contemplate playing money games offshore (in 
avenues such as the Euro money market, the preferred choice of Japan’s large trading 
companies by this time),67 Taiwan’s SMEs were not only deprived of basic freedoms regarding 
income disposal, they also paid a heavy premium in forex transaction costs.68 Permitting SMEs 
to retain their foreign earnings would be a huge bonus for these firms. It would allow them to 
trade, invest or just squander their money abroad -  and make the KMT regime look like a 
generous benefactor in the process.
Secondly, forex reform allowed the ruling party to make a political virtue out of the 
industrial hollowing-out threatening Taiwan’s SMEs, and the increasing illegal investment 
abroad associated with it. As the traditional SME industries endured an upward trend of 
disinvestment, small-scale entrepreneurs faced strong incentives to relocate their labor intensive 
businesses in low cost economies. South East Asia and mainland China were the natural 
recipients of such capital exports, although established foreign exchange regulations in Taiwan 
made the process of relocation extremely difficult -  extremely difficult, but not impossible for 
SMEs adept at operating in gray and black markets. A substantial illicit flow of funds was 
making its way out of Taiwan regardless of government restrictions. For example, RoC data 
indicate that as of mid 1987, episodes of officially permitted investment by Taiwan companies 
in Thailand and Malaysia totaled just 29 cases (US$15 million) and 19 cases (US$7.2 million) 
respectively. Statistics from the target countries, however, indicate that there were 138 cases of 
Taiwan investment in Thailand (US$36 million), and 332 cases in Malaysia (US$25 million).69 
While there are no statistics on Taiwan investment in mainland China before forex reform in 
1987, anecdotal reports suggest that by 1985 it was well underway and probably served as an
comments by Dr Wu Chung-li from Academia Sinica in China News (22 June 1987), p. 8. Correlating 
and anecdotal evidence of the kind included herein, however, suggest that they were under extreme strain 
through 1986, 1987 and beyond. Comments and data from: Far Eastern Economic Review (16 July 
1987), p. 72-73; and Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine) (1 October 1986), p. 130-135.
66 Following points from interviews with various economists in Taipei, 1996.
67 Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan, fn. 21, chp. 5.
Various interviews in Taipei and Taichung with small business proprietors, 1996 and 1999.
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adjunct to the flourishing indirect trade across the Taiwan Strait (usually routed via Hong 
Kong).70 With forex reform, the government could rapidly turn these illegal flows into 
legitimate investment abroad, and thereby give its blessing to the hitherto criminal activities of a 
large number of Taiwan’s SMEs. Again, with a relatively straightforward policy shift, the KMT 
regime could reinvent itself as a benefactor of the island’s small business community.
Genuine forex reform became a possibility in early 1986 as the ruling party sought ways 
and means to compensate Taiwan’s SMEs for the effect of the rising NT dollar; a socio-political 
window of opportunity had opened within the ruling party. The political problem of SME 
adjustment was reduced to a policy question when forex reform was proposed as an adjustment 
placebo. We will examine in the following section of this chapter just how the finance 
technocrats turned this chance for change into a concrete program of forex opening, but for now 
we are left with a quandary. We know from section one of this chapter that forex reform was in 
fact an expeditious process, particularly when measured against the case of securities 
liberalization. Reform started in early to mid 1986, peaked in mid 1987, and concluded just two 
years later; by contrast, securities liberalization seemed to drag on forever. Was this hurried 
process of change entirely attributable to the KMT’s political calculations regarding local 
SMEs? Although SME suffering may have been sufficient to kick-start forex reform in early
1986, our theory of technocratic leadership suggests that it would have been insufficient to see 
the task completed. The speedy pattern of forex reform would suggest that the socio-political 
window of opportunity considered above only just preceded the opening of the KMT’s 
‘sectoral-strategy window.’ That is to say, some time between early 1986 and the middle of
1987, the KMT regime must have had cause to believe that the established forex system was not 
living up to the regime’s policy expectations -  i.e. it was not supporting the ruling party’s 
finance goals of stability and control. Do we have evidence of this second aperture appearing 
within the ruling party in such quick succession?
Before moving on to the task of answering this question, it is first necessary to consider 
some technical issues surrounding the administration of foreign exchange. On both a theoretical 
and practical level, the operation of foreign exchange regimes present governments with an 
awkward dilemma, or rather ‘trilemma.’ The key issue at stake, first analyzed in detail by the 
Canadian economist Robert Mundell in the late 1960s, is that foreign exchange regimes will 
never deliver all the policy outcomes demanded of them Often called the problem of the 
‘unholy trinity,’71 it is thought impossible to construct a foreign exchange system that
69 China News (15 June 1987), p. 8.
70 Ricky Tung, ‘Mainland China in Taiwan’s Economic Future’ in Issues and Studies Vol. 26, No. 5 (May 
1990), p. 40. See also: Tzung-ta Yen, ‘Taiwan Investment in Mainland China’ in Issues and Studies Vol. 
27, No. 5 (May 1991); and Ai Wei, ‘The Development and Limitations of Taiwan-Mainland Economic 
and Trade Relations’ in Issues and Studies Vol. 27, No. 5 (May 1991).
71 This term was first coined by B.J. Cohen in Benjamin J. Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money: The 
Political Economy of International Monetary Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1977). Cohen has 
since applied and extended the concept with interesting results. See, for example: Benjamin J. Cohen, 
‘The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Lessons for the Pacific Region’ in Richard Higgot, Richard Leaver
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simultaneously permits: (1) an independent monetary policy so that governments can engage in 
counter-cyclical interest rate changes; (2) a stable exchange rate to avoid uncertainty tor 
business and disruptions to the domestic financial system; and (3) full currency convertibility, 
ideally to ensure an optimum flow of capital and technology in and out of the country, but short 
of this, to avoid the red tape and rent seeking usually associated with capital controls.72 Foreign 
exchange regimes can support any two of these policy properties, but not all three at once.
Paul Krugman demonstrates the trilemma with reference to a hypothetical country that 
attempts to include all three characteristics into its forex system He postulates an example with 
free capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate (which we’ll call the nation of ‘XO’ in deference 
to the popularity of fortified spirits in Taiwan). What would happen to XO if it sought to 
unilaterally cut interest rates to fight a recession? Domestic investors would see a profit 
opportunity in the disparity between domestic interest rates and comparatively higher rates in 
other countries. They would sell-up their XO assets (or borrow in XO dollars), exchange the 
proceeds for foreign currency and invest abroad. To prevent the increased supply of XO dollars 
from driving down the value of the XO dollar exchange rate, the Central Bank of XO would 
have to buy-up any excess local currency with its reserves. At some point with reserves 
depleted, the monetary authorities of XO would either have to increase interest rates (i.e. 
abandon independent monetary policy), let the XO dollar depreciate (i.e. give up the goal of 
exchange rate stability), or impose capital controls (i.e. give-up convertibility). The bottom-line 
is ‘...any exchange rate system involves sacrificing some important objectives to achieve 
others.’73
The problem of the unholy trinity forces countries to choose among three basic forex 
systems: (1) a floating rate system, which permits freedom of international transactions and 
independent monetary policy, but at the expense of an unpredictable exchange rate; (2) a fixed 
rate system, which permits exchange rate predictability, but without an independent money 
supply; and (3) capital controls, which can marry some level of monetary independence with a 
relatively stable exchange rate, but only insofar as capital controls actually function as intended 
and domestic economic aggregates (savings, investment, consumption) are kept more or less in 
balance through demand management.74 For the KMT regime, with its attachment to stability 
and managerial prerogative, the natural choice among these three alternatives was capital 
controls.75 On the one hand, capital controls purchased crucial insurance against the ruling
and John Ravenhill (eds.), Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict? (St. 
Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993), chp. 7.
72 Robert A. Mundell, International Economics (New York: Macmillan, 1968), esp. chp. 16-18.
73 Paul D. Krugman, ‘The Return of Depression Economics’ in Foreign Affairs Vol. 78, No. 1 (January- 
February 1999), p. 60-61. See also: http://web.mit.edu/krugman/OldFiles/www/ [the official home page 
of Paul Krugman].
74 Krugman, ‘The Return of Depression Economics,’ fn. 73, p. 61.
75 For the sake of positioning the Taiwan case neatly against Krugman’s three alternatives, we include 
within the term ‘capital controls’ the broad system of forex restrictions encompassed by the SAFE. In 
reality, the SAFE was considerably more complex than a straightforward system of capital controls -  e.g.
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party’s long-standing fear of capital flight and chronic trade deficits (as inentioned in chapter 2, 
section two). These traditional fears dovetailed well with the KMT’s later conversion to export 
oriented industrialization and the need to provide local SMEs with a stable platform for 
international trade (as mentioned above). On the other hand, and of equal importance, capital 
controls allowed the KMT government to keep a tight check on domestic inflation. As outlined 
earlier in the thesis, the Nationalists were convinced that their complicity in the mainland 
hyperinflation of the 1940s had been crucial in deciding the outcome of the Chinese Civil War. 
Once ensconced on Taiwan, they were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past -  and 
this meant high interest rates, balanced fiscal budgets and a cold printing press.
And for a time, the chosen forex system delivered acceptable results for the ruling party. 
Over the period spanning the 1950s to the early 1980s, capital exports were reduced to a trickle 
(in 1981, for example, officially approved outward direct investment by RoC citizens was all of 
US$60 million), and the traditional propensity to import more than export was finally wedged 
into a corner (Taiwan recorded the first of a string of trade surpluses in 1969). Further, with 
only one or two exceptions, inflation was also kept at bay. Excellent results were recorded over 
the 1960s (the CPI typically hovered between 3-4%), and above international average results 
recorded for the 1970s (with the exception of the price leap of 1974, the RoC averaged 5.9% 
CPI inflation for the decade).76 But just as the KMT regime was starting to congratulate itself 
on the creation of an ‘economic miracle’(jingji qiji), the established forex policy mix began to 
come under stress. A sectoral-strategy window of opportunity for forex reform was slowly 
taking shape -  a nascent aperture that would ultimately and dramatically fly open in late 1986. 
By the early to mid 1980s there were growing signs that Taiwan’s macroeconomic 
fundamentals were becoming progressively unbalanced. From this time on, it was readily 
apparent that national savings in Taiwan were up, private investment was slowing down, and 
external (i.e. US) demand for RoC goods and services was strengthening. Decade on decade 
from the 1950s to the 1980s, savings rates in the RoC saw an upward trend. Starting-out from a 
healthy 14.9% of GNP in the 1950s, this savings ratio increased to 21.0% in 1961-70, 31.9% in 
1971-80, and finally 33.6% in 1981-88. Juxtaposed against this escalating savings record, the 
pattern of gross domestic investment traces a bell-shaped curve over the same time frame. 
Commencing at 16.1% of GNP for 1951-60, investment climbed to 21.9% in 1961-70 and then 
30.5% in 1971-80, before dipping to 21.8% for the 1980s.77 And just as the Taiwan economy 
was developing all the signs of structural recession, the external sector received a boost from 
policy settings in the US. Tight money and increased defense expenditure in the early Reagan
the web of limitations on the flow of trade-related funds. Of Krugman’s three models, however, capital 
controls is certainly the closest approximation to Taiwan’s old forex system.
76 All preceding statistics from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1996 (Taipei: Council for Economic 
Planning and Development, 1996); or Tables 4.5 & 4.7.
77 Data and comments from: Jia-dong Shea and Ya-hwei Yang, ‘Taiwan’s Financial System and the 
Allocation of Investment Funds’ in Joel D. Aberbach, David Dollar and Kenneth L. Sokol of f (eds.), The
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years saw a dramatic rise in US consumption, the appreciation of the US dollar and 
(consequently) rising imports. 78 Given Taiwan’s strong dependence on the US for export 
markets, Reaganomics soon found its way to the shores of Taiwan in the form of increased US 
demand for RoC products.
TABLE 4.5 RoC trade balance and balance as % of GNP, 1969-90 (US$1,000s)
Period Balance % of GNP Period Balance % of GNP
1969 -12,000 -0.2% 1980 3,343,000 8.0%
1970 106,000 1.9% 1981 1,937,000 4.0%
1971 291,000 4.4% 1982 3,746,000 7.7%
1972 648,000 8.2% 1983 6,329,000 12.0%
1973 734,000 6.8% 1984 9,262,000 15.5%
1974 -830,000 -5.7% 1985 11,151,000 17.6%
1975 -255,000 -1.7% 1986 16,910,000 21.8%
1976 685,000 3.7% 1987 20,160,000 19.5%
1977 1,166,000 5.4% 1988 13,690,000 10.8%
1978 2,189,000 8.2% 1989 16,115,000 10.6%
1979 1,304,000 3.9% 1990 14,807,000 9.0%
Notes: We include here the ‘free on board’ (fob) figures for merchandise trade rather than the ‘cost, 
insurance and freight’ (cif) prices. With trade invoicing, over-insuring and bogus freight charges used as 
important tools of exchange control avoidance in Taiwan during the late 1980s, we can assume that the 
cif price dampens the BoT trend well beyond that which can be explained simply in terms of trade-linked 
invisibles.
Sources: Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of 
China, 1985 and 1999 issues); and Balance of Payments Quarterly, Taiwan District RoC (Central Bank of 
China, Republic of China, various issues).
In a manner not dissimilar to Japan during the same period,79 the coincidence of these three 
factors occasioned the development of an increasingly large and persistent trade surplus for the 
RoC over the 1980s. The figures for pure merchandise trade best demonstrate the fundamental 
trends, and are certainly the most spectacular statistics (see Table 4.5). Throughout the decade, 
Taiwan recorded some of the largest trade surpluses ever experienced by a non-oil producing 
country. Between 1980 and 1990, the surplus maintained an average of around 12.4% of GNP 
per year. For seven of those years -  1983 to 1989 -  the surplus was greater than 10% of GNP 
ever year. In 1986, the surplus hit an all-time high as a percentage of national income at 22% of 
GNP (just under US$17 billion), and a year later an all-time high nominal figure of US$20 
billion (or 19.5% of GNP). Only a small number of OPEC countries have experienced such
Role of the State in Taiwan’s Development (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), chp. 8. Statistics rounded to 
the nearest 0.1%
7b From: Gerald Epstein, ‘The Triple Debt Crisis’ in World Policy Journal Vol. 2, No. 4 (1985).
79 See for example: Peter Drysdale, Japan as a Pacific and World Economic Power, Pacific Economic 
Papers No. 166 (Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre 1988).
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large surpluses as a percentage of national product over such a long time. Among economies 
with a manufacturing base, Taiwan’s trade profile in the 1980s was quite unique.80
TABLE 4.6 RoC national reserves (in US$1,000,000s), select years 1960-1991
Period Reserves Period Reserves
1960-‘78 1.406 1985 22,556
1979 1,467 1986 46,310
1980 2,205 1987 76,748
1981 7,235 1988 73,897
1982 8,532 1989 73,224
1983 11,859 1990 72,441
1984 15,664 1991 82,405
Sources: Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of 
China, 1985 and 1999 issues); and Balance o f Payments Quarterly, Taiwan District RoC (Central Bank of 
China, Republic of China, various issues).
But why did the trade surplus imply problems for the KMT regime’s preferred forex 
system? As noted above, a successful foreign exchange mechanism based on capital controls 
requires that the restrictions placed on inward and outward remittances actually work, and that 
any domestic economic imbalance is rectified with demand management. Aside from 
increasing evidence that evasion of Taiwan’s capital controls was a growth industry (see 
comments above, and note related points on ‘hot money’ below), the KMT regime’s options 
with fiscal policy remained limited over the period in question. As noted in chapter 3, a major 
fiscal stimulus to reduce national savings had been precluded at the start of the decade.81 This 
policy stance was more or less locked in when Chiang Ching-kuo became President in 1978, 
and was set in stone with the economic plans of the early 1980s. While officially the so-called 
14 Major Projects (Shisixiang Jianshe) had been included in budget projections since mid 
1985,82 this policy plan was extremely slow to get off the ground and by and large was a case of 
too little, too late. The reluctance to resort to a major fiscal stimulus left the government with 
an increasing problem of monetary control. The established forex system obliged the Central
80 Comments from: Shiu-Tung Wang, Taiwan’s Persistent Trade Surpluses: The Policy Choices,’ 
unpublished Ph.D. manuscript, University of California, Davis (1989), esp. chp. 1; Maxwell J. Fry, 
Should Taiwan Reduce Its Current Account Surplus? (Irvine: University of California, 1988); and Wing 
Thye Woo and Liang-Yn Liu, ‘Taiwan’s Persistent Trade Surpluses: The Role of Underdeveloped 
Financial Markets’ in Joel Aberbach, David Dollar and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (eds.), The Role o f the State 
in Taiwan’s Development (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).
81 Various interviews with MoF and CBC officials in Taipei, 1996 and 1999. See also: CEPD, 
‘Macroeconomic Planning for Taiwan, Republic of China’ in Industry o f Free China Vol. 53, No. 6 (June 
1980), esp. p. 18-19 & 24; CEPD, ‘Prospects for Economic Development, Targets and Measures’ 
[excerpts from the CEPD’s Four-Year Development Plan, 1982-‘85] in Industry o f Free China Vol. 57, 
No. 3 (March 1982); and Cheng-chi Chang, ‘RoC Fiscal Policy and Development Financing’ in Industry 
of Free China Vol. 52, No. 6 (December 1979). For a critique of the government’s fiscal conservatism at 
this time, see: Ching-huei Chang, ‘Public Finance’ in Gustav Ranis (ed.), Taiwan: From Developing to 
Mature Economy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
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Bank of China to absorb nearly all of the inward flow of foreign exchange created by the 
burgeoning trade surplus (reserve figures from Table 4.6). In the half decade to 1985, the 
Central Bank’s already healthy stock of foreign reserves increased from around US$2.2 billion 
to US$22.5 billion. Thereafter, in 1986 the CBC’s pool of foreign currency leaped to US$46 
billion and then in 1987, an astounding US$76.7 billion. The issuance of domestic currency to 
purchase incoming foreign exchange resulted in a dramatic increase in the local money supply 
(see Table 4.7). In the period between 1981 and 1989 the average annual growth rate of M2 
(currency in circulation plus bank deposits and quasi-money -  a good indicator of longer-term 
monetary trends) averaged 22% per annum In 1986 and 1987, M1B (currency in circulation 
plus most deposits -  an important indicator of short-term monetary conditions) increased at the 
unprecedented rate of 51.4% and 37.8% respectively.
Confirming Mundell’s dictum that foreign exchange systems never deliver all the policy 
outcomes demanded of them, the dramatic expansion of money naturally raised the specter of 
inflation.83 The KMT regime saw its goals of stability and control potentially undermined by 
this, and from around mid to late 1986 the ruling party commenced a preemptive search for 
solutions. While a general increase in prices was in fact avoided (more on this below), by the 
end of 1986 the ruling party had reasonable cause to be concerned. It was increasingly apparent 
by this time that a large component of the trade surplus was not trade-related at all, but hot 
money. ‘Hot money’ (riqian or youzi in Chinese) is a colloquial term for speculative funds, and 
usually refers to those speculative investments conducted in the face of an exchange rate 
realignment.84 Gathering pace around June-Julv 1986, the rise of the NT dollar attracted an 
increasingly large inflow of hot money by investors betting against the CBC’s ‘go slow’ 
appreciation policy. Faced with strong expectations of NT dollar appreciation, these speculators 
were making a killing buying in and out of the local currency. For the most part, this illegal 
practice was conducted by legitimate RoC businesses engaged in foreign trade, typically 
utilizing techniques such as over and under invoicing, delayed contract fulfillment, and so on. 
In an ironic reversal of the ruling party’s original fear of capital flight, estimates put the amount 
of money flowing into Taiwan at this time at around US$1 billion a month, much of it thought 
to be former flight capital parked in the US and Hong Kong.85 Personnel from authorized 
foreign exchange banks described cases of blatant manipulation of the official forex transaction 
procedures; one bank officer described a case in which the actual price of a shipment of exports
82 Taiwan Country Report, No. 1, 1988 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988), p. 11-12.
83 For a particularly useful analysis of the emergence of this threat, see: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth 
Magazine] (1 November 1986), p. 161-164.
84 Graham Bannock, RE. Baxter and Evan Davis, The Penguin Dictionary o f Economics, 5th ed. (London: 
Penguin Books, 1992), p. 197.
85 Par Eastern Economic Review (21 May 1987), p. 97.
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and the associated application for foreign exchange presented at his bank differed by more than 
a fa c to r  o f  10 M
TABLE 4.7 Annual growth of prices and money in Taiwan, 1979-90
Period
[
GDP Def.
Prices
WP1
I f 
CPI MIA
Money
M1B
1
M2
1979 11.5 13.8 9.7 11.1 7.7 9.6
1980 16.2 21.6 19.0 20.0 22.7 21.9
1981 12.1 7.6 16.3 9.0 13.8 18.9
1982 3.4 -0.2 3.0 5.9 14.6 24.3
1983 1.9 -1.2 1.4 14.7 18.4 26.4
1984 0.9 0.5 0.0 5.8 9.3 20.1
1985 0.6 -2.6 -0.2 7.9 12.2 23.4
1986 3.4 -3.3 1.2 46.1 51.4 25.3
1987 0.5 -3.3 0.5 32.3 37.8 26.6
1988 1.1 -1.6 1.3 23.4 24.4 17.9
1989 3.1 -0.4 4.4 17.9 6.1 15.3
1990 3.8 -0.61 4.1 -9.5 -6.6 9.9
Notes: As defined by the RoC monetary authorities MIA, is base money (i.e. money in circulation) plus 
demand deposits at banks, M1B is MIA plus most long-term deposits with banks, and M2 is M1B plus 
quasi-money (e.g. RoC treasury bills).
Sources: Ya-hwei Yang and Jia-dong Shea, ‘Money and Prices in Taiwan in the 1980s’ in Takatoshi Ito 
and Anne O. Krueger, Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia (Chicago-. University of 
Chicago Press, 1996); Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1996 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and 
Development, 1996); and Zhonghua Minguo Taiwan Diqu Jinrong Tongji Yuebao [Financial Statistics 
Monthly, Taiwan District, RoC] (Taipei: Economic Research Department, Central Bank of China, 1996).
By late 1986, it was clear that the KMT regime had an inflationary threat on its hands 
considerably more complicated and intractable than anything it had confronted in the past. The 
challenge presented to the KMT’s finance goals by the trade surplus buttressed the socio­
political argument for forex reform Thus, through late 1986, the second policy window opened 
-  i.e. the sectoral-strategy window. In less than 12 months, forex reform had become an entirely 
judicious strategy for the ruling party. Hereafter, the potential for reform to complete a full 
cycle of adjustment was high indeed.
4. Guiding the great leap
In the discussion above we have seen how, in early and late 1986, foreign exchange reform 
rapidly emerged as a sensible political strategy for the KMT regime. There is a strong 
correlation between the ruling party’s two policy windows and the process of forex reform:
Estimates and comments from: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 June 1986), p. 70; Tianxia 
Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 January 1987), p. 159; Far Eastern Economic Review (18 June 
1987), p. 58-59; and Ear Eastern Economic Review (21 May 1987), p. 97.
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foreign exchange liberalization starts in early 1986 as the socio-political window opens, and 
then culminates (and ultimately concludes) not long after with the emergence of the sectoral 
strategy window at the end of the year. The opening of the two KMT policy windows was a 
prerequisite for forex liberalization; however, reform did not take place spontaneously. Change 
was ultimately dependent on instrumental effort by interested policy elites. At this point in the 
narrative, we return to Yu Kuo-hwa’s finance technocrats. I would argue that the finance 
technocrats seized upon the KMT policy windows to initiate their plans for forex reform. What 
evidence do we have to confirm this proposition?
As with the previous chapter, three items of evidence are significant. First, it is readily 
apparent that the emergence of the KMT policy windows in early and late 1986 coincided with 
increased reform effort by the finance technocrats. The upturn in policy activity is relatively 
easy to observe, as the finance technocrats were the dominant faction within Cabinet at this time 
-  Yu Kuo-hwa, Robert Chien and Chang Chi-cheng held the key portfolios of Premier, Minister 
of Finance and CBC governor respectively over most of the period of forex policy change. Of 
the three, the efforts of Yu and Chang were most pronounced in early to mid 1986: it was Yu 
who directed the Central Bank to review the administrative provisions for the trade account in 
May, and Chang who presided over the introduction of the Regulations Governing Foreign 
Exchange Reporting in Respect of Exports and Imports two months later in July. Robert Chien 
stepped into the limelight soon after when the Ministry of Finance announced the abolition of 
the ban on the gold trade in October.88 It must be noted, that Yu and Chang’s early initiatives 
on the trade front had particularly important ramifications for Taiwan’s SMEs. The partial 
liberalization of the current account saw the elimination of two especially pernicious barriers 
affecting small exporters: the long-standing trade licensing system and the old ex ante 
application procedure for firms engaged in forex transactions (both of which discriminated in 
favor of established and larger firms).89
As the second KMT policy window opened in late 1986, Yu and his colleagues again 
increased their reform effort. The greater salience of their policy work at this time is difficult to 
dispute. Media reports and interviews, for example, place Yu, Chang and Chien at the heart of 
the decision making process during the crucial months from early to mid 1987 (i.e. the 
development phase and apex of forex opening). Yu and Chang were directly credited with the 
launch of the forex reform plan in late March, and the introduction of the new SAFE in July
87 For a broader appreciation of the tenor of Yu’s Cabinet, see: Xue, Bianju Zhong de Yuejin: Yu Guo-hua 
de Zhengyuan Wunian [In the Midst of Critical Change: The Five Year Cabinet of Yu Kuo-hwa], fn. 41, 
esp. chp. 1
88 Liu, ‘Mounting Forex Reserves Prompt Rethinking of Economic Strategy,’ fn. 7; Ke, ‘Strength of NT 
Dollar Bringing Forex Banks to Their Knees,’ fn. 8; and Taiwan Country Report, No. 2, 1987 (London: 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 1987). Supplemented with interviews in Taipei, 1996 and 1999, esp. 
interview with Professor Shirley Kuo, Minister Without Portfolio, RoC Cabinet, 4 December 1996.
84 See: Liu, ‘Mounting Forex Reserves Prompt Rethinking of Economic Strategy,’ fn. 7; and comments 
by an unnamed SME proprietor in: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 June 1986), p. 64-65.
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occurred with the official blessing of Chang and Chien.10 As intimated elsewhere in this 
chapter, however, the media portrayal of the finance technocrats throughout this period 
remained overwhelmingly negative: they were believed to be pursuing forex opening under 
extreme duress and with very little genuine commitment to the task. We will consider the issue 
of coercion in more depth below, but for now even a cursory look at the historical record reveals 
that the finance technocrats were far more attached to their reform package than the bad press 
suggests. Despite the incorporation of the ‘logjam clause’ into the amended SAFE by the 
Legislative Yuan in mid June 1986 (as noted in the first section of this chapter) and the loss of 
executive privilege this move implied, Yu’s team choose to proceed with the implementation of 
the new forex system almost immediately after.91 This was hardly an act of policy diffidence. 
Finally, Yu and Chang supervised some of the most important initiatives of the consolidation 
phase of forex opening. Before the two technocrats retired from office in mid 1989, they 
authorized the float of the NT dollar in April and the revision of cross-border investment 
provisions in May.92
Second, in addition to the substantive activities considered above, there is evidence that the 
finance technocrats were conscious of the KMT policy windows that emerged in early and late 
1986. On the one hand, forex reform occurred alongside a strong increase in the symbolic 
commitment of the finance technocrats to small business. At various times over 1986-87, 
Robert Chien, Chang Chi-cheng and other senior finance officials expressed their sympathy for 
the SMEs and the hardships endured in light of the rising NT dollar. During the latter phases of 
forex opening, the finance technocrats also conducted a number of fact-finding missions to 
communicate with small business on a face-to-face level. On at least one occasion, even Yu 
Kuo-hwa himself accompanied one of these outings. In early 1989, Yu and Minister of 
Economic Affairs Chen Fu-an visited a selection of small enterprises in and around Kaohsiung 
city in southern Taiwan -  a region where export oriented SMEs were concentrated and one of 
the areas worst hit by the currency appreciation of the late 1980s. With these and other 
symbolic gestures, Yu’s technocrats could justly claim to be concerned about the ‘zhongxiao 
qiye shengcun kongjiatf [room to move or breathing space of the island’s SMEs].93 And the
90 Far Eastern Economic Review (9 April 1987), p. 119-120; and Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] 
(16 July 1987), p. 1-2. Supplemented with data from: Wang, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya 
Xingjiao [Finance Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and Travels], fn. 26, p. 458-461; and interviews in Taipei, 
1996.
91 Far Eastern Economic Review (23 July 1987), p. 53-54.
92 From: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 May 1989), p. 86-92. Includes a profile of 
Chang’s time as CBC governor. See also: Xue, Bianju Thong de Yuejin: Yu Guo-hua de Zhengyuan 
Wunian [In the Midst of Critical Change: The Five Year Cabinet of Yu Kuo-hwa], fn. 41, p. 134-136.
93 Wang, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [Finance Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and Travels], 
fn. 26, p. 465; Xue, Bianju Thong de Yuejin: Yu Guo-hua de Zhengyuan Wunian [In the Midst of Critical 
Change: The Five Year Cabinet of Yu Kuo-hwa], fn. 41, p. 172-174. Further, a review of earlier 
statements by the Yu group reveals that Taiwan’s small business sector rarely attracted their attention 
before 1986. In the past, concern for Taiwan’s SMEs was conspicuously absent during episodes when 
this group was hurting most. Yu’s recollection of the one-off price hike of 1974, and the stagflation of 
1981-82 is strictly a macroeconomic account and compares strongly with his interest in the well being of
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concern did not go unnoticed. Early feedback from the target group was generally very positive 
for the technocrats and the ruling party. Toward the end of 1986, SME industry representatives 
were commenting favorably that l...zhengfu neng zai z.hege shihou fangcong yidian [waihui/ 
guanzhi, bingfudao zhongxiao qiye yinying ye shi henhaode' [...the government’s efforts at this 
time to loosen exchange restrictions, and give small to medium-sized enterprises a guiding hand 
to adjust are very welcome indeed].94
On the other hand, there is also evidence demonstrating that Yu’s technocrats were aware of 
the threat to the KMT’s finance priorities posed by the inflationary surplus. Above all else, Yu 
and his colleagues promoted the forex reform process as a fix for monetary policy. As we might 
expect, this linkage was most pronounced during the developmental phase of forex opening; that 
is, March to July 1987. When the suspension of forex controls was first announced, Yu issued a 
press-statement commenting that lifting restrictions on the flow of funds was ‘... the only way to 
effectively alleviate the long-term accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and the increase 
in the money supply.’95 In presenting the new draft SAFE to the Legislative Yuan several days 
after, the Premier specified that the Executive Yuan was seeking authority to lift forex controls 
when Taiwan experienced ‘...a long-term international trade surplus, accumulated substantial 
foreign exchange reserves, or when the international economy underwent major changes.’96 
Later, as Chang Clii-cheng attempted to finesse the new law through the Legislative Yuan, the 
Central Bank governor described the problems faced by the CBC in dealing with the trade 
surplus. Speaking to the lawmakers in early June, he commented that the CBC’s stock of 
foreign reserves had already reached USS60 billion -  an addition of US$3 billion every month 
since the end of 1986 -  and the Bank was doing everything in its power to cope with this 
monetary influx. He concluded by expressing confidence that the lifting of forex controls 
would immediately remedy this unstable situation, and called for the expeditious passage of the 
new SAFE.97
And finally, consider the counterfactual question: what if the finance technocrats’ reform 
activities were forced? Within the KMT regime itself, we know that on at least two occasions in 
mid 1986 and early 1987, President Chiang Ching-kuo spoke directly on the issue of forex 
policy. In a formal message delivered to Cabinet on 24 July 1986, Chiang appealed for ‘action 
to relax foreign exchange controls, lower tariffs, remove import restrictions and encourage 
investment abroad.’98 Nine months later in a ministerial meeting on 14 March 1987, CCK 
reportedly directed Yu, Chien, Chang and Minister of Economics Lee Ta-hai to speed-up
the SMEs during the late 1980s. See: Wang, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [Finance 
Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and Travels], fn. 26, p. 268-269 & 273-274; and Ying (ed.), Juecezhe 
[Decision Makers], fn. 39, esp. p. 22-23 & 28.
94 Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 September 1986).
95 Far Eastern Economic Review (9 April 1987), p. 119.
96 Liu, ‘Brave New World of Financial Reform in Taiwan, the Republic of China,’ fn. 6, p. 144.
97 China News (9 June 1987), p. 8.
9S Far Eastern Economic Review (14 August 1986), p. 81.
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measures to liberalize and internationalize Taiwan’s trade and financial policies.99 While these 
episodes certainly demonstrate that CCK had elevated foreign exchange administration to a 
priority area, they do not imply that he had a plan for change in mind. Indeed, we have strong 
reason to suspect the opposite. Both communiques were delivered within the last 18 months of 
President Chiang’s life -  CCK’s declining health at this time and his long-standing detachment 
from the details of economic policyllK1 must place a question mark over their origins. It is highly 
unlikely during the last 18 months of his life that the President would have forced Yu Kuo-hwa 
to pursue a major change in economic policy. We know that over 1986-87, CCK was even 
more dependent than ever on Yu’s economic policy advice. On those rare occasions when Yu 
did agree to a pursue a policy option not to his liking, he was not afraid to make his position 
known to the President -  witness the decision to lower oil prices over 1986. The intra-elite 
‘debate’ that surrounded this episode was entirely absent in the process of forex liberalization.101 
In sum, detailed pressure for forex reform was not forthcoming from the head of the KMT. 
CCK’s message to the finance technocrats was only slightly more complex than ‘review the 
policy for foreign exchange. ’
Aside from any pressure brought to bear by CCK, there is also some evidence of 
bureaucratic politics playing a part in the finance technocrat’s reform activities. At various 
times in 1986-87, forex reform became a political football in the relationship between the 
Central Bank and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Lee Ta-hai from the Economics Ministry 
was urging a radical adjustment in forex policy (including a large, one-off jump in the exchange 
rate) to assuage the demands of the Americans for more trade access, while Chang Chi-cheng as 
CBC governor was heralding the cause of tariff reduction (a key responsibility of the Economics 
Ministry).102 But again, as a real source of intra-regime pressure on the finance technocrats, the 
MoEA and CBC tension is questionable. According to most commentators, Lee’s advocacy on 
the forex issue had more to do with buck-passing than a desire to force the CBC into a policy 
review. As Minister of Economic Affairs, Lee was the individual bearing the full brunt of 
American lobbying on the bilateral trade imbalance, and blaming an obstructionist Central Bank 
probably met with a receptive audience in Washington. Indeed, some of these latter MoEA- 
CBC exchanges have the feel of a well-rehearsed sympathy play about them -  perhaps they
99 Far Eastern Economic Review (26 March 1987), p. 87.
100 Note related comments in chapter 3, section four on CCK, and see: John C.H. Fei, ‘The Taiwan 
Economy in the Seventies’ in Shao-chuan Leng (ed.), Chiang Ching-kuo’s Leadership in the 
Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan, Volume 3 of the Miller Center Series on Asian Political 
Leadership (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1993), p. 86. See also, personal interview 
with CCK in Tianxia just weeks before his passing. There is not one mention of economic issues in the 
entire discussion. See: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 December 1987), p. 17.
101 Wang, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [Finance Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and 
Travels], fn. 26, esp. p. 400-411.
102 Far Eastern Economic Review (12 June 1996), p. 128; and Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (25 
May 1987), p. 1-2.
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were orchestrated.1<M Further, why would the Central Bank bow to pressure from the Ministry 
of Economics at this time? As noted elsewhere, Cabinet was dominated by Yu’s finance 
technocrats throughout 1986-87. Any pressure emanating from Lee and others on the trade 
issue was unlikely to be decisive.
Outside the KMT regime, there are at least two other ‘players’ who may have forced the 
hand of the finance technocrats. To begin with, consider Taiwan’s small to medium sized 
enterprises. As we saw in the last section of the chapter, they certainly had an interest in policy 
adjustment. And, unlike the middle class investors who we met in chapter 3, they understood 
their objective interest in reform and were not afraid to raise their concerns in public.104 
However, SME pressure can’t explain the sheer extent of assistance they received in 
conjunction with forex reform -  i.e. assistance above and beyond that which could be explained 
simply in terms of actual enterprise demands. When foreign exchange liberalization reached its 
apex in July 1987, for example, Yu’s Cabinet actively sought to teach small companies how to 
take advantage of the policy move. At a special seminar conducted soon after the introduction 
of the new SAFE, the Executive Yuan announced its intention to establish a service center to 
help small businessmen invest abroad.105 The service center proposal was just one component 
of a comprehensive package of SME assistance that had been put in place by Yu and his 
administrative colleagues by this time. Cobbled together over the preceding 18 months, the 
support schemes included everything from cheap finance provided by Taiwan’s state-owned 
banks to tax breaks granted by the Ministry of Finance.106 Forex reform came complete with a 
user guide and bonus extras for Taiwan’s small business sector; no other social group in the 
RoC was so well looked after.
And finally, the inflation bogey. It could be argued that the inflationary trade surplus was 
the factor pushing reform: that there was no prior existing plan for forex opening, and the 
finance technocrats were simply backed into a corner by unstable monetary conditions. As 
briefly noted above, however, it must be remembered that the threat of inflation presented by 
the trade surplus was just that -  only a threat. Despite bubbles in Taiwan’s real estate and stock 
markets at the time, inflation (i.e. a general rise in prices) never eventuated in the late 1980s. 
Indeed, as of early 1987, a number of ranking economists in Taiwan -  including Ke Ji-le, senior 
economist for the First Commercial Bank, and Yu Zong-xian, second in charge at the Chung - 
hwa Institute for Economic Research -  were confident that even under existing forex 
arrangements, inflation was unlikely to become a major issue in the short to medium term.107 
The saving grace in this story, of course, was the rising NT dollar; this kept a lid on the price of
1<n Far Eastern Economic Review (12 June 1996), p. 128; China News (6 June 1987), p. 8; China News 
(10 June 1987), p. 7-8; China Post (11 June 1987), p. 4; and China Post (25 June 1987), p. 7.
104 Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 October 1986), p. 126-135.
105 China News (14 July 1987), p. 8.
I0<’ By early to mid 1987, these assistance measures were well institutionalized. See: Tianxia Zazhi
[Commonwealth Magazine] (1 March 1987), p. 56-60
107 Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 January 1987), p. 158.
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imported consumer goods and production components (note WPI figures on Table 4.7). True, 
monetary conditions were extremely loose; indeed, sufficient to shake the KMT regime out of 
its complacency with the old forex system. But there was no desperation in the finance 
technocrats’ decision to liberalize the forex system. It was, to quote Shirley Kuo, ‘...intentional 
policy making rather than reactive.’108
Conclusion
It has been the argument of this chapter that the process of forex reform on Taiwan in the late 
1980s was ultimately driven by the ideas and exploits of the so-called ‘finance technocrats,’ -  a 
tightly composed group of state officials who owed their allegiance to senior finance 
administrator Yu Kuo-hwa -  and followed a pattern dictated by the short temporal spread of 
opportunities presented within the ruling party. Foreign exchange liberalization initially got off 
the ground because the finance technocrats became convinced some years prior to the late 1980s 
that the internal and external circumstances of Taiwan’s economy rendered the old restrictive 
forex system obsolete. Reform moved from the conceptual stage to policy practice as party 
political windows of opportunity opened up in quick succession over the course of 1986. In 
contrast to the case of securities reform that we saw in chapter 3, the temporal spread of 
opportunities that faced the finance technocrats was extremely narrow -  so narrow that they 
were distinguishable only by a matter of months and in many respects were contiguous. Early 
into 1986, the finance technocrat’s agenda for forex policy change was assured the attention of 
the KMT regime as it became an effective means of shoring-up party support among small to 
medium sized manufacturers, a category of traditional party support that was suffering badly 
from a dramatic rise in the NT dollar exchange rate. Very soon after, the technocrats’ reform 
program received full backing from the KMT because the established foreign exchange system 
was inadvertently generating an explosion in the domestic money supply; evoking the threat of 
inflation and therefore a breach of the ruling party’s preference for a stable and controllable 
financial sector. The pattern of foreign exchange opening was decidedly short and sharp 
because these two windows of opportunity opened almost simultaneously.
The chapter was composed of four main parts. In part one I surveyed the process of forex 
reform as it unfolded between 1986 and 1989. This section focused on the procedural and 
institutional effect of liberalization rather than the cause. In part two of the chapter we looked 
behind the outcomes detailed in part one to analyze the root cause. This section included an 
examination of the composition and ideas of Yu Kuo-hwa’s finance team Part three of the 
chapter was dedicated to examining the windows of opportunity that emerged within the KMT 
over the course of 1986-87. In this extended section of the chapter we reviewed why these 
windows opened when they did. Finally, part four of the chapter considered the response of the
10s Interview in Taipei with Professor Shirley Kuo, Minister Without Portfolio, RoC Cabinet, 4 December 
1996.
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finance technocrats to the KMT policy windows detailed earlier. In the next chapter of the 
study 1 will explore the process of banking reform that commenced in 1985 and concluded 
around 1991-92. The pattern of reform in this instance was a hybrid of the two reform episodes 
we have already reviewed -  somewhat faster than the process of securities opening, but 
certainly not as abrupt as forex reform Despite the variation in outcomes, however, the banking 
reform story is strikingly similar to both of these episodes of policy change. We will find that 
once again a small number of technocrats were at the center of the reform process, and KMT 
politics was fundamental to the ultimate result.
***000***
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Middling through: bank opening 
from 1985 to 1992
Crafting Markets in Taiwan
Introduction
For most observers, the introduction of the amended National Bank Law (NBL -  Yinhangfa) in 
July 1989 was the jewel in the crown of the island’s financial reform agenda, described by one 
observer in an interview as ‘...conclusive recognition by the government that the old ways [of 
financial administration! were not sustainable.’1 Like most late developing countries and a 
small number of economically advanced nations, banks had long dominated Taiwan’s financial 
sector. For the majority of RoC citizens and firms, avenues for the disposal of unconsumed 
income and for raising investment capital were twofold: a dozen or so major commercial banks 
or tlie illegal curb market. The character of Taiwan’s financial system was in many ways a 
carbon copy of countries as far distant as Japan, India and Brazil.2 In Taiwan’s case, the 
simplicity of this financial structure was compounded by state ownership and control of nearly 
all the banks on the island. While a few regulatory niches were permitted for foreign bank 
branches and private Trust Companies (a type of non-bank investment firm with many of the 
hallmarks of monetary institutions), by and large the banking sector was a government 
monopoly. The portfolio decisions of major concerns like First Commercial Bank, Chang-Hwa, 
Hua-Nan and the Bank of Taiwan were indistinguishable from the policy directives of the 
Central Bank of China or the Ministry of Finance. In this context, the decision to liberalize RoC 
banking had implications that, symbolically as much as practically, went well beyond the 
reform of securities or foreign exchange. It was here that bureaucratic power over the allocation 
of funds in Taiwan was most obvious, and it was here that the overall success of financial 
reform would, rightly or wrongly, ultimately be judged.
In chapter 3 and 4 of the study we saw how the theory of technocrat leadership applied to 
the case of securities and foreign exchange liberalization. The processes of policy adjustment in 
those two areas of financial administration were polar opposites: slow and incremental for 
securities opening, and fast and decisive for forex reform These differences were indicative of 
the narrow and wide spread of party political opportunities facing interested technocrats in each 
case. In the present chapter we will review the case of bank liberalization. In terms of speed 
and intensity, this episode of financial opening marks out the middle ground between the other 
two cases of reform Bank liberalization in the RoC spanned a period of around seven years,
1 Interview in Taipei with Dr Yin Nai-Ping, Department of Banking, National Chengchi University, 6 
July 1996
2 On bank-based versus securities-based financial systems, see: Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, 
‘Bank-Based and Market-Based Financial Systems: Cross-Country Comparisons,’ Research Paper No. 
2143, Development Research Group, World Bank (July 1999). On financial dualism in late developing 
countries, see: Jan Pieter Krahnen, Development Finance as Institution building: A New Approach to 
Poverty-Oriented Banking (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), part C.
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while securities reform came in at more than a decade and forex reform took just under four 
years. Behind the process of bank liberalization, we find that once again the initiative and effort 
for policy change was tied to a select group of interested technocrats.3 Bank liberalization was a 
product of the thinking of the so-called ‘young reformers’ -  a cohort of younger policy elites 
that included the likes of Shirley Kuo and Wang Chien-shien. These talented and visionary 
technocrats were motivated by a belief that the local banking sector was grossly inefficient, and 
that a reformed RoC banking system could one day form the basis of a regional or global 
financial center. The story of when and how the young reformers were able to act is part of a 
generalizable account of KMT politics. In chapter 1 of the thesis I argued that for technocrats to 
be ultimately successful with financial reform, two kinds of ‘policy window’ need to be open 
within their referent political party: a broad socio-political window and a narrow sectoral- 
strategy window.4 In this chapter, I will demonstrate that the pattern of bank liberalization had 
features of both forex and securities policy reform because these two policy windows opened 
neither simultaneously nor discontinuously but somewhere between these two extremes. The 
median spread of opportunities dictated when and how the young reformers were able to act, 
and ultimately gave rise to a ‘middling’ process of policy change.
Once again, the present chapter is composed of four main parts. In part one we review the 
process of bank liberalization. I include an account of the principal steps in the bank reform 
cycle, and give due attention to the institutional background. In part two of the chapter we look 
behind the outcomes detailed in part one and seek to analyze causes. This section of the chapter 
includes an examination of the character and ideas of the young reformers, with a special focus 
on Kuo and Wang. Part three of the chapter is dedicated to the windows of opportunity that 
emerged within the KMT over the course of 1985 and 1988. In this section we examine why 
and how these policy windows opened. In the final section of the chapter, we briefly consider 
how the young reformers took advantage of the opportunities. We include counterfactual tests 
to buttress the case for technocrat leadership.
3 To recap the definition given earlier in the study: a technocrat is a state official who uses their claim to 
knowledge in some specialist area, or their ability to perform some specified function, to affirm their right 
to public office. In this thesis, we use the term with specific reference to ‘proximate decision makers,’ or 
elite officials. From: Miguel A. Centeno and Particio Silva, ‘The Politics of Expertise in Latin America: 
Introduction’ in Miguel A. Centeno and Patricio Silva (eds.), The Politics o f Expertise in Latin America 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1998), chp. 1. See also: Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of 
Expertise (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), chp. 1.
4 It will be remembered from chapter 1 that the socio-political window is generated by a reconfiguration 
of, or challenge to, the ruling political party’s social support base, and the sectoral-strategy window is 
created by any perceived failure of established financial policy to realize the party’s sectoral goals. The 
notion of the policy window is borrowed from: Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political 
Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior tmd the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997), esp. chp. 1
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1. The process of hank reform
Although the shift in bank policy that occurred during the late 1980s was in many ways just one 
aspect of Taiwan’s broader project of financial liberalization, the course of bank opening had a 
character that was quite unique (see Table 5.1 for an overview). Bank reform was a mix-match 
of policy processes -  a hybrid of securities and forex policy change. Generally speaking, it 
encompassed a moderate pace of policy transformation covering some seven or eight years. 
There is nothing intrinsic to the history of RoC bank regulation that would suggest this process 
was in some sense inevitable. While the National Bank Law was no stranger to regulatory 
adjustment prior to 1989, the evolution of the document after its introduction in the 1930s 
reveals nothing that is even remotely similar to the period we will examine below.
TABLE 5.1 Process of banking liberalization, 1985-92
P hase P e r io d R e g u la to ry  In itia tive
T a k e o ff Mar 1985 
Jun 1985 
Jun 1986
CBC announces introduction of prime rate system 
Non-bank (trust) institutions given stronger legal basis. 
EY announces decision to decriminalize bad checks.
D eve lo p m en t Jul 1987 
Feb 1988 
May 1988 
Early 1989 
11 Jul 1989
MoF committee convened to review NBL.
Review completed; draft NBL handed to EY.
EY approves draft NBL; statute handed to LY.
Draft NBL debated in LY, some EY concessions.
LY passes draft NBL; receives EY and Presidential approval.
A p e x 19 Jul 1989 Amended NBL comes into effect.
C o n so lid a tio n Jul 1989 
Mid 1990- 
1989-92-
Interest rate liberalization.
MoF accepts bank license applications; 15 new banks est. 
Some initial progress on bank privatization.
Notes: CBC is the Central Bank of China, EY is the Executive Yuan, MoF is the Ministry of Finance, 
NBL is the National Bank Law, LY is the Legislative Yuan.
Sources: Various, see esp.: Juan-bao Yan, Taiwan Diqu Yinhang Fazhan 40 Nian [The 40 Year 
Development of Banking on Taiwan] (Taipei: Zhonghua Zhengxinsuo, 1991); Ying-zhao Lai, Taiwan 
Jinrong Bantu zhi Huigu yu Qianzhan [The Domain of Taiwan Finance: Retrospect and Prospects] 
(Taipei: Lianjing Chubanshe, 1997); and Shang-mao Chen, Taiwan Yinhang Zhengce de Zhengzhi Jingji 
Fenxi’ [The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Banking Policy], unpublished Masters manuscript, 
Department of Politics, National Cheng Chi University, Taipei (1998), chp. 2.
The phases of bank liberalization covered the following junctures: the takeoff phase from 
early 1985 to July 1987, the development phase from July 1987 to June 1989, the apex of 
reform in July 1989, and the consolidation phase from July 1989 through 1992. In the years 
prior to reform takeoff, Taiwan’s banking system was monist in design and operation. Formal 
markets for deposits and loans existed only at the margins of the industry, and interest rates 
offered by the 16 or so domestic banks were set by administrative fiat. Government ownership 
and control of these institutions came about in progressive stages through the 1940s, 1950s and
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1960s. Some were nationalized at the end of the Japanese occupation (e.g. Bank of Taiwan), 
some followed the government to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese Civil War whereupon state 
ownership was ‘assumed’ (e.g. the Communications Bank), and others were established as 
direct instruments of development policy (e.g. the Medium Business Bank). There were always 
qualifications of the monist framework: a number of foreign banks were permitted access to the 
domestic market in the 1960s and early 1980s, and several private Trust Companies were 
established in the 1970s.5 While portrayed as major reforms when first introduced, these 
qualifications were no more than tinkering at the edge o f the system. Foreign banks and Trust 
Companies functioned as little more than satellites of the state-owned concerns, and took their 
cue on rate changes and business strategy from these institutions.
From the beginning of 1985, however, regulatory changes were gradually introduced that 
questioned the long-term efficacy of the monist framework. First, in March 1985 the Central 
Bank announced a partial overhaul of the system of interest rate determination. At that time, a 
prime-rate system of rate ceilings and floors was adopted to replace the old ‘negotiated rate’ 
mechanism6 Later, in August 1985, the prime-rate system was entrenched with the abolition of 
the Statute Governing Interest Rates, the Central Bank’s main source of legal authority for 
dictating rate changes.7 Second, following a housekeeping revision of the National Bank Law 
in May 1985, the business rights and obligations of non-bank financial institutions (particularly 
Trust Companies) were detailed for the first time. While this regulatory move was primarily 
aimed at curbing the excesses of these institutions, it also served to give private financiers in 
Taiwan a preliminary legal basis for their operations. Hitherto, non-bank financial institutions 
had existed in a gray zone. Under Taiwan’s civil law code, this was tantamount to a formal 
prohibition on their operation.8 And finally, in June 1986 the Executive Yuan announced a
5 These points from: Juan-bao Yan, Taiwan Diqu Yinhang Fazhan 40 Nian [The 40 Year Development of 
Banking on Taiwan) (Taipei: Zhonghua Zhengxinsuo, 1991); and Ying-zhao Lai, Taiwan Jinrong Bantu 
zhi Huigu yu Qianzhan [The Domain of Taiwan Finance: Retrospect and Prospects] (Taipei: Lianjing 
Chubanshe, 1997).
6 An arrangement that in principle saw rates negotiated among members of the RoC Banker’s 
Association, but in practice was a thin disguise for Central Bank power.
7 The prime-rate mechanism was basically a system of interest rate ceilings and floors for key or ‘prime’ 
financial products offered by banks (e.g demand deposits, call loans, and so on). From: Financial Market 
Integration in Chinese Taipei (Taipei: Bureau of Monetary Affairs, Ministry of Finance, 1995), p. 67-70; 
and interviews with economists in Taipei, 1996.
8 Although given mention in the NBL since the 1970s, the management, ownership and business scope of 
Trust Companies was largely unaccounted for in RoC law. Under civil law jurisdictions like the RoC, 
business activities must be defined and described to be permissible. Those activities not covered in law 
are rendered, defacto, either illegal or unprotected by parallel and related legal provisions (e.g. contract 
law). Interview in Taipei with Lawrence Shao-liang Liu, Attorney at Law, Lee and Li Attorneys, 16 
December 1996. The character of Taiwan’s legal system left a large inconsistency in the NBL after the 
amendment of 1975: i.e. Trust Companies were permitted to exist, but left in limbo as to their business 
rights and obligations. Spelling out more clearly these rights and obligations brought the Trust 
Companies into the mainstream of RoC financial regulation for the first time, and was a large step in the 
direction of accepting private banks on the island. For details on the 1985 NBL changes, see: Shang-mao 
Chen, ‘Taiwan Yinhang Zhengce de Zhengzhi Jingji Fenxi’ [The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Banking 
Policy], unpublished Masters manuscript, Department of Politics, National Cheng Chi University, Taipei 
(1998), p. 39-40.
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decision to decriminalize bad checks. Post-dated checks were a popular means of extending and 
obtaining business loans in Taiwan, and were a guaranteed instrument due to criminal 
prohibitions on non-payment. The effect of their use, however, was to instill a commercial 
culture among bankers and the business community that was the antithesis of a market oriented 
financial system; if checks are guaranteed by a prison sentence, why research the commercial 
wherewithal of a client or custom er?9 The decriminalization of bad checks preempted the 
introduction of standard credit assessment procedures in Taiwan, and laid the groundwork for 
more conventional modes of banking.10
At around the same time that these major regulatory moves occurred, several other minor 
reforms were also launched -  including the introduction of new bank business powers in the 
forex market, and the establishment of the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation.* 11 It was not 
until mid 1987, however, that the process of banking reform in Taiwan assumed a coherent 
direction. Led by the Ministry of Finance, the transition to the development phase of bank 
opening occurred in the wake of foreign exchange liberalization. At the end of July 1987, the 
Finance Ministry appointed an internal committee to conduct a review of the National Bank 
Law. While the timing of the review would seem to suggest it was largely concerned with fine- 
tuning the NBL,12 personnel involved in the process saw it as a much more comprehensive 
endeavor. According to one official from the Ministry of Finance, the review process was 
‘...mainly designed to speed up the internationalization and liberalization of local financial 
operations.’13 Over the following six months, the committee completed a summary revision of 
the Banking Law that included the amendment of 27 existing articles and the inclusion of five 
new clauses (out of a total of approximately 140 articles).14 When the draft statute was 
presented to the Executive Yuan in February 1988,15 it generated a level of controversy 
consummate with the document’s significance and long-term ramifications. For some, such as
9 On post-dated checks, Wade comments: ‘The principle instrument in [the Taiwan] financial system is 
the post-dated check. When a borrower takes a loan he gives the lender a check drawn at some future 
date for an amount covering principal and interest. In a “normal” developed financial system, by contrast, 
checks are used as cash substitutes rather than as credit instruments, while promissory notes are used for 
credit and drafts for trade purposes. In Taiwan, however, the post-dated check is used for all trade 
finance and is often used as extra security in all kinds of financial transactions. Not only the curb market 
but also government banks rely on the post-dated check. The basic reason is that the dishonoring of a 
check carries (since 1954) criminal, not just civil penalties....’ See: Robert Wade, Governing the Market: 
Economic Theory and the Role o f Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 162-163.
10 Philip Liu, ‘Bad-Check Decriminalization Has Important Social Implications’ in Financial and 
Investment Yearbook, RoC 1987 (Taipei: Central Economic News Service, 1987), p. 38-51.
11 Taiwan Country Report, No. 2, 1986 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986), p. 11-12; and 
http://www.cdic.gov.tw/eng.html [web page of the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation; contains 
historical notes on the organization] -  viewed 22 June 2000.
12 Another housekeeping revision, this time to keep the NBL in line with the new regulatory framework 
for foreign exchange.
13 Willis Ke, ‘Liberalization Has Them in a Hopeful Ferment’ in Financial and Investment Yearbook, 
RoC 1988 (Taipei: Central Economic News Service, 1988), p. 46
14 CENs staffwriter, ‘Draft of Amendments to the Banking Law’ in Financial and Investment Yearbook, 
RoC 1989 (Taipei: Central Economic News Service, 1989), p. 54-56.
15 Interviews in Taipei with Ministry of Finance officials and others, 1996 & 1999.
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foreign bunkers, it was a long-awaited sign that the government was finally getting serious 
about sector reform. For others -  notably representatives from the Taiwan Provincial Assembly
-  it was a most unwelcome attack on their traditional privileges in the domestic banking
. 16 sector.
After a brief period of deliberation in the Executive Yuan, in mid May 1988 the draft 
National Bank Law was endorsed and delivered to the Legislative Yuan.17 For much of the 
remainder of the year, the document was held in abeyance as the lawmakers struggled to catch 
up with a backlog of legislation.18 During this hiatus, the Ministry of Finance introduced a 
number of regulatory adjustments keeping the reform momentum afloat. Initiatives included: a 
program to speed-up the offshore expansion of Taiwan banks, preparation for the entry of 
commercial banks into the domestic trust business, and the introduction of international credit 
cards (Visa, MasterCard, etc.).19 When the National Bank Law finally reached the floor of the 
Legislative Yuan in early 1989, it rapidly became politicized. Non-KMT representatives 
(including lawmakers from the newly formed Democratic Progressive Party) made good use of 
the opportunity to filibuster on a crucial piece of government legislation20 -  a tactic that 
coincided with a series of opposition street demonstrations.21 Among the ruling party’s own 
ranks, KMT lawmakers with links to business interests in Taiwan were keen to extract pro­
business concessions from the new law. The so-called ‘bank legislators’ (yinhang liwei) lobbied 
hard on issues such as institutional oversight and the application criteria for new bank licenses.22 
Although the Executive Yuan eventually gave some ground in the face of Legislative Yuan 
resistance,23 the ultimate effect on the draft Banking Law was marginal. When the bill was
16 China News (10 May 1988), p. 4; China News (23 May 1988), p. 12; China News (27 May 1988), p. 
11; and China News (28 May 1988), p. 11 & 12.
17 Occurring sometime between 10 May and 23 May. Deduced from references made in: China News (10 
May 1988), p. 4; and China News (23 May 1988), p. 12. The precise timing of Executive Yuan approval 
and delivery to the Legislative Yuan is open to some question. At least one writer suggests that the 
transfer occurred as late as January 1989. See: Yuan-yu Yang, ‘San Shangyin Minyinghua yu Xin 
Yinhang Kaifang Sheli Zhengce zhi Yanbian’ (The Evolution of Reform Policy for Privatization of the 3 
Commercial Banks and the Establishment of the New Banks!, unpublished Masters manuscript, National 
Chengchi University, Taipei (1995), p. 73. Yang’s reference to the timing of these events is inaccurate, 
and possibly based on an inappropriate reading of related news in: Gongshang Shibao [Commerical 
Times] (6 January 1989).
18 Recent democratizing moves had generated a strong demand for new enabling laws in the RoC, as well 
as opening up the legislative chamber to a plethora of new interests and political games; into 1988, the 
legislative process in Taiwan slowed sharply. More below. Interviews in Taipei, 1996 & 1999.
19 Various press reports, Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (May-December 1988); and Tianxia Zazhi 
[Commonwealth Magazine] (May-December 1988). See esp. interview with Shirley Kuo in Tianxia 
Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 September 1988), p. 49-57.
20 Taiwan Country Report, No. 3, 1989 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1989), p. 22.
21 Far Eastern Economic Review (1 June 1989), p. 20.
22 Chen, ‘Taiwan Yinhang Zhengce de Zhengzhi Jingji Fenxi’ [The Political Economy of Taiwan’s 
Banking Policy], fn. 8, p. 84-85.
2̂  Far Eastern Economic Review (18 May 1989), p. 56-57; and Far Eastern Economic Review (27 July 
1989), p. 15.
- 144-
Chapter 5 Crafting Markets in Taiwan
finally passed on 1 1 July 1989, key components of the legislation were still intact and congruent 
with the original purpose of the statute.?J
The amended National Bank Law rapidly received Cabinet and Presidential approval, and 
was formally implemented on 19 July 1989. The introduction of the new regulatory framework 
signified the apex of the banking reform process, and as we saw in chapter 1 of the study, 
foreshadowed the onset of a new era of more liberal banking in the RoC. Described by more 
than one observer at the time as ‘revolutionary,’25 the implications of the legal framework went 
well beyond the sheer number of changes rendered to the text of the NBL (around 25% of the 
document). Highlights of the new regulatory scheme included: provisions for granting new 
licenses to an unlimited number of private sector banks, the abolition of remaining restrictions 
on interest rate mobility, increase of the scope of business operations for foreign bank branches 
to conditions approaching national treatment, provisions for the privatization of government- 
owned banks, and institutional reforms designed to enhance prudential oversight and improve 
the operational health of the Taiwan banking sector.26 Together, these changes held the 
potential to instill a far greater level of competition and efficiency into local banking.
In accord with the previous phases of banking reform, the consolidation period of the 
reform cycle was an exercise in moderation, neither rushed like forex reform, nor meandering 
like securities opening. The first major initiative in this last leg of the bank reform process was 
the abolition of the ‘prime rate’ system of interest rate determination. From 19 July 1989, 
pursuant to amended article 41 of the revised National Bank Law, rate floors and ceilings were 
removed and henceforth all products offered by financial intermediaries in Taiwan were subject 
to variable rates. This reform move had implications for the entire financial system. The 
introduction of floating interest rates put pressure on those financial prices still subject to 
administrative fiat -  e.g. remaining commission fees on securities transactions -  and preempted 
a compression of margins across the entire financial sector.27 Another major step in the 
consolidation phase of bank reform came in mid 1990 when the Standards for the Establishment 
of Commercial Banks was proclaimed and the Ministry of Finance began accepting applications 
for new bank licenses. In early 1991, the Ministry granted 15 licenses among a total pool of 19 
applicants, and the so-called new banks (xin yinhang) commenced business in the second half of 
the year. Many of the successful candidates were representatives of Taiwan’s large industrial 
groupings (more below), although a 15% cap on proprietary interests de-linked ownership and 
management of the new institutions.28
24 Taiwan Country Report, No. 3, 1989 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1989), p. 22.
25 Willis Ke, ‘Liberalization Continues Sweeping Over Financial Landscape’ in Financial and Investment 
Yearbook, RoC 1990 (Taipei: Central Economic News Service, 1990), p. 36.
26 See esp.: Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News) (20 July 1989), p. 1-2; and Gongshang Shibao 
[Commercial Times] (20 July 1989), p. 1-2.
27 Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (20 July 1989), p. 1.
2is Another half dozen new banks were gradually added to the initial total of 15 by the end of the 1990s. 
Unlike the first group of licensees, however, these later additions were institutional conversions: most 
were well-established trust companies or regional cooperatives before they became banks. Chen, ‘Taiwan
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Finally, some tentative moves were made on privatization of the state-owned banks. The 
Ministry of Finance had been surreptitiously preparing for privatization since mid 1988. At that 
time, an intra-government council was convened to decide which administrative agents of the 
RoC state owned which banks (and how much of each). Soon after the introduction of the 
amended NBL in July 1989, the Finance Ministry and Central Bank sold their bank equity and 
commenced negotiation with the other responsible agencies (with a view to encouraging full 
privatization).29 The negotiations received a push-along in late 1992 when the National Bank 
Law was subjected to another round of legislative adjustments. In a move that marks the end of 
this cycle of bank reform, in October 1992 the Ministry of Finance initiated a cache of minor 
regulatory changes to broaden the business powers of the new banks and to secure the 
Ministry’s position as the principle regulator of RoC banking. 30 The commercial and 
administrative repercussions of this regulatory move placed the state-owned banks and their 
political/bureaucratic overlords under strong pressure to privatize, and set the tone for 
incremental restructuring over the remainder of the 1990s.
2. The young reformers and the rationale for change
The regulatory and institutional data examined above demonstrates quite clearly that bank 
reform in Taiwan from 1985 to 1992 was a ‘middle of the road’ process. The seven-year 
sequence of change progressed in a manner that was representative of neither panic nor 
lethargy. Bank opening was a combination of the patterns we observed earlier in the study with 
securities and forex reform Those two episodes were respectively sluggish or energetic -  
adjectives from a continuum of finance policy change which cannot readily be applied to bank 
liberalization. In staking out the middle ground for finance reform, the process of bank opening 
probably shares center stage with one or two other key areas of policy development in Taiwan. 
For example, the wave of RoC labor law reform in the mid 1990s bears some resemblance to the 
middling pattern of bank policy change.31 In this respect, the process of bank reform can be 
understood as a representative sample of the ‘average’ pattern of policy change in Taiwan. And
Yinhang Zhengce de Zhengzhi Jingji Fenxi’ [The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Banking Policy], fh. 8, 
p. 116. See also: Willis Ke, ‘Solid Earnings in a Sea of Economic Turbulence’ in Financial and 
Investment Yearbook, RoC 1996 (Taipei: Central Economic News Service, 1996), p. 28-31.
29 The most important of these agencies being the Taiwan Provincial Government -  more below. 
Interview in Taipei with Professor Shirley Kuo, Minister Without Portfolio, RoC Cabinet, 4 December 
1996. For the broader context of these initiatives, see also: Chi Schive, ‘Experiences and Issues of 
Privatization in Taiwan’ in Industry of Free China Vol. 83, No. 1 (January 1995).
30 Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (31 October 1992), p. 1-2; and Chen, ‘Taiwan Yinhang Zhengce 
de Zhengzhi Jingji Fenxi’ [The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Banking Policy], fn. 8, p. 43-44.
31 This episode included the decision to bring Taiwan’s service industries under the Labor Standards Law. 
See e.g.: China Post (8 May 1996), p. 4; China Post (20 June 1996), p. 1; China News (2 July 1996), p. 1; 
and Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (7 December 1996), p. 1-2. The evolution of RoC labor law is 
something of a lacuna in the literature on Taiwan’s economic and political development. Considering the 
close involvement of labor in both movements, it appears strange that labor law hasn’t received more 
attention. The notable exception to this, of course, is the work by Marxist writer Hill Gates in the late 
1980s. See: Hill Gates, Chinese Working-class Lives: Getting by in Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1987).
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just as the process of bank opening was average in the Taiwan context, so too it appears 
remarkably middling when compared to other international examples of bank reform Put side 
by side with some extreme cases of policy change -  say, Poland and Mainland China32-  the 
process of bank reform in Taiwan appears decidedly ordinary.
So how can we explain the process of bank reform in Taiwan? As with the previous case 
studies examined in this thesis, aspects of the bank reform experience can certainly be 
illustrated with the established theoretical tools of policy science.33 However, none of these 
alternatives can clearly explain why bank reform occurred at a median speed and intensity when 
such a pattern of policy adjustment was by no means inevitable. Further, the theories available 
in the literature perform especially poorly in explaining certain incongruities in the public 
perception of bank reform When reform took off in early 1985 it looked set to become another 
long and tedious affair like securities opening; and yet, when the amended National Bank Law 
was finally unveiled in July 1989, it was greeted with all the fanfare of a circus coming to 
town.34 How do we explain the fact that the media persona of bank reform was so variable? 
The reader will recall from earlier chapters that this study seeks to demonstrate a link between 
financial liberalization and the leadership efforts of elite technocrats. In the first instance, 
liberalization arises as a conceptual strategy because members of this group decide to adopt a 
reform agenda and run with it. We will see below that the original motivation for bank reform 
in Taiwan owed much to the experience and thinking of a younger generation of administrative 
elites -  a group that has occasionally been referred to as the ‘young reformers.’ These highly 
talented and ambitious individuals were motivated by two interrelated factors: a belief that 
Taiwan’s banking sector was grossly inefficient and uncompetitive, and a vision that the local 
financial system could one day compete as a regional or global financial center. This analysis
32 On the radical process of bank reform in Poland in the early 1990s, see esp.: David Lipton and Jeffrey 
Sachs, ‘Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland’ in Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity No. 1 (1990). On China’s tinkering with its bank system over the 1980s and 1990s, 
see: On Kit Tam (ed.), Financial Reform in China (London: Routledge, 1995); and Xiao-ping Xu, 
China’s Financial System Under Transition (London: MacMillan Press, 1998).
33 The theories include: the market-driven approach, statist analysis, pluralism and the foreign pressures 
model. See chapter 1, part two. Leading examples of these four theories include, respectively: Richard 
O’Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992); Louis 
W. Pauly, Opening Financial Markets: Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1988); Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989); and Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From 
Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
34 Despite the fact that the introduction of the prime-rate system of interest rate determination in March 
1985 was an important policy adjustment, it scarcely received any mention in the business press at the 
time. See e.g.: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (March, April & May editions, 1985). When 
interest rate liberalization was finally taken to its logical conclusion in July 1989, however, press 
coverage was extensive. Compare: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (July, August & 
September 1989), various articles. See also comments by Shirley Kuo in the September edition of 
Tianxia: ‘Zhenzheng de ziyouhua shi shenme ne? Ruguo shuo yuxu mingying, huo zhengfu shenme dou 
bu guan, jiu renwei shi ziyouhua, zhe shi dada de cuowu.... Women de ziyouhua shouyao zhongdian jiu 
shi lilu ziyouhua.’ [So what is real liberalization? If you say privatization or the complete withdrawal of 
government involvement, you are sadly mistaken. .. The primary object of our liberalization efforts has 
been the deregulation of interest rates]. Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 September 1989), 
p. 229.
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slowly consolidated in the minds of officials like Shirley Kuo and Wang Chien-shien through 
the early 1980s, and was well entrenched in their policy outlook as they moved into senior 
positions of power in the second half of that decade.
The story of when and how the likes of Kuo and Wang were able to pursue policy change is 
one of KMT politics. I have argued that for elite technocrats to be ultimately successful with 
financial reform, two kinds of ‘policy window’ need to be open within their referent political 
party: a broad socio-political window and a narrow sectoral-strategy window.35 I will 
demonstrate below that the pattern of bank reform in Taiwan evolved the way it did simply 
because, insofar as this sub-sector of finance was concerned, these two windows opened neither 
simultaneously nor discontinuously but somewhere between these two extremes. In a manner 
that has points of comparison and contrast with both securities and forex opening, the young 
reformers were confronted with a median spread of opportunities. Early into 1985, the reform 
agenda of these younger technocrats caught the attention of the KMT regime because it offered 
a means to deal with the 10th Credit Cooperative crisis, an event which radically undermined the 
ruling party’s preference for a stable and controllable financial sector (sectoral-strategy window 
opens). Into 1988-89, reform reached its apex and moved to the consolidation phase because it 
came to be seen as a useful instrument for manipulating and sidelining Taiwan’s emerging strata 
of big business interests (socio-political window opens). The three to four years between these 
two windows meant that the young reformers were able to promote a considered but timely 
process of bank reform.
In chapters 3 and 4 of the study we were introduced to the development technocrats (a.k.a 
the KT Faction) and the finance technocrats (sometimes called the Yu Faction or Yu Family). 
We saw how these sub-groups within Taiwan’s economic technocracy played important 
leadership roles in securities and forex reform. By and large, bank opening fell to yet another 
sub-set of policy elites, the ‘young reformers.’36 Unlike the technocrats we have seen elsewhere 
in this study, the young reformers often saw financial liberalization as a social good in and of 
itself. As the title suggests, the young reformers were the most market-oriented of Taiwan’s 
technocracy, and were more ideologically driven than their older colleagues. As a group, they 
were an individualistic network of elites and lacked a readily identifiable mentor. They were 
not adverse, however, to taking a ride on the back of sympathetic power-holders; the close 
association of the group with the charismatic Lee Huan has been noted in several academic 
works and the press.37 While similar to the development and finance technocrats in basic
35 From chapter 1, section three.
36 This group was called all manner of things in the late 1980s (including the ‘young Turks’ and the ‘NTU 
faction’), but the title ‘young reformers’ probably best describes what really defined them -  i.e. their 
generational status in the civil service and their policy orientation. See for example: Far Eastern 
Economic Review (28 July 1988), p. 19.
37 Cong-rong Li, ‘Guojia yu Jinrong Ziten: Weiquan Shicong Zhuyi xia Guomindang Zhengquan 
Yinhang Zhengce de Xingcheng yu Zhuanxing [The State and Financial Capital: KMT Bank Policy Form 
and Development under Authoritarian Rule] unpublished Masters manuscript, Department of Sociology,
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composition and thinking (review arguments in chapter 2, section three), the young reformers 
differed from these two sub-groups in several important ways. They were distinguishable as 
technocrats who: (1) were too young to have had adult or professional experience of KMT rule 
on the mainland, (2) had advanced academic credentials, often at the PhD level and often 
including extended periods as a college professor, and (3) tended to bypass career appointments 
in Taiwan’s state-owned enterprises in favor of promotion through the bureaucracy. As a 
general ‘type’ of technocrat, the young reformers are difficult to place in any broad category 
presented within the literature. This said, the strong political sensibilities of the group would 
seem to suggest that they had a natural affinity with Williamson’s concept of the ‘technopol. ’38 
This mix of technocratic skills and political smarts saw some young reformers follow a 
career path that eventually lead to formal politics. After first making a name for themselves as 
ranking economic policymakers, individuals like Wang Chien-shien (more on him below) and 
Vincent Siew gained seats in the Legislative Yuan as candidates for the KMT. There are 
tentative parallels here with the career paths of some Japanese civil servants in the post-War era 
(through Japan’s line-ministries to the Diet) . 39 However, for most young reformers the career 
path of choice was, perhaps ironically, deeply inspired by Chinese tradition: a path leading from 
scholarship to civil service and back again. Some of the leading exponents of this classical 
journey included such individuals as Fredrick Chien (younger brother of Robert Chien who we 
met in the last chapter), Chen Li-an and Shirley Kuo (more below). These three young 
reformers were particularly impressive individuals. Over and above their achievements in the 
RoC bureaucracy, they were among Taiwan’s foremost scholars in the fields of international 
relations, mathematics and economics respectively. This strong formal link with the academy 
was backed up by a host of particularistic links. In contrast to the technocrats we have seen in 
previous chapters, the young reformers thrived on being seen to mix with Taiwan’s intellectual 
elite. While the development technocrats had eclectic relationships with Taiwan’s academic 
community and the finance technocrats choose to ignore them almost completely, the young 
reformers saw ongoing dialogue with professors from Taiwan’s elite universities as both natural 
and healthy.40 Ties to the Department of Economics at National Taiwan University and the 
Chung-hua Institute of Economic Research (a semi-autonomous offshoot of NTU) were
Tunghai University, Taiwan (1994), p. 108. See also: Far Eastern Economic Review (1 June 1989), p. 
20 .
38 See: John Williamson (ed), The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington: Institute for 
International Economics, 1994), chp. 1.
39 There is a well-developed academic debate regarding who pulls the strings in Japan’s ‘lateral’ transfer 
of personnel from the bureaucracy to the legislature. For the party-political argument, see: Mathew D. 
McCubbins and Gregory W. Noble, ‘The Appearance of Power: Legislators, Bureaucrats and the Budget 
Process in the United States and Japan’ in Peter F. Cowhey and Mathew D. McCubbins (eds.), Structure 
and Policy in Japah and the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For the 
bureaucratic argument, see: Chalmers Johnson, ‘Japan: Who Governs? An Essay on Official 
Bureaucracy’ in Journal of Japanese Studies Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1975).
40 Confirmed in interviews with Wang Chien-shien and Shirley Kuo. Interview in Taipei with Professor 
Shirley Kuo, Minister Without Portfolio, 4 December 1996; and interview in Taipei with Mr Wang 
Chien-shien, Chairman, the Renewal Foundation, 9 July 1999.
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particularly well established, links which were partially responsible tor the group occasionally 
being dubbed ‘the NTU gang’ (Taida hang).
The fact that the young reformers’ lacked a readily identifiable mentor makes it quite 
difficult to isolate the core of the group. This said, it is possible to name at least two technocrats 
whose absence from an inventory of key players in banking reform would leave such a list 
incomplete: Shirley Kuo and Wang Chien-shien. Of these two individuals, Shirley Kuo (Guo 
Wan-rong) stands out as the intellectual principal. The first twenty years of Kuo’s professional 
life were centered on various academic appointments and study at the Department of 
Economics, National Taiwan University. After graduating with a bachelor’s degree in the early 
1950s, Kuo immediately took up a position as an associate lecturer in the Department. Over the 
following decade she augmented her qualifications with a Masters degree from MIT (1962-63), 
and soon afterward was appointed full professor (1966). The next seven years were some of 
Kuo’s most productive academically,41 culminating in her selection as a Fullbright-Hays 
Exchange Professor to MIT in 1971-72. Her transition from academic life to public service 
occurred in 1973 and was almost seamless, rendered possible by a senior appointment to the 
research oriented Council for Economic Planning and Development. During the next six years 
she caught the attention of finance heavyweight Yu Kuo-hwa (who we met in chapter 4) and 
was promoted to the position of Deputy Governor of the Central Bank in 1979. From 1979 to 
1988 Kuo worked closely, though not uncritically, with Yu while studying for a doctorate in 
economics at Kobe University. The completion of this degree in 1984 marked the pinnacle of 
her academic career42 and laid the way for her appointment as Minister of Finance in July 1988. 
Kuo’s three years as Finance Minister coincided with the passage of the amended National Bank 
Law and presaged some of the most important changes in Taiwan’s banking sector for 40 years. 
During this period, her personal influence in policy-making circles reached its zenith -  a fact 
officially confirmed with her concurrent ascendancy to the Central Standing Committee of the 
KMT.43
If Shirley Kuo was the brains trust of the young reformers, Wang Chien-shien (Wang Jian- 
xuan) was the group’s publicist. A natural self-promoter and purveyor of new policy ideas, 
Wang commenced his career in 1961, graduating with an arts degree (statistics major) from
41 And included the production of a number of works in English and Chinese, including: Shirley W.Y. 
Kuo, The Economic Structure of Taiwan, 1952-1969 (Taipei: Graduate Institute of Economics, National 
Taiwan University, 1970).
42 While studying for her doctorate at Kobe, Kuo concurrently produced three English texts on RoC 
economic development for which she is best known outside Taiwan: John C.H. Fei, Gustav Ranis and 
Shirley W.Y. Kuo, Growth With Equity: The Taiwan Case (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); 
Shirley W.Y. Kuo, Gustav Ranis and John C.H. Fei, The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with 
Improved Income Distribution in the Republic of China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981); and Shirley 
W.Y. Kuo, The Taiwan Economy in Transition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983).
4’ Biographical material from: Republic of China Yearbook, 1996 (Taipei: Government Information 
Office, 1996), p. 506-507; and Zhonghua Minguo Mingrenlu, Minguo 88 Nian [Who’s Who in the 
Republic of China, 1999] (Taipei: Central News Agency, 1999), p. 162-163. Supplemented with 
information from interview in Taipei with Professor Shirley Kuo, Minister Without Portfolio, 4 December 
1996.
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National Chengkung University. He soon after commenced a research Masters in finance at 
National Chengchi University, during which time he developed an interest in public 
administration and fiscal policy. Completing his Masters in 1965,44 Wang stayed on as an 
associate lecturer at Chengchi University and refined his academic interests to taxation. This 
narrowing of research concerns eventually took Wang to the US, where in 1971 he was admitted 
as a fellow in the International Taxation Program of Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. 
Upon returning to Taiwan in the following year, Wang took up a post as research specialist in 
the Department of Taxation, Ministry of Finance. In the ensuing decade and a half, he moved 
from post to post in the Finance Ministry and the Executive Yuan -  mostly at the level of 
divisional director -  developing a reputation for thoroughness and ‘straight talking’ in the 
process.45 At the end of this period, Wang finally got the promotion he needed to place him 
among Taiwan’s most senior technocrats: in 1984 he was appointed Administrative Vice 
Minister of Economic Affairs, a post he held until 1989. After a brief period as Political Vice 
Minister of Economic Affairs, Wang was appointed Minister of Finance in 1990. As Finance 
Minister from 1990 to 1992, Wang Chien-shien was closely associated with the introduction of 
the new private banks, and other initiatives of the bank reform ‘consolidation phase.’ These 
events saw our young reformer honored as the 1992 Asian Development Bank Finance Minister 
of the Year and named by the Executive Yuan for the rare Distinguished Services Award.46
The young reformers were destined from the very start of their careers in government 
service to be the ideational engine of bank opening. Their reasons for seeking reform in this 
most prominent area of financial administration were basically twofold. On the one hand, the 
young reformers believed that Taiwan’s banking sector was grossly inefficient and 
uncompetitive. Comments by Wang Chien-shien in an interview make this point eloquently and 
succinctly, and are worth quoting in full:
‘When I first became vice-Minister of the Economics Ministry I heard petitions and 
complaints almost every month about the poor state of the financial sector. The state- 
owned banks in particular would receive a lot of criticism Most of this was quite 
justified: the outrageous difference between loans and deposits at the state banks, for 
example, meant that they were simply not interested in improving their service to
44 See: Chien-shien Wang, ‘Faren Suodeshui Wenti zhi Yanjiu’ [A Study on Corporate Income Tax 
Problems] unpublished Masters manuscript, Finance Research Center, National Chengchi University, 
Taipei (1965).
45 See for example: Chien-shien Wang, Suodeshui Zhidu ji Shifu [A Thorough Account of the Income Tax 
System] (Taipei: Public Finance Training Institute, Ministry of Finance, 1977); and Chien-shien Wang, 
Shuiwu Kuaiji [Tax Accounting] (Taipei: Huashi Wenhua, 1981).
46 Biographical material from: Shijie Nianlu 1996 [Chinese World Almanac 1996] (Taipei: Central News 
Agency, 1996), p. 925; and Republic o f China Yearbook, 1996, fn. 43, p. 568-569. Supplemented with 
information from interview in Taipei with Mr Wang Chien-shien, Chairman, the Renewal Foundation, 9 
July 1999. As alluded to above, Wang Chien-shien made a move to politics in the early 1990s after 
completing his tenure as Minister of Finance. In this period, Wang’s natural inclination toward advocacy 
and reform (broadly defined) became most apparent. See, in particular: Chien-shien Wang, Rang Haoren 
Chutou: Wang Jian-xuan de Congzheng Linian [Let Good People Rise: Wang Chien-shien’s Political 
Thinking] (Taipei: Commonwealth Magazine Publishers, 1995).
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customers and clients. Before banking reform it was a seller’s market -  they were 
extremely lazy in some areas. When I became Finance Minister, for example, I asked 
one of my subordinates why the money market was so thoroughly monopolized by the 
three Bills Finance Companies when banks were permitted to do some kinds of 
business in this area. Fie replied that they were simply not interested. They were 
already making unreal profits in the banking business, why would they want to 
diversify?! ’47
With more than half of all deposits at RoC monetary institutions in the early to mid 1980s going 
to the 16 government banks (including the entire pool of government deposits), they could 
afford to be extremely lazy about attracting funds. On the demand side, they satisfied greater 
than 70% of the market for loans in Taiwan; there was absolutely no incentive to seek-out new 
corporate or consumer custom.48 But this inefficiency was even more insidious than the broad 
figures suggest. Wang Chien-shien continues:
‘The way corporate banking was conducted was also very uncompetitive. To get funds 
from a bank, businessmen almost always needed to have a “special” relationship with 
their bank manager; this often involved all sorts of bribes and quasi-legal “fees.” The 
extent of this bad business practice and the poor state of corporate banking in Taiwan 
was especially underlined by the comparative performance of the new foreign banks in 
the local market [NB. many of these institutions arrived in the early 1980s]. They were 
totally different in their approach to doing banking business, and they made the 
domestic banks look really bad in a number of areas. The treatment of businesswomen 
in Taiwan was a case in point -  the domestic banks virtually ignored women 
completely, but the foreign banks tapped into this lucrative market very early. 
Examples like this made it obvious that reform of the banking sector was required.
And reform did make a dramatic difference: before liberalization businessmen would 
go to their bank for funds; after reform bank, managers would actively go out and visit 
company clients. Almost overnight banking became a buyer’s market.’49 
On the other hand, the young reformers had a vision for the future role of Taiwan’s financial 
sector in the national economy. This thinking was a logical extension of the policy agenda first 
advanced by the development technocrats in the late 1970s (as outlined in chapter 3, section 
two), and was cast within a discussion on Taipei’s emergence as a major center for banking and 
finance. In the past, the young reformers reasoned, Taiwan had performed very well with 
manufacturing, but this component of GDP -  around 50% in the mid 1980s -  would eventually
47 Emphasis in original discussion. Interview in Taipei with Mr Wang Chien-shien, Chairman, the 
Renewal Foundation, 9 July 1999.
4* Calculated from statistics in: Zhonghua Minguo Taiwan Diqu Jinrong Tongji Yuebao [Financial 
Statistics Monthly, Taiwan District, Republic of China] (Taipei: Economic Research Department, Central 
Bank of China, July 1986), esp. sections on consolidated assets and liabilities of banks, all monetary 
institutions and ‘other’ financial institutions.
44 Interview in Taipei with Mr Wang Chien-shien, Chairman, the Renewal Foundation, 9 July 1999.
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shrink and become less important as a source of national growth. Some time in the medium to 
long term, Taiwan’s rising cost structure and increasing volume of real trade (among other 
things, trade stimulates financial activity as financial institutions facilitate payments, provide 
letters of credit, etc.) would favor the island’s emergence as a service-led economy. 50 
Eventually, Taiwan would become ‘post-industrial’ in the same manner as Europe and North 
America in the late 1960s, with the finance sector at the forefront of the change.51 To provide a 
conceptual framework for this transition, the young reformers sought to portray Taipei as a 
potential site for regional and international banking business. Following important historical 
works by Kindleburger and Reed, 2 the notion of the financial or banking ‘center’ became 
popular in RoC academic circles during the early to mid 1980s. Although Taiwan’s tight 
regulatory structure was a strong barrier to entering the global network of transaction centers, 
Taipei had a number of other things going for it: basically sound monetary institutions, 
geographical proximity to the markets of China and North East Asia, a strong industrial base, a 
strong trade position, an educated workforce and (at least as applied to the commercial sector) 
an established tradition of legalism53 With the right infrastructure and regulatory opening, 
Taipei could reinvent itself as the next Hong Kong or Singapore -  and complete the cycle of 
developmental catch-up in the process.54
These two specific reasons for seeking bank liberalization dovetailed with the young 
reformers’ broader outlook on social policy and political development. Although it would be 
wrong to portray this group of policy elites as diehard democrats -  indeed, occasionally it seems 
the reverse was true -  there is little question that they saw bank reform as something bigger than 
simply an adjustment of regulatory provisions. The essential ‘embeddedness’ of their reformist 
agenda was apparent in interviews. In response to a question about her motives for bank reform 
during her time as Finance Minister, Shirley Kuo comments that liberalization is often defined 
far too narrowly. She continues:
‘We must first understand what we mean by liberalization. Financial liberalization has
three main aspects: the deregulation of prices so that they may reflect scarcity, the
removal of restrictions on the movement of funds and the liberalization of management.
50 Interviews in Taipei, 1996 and 1999. I am especially grateful for a discussion with Timothy Lin, 
Senior Counsel to the Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, 5 March 
1996.
51 To use a term first coined by Bell: Daniel Bell, The Coming o f Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in 
Social Forecasting (New York, Basic Books, 1978).
52 Charles P. Kindleberger, The Formation o f Financial Centers: A Study in Comparative Economic 
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); and Howard C. Reed, The Preeminence of 
International Financial Centers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981).
53 Interviews in Taipei, 1996 and 1999.
54 To some extent, the launch of the ‘offshore banking units’ or OBUs in mid 1984 (as noted in chapter 4, 
section one) was a tentative step toward this goal. See: Michael A. Goldberg, ‘International Finance on 
the Pacific Rim and the Emerging Network of Pacific International Financial Centers’ a paper presented 
to the 21st World Congress of the International Association of Financial Executives Institutes, 
International Convention Center, Taiwan (4-7 November 1990), p. 36-37. In practice, this item of 
regulatory tinkering held more implications for forex regulation than banking. For this reason, I have 
included detail on the OBU scheme in chapter 4 rather than here.
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It is not just an economic phenomenon, as many academic economists would argue, but 
also a social and institutional phenomenon as well. As financial liberalization 
progresses, people have to get use to it and make adjustments. For this reason the pace 
and style of liberalization is important, not just the end goal.’55 
Of the three groups of technocrats examined in this study -  i.e. the development technocrats, the 
finance technocrats and the young reformers -  the last were the most sensitive to the broader 
implications of their policy agenda. The young reformers were far more attuned than their 
colleagues to the social dynamics and context of financial opening; a fact they used to their 
advantage when it can time to winning over the powers that be within the KMT.
3. The KMT policy windows for bank reform, 1985 and 1988
Of course, at the time (and indeed, long after), many observers hotly disputed the arguments for 
bank liberalization advanced by Shirley Kuo, Wang Chien-shien and others. Some bureaucrats 
and many state-bank employees argued that the measures of efficiency applied to Taiwan’s 
domestic banks were inappropriate. Contrary to the claims of the young reformers, supporters 
of the status quo believed that the banks were efficient -  as revealed by research based on 
assessment criteria relevant to public sector enterprises.56 The young reformers also came under 
fire for advancing the idea that Taiwan’s economy could one day ride on the back of the finance 
industry. Opponents of change believed that the banks’ primary role in the Taiwan economy 
was to support manufacturing and would remain as such indefinitely57 -  the notion that Taipei 
could emerge as a center for regional or international transactions, they argued, was simply a 
delusion. Despite the conceptual and practical pitfalls of these arguments, they had 
considerable currency in Taiwan prior to the commencement of bank reform in the mid 1980s. 
To a significant extent, this popularity was an indirect function of the party political realities of 
the time. Bank liberalization would never be a policy option for the island unless it could
55 Interview in Taipei with Professor Shirley Kuo, Minister Without Portfolio, 4 December 1996.
56 For example: ‘It really depends on how you measure efficiency. We have done comparative studies on 
the performance of government-owned banks and foreign private banks in Taiwan and found that in terms 
of return on assets (RoA), Taiwanese banks perform as well as or even better than the foreign banks. On 
the other hand, in terms of return on expenditure (RoE) the foreign banks outstrip Taiwan’s government 
banks every time. This is to be expected, however, because for various reasons they have higher leverage 
ratios.’ Interview in Taipei with Chang Ming-daw, Director, Division of Domestic Banking, Bureau of 
Monetary Affairs, Ministry of Finance, 2 April 1999. This argument could be seen as a post-modem 
deconstruction of the concept of ‘efficiency.’ The bottom line is that in most countries most of the time, 
markets reward banks that get a good return on their outlay. While it is true that efficiency is a 
multifaceted beast, searching for a definition that best suits your opinion is simply spurious.
57 The idea that the financial system in Taiwan preformed a supporting role vis-ä-vis manufacturing in the 
island’s development process is enduring but essentially erroneous. The point was well made in an 
interview with Lawrence Liu: ‘Manufacturing in Taiwan has never been happy with the state of the 
financial industry here. It is nonsense to suggest that the financial industry could somehow serve 
manufacturing when so many companies resort to the curb market or go overseas to satisfy their financial 
needs.’ Interview in Taipei with Lawrence Shao-liang Liu, Attorney at Law, Lee and Li Attorneys at 
Law, 16 December 1996.
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impress the ruling KMT as an expeditious strategy (1) to secure socio-political support, and (2) 
to reinforce the party’s conservative finance goals.
Early in 1985, however, the second of these windows of opportunity opened and set the 
stage for bank reform. The source of the KMT’s change of heart was the 10th Credit 
Cooperative scandal (Shixin fengbao), named after a financial subsidiary of the Cathay 
conglomerate as the first enterprise in the group to attract government intervention. Academic 
and industry commentators have described the lO'1, Credit Cooperative scandal as the worst 
economic crisis in Taiwan’s post-War history.58 Three separate government reports conducted 
after the event outlined a long record of funds misappropriation within the Cathay business 
group, and a trail of administrative indecision by the RoC monetary authorities. At the end of 
play, private machinations and public incapacity led to a total of NT$7.7 billion (US$190 
million) of blatantly illegal loans being ‘lost’ within the Cathay group, NT$20 billion (US$500 
million) in suspect loans turned over to bad debt, and an additional NT$3.3 billion (US$85 
million) in public funds devoured in the process of trying to rectify the mess. Further, a series 
of runs on affiliated Cathay group enterprises nearly brought down the entire conglomerate and 
threatened a general loss of faith in RoC financial institutions. Economists have estimated that 
Taiwan’s GDP growth in 1985 was probably reduced by around 0.5-1% as a direct result of the 
10th Credit Cooperative scandal. In the search for blame, a score of Cathay group executives 
were convicted of fraud and imprisoned, and three senior members of the Executive Yuan were 
‘retired’ from their posts.59
To really appreciate how all this transpired, it is first necessary to consider a basic 
conceptual question in bank regulation: How are banks distinguished from other financial 
intermediaries?60 In theory, banks are those intermediaries that by virtue of their authority to 
accept demand deposits and provide call loans create money.61 This specific power places these
58 Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 April 1985), p. 61; and Karl J. Fields, Enterprise and the 
State in Korea and Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 170.
59 Figures and comments from: Far Eastern Economic Review (21 March 1985), p. 150-153; and Far 
Eastern Economic Review (12 September 1985), p. 93-94.
60 It will be recalled that in the introduction, we defined financial intermediaries as institutions that issue 
indirect financial instruments (deposits, insurance contracts, etc.) and in turn lend or invest the 
accumulated funds. See: Brian Wallace Semkow, Taiwan’s Financial Markets and Institutions: The 
Legal and Financial Issues of Deregulation and Internationalization (Westport: Quorum Books, 1992), p. 
32-33.
61 A few words on the mechanics of money creation by banks is probably warranted here. Assume a 
closed economy with one bank and one customer -  a builder who we’ll call ‘Ned.’ Assume further, that 
money is defined as currency in circulation plus bank deposits (sometimes referred to as MIA). Ned has 
placed his life savings totaling $10,000 in the bank. As the bank only has one customer, this means that it 
has deposit liabilities to the value of $10,000. To transport more materials and tools to his latest worksite, 
Ned needs a bigger pick-up truck. He approaches the bank, which lends him $10,000 (he’s a good 
customer), which in turn he then uses to purchase a truck worth $8,000. Ned places the remaining $2,000 
into his savings account -  a reserve he’ll retain for upkeep on the car. This addition to Ned’s original 
savings means that he now has $12,000 in the bank, and the bank has $12,000 in deposit liabilities. This 
transaction has meant that the stock of money in our closed economy has increased by $2,000. The bank 
has created money. While this model is obviously a simplification -  indeed, our model gives no 
indication of how liquidity is maintained in a financial system -  in reality the principle is more or less the
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institutions in a unique position. They are an integral link in a nation’s payments system (i.e. 
the system of currency and exchange which facilitates economic transactions) and, together with 
reserve bank management decisions, play a key role in determining an economy’s volume and 
velocity of money. The unique function of banks directly ties their corporate activities with the 
public good -  a fact that is generally accepted as justification for regulating banks more closely 
and more strictly than other enterprises. So-called ‘non-banks’ are financial intermediaries that 
do not have the authority to accept deposits and provide loans -  or if they do, these rights are 
strictly qualified -  and therefore cannot create money. The category includes insurance 
companies, venture capital companies, credit cooperatives, and trust and investment firms. The 
last two of these financial institutions are widely used in many developing financial systems 
(largely due to their organizational simplicity), and were an integral part of Taiwan’s financial 
landscape by the mid 1980s. They perform an important function in a financial system by 
competing with banks for scarce funds, and are usually granted access to riskier markets. In 
principle, however, their business activities do not have an impact on a nation’s payments 
system62 Although the distinction may be clear in theory, in practice keeping banks and non­
banks apart can be a major headache for monetary authorities. Unsupervised, non-banks can 
easily ‘slip’ into deposit taking and loans provision, or become entangled in various interbank 
transactions. In turn, this can become an issue for monetary administration and the health of the 
financial system -  particularly if the non-banks concerned are large and engaged in business 
activities where the risk of moral hazard is high.63
From the very beginning of KMT rule on Taiwan, the regime permitted a small cohort of 
private non-bank intermediaries to do business. Based on the assumption that banking functions 
could be readily sealed off from these financial institutions, the ruling party saw their inclusion 
in the regulatory framework as consistent with its goals of stability and control. Credit 
cooperatives (xinyong hezuoshe), including credit departments of industry associations, became 
active in the 1950s as the KMT regime pursued land reform and restructured the island’s 
agricultural sector. They performed functions well beyond the mobilization and provision of 
credit for members, including the administration of industry extension services, regional 
developmental financing, and financial training and education for local government officials. 
As noted in chapter 2 of the study, the credit cooperatives attracted considerable low-level fraud
same. Based on observations in: John Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems 
and the Politics o f Industrial Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 59-60.
62 Dimitri Vittas, ‘The Role of Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries (with Particular Reference to Egypt),’ 
research paper prepared for the World Bank, Working Paper No. 2325 (April 2000), available online at 
http://www.worldbank.com/ [web page of the World Bank Organization] -  viewed on 20 August 2001.
63 On the problems of non-banks, see: Anjali Kumar, Nicholas Lardy, William Albrecht, Terry Chuppe, 
Susan Selwyn, Paula Perttunen and Tao Zhang, China’s Non-Bank Financial Institutions: Trust and 
Investment Companies, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 358 (Washington: World Bank, 1997). Moral 
hazard is usually defined as a problem of information asymmetry in contracts (e.g. a dying man takes out 
life insurance, lying about his condition to obtain a large payout for his family after his death). For a 
taxonomy of the various manifestations of moral hazard, see esp.: Eric Rasmusen, An Introduction to 
Game Theory, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1989), chp. 7-10.
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and corruption. Local political elites regularly used the island’s 350-400 cooperative 
institutions to bankroll regional election campaigns and fund private construction projects. 
However, the credit cooperatives were only ever a minor part of Taiwan’s financial system; 
even by the early to mid 1980s they accounted for less than 10% of the total pool of national 
savings.64 Content that the credit cooperatives had proven to be relatively innocuous, in the 
early 1970s the KMT regime permitted the introduction of another kind of non-bank institution 
-  trust and investment companies (xintuo touzi gongsi -  TICs). The TICs were a fairly painless 
way for the ruling party to satisfying demands for more private participation in the financial 
sector, while leaving the state-owned commercial banks largely untouched. Six licenses were 
issued in 1971, establishing the following firms: Cathay Trust, the Overseas Trust Corporation, 
Taiwan First, the United China Trust Company, Asia Trust and the Taiwan Development 
Corporation. Although the TICs were married to some of Taiwan’s larger business groupings, 
their activities were firmly constrained. New regulations on insider trading introduced in 1975 
left it in little doubt that they were never intended as piggy-banks for Taiwan’s emerging 
conglomerates.65
But although the KMT regime saw the credit cooperatives and trust companies as a 
harmless adjunct to the state-owned banks, at least one entrepreneur had grander plans for his 
non-bank institutions. Tsai Wan-chun founded the Cathay group with his brothers in the early 
1950s, doing business in a variety of areas including food processing, retail, lumber and real 
estate. Keen to tie Cathay’s long-term expansion to the service industry, in the late 1950s Tsai 
took over management of the 10th Credit Cooperative Association of Taipei. This move 
presaged two decades of rapid growth for the group and further diversification into as many 
areas of the financial business as the government would (progressively) allow. By 1977, Cathay 
encompassed 24 separate enterprises, consolidated assets of US$1 billion (more than 4% of 
Taiwan’s GDP) and around 20,000 employees -  one of the largest industrial groups in Taiwan 
at that time measure in terms of assets. It also included two insurance companies, a large 
leasing operation run as an appendage to the group’s construction business, and the Cathay 
Investment and Trust Company (Guotai Xintuo Touzi Gongsi, founded in 1971). Over the 
course of the 1970s, the Cathay group’s finance arm pursued business activities that
64 Ming-hui Wang, ‘Cong Wanglu Guanxi Tantao Nonghui Xinyongbu zhi Yunzuo’ [A Network Analysis 
of the Use and Manipulation of Credit Departments in Farmers Associations] in Si yu Yan [Ideas and 
Words] Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1993); and Chyuan-Jeng Shiau, ‘The Functions and Development of the 
Farmers Associations in the Republic of China’ in Journal of Social Science Vol. 34 (June 1986). For an 
in-depth review of local financial institutions from a more sociological perspective, see: Bao-an Lin, 
‘Taiwan Difang Jinrong yu Difang Shehui: Xinyong Hezuoshe de Fazhan Lishi yu Shehui Yiyi’ [Local 
Finance in Taiwan and Local Society: The Development and Social Significance of Credit Cooperatives], 
unpublished Ph.D. manuscript, Donghai University, Taiwan (1994).
65 Tun-jen Cheng, ‘Guarding the Commanding Heights: The State as Banker in Taiwan’ in Stephan 
Haggard, Cheng H. Lee and Sylvia Maxfield (eds.), The Politics o f Finance in Developing Countries 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 70-71; and Nai-ping Yin, ‘40 Nian lai Taiwan de Jingji 
Fazhan yu Jinrong Zhengce’ [40 Years of Economic Development and Financial Policy in Taiwan] in 
Ziyou Zhongguo zhi Gongye [Industry of Free China] Vol. 70, No. 4 (October 1991), p. 19.
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occasionally pushed the envelope of Taiwan’s financial law. Between 1974 and 1979, the 10th 
Credit Cooperative was cited four times by the island’s monetary authorities for accepting 
irregular deposits. Due to inadequate legal provisions, each infraction incurred little more than 
a reprimand. In addition, the Tsai family was implicated in a number of untoward business 
deals. One involved a speculative venture in which Cathay Life and Cathay Trust equity was 
secretly used to leverage a real estate purchase. Government investigations revealed insufficient 
evidence to prosecute.66
TABLE 5.2 Tsai family and the structure of the Cathay conglomerate
Family Member Relationship to 
Tsai Wan-chun
Cathay Group 
Subsidiary
M ain Areas o f  
Business
Sample
Companies
Chen-chou elder son Cathay Plastics 
Group
petrochemicals,
manufacturing
Cathay Plastics, 
Taiwan Shoes, 
10,h Credit
Chen-nan elder son Cathay Trust 
Group
finance, services, 
manufacturing
Cathay Trust, 
Lai Lai Hotel, 
Cathay Electric
Wan-tsai brother Fubon Group construction,
finance,
Fubon
Investment, & 
Construction
Wan-lin brother Lin Yuan Group construction, 
finance, services
Cathay
Construction, & 
Life Insurance
Chen-yang,
Chen-wei
younger sons Hsing Lai Group services Lai Lai and 
Hsing Lai 
Depart. Stores
Sources: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 April 1985), p. 68-69; and Karl J. Fields, 
‘Developmental Capitalism and Industrial Organization: Business Groups and the State in Korea and 
Taiwan’ unpublished Ph.D. manuscript, Graduate Division of Political Science, University of California 
at Berkeley (1990), chp. 5.
In 1979, ill health persuaded the elder Tsai Wan-chun to break-up his family company into 
five nominally independent operations headed up by his two brothers and four sons (see Table 
5.2). Taking advantage of poor administrative oversight and the emerging market power of the 
Cathay conglomerate (with total assets of US$3.7 billion by 1984), the eldest sons Tsai Chen- 
chou and Tsai Chen-nan used Cathay Plastics and Cathay Trust to fund speculative business 
ventures and support their extravagant lifestyles. Initially these money games were relatively
66 Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 April 1985), p. 61-75; Fields, Enterprise and the State in 
Korea and Taiwan, fn. 58, p. 172-174; and historical information from several Cathay group web pages, 
including: http://www.cathaysite.com.tw/ [website of the Cathay Securities Investment Trust Company] -  
viewed 24 August 2001.
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inconsequential, but when the economy floundered in 1981 they took an ominous turn. With 
Cathay sales down and profit margins trimmed, the group’s overall repayment ability was 
seriously compromised. Cathay Plastics in particular began to struggle, and at some point Tsai 
Chen-chou started to plunder the funds of the 10th Credit Cooperative to prop-up the remainder 
of his group’s operations. Into 1982, Chen-chou called upon Chen-nan to help out with funding 
from the Cathay Investment and Trust Company. Thereafter, in a vicious circle of refinancing 
and expansion, Chen-chou and Chen-nan simply ignored all the legal restrictions on non-bank 
business operations. Through their respective financial institutions, they solicited short-term 
deposits, provided checking account services, offered loans far in excess of the legal ceilings, 
and traded debt. 10th Credit and Cathay Trust were being run as private banks -  although 
entirely for the benefit of the two Tsai brothers and in conjunction with the normal (and 
therefore riskier) non-bank activities of these two institutions. When the government finally 
audited the books of 10th Credit in early 1985 the enterprise had virtually no reserves to speak 
of; the lending limit for credit cooperatives of 78% of assets had apparently been disregarded 
for almost two years. Further, more than 50% of Cathay Trust loans (a total of NT$38 billion or 
US$0.95 billion at the start of 1985) had been channeled to Cathay group companies.67
The behavior of the Tsai brothers increasingly compromised the KMT regime’s finance 
goals of stability and control, and by 1982 the stage was set for the emergence of a policy 
window for bank reform In the short-term, however, the official response was slow and 
tentative. Some of this can probably be explained in terms of Chen-chou’s high-profile entry 
into the Legislative Yuan in 1983.68 However, much of this official procrastination was the 
outcome of an unfortunate combination of (1) inadequate legal provisions, and (2) an over­
estimation of the capacity to contain the wayward activities of Taiwan’s non-banks. Senior 
figures in Cabinet (including Finance Minister Hsu Li-teh who we met in chapter 3) were aware 
as early as 1981 that Cathay executives were engaging in suspect financial dealings. But in the 
absence of a law specifically relevant to the trust business, a fluid definition of ‘deposits’ in the 
National Bank Law, weak penalties for fraud and financial impropriety, and ambiguous 
regulations regarding the appropriate role of Taiwan’s oversight agencies, the monetary 
authorities were severely restricted in what they could actually do.69 Various citations and fines
67 Taiwan Country Report, No. 2, 1985 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1985), p. 5-6; Taiwan 
Country Report, No. 3, 1985 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1985), p. 5; and Far Eastern 
Economic Review (7 March 1985), p. 50-51.
68 Which is the standard explanation -  typically relayed with detail of Chen-chou’s mischievous political 
dealings with a group of lawmakers called the ‘13 Brothers.’ See esp.: Fields, Enterprise and the State in 
Korea and Taiwan, fn. 58, p. 176-178. This interpretation is too weak to stand on its own, however, as 
the KMT senior leadership would never have tolerated such preferential treatment for one of its own. The 
sacking of Wang Sheng in the fall of 1983 was testament to the reality that no one individual or faction 
was above the party. See: Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the 
Republic o f China (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), p. 80-81.
(’9 The legal deficit cannot be overstated. Five months after the government had moved to bail out 10th 
Credit, regulators were still debating the legality of placing limitations on Tsai Chen-chou’s 
proprietorship rights over Cathay Plastics. Even after the full account of his reckless behavior had 
become clear, RoC law was silent on whether or not Chen-chou could continue to direct his company!
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issued against 10lh Credit between 1981 and 1984 had almost no impact on the activities of the 
Tsai family. Only when the Ministry of Finance had grounds for suspecting that 10th Credit was 
on the verge of collapse was a thoroughgoing audit considered unequivocally justifiable. And 
of course, when the audit was finally completed in January 1985, a depositor run ensued soon 
after; by this stage anything the government did was bound to elicit panic. To their credit, when 
substantive action was finally taken on 9 February, the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance 
moved swiftly and decisively. A score of Cathay business enterprises, including 10th Credit and 
Cathay Trust, were taken over and reorganized in a systematic and largely transparent fashion.70
The flipside of this legal failure was a certain gung-ho attitude regarding the government’s 
capacity to rein-in Taiwan’s non-banks. There was some justification for this confidence. In 
1982, the Central Bank and Finance Ministry had handled a serious run on the Asia Trust and 
Investment Company with apparent ease. Although the circumstances of that crisis were not 
entirely similar to the events of 1985 -  in the earlier case, Asia Trust found itself overexposed in 
the face of a downturn in real-estate prices -  once again the monetary authorities only moved in 
when the institution concerned was on the brink of insolvency. Acting initially to provide 
liquidity and soon after to facilitate an institutional takeover, a major financial crisis was 
averted. With the bailout ultimately costing the Central Bank NT$2.2 billion (US$55 million) -  
a figure in the same league as that which was spent on 10th Credit three years later -  within six 
months the event was a distant memory. By early 1985, the government had some reason to 
believe it could replicate the Asia Trust solution with 10th Credit.71
But as we have seen, the effects of the 10th Credit Cooperative scandal were far more 
extensive and debilitating than any previous financial predicament. In May 1985, with the dire 
results of the non-bank crisis increasingly apparent (including an unprecedented spike in 
unemployment, which reached a record high of 4.5% by August), the KMT regime commenced 
a search for solutions -  in other words, a window of opportunity for policy reform had finally 
opened. An important part of this search was the establishment of the so-called Economic 
Reform Committee (ERC -  Jinggaihui). The ERC was staffed by senior government officials, 
leading business figures and economists -  including government convener Chao Yau-tung, 
entrepreneur Koo Chen-fu, and head of the Chung-hua Institute of Economics T. S. Tsiang -  
and given a broad mandate to comment on Taiwan’s financial and economic policy. A major 
focus was the regulation of financial institutions in Taiwan, as well as a number of related areas 
including fiscal policy, corporate law, and trade and industry policy. Although it is true, as 
Noble says, that a key underlying function of the ERC was diversionary -  ‘to take public
See: Zhongyang Shibao [Central Daily News] (20 July 1985), p. 3; and Zhongyang Shibao [Central Daily 
News] (21 July 1985), p. 3.
70 Xin-rong Xue, Bianju Zhong de Yuejin: Yu Guo-hua de Zhengyuan Wunian [In the Midst of Critical 
Change: The Five Year Cabinet of Yu Kuo-hwa] (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1996), p. 140-142.
71 Jun Wang, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [Finance Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and 
Travels] (Taipei: Sunbright Publishing Company, 1999), p. 363-366.
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attention away from the Cathay scandal’72 -  the ERC pursued its nominal assignment with 
gusto. Many policy options were placed in the public sphere for the first time. ERC 
deliberations were front-page news for much of the remainder of 1985. The talks were 
completed in December with the delivery of a comprehensive report. Among the more radical 
of the recommendations produced by the ERC were proposals to privatize the state-owned 
banks, liberalize the capital account, fully rewrite RoC company and banking law and reduce 
trade tariffs to less than 10% across the board. The ERC was a milestone for public economic 
debate in Taiwan; a model of policy deliberation and consensus-building that RoC governments 
would use again in the 1990s and beyond.77
Reform of Taiwan’s banking system first became a possibility in early 1985 as the KMT 
regime commenced a search for solutions to the 10th Credit Cooperative scandal; a sectoral- 
strategy window of opportunity had opened within the ruling party. In the following section of 
the chapter we will examine just how the young reformers used this political opening to launch 
their agenda for bank liberalization. For now, we turn our attention to the second KMT policy 
window. It is apparent from section one of this chapter that the bank reform process moved into 
the final stages of liberalization over the course of 1989-92. This timing would suggest that a 
socio-political window of opportunity must have opened within the KMT regime just prior to 
this. That is, sometime in 1989 or perhaps earlier the ruling party must have responded to a 
change in, or threat to, its social support base. Do we have evidence of this second aperture 
emerging within the ruling party? The remainder of this section seeks to address this question.
In chapter 4 we saw how in the post-War era, Taiwan’s political economy came to be 
dominated by small to medium sized enterprises. By the mid 1980s, SMEs constituted around 
98% of all firms in the RoC -  an industrial structure that dovetailed well with the ruling party’s 
ideological and historical distain for the concentration of capital. But despite the broad contours 
of economic development on the island, and much to the disappointment of the KMT regime, 
some concentration of private industry did occur. Over the 1960s and 1970s, large corporate 
identities emerged on the island, although in a manner and form which seems to have been 
uniquely Taiwanese.74 Into the early 1980s, a significant number of academics and business 
journalists began to describe Taiwan’s economic landscape at least partially in terms of large, 
amorphous corporate groups known as the guanxi qiye. The term guanxi qiye has never been 
legally defined in Taiwan, and as it came into common parlance in the 1980s generated
72 Gregory W. Noble, Collective Action in East Asia: How Ruling Parties Shape Industry Policy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 88.
73 For details on the launch of the Economic Reform Council in May, see various articles in Tianxia Zazhi 
[Commonwealth Magazine] (1 June 1985). For the conclusion of the Council deliberations, see various 
articles in Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 December 1985), esp. p. 155-156. For an 
example of the breadth of topics considered by the Council, see also: Gaixin, Gaixin: Wang Yong-qing 
dui Jingji Gaixin Weiyuanhui zhi Jianyan [New Reforms, New Heart: Wang Yung-ching’s thoughts and 
suggestions for the Economic Reform Council] (Taipei: written and published by the Economic Daily 
News, 1985).
74 I am grateful to Dr Zhu Tian-biao for this point. Mainland China and overseas Chinese communities 
do not have corporate entities along the lines discussed below.
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considerable debate.7' In the battle over definition, however, one operational definition 
gradually gained far more acceptance than others -  probably more by default than design. From 
the early 1970s, the business research group ‘China Credit Information Service’ (CCIS -  
Zhonghua Zhengxinsuo) proposed a narrow specification of three or more firms with the 
following characteristics: (1) total assets and sales greater than NT$1 billion for the group, (2) 
retention of a leading individual, management team, or pilot firm which wields the power of 
‘final say’ over other companies in the group, and (3) universal acknowledgement of group 
membership.76 CCIS further specified three basic types of intra-group organization -  the sister 
type, the mother-child type and the marriage type (see Diagram 5 .1 )-  each based on a variety of 
underlying guanxi links.77
Despite the conceptual challenges involved, the specification of the guanxi qiye allows us to 
point to a selection of relatively large, cohesive and influential business conglomerates in 
Taiwan prior to the apex of bank reform (see Table 5.3). Their dimensions were quite 
impressive, certainly in Taiwan’s context but also more broadly. As of 1988, sales earnings of 
the top 100 guanxi qiye accounted for around 34% of GNP, while the top ten groups had 
combined annual revenues of more than NT$437 billion or 13% of GNP. The top ten groups 
also accounted for nearly 40% of earnings in their respective sectors. Further, nearly half of 
Taiwan’s top ten guanxi qiye would have made Fortune magazine’s ‘Global 500’ in the late 
1980s.78 In addition to being large in aggregate terms, the guanxi qiye were also spatially vast; 
individual guanxi qiye were represented in an extraordinarily range of industrial sectors. While 
a number of business groups, such as Formosa Plastics and Shinkong, exhibited a high degree of 
vertical integration, expansion into disparate markets was the norm for most guanxi qiye. 
Hamilton et.al. comment that in the mid 1980s, the top 100 guanxi qiye had interests in an 
average of four unassociated industries.79 The final tiling to be noted about the guanxi qiye was 
their relative stability over time. The growth of Taiwan’s related businesses tended to match the 
growth of the overall economy, and did not see the kind of aggressive expansion of corporate
75 See: Zong-shao Chu, ‘Wo Guo Guanxi Qiye zhi Xiankuang Fenxi Jiqi Yingyun Zongxian zhi Yanjiu’ [A 
Study of the Contemporary Circumstances and Operational Synergy of Related Enterprises in the RoC] in 
Qiye Yinhang Jikan [Enterprise Bank Quarterly] Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1982); and Hahn-koo Lee, Ichiro 
Numazaki and Yoshiaki Ueda, ‘Comments on “Enterprise Groups in East Asia” by Hamilton, Orru and 
Biggart’ in Shoken Keizai No. 162 (December 1987), p. 10-29.
76 Taiwan Diqu Jituan Qiye Yanjiu, Minguo 77-78 Nian [Business Groups in Taiwan] (Taipei: China 
Credit Information Service, 1989), p. 29-30.
77 In descending order of importance, the key links typically included: nuclear family, blood relatives, 
relatives by marriage and people sharing a common hometown (tongxiang -  a connection with particular 
importance for Chinese people). Ichiro Numazaki, ‘Networks of Taiwanese Big Business’ in Modern 
China Vol. 12, No. 4 (October 1986), p. 494- 506.
7S Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan, fn. 58, p. 64-65; and Taiwan Diqu Jituan Qiye 
Yanjiu, Minguo 77-78 Nian [Business Groups in Taiwan], fn. 76, p. 1-20. Calculations performed by the 
author.
74 Gary G. Hamilton, Marco Orru and Nicole Woolsey Biggart, ‘Enterprise Groups in East Asia: An 
Organizational Analysis’ in Shoken Keizai No. 161 (September 1987).
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holdings witnessed in Japan and Korea in the 1970s and 1980s/0 Further, a review of the top 
ten ranking guanxi qiye (measured in assets) at regular intervals between 1972 and 1988 reveals 
that at least half of the leading business groups in the top ten at the start of the 1970s were still 
there in the late 1980s. The number one position remained in the hands of Wang Yung-ching’s 
Formosa Plastics for the entire p erio d /1
Although it is tempting to see the information given above as evidence that the guanxi qiye 
were a source of increasing business pressure on economic policy in Taiwan, this view is only 
partially correct at best. We saw briefly in chapter 1 that through the late 1980s, the power of 
Taiwanese ‘big business’ remained strongly qualified on two counts. On the one hand, as 
independent entities the guanxi qiye were still small compared to RoC state-owned enterprises, 
and miniscule compared to the giant Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebol. On the other hand, 
Taiwan’s partially open political system offered the guanxi qiye few direct avenues of access to 
the administrative centers of policymaking/2 But these qualifications understate the extent to 
which the KMT regime was prepared to go to keep business interests on the margins of its 
social support base. As the guanxi qiye could not be simply ignored -  clearly, they were large 
enough to be an important structural constraint by the late 1980s -  the ruling party engaged in 
some interesting social politics to keep tabs on individual corporate representatives. One aspect 
of this manipulation was the practice of playing favorites. The story of Koo Chen-fu is 
probably the most prominent example of this. Koo became head of Taiwan Cement (number 14 
on Table 5.3) in the mid 1950s and the China Trust group (number four on Table 5.3) during the 
1970s. As his corporate empire and intra-business contacts expanded, the KMT regime co­
opted Koo -  along with one or two others, including Lin Ting-sheng from the Tatung group -  to 
establish a personal link between the ruling party and the elite of Taiwanese business. Koo’s 
cooperative demeanor won him a seat on the Central Standing Committee of the KMT and a 
series of semi-formal appointments as a business and national emissary. In the early 1990s, he 
was made chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation, the KMT regime’s prestigious ‘non­
governmental organization’ for handling relations with Beijing.83
80 Gary G. Hamilton and Nicole Woolsey Biggart, ‘Market, Culture and Authority: A Comparative 
Analysis of Management and Organization in the Far East’ in American Journal o f Sociology Vol. 94, 
Supplement (1988), p. 61. See also: Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan, fn. 58, p. 71.
81 Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan, fn. 58, p. 70; and Taiwan Diqu Jituan Qiye 
Yanjiu, Minguo 62-63 Nian [Business Groups in Taiwan] (Taipei: China Credit Information Service, 
1974).
82 From chapter 1, section two.
83 While Koo made it to the top of the party-business nexus, others demonstrably did not. Despite the size 
and status of his Formosa Plastics, Wang Yung-ching was only ever invited to play a minor role in the 
ruling party’s game of business representation. See esp.: Ichiro Numazaki, ‘The Role of Personal 
Networks in the Making of Taiwan’s Guanxiqiye’ in Gary Hamilton (ed.), Business Networks and 
Economic Development in East and South East Asia (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991); and 
Taniura Takao, ‘Management in Taiwan: The Case of the Formosa Plastics Group’ in East Asian Cultural 
Studies Vol. 28, Nos. 1-4 (March 1989). See also: Noble, Collective Action in East Asia: How Ruling 
Parties Shape Industry Policy, fn. 72, p. 45; and Far Eastern Economic Review (1 February 1990), p. 40- 
41.
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DIAGRAM 5.1 Types o fguanxi qiye intra-group organization
/// Sister Type Organization:
Partners X and Y jointly establish or invest in companies 
A, B, and C, and the three firms are said to be in a 
sibling relationship. The Sampo Group was a typical 
example of this kind of group organization.
#2 Mother-Child Type Organization:
Partners X and Y jointly invest in company A, which 
subsequently invests in firms B and C. Company A then 
stands as parent to B and C. Tatung Group maintained 
features of this intra-group structure.
#3 Marriage Type Organization:
Partners X and Y invest in A, while Y and Z invest in 
another firm B. X and Z are therefore ‘married’ through 
their shared association with Y. For a time, this style of 
organization was typical of the Cathay Group.
Notes: Generally speaking, the guanxi qiye tend toward one of these three models, but they are not 
mutually exclusive.
Sources: Ichiro Numazaki, ‘Networks of Taiwanese Big Business’ in Modern China Vol. 12, No. 4 
(October 1986), p. 496-501; and Taiwan Diqu Jituan Qiye Yanjiu, Minguo 77-78 Nian [Business 
Groups in Taiwan] (Taipei: China Credit Information Service 1989), p. 29-30.
For many years, Koo was also chairman of the Chinese National Association of Industry 
and Commerce, one of three peak representative organizations for business in Taiwan 
(including the Chinese National Federation of Industry and the RoC Chamber of Commerce). 
This leads us to the second aspect of the KMT regime’s social manipulation of the guanxi qiye: 
the top-down use of industry associations (gongye xiehui). We saw briefly in chapter 2 how the 
KMT created front organizations to ensure maximum control over all established and emergent 
social groups on the island. Once established, these civic associations were usually assured 
obedience to the ruling party through penetration with party cells.84 The number of industry 
associations ran into the hundreds and had a remarkable degree of sectoral coverage. Some 
undoubtedly had a developmental rationale attached to their establishment -  e.g. the Taiwan 
Importers and Exporters Association. Others, like the Taipei Canned-Cake Food Manufacturers
>'J From chapter 2, section two.
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Association, appear to be the outcome of little more than a political desire to be organizationally 
encom passing /5 As Noble argues, the purpose of the industry associations was often only 
thinly disguised, formally, they came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior (a 
control agency) and were typically staffed by military, party or security personnel. Leadership 
positions were usually derived by ruling party appointment. Association ballots were rare, and 
where they did occur, were often designed to simply confirm  ex post facto  a decision imposed 
from above.86
TABLE 5.3 Top twenty guanxi qiye in 1988-89 by group assets (NT$1,000,000s)
Rank Group Assets Rank Group Assets
11 Formosa Plastics 131,720 11 Pacific Electronics* 19,246
2 Lin Yuan 96,310 12 China Rebar 17,471
3 Shin Kong 62,695 13 Tunex 17,104
4 China Trust 61,695 14 Taiwan Cement 13,761
5 Far Eastern 45,260 15 Qingfeng Investment* 12,036
6 Tatung 39,266 16 Wei Chuan 11,570
7 Tainan Textiles 37,651 17 Sampo 11,308
8 Yulon Motor 31,721 18 Yuen Foong Yu 10,967
9 Zhongxing Textiles* 25,562 19 Internatnl. Telephone* 10,809
10 Yixin* 25,534 20 China General 10,774
Notes: Group titles specified with an asterisk are directly translated or romanized from the Chinese and 
may not correspond with the official English names of these business groups.
Sources: Taiwan Diqu Jituan Qiye Yanjiu, Minguo 77-78 Nian [Business Groups in Taiwan] (Taipei: 
China Credit Information Service, 1989), p. 2.
The KMT’s politicking left the guanxi qiye with little room to maneuver, and for many 
years business was effectively locked-out of the regime’s support base. There were early signs, 
however, that this comfortable arrangement could not continue indefinitely -  a socio-political 
window of opportunity for bank reform was about to open. Change was not a direct function of 
the increasing size and prominence of the guanxi qiye per se,sl but part of the broader evolution
85 See esp.: Taiwan Zhinan [Directory of Taiwan] (Taipei: The China News, 1989), p. 132-165.
86 Noble, Collective Action in East Asia: How Ruling Parties Shape Industry Policy, fn. 72, p. 44-45. 
Augmented with interviews in Taipei, 1999.
87 Which is the reason I have not presented the 10th Credit Cooperative scandal and the machinations of 
the Tsai family as part of the present story on the guanxi qiye. Analytically, the topics are quite distinct: 
one is a narrow story about the behavior and manipulation of certain types of financial institution, the 
other a broad account of business advocacy within a context of increasing political pluralism. Insofar as 
the aim of any social-science analysis is to relate a generalizable account, focusing on the common 
ground between the two stories presented herein -  i.e. the fact that 10th Credit scandal just happened to 
occur within the Cathay guanxi qiye -  is not necessarily significant and may indeed be misleading. To 
my mind, this is a key problem with Karl Field’s work. See: Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea 
and Taiwan, fn. 58, esp. chp. 5. Fields’ account of the 10th Credit scandal is a one-off story about intra- 
guanxi qiye intrigue. The simpler and more widely applicable story about the problems associated with
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of political pluralism in Taiwan. We saw in chapter 3 that the early interplay between the ruling 
party and opposition dangwai simultaneously produced demands for middle class inclusion and 
opportunities for regime cooptation -  the end result in the area of finance policy being Taiwan’s 
first steps toward securities liberalization.xx Through the mid to late 1980s, the dynamic 
between the KMT and opposition deepened and diversified. After the establishment of the 
Association for Public Policy Research in 1983 (the first move toward an opposition political 
party) dangwai activists stepped-up their efforts on two fronts: applying pressure to the ruling 
party for democratic concessions, and intra-opposition organization. With a series of 
increasingly rowdy street demonstrations and a campaign of procedural disruption in the 
Legislative Yuan, the dangwai strived to engage the KMT in political negotiation. Although 
initially these efforts were unsuccessful -  and even counterproductive from a public relations 
perspective -  in early 1986 the ruling party opened up talks with opposition moderates. This 
culminated in September with a surprise announcement by President Chiang Ching-kuo that 
martial law would be lifted (brought to fruition in July 1987), and an equally surprising move by 
the opposition to openly establish the Democratic Progressive Party (just in time for the 
December 1986 elections).89
As the opposition movement gained in strength through 1987-88 -  buoyed by an increase in 
the DPP’s legislative presence -  the KMT commenced a period of protracted leadership 
transition and adjustment. On the occasion of CCK’s death in January 1988, Lee Teng-hui rose 
to power, in the first instance as alternate RoC President and KMT Chairman. The early months 
of 1988 saw Lee successfully secure his right to office as CCK’s appointee, although in the face 
of stubborn internal opposition from a core of KMT conservatives. Toward the middle of the 
year, the acting President commenced the task of acquiring office in his own right. Lee 
outmaneuvered the conservatives at the KMT’s 13th National Congress in July to win the ballot 
for party chairman. In the ensuing appointment process for the Central Committee and Central 
Standing Committee, Lee’s preferred candidates also prevailed and the influence of party 
conservatives was seriously compromised. Lee then turned his attention to the RoC Presidency. 
The much-awaited passage of the Civic Organization Law in early 1989 (finally legalizing the 
creation of opposition political parties) and a poor showing by the KMT at the Legislative Yuan 
elections in December lent weight to Lee’s cause. Touting himself as a leading light of 
democratization and internal KMT reform, in April 1990 Lee Teng-hui was officially elected 
President at the spring session of the RoC National Assembly. This act solidified Lee’s position
regulating non-banks is completely lost. Further, the broad phenomenon of increasing business power in 
Taiwan is reduced to an episodic and enterprise-specific account.
88 From chapter 3, section three.
89 Kuang-yu Ji, Zhonghua Minguo de Zhengzhi Fazhan: Minguo 38 Nian Lai de Bianqian [Political 
Development of RoC] (Taipei: Yangzhi Wenhua Chubanshe, 1996), p. 508-501; and Yun-han Chu, 
Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992), p. 42.
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in the KMT regime and muted the strength of intra-party opponents -  a situation that became a 
key feature of Taiwan politics through the remainder of the 1990s/1
The fluid political environment detailed above gradually and inadvertently provided the 
guanxi qiye with an unprecedented chance to voice their opinion on economic policy. From the 
conclusion of the KMT’s 13th National Congress in July 1988, business advocacy became a 
regular feature of the island’s policy discourse. Although mostly negative and reactive, industry 
demands were typically channeled through compliant lawmakers in the Legislative Yuan, based 
on surreptitious and often quasi-corrupt relationships referred to as ‘political-business networks’ 
(.zhengshang guanxi or zhengshang wanglu). Much of the dynamic of business advocacy was 
actually internal to the KMT regime itself: the Executive Yuan would present a proposal to the 
Legislative Yuan for a change in economic policy, whereupon KMT legislators with business 
links would do their utmost to see it destroyed or turned into a source of corporate rent. Success 
in such endeavors was actually quite rare, but the process always made for spectacular politics. 
The proposal to introduce a 0.3% tax on securities transactions in September 1988, for example, 
caused an uproar in the Legislative Yuan and allegedly inspired several stock manipulation 
schemes by politician-business insiders. The Taiwan Stock Exchange nosedived into a mini­
crash in late September. Eventually, Cabinet returned with a 0.15% tax that was passed in 
October and finally introduced in January 1989.91
As business acquired a public voice -  albeit only partial -  the KMT regime commenced a 
search for further means to silence and subjugate it. In the new political environment, keeping 
the guanxi qiye on the extremities of the ruling party’s social support base required more 
restraint than in the past -  more emphasis on the carrot than the stick. In this context, from 
around mid 1988 the ruling party began to look seriously at Taiwan’s banking industry as a 
source of political diversion. There were several aspects to this new approach, two of which are 
worthy of mention here. First, with due attention to such issues as industry entry, bank 
liberalization was an attractive instrument to intensify inter-guanxi qiye rivalry. The capacity to 
play off the guanxi qiye had already been proven effective with the introduction of the new 
securities companies. After May 1988, it will be recalled from chapter 3, the Securities 
Exchange Commission started accepting applications for new securities firms. Partially in a bid 
to see that no one dominated the new private business in brokerage, dealing and underwriting, 
the SEC issued an inordinate number of licenses -  some 100 by the end of 1988 and more than 
370 by the end of 1989. In and of itself, this move made little sense economically but it
90 Steven J. Hood, The Kuomintang and Democratization of Taiwan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 
chp. 6, esp. 93-101; and James D. Seymour, ‘Taiwan in 1988: No More Bandits’ in Asian Survey Vol. 29, 
No. 1 (January 1989), esp. p. 56-58.
91 See esp.: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 November 1988), p. 54-76. Includes a feature 
article on Legislative Yuan links to business. See also: Chen, ‘Taiwan Yinhang Zhengce de Zhengzhi 
Jingji Fenxi’ [The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Banking Policy], fn. 8, chp. 4; and Taiwan Country 
Report, No. 4, 1988 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988), p. 12-13.
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certainly kept major corporate players on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in check/2 It new bank 
licenses were issued with similar fervor, the KMT regime could replace attentive subjugation 
with competition in its treatment of the guanxi qiye. Needless to say, as with the securities case, 
questions of bank economies of scale and sectoral capacity were rendered irrelevant by such 
calculations.
Second, bank opening was an effective means for the KMT regime to increase scrutiny of 
the guanxi qiye's internal financial activities, while retaining formal detachment. Opaque 
financial management had long been a feature of business administration on Taiwan, and 
regularly became an item of public debate when leading corporate groups experienced 
repayment difficulties or went bankrupt (the 10th Credit Cooperative scandal generated 
discussion along these lines). Most corporations had two sets of financial statements: those 
intended for company insiders and those meant for government oversight agencies or 
creditors.93 By and large, this situation was tolerated. Among other things, it gave the KMT 
regime a legitimate excuse to keep the affairs of business at arm’s length. But it was also a lost 
opportunity. Systematic scrutiny of corporate finances could have been used to exercise ruling 
party control over wayward guanxi qiye. The challenge was to introduce administrative 
arrangements that retained the desired distance, but left the extent of regime reach beyond 
doubt. Bank opening was one such option. The establishment of new private banks, the 
adoption of more market oriented lending policies by state owned institutions, and so on gave 
the ruling party a practical reason to increase financial oversight activities. However, this 
surveillance would be mediated and limited: tire financial authorities would only delve as far as 
necessary to ascertain if, for example, bank loans were being misappropriated within a corporate 
group. Larger questions of financial management -  e.g. tax avoidance -  could remain safely at 
a distance from the ruling party.94
These socio-political incentives reinforced the KMT’s sector-specific imperative to reform 
Taiwan’s banking industry. Thus, through mid to late 1988, the second window of opportunity 
for the young reformers opened. After a leisurely three to four years, reform of Taiwan’s 
banking system had become an entirely expeditious political end; comprehensive policy change 
was now a strong prospect.
92 By the second half of 1988 it was apparent that the fledgling securities industry was overheating: 
around 6,000 jobs had been generated by the establishment of the new securities firms, and with precious 
few skilled personnel to fill them, wages blew-out to unsustainable levels. Further, by the end of 1988, 
the high number of new securities firm licenses was seen as an adjunct to the TSE bubble and there were 
calls for a slowdown in issuance. Taiwan Country Report, No. 4, 1988 (London: Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 1988), p. 24-25. See also: Gongshang Shibao [Commercial Times] (3 May 1988), p. 17; 
Gongshang Shibao [Commercial Times] (6 May 1988), p. 16; and Tianxi Zazhi [Commonwealth 
Magazine] (1 August 1988), p. 90-95.
9̂  Issues covered in: Jane Kaufmin-Winn, ‘Reform of the RoC’s Corporate Reorganization Law Needed’ 
in Financial and Investment Yearbook, RoC 1987 (Taipei: Central Economic News Service, 1987), p. 28- 
32.
94 Interviews in Taipei, 1996 and 1999.
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4. Managing the middle way
A strong prospect perhaps, but by no means a certainty. In the discussion above we have seen 
how in 1985 and then again in 1988, bank reform emerged as a prudent political tactic for the 
ruling KMT. The association between the ruling party’s two policy windows and the actual 
process of bank reform is relatively clear: bank opening starts in early 1985 as the sectoral- 
strategy window opens, and then reaches a high point (and eventually concludes) after the 
appearance of the socio-political window in the latter half of 1988. The opening of these policy 
windows within the KMT regime was a necessary prerequisite for bank reform, but reform did 
not automatically take place. For that, sustained effort by the young reformers was needed. I 
would argue that the likes of Shirley Kuo and Wang Chien-shien used the two KMT windows of 
opportunity to introduce and consolidate their agenda for bank liberalization. What is the basis 
for this claim?
In accord with the previous case studies of this thesis, it is important to consider three items 
of evidence. First, a close look at the historical record shows that after early 1985 and late 
1988, the young reformers became more active in the pursuit of bank policy change. Much of 
the earlier activity is difficult to observe, as the young reformers were not the predominant 
faction within Cabinet in the wake of the 10th Credit Cooperative scandal. Beneath the 
unadventurous policy response of Yu Kuo-hwa’s finance technocrats,95 however, the young 
reformers were busy making their case for institutional transformation. The most obvious 
example of this adjustment in behavior was Wang Chien-shien’s public relations campaign for 
financial reform over 1985. From January, the Vice-Minister of Economic Affairs conducted a 
sustained but careful critique of prevalent financial policy, arguing that Taiwan’s real economy 
had fundamentally changed since the 1950s and the financial system needed to keep up with this 
development. He pointed to bank reform in Korea and elsewhere as evidence that the island’s 
policy framework was increasingly out of step with the times.96 Beyond broad publicity work, 
the Economic Reform Committee also provided a unique venue for a number of the young 
reformers to have substantive input into the emerging bank policy agenda. Both Wang Chien- 
shien and Shirley Kuo were junior participants in the ERC -  Wang as sub-convener for the 
ERC’s tax panel and Kuo as an advisor to the finance panel.97 It must be remembered that the 
ERC’s final collection of recommendations -  very much a liberal document -  was by no means 
a foregone conclusion. Indeed, press commentary at the time suggests that ERC deliberations
95 See chapter 4, section two; and note comments on Yu’s response to the 10th Credit Cooperative scandal 
in: Xue, Bianju Zhong de Yuejin: Yu Guo-hua de Zhengyuan Wunian [In the Midst of Critical Change: 
The Five Year Cabinet of Yu Kuo-hwa], fn. 70, p. 140-142.
96 Wang contributed opinion editorial pieces or conducted interviews with Jingji Ribao, Tianxia and 
several other business magazines and newspapers. See for example: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth 
Magazine] (1 January 1985); Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 February 1985); and Tianxia 
Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 June 1985).
97 Wang, Caijing Juba: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [Finance Master: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Life and Travels], 
fn. 71, p. 430-431; and interviews in Taipei, 1999.
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encompassed considerable ‘internal education.,9S This fluid environment must have favored 
those with reasoned and coherent programs for bank policy change -  i.e. the young reformers.
Further, it is clear that as guanxi qiye advocacy reached new heights into late 1988, so too 
did the reform activities of our younger technocrats. Through the second half of 1988, several 
young reformers were elevated to senior positions within Cabinet and, riding a wave of public 
enthusiasm for change, immediately commenced a campaign of economic policy renewal. As 
new Finance Minister, Shirley Kuo’s sudden zeal for bank opening surprised many observers. 
The press portrayed the hitherto reserved Kuo as an intriguing paradox: ‘shuo xiao, zuo da’ [to 
say very little, but do a lot] seemed the only appropriate way to describe the first woman to be 
admitted to the Executive Yuan and the Central Standing Committee of the KMT." As she 
warmed to her new post, Kuo went public for the first time with her plans for bank reform 
Using a mix of academic and plain language intended for a broad audience, she spoke of the 
need for interest rate liberalization, change in bank management practices, privatization and 
(most significantly for business) new entry into the banking market.100 Behind the scenes, she 
was energetically preparing the regulatory basis for change. In an interview with the author, 
Kuo describes this time as not only frantic, but almost fun: ‘I proceeded rapidly and with 
determination, taking this [redundant regulation] away and that away....The time was ripe for 
change, and so we did what we had to do!’ And this effort paid dividends: within 12 months of 
taking office, Kuo presided over the introduction of the RoC’s new banking law, an event she 
describes proprietarily as a major highlight of her career.101 After his appointment to Cabinet in 
early 1990, much of Wang Chien-shien’s time was devoted to promoting new bank entry. In the 
middle of the year he launched the Standards for the Establishment of Commercial Banks and 
commenced the task of assessing applicants. It is apparent from interviews that the final 
decision on new licenses -  proclaimed in early 1991 -  also ultimately resided with Wang.102
Second, there is some evidence that the young reformers were conscious of the KMT 
windows of opportunity that opened in 1985 and 1988. In interviews with the author, for 
example, both Wang and Kuo acknowledged that the 10th Credit scandal had an impact on the 
general enthusiasm for reform In Wang’s own words ‘...it certainly generated a lot of 
discussion and focused the reform effort.’103 Beyond this basic acknowledgement, however,
See esp.: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 June 1985), p. 98; and Tianxia Zazhi 
[Commonwealth Magazine] (1 December 1985), p. 152-154.
"  Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 August 1988), p. 154-164. Includes special introduction 
article on Kuo.
100 Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 October 1988), p. 48-57. Part of Cabinet review article 
including material on Kuo, Chen Fu-an and Qian Fu.
101 Interview in Taipei with Professor Shirley Kuo, Minister Without Portfolio, RoC Cabinet, 4 December 
1996.
I0“ Various interviews in Taipei, 1996 and 1999; including interview with Mr Wang Chien-shien, 
Chairman, the Renewal Foundation, 9 July 1999.
101 Interview in Taipei with Professor Shirley Kuo, Minister Without Portfolio, 4 December 1996; and 
interview in Taipei with Mr Wang Chien-shien, Chairman, the Renewal Foundation, 9 July 1999.
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Wang and Kuo are silent on the impact of 10th C redit.104 This reticence can probably be 
explained in terms of proximity to the issue: both technocrats were very close to individuals 
who lost their jobs over the scandal, and might naturally be reluctant to talk about it (e.g. Hsu 
Li-teh was Minister of Economic Affairs while Wang Chien-shien was Vice Minister). A 
number of immediate friends and associates of the young reformers were less inhibited, 
however. Professor Liang Kuo-shu, Shirley Kuo’s colleague and personal friend from National 
Taiwan University (and one-time co-worker at the Central Bank of China), stated without 
reservation:
‘The Cathay financial scandal has clearly demonstrated that the failure of financial 
institutions has serious repercussions extending far beyond the financial sector. With 
the process of market restructuring and regulatory reform incomplete, financial 
deregulation and fundamental reform of the financial system are urgent imperatives.’105 
And then there were the press leaks. Over the course of 1985 junior staff of the economic 
ministries were a dependable source of inside information for Taiwan’s print media on the 10,h 
Credit Cooperative scandal. Invariably, these leaks were tied to a plea for reform, and most of 
the time were anonymous. They leave little doubt that at least some technocrats were well and 
truly aware that a chance for change had arrived.106
Further, there is evidence to confirm that the young reformers were aware of the policy 
window generated by the politics of guarixi qiye advocacy. In interviews, for example, both 
Shirley Kuo and Wang Chien-sliien referred to increased business lobbying through and beyond 
1988. Kuo notes that: ‘We were hit with [a series of] demands for regulation change.’ Wang 
recalls that: ‘Representatives of the private sector spoke very loudly in favor of financial 
reform....When I was Finance Minister, we were lobbied very strongly by important 
businessmen in Taiwan anxious to get new bank licenses.’107 Substantive actions attributable to 
the young reformers also reveal an awareness of the socio-political context. Shirley Kuo’s 
decision to set the capitalization ratio for new bank applicants at the high level of NT$10 billion 
(c. US$400 million) and to restrict the level of investment in new banks by enterprise groups to
104 The 10th Credit Cooperative scandal is conspicuously absent from Kuo’s academic work of the late 
1980s. This is despite the fact that in a number of cases she specifically identifies 1985 as a turning point 
in the regulation of RoC banking. See esp.: Shirley W.Y. Kuo, ‘Liberalization of the Financial Market in 
Taiwan in the 1980s,’ keynote address at the First Annual Pacific Basin Finance Conference, Taipei, 
Taiwan (14 March 1989); and Christina Y. Liu and Shirley W.Y. Kuo, ‘Interest Rate and Foreign 
Exchange Liberalization in Taiwan in the 1980s’ in Seiji Naya and Akira Takayama (eds.), Economic 
Development in East and Southeast Asia: Essays in Honor o f Professor Shinichi Ichimura (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990).
105 Kuo-shu Liang, ‘Financial Reform, Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalization in the Republic of 
China’ in Economic Review [journal issued bimonthly by the International Commercial Bank of China] 
No. 242 (March-April 1988), p. 6.
106 See e.g.: Zhongguo Shibao [China Times] (28 July 1985), p. 1-2; Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth 
Magazine] (1 June 1985), p. 160-170; and Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 September 
1985), p. 12-21.
107 Interview in Taipei with Professor Shirley Kuo, Minister Without Portfolio, RoC Cabinet, 4 December 
1996; and interview in Taipei with Mr Wang Chien-shien, Chairman, the Renewal Foundation, 9 July 
1999.
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15% of total capitalization speaks directly to the cause of keeping the guanxi qiye in check. At 
the time, Kuo received considerable criticism for this initiative, which was seen as both 
unnecessary and a drag on the future efficiency of the new institutions -  criticisms that 
eventually were proven largely correct. Similarly, Wang Chien-shien’s decision in 1992 to 
issue 15 new bank licenses in the first instance (out of a pool of just 19 applicants) reveals a 
strong desire to prevent any kind of market concentration. As the 1990s progressed, the 
downside of this move was displayed in all its glory. Taiwan’s banking sector became 
chronically over-serviced, eventually and perhaps ironically giving rise to the prospect of 
institutional mergers.108
Finally, consider the counterfactual alternatives to young reformer leadership on bank 
liberalization. What if someone else within the KMT regime was promoting the cause of bank 
opening? This alternative is certainly a strong possibility. We know that at least in the early 
days of bank liberalization, Kuo, Wang and other young reformers were still relatively new 
players among the KMT policy elite. Further, we also know that intra-party pressure to do 
something in the wake the 10th Credit Cooperative scandal was strong: witness CCK’s angry 
proclamation on 4 February 1985 that the ruling party must ‘fight against monopoly, fight 
against special privilege, and tight against profiteering.’109 But identifying a group or individual 
within the KMT regime that was committed to bank opening -  apart from the young reformers -  
is extremely difficult. Indeed, for most of the major players within the KMT hierarchy at this 
time -  including the finance technocrats who we met in chapter 4 -  the instinctive reaction to 
the worst financial crisis in Taiwan’s post-War history was to crack down on the excesses of the 
non-banks, not to pursue broad institutional opening.110 Through 1985, bank reform was really 
a counterintuitive response for the ruling party; and yet, as we saw in section one of this chapter, 
the argument for change ultimately held some sway in the decision-making process. Obviously, 
someone within the KMT regime was making the case for liberalization in 1985, and the most 
likely group of protagonists was the young reformers.
And what about 1988? We know that on at least one occasion over the course of the year, 
new President Lee Teng-hui publicly affirmed his support for privatization of the ‘big three’ 
state-owned banks (i.e. First Commercial, Chang Hwa and Hua Nan). But if Lee was genuinely 
committed to bank opening, we might have expected to see him pursue this cause with the main 
institutional opponent of privatization at that time -  the Taiwan Provincial Assembly (as a 
majority stockholder in the big three). As President and KMT Chairman, Lee could have
108 Interviews in Taipei, 1996 and 1999. See also: Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (18 July 1989), p. 
1; Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (19 July 1989), p. 2; Far Eastern Economic Review (4 April 
1991), p. 36-37; and Far Eastern Economic Review (11 July 1991), p. 35-36.
109 In: Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan, fn. 58, p. 179.
110 The island’s trust companies endured the brunt of this clean-up operation -  a movement that only 
intensified after the failure of the Overseas Trust Corporation in September 1985. See esp.: Tianxia Zazhi 
[Commonwealth Magazine] (1 November 1985), p. 86-94. Includes an excellent overview of the poor 
state of Taiwan’s trust industry in 1985, with some interesting commentary on the blunt handling of these 
problems by the Ministry of Finance and other oversight agencies.
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chosen to force the issue, and yet he remained passive. The Taiwan Provincial Assembly 
ultimately voted to retain their stake in the big three banks, whereupon Lee summarily dropped 
the matter.111 As briefly intimated in chapter 3, Lee’s behavior in this case can more than likely 
be explained in terms of his efforts to secure the presidency and party chairmanship. In the 
early days of Lee’s rule, there was good political capital to be made from a strategy of soft 
support for bank privatization: it would isolate KMT conservatives, rally those with reformist 
sentiments (including our young reformers), and loosely channel public and party scrutiny of the 
new Lee administration into a relatively safe area. Once the need for these things had subsided, 
however, a strategy of soft support could be readily and conveniently abandoned.112 Not 
surprisingly, after the KM T’s 13th National Congress, Lee never returned to the issue of bank 
privatization again.113
Outside the immediate boundaries of the KMT regime, there are one or two other players 
who may have forced bank reform onto the public agenda. In the aftermath of the 10th Credit 
Cooperative scandal, Taiwan’s community of economists was particularly vocal. A number of 
high-profile academics were present at the ERC discussions (including T.S. Tsiang from the 
Chung-hua Institute of Economic Research) and some of these individuals made strident calls 
for policy change.114 It must be remembered, however, that Taiwan’s academic economists by 
no means presented a united front on the bank reform issue. The 10th Credit Cooperative 
scandal opened up serious disagreements within the group. Some of the dividing lines included: 
(1) new bank licenses -  some economists were keen to new private banks enter the market while 
others were concerned about creating slush-funds for business; (2) interest rate liberalization -  
discussion was split between those who wanted the real cost of capital represented in the price 
of deposits and loans, and those who feared a negative impact on investment; and (3) 
privatization -  some argued that privatization of the state-owned banks would deliver more 
efficiency, but others were adamant that Taiwan’s stock market was insufficiently mature to 
handle the process of securitization.115 Clearly, a consistent line of argument on bank policy
111 See e.g.: China News (10 May 1988), p. 4; China News (25 May 1988), p. 11; and China News (27 
May 1988), p. 11. See also: Yang, ‘San Shangyin Minyinghua yu Xin Yinhang Kaifang Sheli Zhengce 
zhi Yanbian’ [The Evolution of Reform Policy for Privatization of the 3 Commercial Banks and the 
Establishment of the New Banks], fn. 17, p.39-52.
112 Based on interviews in Taipei, 1999; esp. interview in Taipei with Mr Wang Chien-shien, Chairman, 
the Renewal Foundation, 9 July 1999.
113 Indeed, there were a number of occasions over the 1990s where Lee, if genuinely committed to 
privatization of the big three, might well have said something about it. We might have expected, for 
example, that the early 1997 decision to freeze the activities of the Taiwan Provincial Government would 
see Lee raise the issue of bank pnvatization as a desirable side-effect. Although almost everyone else 
made this link -  see e.g. Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (9 January 1997), p. 1; China News (11 
January 1997), p. 7; and China Post (9 January 1997), p. 1 -  Lee himself was conspicuously silent on the 
matter.
114 The popular perception of the 1985 debates on financial policy typically depicts such enlightened 
individuals pitched against a protectionist government. Interviews in Taipei, 1996; including interviews 
with officers fromTaishin International Bank, 1 October 1996.
115 Yang, ‘San Shangyin Minyinghua yu Xin Yinhang Kaifang Sheli Zhengce zhi Yanbian’ [The 
Evolution of Reform Policy for Privatization of the 3 Commercial Banks and the Establishment of the 
New Banks], fn. 17, p. 33-36; and interviews in Taipei, 1999. The divisions reflected broader public
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was not forthcoming from local economists. Any reform advice adopted from this group was 
selectively introduced to the policy agenda; and who other than the young reformers would have 
had an interest in this process of selection?
But what of the input of the guanxi cfiyel What if they were the original source of bank 
reform, especially after mid 1988? As noted elsewhere, we know that around this time 
Taiwan’s big business groups were structurally influential, had at least a partial mouthpiece 
within the Legislative Yuan, and had lobbied senior economic technocrats for some form of 
bank policy adjustment. But if big business was the ultimate source of change, we might expect 
to see at least a mild correlation between: (1) the extent to which these factors were actually 
extant, and (2) the benefits accrued from bank reform In the event, the outcome of policy 
change was more non-discriminatory than this hypothetical correlation would imply. What is 
striking, for example, about the distribution of new bank licenses in 1991 is not who got them - 
many of Taiwan’s big business groups were indeed successful116 -  but just how many licenses 
were actually issued. As commented above, the Ministry of Finance under Wang Chien-shien’s 
direction gave out 15 new licenses from a total pool of just 19 applicants. The four losers in the 
license lottery were excluded reluctantly. The applicants for one new bank -  a consortium of 
related business enterprises from Ilan County -  were implicated in a stock trading scandal and 
had to be dismissed as a matter of prudence. As the 1990s rolled on, even more licenses were 
granted; by the end of the decade there were fully 22 new banks in Taiwan. Clearly, any bias in 
the selection process for private banks was not toward big capital per se.nl
Conclusion
It has been the argument of this chapter that the process of bank reform in Taiwan from 1985 to 
1992 was ultimately driven by the ideas and exploits of the ‘young reformers’ -  a younger 
cohort of technocratic elites which included the likes of Shirley Kuo and Wang Chien-shien -  
and followed a pattern dictated by the ‘middling’ spread of opportunities presented within the 
ruling KMT. The young reformers’ thinking on bank policy was motivated by two interrelated 
factors: a belief that Taiwan’s banking sector was grossly inefficient and uncompetitive, and a 
vision that the local financial system could one day compete as a regional or global financial 
center. Reform moved from the conceptual stage to policy practice as party political windows 
of opportunity opened up in early 1985 and midway through 1988. In contrast to the cases of 
securities and forex reform which we reviewed in chapters 3 and 4 of the study, the temporal 
spread of opportunities that faced the young reformers was neither broad nor narrow, but
debates in Taiwan at the time. See esp. the public surveys in: Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] 
(1 September 1985), p. 106-108; and Tianxia Zazhi [Commonwealth Magazine] (1 December 1985), p. 
158-160.
116 For a simple overview in English, see: Far Eastern Economic Review (11 July 1991), p. 36. For a 
more in-depth review in Chinese, see: Caixun [Wealth Magazine] (1 June 1992), p. 172.
117 Which is not to say there was no bias at all. Some analysts believe that the application rules for new 
banks were ‘interpreted very creatively’ to allow a KMT-backed consortium -  the proprietors of Hua 
Hsin Bank -  to gain a license. Discussion in Taipei with Dr Kuo Cheng-tian, 1999.
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somewhere between these two extremes. Early in 1985, the policy agenda of the young 
reformers caught the attention of the KMT regime because it offered a means to deal with the 
10th Credit Cooperative crisis, an event which radically undermined the ruling party’s 
preference for a stable and controllable financial sector. After mid 1988, reform gradually 
progressed to the apex and consolidation phases because it came to be seen as a useful 
instrument for manipulating Taiwan’s increasingly vocal strata of big business interests. The 
three to four years between these two windows meant that the young reformers were able to 
promote a considered but timely process of bank reform.
As with our earlier case-study chapters, the present chapter was composed of four main 
parts. In part one I surveyed the process of bank reform as it unfolded between 1985 and 1992. 
This section focused on the procedural and institutional effect of liberalization. In part two we 
looked behind the outcomes detailed in part one to analyze why it all happened. This section 
included an examination of the composition and ideas of the so-called young reformers -  the 
original protagonists of the bank liberalization story. Part three of the chapter was dedicated to 
examining the policy windows that emerged within the KMT regime between early 1985 and 
mid 1988. In this extended section of the chapter we reviewed why and how these windows 
opened. Finally, in part four of the chapter, we briefly consider how the young reformers took 
advantage of the opportunities as they arose. As an adjunct to the factual data, I included 
counterfactual tests to butress the case for technocrat leadership. The reader will possibly note 
that in section three of the chapter, the order of the KMT policy windows was the opposite of 
the previous case studies. The policy windows for bank reform emerged in the order of (1) 
sector-strategy window, and then (2) socio-political window -  the reverse of securities and forex 
reform From the evidence reviewed, it appears that the sequence of the windows is not 
important to the pattern of financial reform; what matters is the temporal distribution of 
opportunities. This finding is consistent with our theoretical discussion earlier in the study. For 
technocrats with a reform agenda in mind, a run on a financial institution or an increasingly 
demanding business sector represents the same thing: a party political chance for change.
***000***
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-Conclusion-
Bringing agency back in and 
technocrat leadership beyond the late 1980s
I began this thesis with a series of questions about policy change and the role of leadership. 
While a definitive reply to those provocative queries is probably beyond the scope of just one 
study (or perhaps even several), the material we have considered herein provides some initial 
confirmation of the view that routine political choice is indeed tied to ‘smart, dedicated, or at 
least unusual people.’ The ideas and efforts of Taiwan’s economic technocracy left an indelible 
mark on the island’s three waves of financial reform in the late 1980s. Ignoring this group in 
the story of RoC securities, foreign exchange and bank liberalization would be akin to writing a 
history of Japanese post-War foreign policy and neglecting to mention the contribution of Prime 
Minister Yoshida Shigeru -  you could probably do it, but it would be a hollow and ultimately 
misleading account. The practice of leadership matters at all levels, not just in areas commonly 
considered to be ‘high politics.’ Leaving aside the leadership phenomenon in lower-order 
political choice seems at best deficient, and at worst foolhardy.
The real debate concerns how to deal with leadership practices in a rigorous and systematic 
fashion -  i.e. the methodological issue of operationalizing the concept of leadership and 
deriving testable hypotheses. This thesis has attempted to meet this challenge head on. The 
study commences with a simple puzzle regarding the historical and party-political conundrum 
posed by Taiwan’s experience of financial reform Reform was introduced in three consecutive 
waves of legal amendment, including passage of new laws for the foreign exchange system, 
securities and banking in 1987, 1988 and 1989 respectively.1 These three waves of 
liberalization were juxtaposed against a record of strong state intervention in all areas of 
finance. The KMT regime controlled almost every facet of credit allocation in Taiwan, a level 
of intervention, or perhaps more correctly ‘interference,’ which was matched in most other 
sectors of the economy. Very few capitalist economies can claim to have had such a strong role 
for government in such a crucial sector of national production. And then everything changed. 
By the early to middle 1990s, Taiwan was fast losing its reputation as a protected market for 
savings and investment, and steadily acquiring a reputation for openness -  perhaps not as liberal 
as the financial systems of Hong Kong and Singapore, but certainly in the same club as these 
paragons of free-market finance. Just how did the Taiwan financial system move from virtual 
autarky to a largely open market for credit in just over half a decade? This policy shift is 
rendered doubly intriguing when we consider that it occurred under the auspices of the same 
political regime that built the original dirigiste financial system in the first place: i.e. the KMT.
1 Lawrence S. Liu, ‘Brave New World of Financial Reform in Taiwan, the Republic of China - Three 
Waves of Internationalization and Liberalization and Beyond’ in Chinese Yearbook o f International Im w  
and Affairs Vol. 8 (1988-89).
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If financial liberalization involves at least some loss of authority or influence for a political 
regime, then why did the KMT choose to disempower itself? If, as Stephan Haggard has 
intimated, policy choices that weaken the political authority o f governments are unlikely to be 
pursued,2 why then did the KMT seek to make such a choice? We are faced with a paradoxical 
situation in which a regime with ambiguous credentials on economic policy embarks upon 
radical free-market reform. How can we explain this contradiction?
The explanation 1 have offered to account for this puzzle -  my ‘theory of technocrat 
leadership’ -  starts from the premise that leadership is a practice involving idea generation, 
creative effort, teamwork and opportunism,3 that can be characteristic of outstanding groups as 
much as individuals. The thesis focuses on a small group of economic policy elites in Taiwan 
(the economic technocrats of the RoC state), and seeks to analyze the structural and temporal 
character of their relationship with the ruling KMT. The dynamic in this relationship, at least 
insofar as it relates to the financial reform story, centers on two KMT ‘policy windows’ -  
specifically, a socio-political window and a sectoral-strategy window.4 At its most basic, the 
theory of technocrat leadership predicts two things. First, in any given episode of financial 
opening we should be able to distinguish the presence of a core group of technocrats with an 
exante or independent plan for financial reform With the emergence of a policy window 
within the governing political party, we should be able to observe these technocrats ‘seize the 
day’ and attempt to implement their plan for policy change. Second, behind a full cycle of 
financial reform we should be able to observe the successive emergence of both party-political 
windows of opportunity. The temporal distribution of these two policy windows will influence 
the way technocrats pursue reform objectives: a wide distribution of windows will mean reform 
efforts are slow and incremental, while a narrow distribution will mean reform is fast and 
decisive.
The variable process of policy change across Taiwan’s three main waves of financial 
opening (see Diagram Con. 1 for a figurative representation) provides a convenient series of 
comparative tests for these two predictions. As we saw in chapter 3 of the thesis, the slow 
process of securities reform owed much to the work of the so-called ‘development technocrats,’
2 Stephen Haggard, ‘The Politics of Industrialization in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan’ in Helen 
Hughes (ed.), Achieving Industrialization in East Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
p. 281.
3 A definition broadly in line with the work of: Jameson W. Doig and Erwin C. Hargrove (eds.), 
Leadership and Innovation (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987); William H. Riker, The Art 
of Political Manipulation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Michael D. Cohen and James G. 
March, Leadership and Ambiguity, 2nd ed. (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1986); and Norman 
Fröhlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Oran R. Young, Political Leadership and Collective Goods 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
4 The term ‘policy window’ refers to a change in party politics that provides entrepreneurial technocrats 
with an opportunity to pursue their ideas for policy reform. Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International 
Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1997), esp. chp. 1.
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with technology guru Li Kwoh-ting at the forefront.5 This group was originally motivated by a 
belief that technological upgrading in Taiwan was strongly dependent on the emergence ot 
more mature capital markets. They were able to launch their policy agenda after 1980 as the 
KMT came to see securities reform as an efficient means of co-opting support among Taiwan’s 
growing middle-class (socio-political window opens). Securities reform peaked and then 
gradually consolidated after 1987 because the growth and complexity of the local securities 
sector at that time was unacceptable to the ruling party (sectoral-strategy window opens). The 
eight years or so between these two windows of opportunity meant that the development 
technocrats were obliged to make securities liberalization a gradual and methodical exercise -  a 
process that ultimately spanned more than a decade and saw many of the development 
technocrats come and go over this timeframe.
DIAGRAM Con.l Waves of financial 
reform in Taiwan through the late 1980s
Foreign Exchange j
Banking
Securities
84 85
Notes: Diagram shows the three main waves of financial liberalization over the late 1980s. Arrows 
indicate passage of Statute for the Administration of Foreign Exchange (July 1987), Securities 
Exchange Law (January 1988), and National Banking Law (July 1989) respectively. HI and LI 
stand for high and low reform intensity. Diagram is intended as a simple graphical representation 
only. No claim is made for the values indicated.
In chapter 4, we reviewed the speedy pattern of foreign exchange reform This reform 
episode was tied to the ideas and effort of the ‘finance technocrats’ -  a small and exclusive 
group of policymakers loyal to finance expert and long-term policy practitioner Yu Kuo-hwa.6 
The enigmatic Yu and his immediate circle were driven by a firm but intensely private 
conviction that the established forex system had outlived its original rationale. Early in 1986, 
the finance technocrats’ reform agenda was assured the attention of the KMT because it became 
an effective tool to buttress party support among Taiwan’s ailing small to medium sized
5 The development technocrats were a latter-day version of the 1950’s industrializing reformers. Stephan 
Haggard and Chien-kuo Pang, ‘The Transition to Export-Led Growth in Taiwan’ in Joel D. Aberbach, 
David Dollar and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (eds.), The Role of the State in Taiwan’s Development (Armonk: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 68-69.
6 Wang Jun, Caijing Jubo: Yu Guo-hua Shengya Xingjiao [A Master of Finance: Yu Kuo-hwa’s Career 
and Travels] (Taipei: Sunbright Publishing Company, 1999), p. 248.
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enterprises (socio-political window opens). Within the space of a year, the technocrats’ reform 
program received full backing from the ruling party because the established foreign exchange 
system was beginning to threaten the KMT’s conservative priorities tor monetary policy 
(sectoral-strategy window opens). The negligible period of time between these two windows 
meant that the finance technocrats were able to make foreign exchange liberalization an 
expeditious course of action -  a process that was more or less completed with the departure 
from office of Yu in mid 1989.
And finally, in chapter 5 we examined the middling process of bank liberalization. This 
reform episode was driven by the ‘young reformers,’ a group of younger technocrats that 
included among their number Shirley Kuo and Wang Chien-shien.7 The young reformers were 
motivated by two related factors: a belief that the local banking sector was grossly inefficient 
and uncompetitive, and a vision that Taiwan’s financial system could one day compete as a 
regional or global financial center. From early 1985, the young reformers commenced their 
campaign for bank reform as the KMT regime suffered from the effects of the 10th Credit 
Cooperative scandal (sectoral-strategy window opens). They were given full sway to 
implement their plans after mid 1988 because the ruling party saw bank reform as a way of 
sidetracking or diffusing the influence of the newly assertive guanxi qiye (socio-political 
window opens). The median period of time between these two windows meant that the young 
reformers crafted a style of bank reform that had features of both the securities and forex 
episodes -  i.e. neither incremental nor rapid but somewhere in between these two extremes. 
The entire reform cycle ultimately took eight years to complete and roughly coincided with the 
young reformers’ peak career years.
The explanatory power of my theory of technocrat leadership stands in stark contrast to the 
poor insights offered by the established analytical approaches to financial reform. The standard 
tools of political and policy science -  including the market-driven approach, statist analysis, 
pluralism and the foreign pressures model8 -  are less than satisfactory in their elaboration of the 
Taiwan case. In broad terms, the shortcomings of these alternative theories can be reduced to 
two closely related points. On the one hand, the established approaches attribute very little 
power of choice to policy elites. Some of the theories (e.g. statist analysis) are less guilty of 
this sin than others (e.g. the market driven approach), but all four give the agency involved in
7 Also known as the NTU Gang (i.e. National Taiwan University) or Taida Bang. See: Cong-rong Li, 
‘Guojia yu Jinrong Ziben: Weiquan Shicong Zhuyi xia Guomindang Zhengquan Yinhang Zhengce de 
Xingcheng yu Zhuanxing [The State and Financial Capital: KMT Bank Policy Form and Development 
under Authoritarian Rule] unpublished Masters manuscript, Department of Sociology, Tunghai 
University, Taiwan (1994), p. 108.
8 Respectively: Richard O’Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1992); Louis W. Pauly, Opening Financial Markets: Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in 
Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Eric Helleiner, States and the 
Reemergence of Global Finance: From Breton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1994).
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decision-making an analytical back seat.9 We have seen, however, that technocrat ideas and 
actions in Taiwan’s three waves of financial reform cannot simply be explained away by 
structural imperatives. Even under circumstances in which external constraints were strong -  
e.g. the pressure of inflation after late 1986 or the influence of the guanxi qiye after mid 1988 -  
the relevant technocrats were never impelled to pursue one particular course of action on 
finance policy. There was always some room for variation in response, and often the clearest 
alternatives were the anathema of liberalization. Further, on several occasions, it was not 
obvious in an institutional sense who would pick up the reform chalice. Later initiatives in the 
process of securities reform, for example, were advanced by SEC Chairmen Shen Pei-ling and 
C.P. Chang. Formally speaking, their role in reform after 1987 could just as easily have been 
assumed by the Minister of Finance (either Robert Chien or Shirley Kuo). The key difference 
was motive: Shen and Chang were part of a technocratic team that saw securities reform as a 
developmental priority. Chien and Kuo, while not opposed to securities reform in a generic 
sense, simply did not carry this personal and professional agenda.
On the other hand, the four established theories of financial reform also paint an inaccurate 
picture of the structural constraints that did count in Taiwan’s reform experience. Knowledge 
of the history, ideology and organization of the ruling KMT is crucial to appreciate how 
financial reform became a practical option during the late 1980s.10 There were certainly 
exceptions to this rule: an interesting story about insurance reform after 1986 can be told with 
almost exclusive reference to American pressure for market opening. This being said, virtually 
every other example of finance policy change over the period of relevance to this thesis is 
linked to KMT politics. From the first moves to open the stock market in the early 1980s to the 
liberalization of bank entry in the early 1990s, an appeal to ruling party priorities was vital to 
ensure the success of financial policy change. Of course, in making this claim I am not simply 
offering yet another structuralist theory of financial liberalization. Focusing exclusively on the 
KMT for an explanation of RoC financial reform leaves us with an account devoid of ideas: the 
Taiwan case of financial liberalization had a programmatic component that was rational in a 
strictly policy sense, and had little to do with KMT priorities whatsoever. These plans for 
change were invariably linked to particular technocrats who understood the highly specialized
9 Which is not to claim that I am giving agency the steering wheel. My project is less ambitious: to 
reclaim a level of analytical importance for agency that is at least on par with structural factors in political 
explanation. In pursing this goal, I have some strange but interesting bedfellows across the gamut of 
political science. See e.g.: Philip G. Cemy, The Changing Architecture o f Politics: Structure, Agency and 
the Future o f the State (London: Sage Publications, 1990); Joan Always, Critical Theory and Political 
Possibilities: Conceptions o f Emancipatory Politics in the Works o f Horkheimer, Ardorno, Marcuse and 
Habermas (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995); Patricia S. Mann, Micro-politics: Agency in a 
Postfeminist Era (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); and Philip Pettit, A Theory o f 
Freedom: From Psychology to the Politics o f Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
10 An argument based on my empirical findings, but supported theoretically by the work on party politics 
and economic policy. The classic statement of the position is: Douglas Hibbs Jr., ‘Political Parties and 
Macroeconomic Policy’ in American Political Science Review Vol. 71, No. 4 (December 1977). And for 
recent work on political parties and economic reform, see e.g.: Javier Corrales, ‘Presidents, Ruling Parties 
and Party Rules’ in Comparative Politics Vol. 32, No. 2 (January 2000).
- 180-
Conclusion Crafting Markets in Taiwan
issues concerned.11 While KMT politics shaped the field of action, people and their ideas 
determined the ultimate outcome. The ‘meat’ of T aiw an’s reform story resides in the 
interaction of these two entities.12
Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to speak beyond the reform moves that spanned 
the late 1980s, a few words regarding the listless path of financial reform over the 1990s are 
probably warranted in closing. Several journalists and academics have commented that policy 
adjustment in Taiwan stagnated over the last decade of the 20,h Century.15 Despite the best 
efforts of the economic technocrats in the 1980s, key tasks in the process of opening remained 
incomplete. Some of the more obvious areas included: internationalization of the NT dollar, 
full privatization of the state-owned banks, adherence to the intention as much as the letter of 
national treatment for foreign financial institutions operating in Taiwan, and consolidation of 
linkages between local securities markets and leading exchanges elsewhere. Estimates of the 
level of waste or lost investment associated with continuing financial restrictions such as these 
varied anywhere between US$2 billion and US$20 billion a year (at the upper-end, just less 
than 1% of average GDP for the 1990s).14 In addition to outstanding areas of reform, a new set 
of problems associated with the merging of Taiwan’s financial markets (a logical outcome of 
the reform initiatives instituted earlier) complicated the agenda for policy change. At the 
forefront of the problems was the increasing politicization and volatility of Taiwan’s 
community financial institutions; these local non-banks went to the wall at the rate of roughly 
two a year from 1990 to 2000. In many respects, the exposure of the ‘loopy end’ of Taiwan’s 
financial system was inevitable. As one academic commentator remarked in an interview: ‘The 
introduction of market forces has uncovered the weakest players. We should expect them to go 
bankrupt and accept the cost.’15
11 In line with an increasing number of scholars studying ideas and policy change, I am not convinced by 
claims that ideas are in some sense disembodied entities waiting for problems to arise (a.k.a. the ‘garbage 
can model’). The truth is, not everyone can carry or communicate policy proposals, and the more 
technical the area, the more likely that policy solutions will be married to particular individuals or groups. 
This position is broadly commensurate with the work of Checkel, Odell, Sikkink and to some degree 
Haas. See esp.: Jeff Checkel, ‘Ideas, Institutions and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution’ in World 
Politics Vol. 45, No. 2 (January 1993); John Odell, US International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power 
and Ideas as Sources o f Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas 
and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and 
Peter Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
12 I think Checkel puts it best: ‘My aim is not to show either the primacy of agents over structure or the 
reverse. Rather, I have explored how advocates of change and political leaders are constrained and 
motivated by institutions and international structure.’ Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: 
Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End o f the Cold War, fn. 4, p. 123.
13 See e.g.: Elizabeth Thurbon, ‘Two Paths to Financial Liberalization: South Korea and Taiwan’ in The 
Pacific Review Vol. 14, No. 2 (2001); and Christopher Ruhr, ‘Opportunity Cost: Can Taipei Build a 
Regional Financial Center Without Internationalizing the NT Dollar?’ in Topics [monthly magazine of the 
American Institute in Taiwan] (April 1995).
14 Various interviews with economists in Taipei, 1996 and 1999.
13 Interview in Taipei with Norman Yin, Department of Banking, National Chengchi University, 6 July 
1996.
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Hie unfinished business of reform was certainly a matter of concern to the generation of 
policy elites that came of age over the 1990s. During this period, a number of very liberal- 
minded technocrats took senior posts within the executive branch: Lien Chan (Premier, Vice 
President), Lawrence Liu (Director of APROC, more below), Paul Chiu (Minister of Finance), 
Schive Chi (Chair of the CEPD) and a rehabilitated Hsu Li-teh (Chair of the CEPD, Vice 
Premier). Their efforts to keep the financial reform momentum of the late 1980s alive resulted 
in some creative policy innovations. Foremost among these was the so-called Asia-Pacific 
Regional Operations Center plan (APROC -  Yatai Yingyun Zhongxin), established in January 
1995. This high-profile program sought to coordinate liberalization efforts in five key areas of 
the RoC economy: manufacturing, transport, telecommunications, media and, most importantly, 
finance.16 Reform targets were set in all of these areas, and were held up to the public for 
comment -  a move that spawned the creation of several watchdog groups such as the ‘APROC 
Clock,’ an initiative of the European Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan. APROC was the 
ideational home of reformist thinking in the RoC for much of the mid to late 1990s, and the 
source of several hard-fought advocacy campaigns (e.g. WTO admission). In the end, however, 
the program’s achievements were marginal. Many of APROC’s key goals were reduced to 
legislative ‘statements of intent,’ and by the end of the decade the financial reform agenda 
remained largely unchanged. Opposition to reform merely hardened with the onset of the East 
Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, and from this point to the summary dissolution of the program 
in late 2000, APROC floundered.17
Perhaps ironically, technocrat incapacity in the 1990s was linked to the same structural 
forces that permitted reform successes a decade earlier. KMT politics in the last years of the 
millennium offered no substantive prospect for policy change; there were no party political 
‘windows of opportunity’ for the latest band of economic technocrats to exploit. There were, 
however, some close calls. The socio-political calculus of the ruling party received a 
substantial shock in 1993 when a core of mainlander politicians broke away from the KMT to 
form the New Party. In 1999, tensions between popularist and machinist elements in the party, 
roughly correlating with a rural-urban divide, gave rise to two prospective KMT candidates for 
the 2000 presidential election (James Soong and Lien Chan). Both of these events could have 
generated a socio-political window for reform, but Lee Teng-hui’s vice-like grip on the upper 
reaches of the KMT contained the damage to the party’s social support base and prevented any 
policy spillover.18 Further, the sectoral calculus of the ruling party came under stress from one
16 Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News] (18 January 1995), p. 2; Plan fo r  Developing Taiwan as an Asia- 
Pacific Regional Operations Center (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
Executive Yuan, 1995); and various articles in Free China Review Vol. 45, No. 11 (November 1995).
17 ECCT Newsletter [monthly bulletin of the European Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan] (various 
editions, 1996-1999); and various interviews in Taipei, 1996 and 1999.
1!n Interviews and observations in Taipei, 1996 and 1999. Especially grateful for discussions with Mr 
Wang Chien-shien, Chairman, the Renewal Foundation, 9 July 1999; Prof. Ye Kuang-shi, Lecturer in 
Organization and Human Resources at the Department of Business Management, National Sun Yat-sen 
University, 28 February 1999; and Kuo Cheng-tian, various occasions, 1999. See also: Gregory W.
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or two financial scandals. In the Hualon incident of October 1994, tor example, Hualon Group 
CEO Oung Da-ming was indicted for a share manipulation scheme that saw tour major 
securities firms default on US$124 million in margin loans and the stock market plunge 300 
points in a single day. While the potential for financial meltdown was serious at the time, the 
incident was effectively contained, and by early 1995 Oung Da-ming’ exploits were a distant 
memory. As with various runs on community financial institutions, the Hualon case was small 
fry compared to, say, the 10th Credit Cooperative scandal of 1985.19 In the 1990s, reformist 
technocrats would search in vain for an excuse to implement their agenda for financial opening.
At its most basic, financial reform in Taiwan is an intriguing tale of technocrat aspirations -  
brought to life by party political opportunities or stymied by party political constraints. 
Leadership practices matter in cases of finance policy change. The key question for the 
researcher is to determine when and how such practices will be successful. While this thesis has 
only shown the validity of my theory of technocrat leadership in the Taiwan case of financial 
liberalization, it is hoped that others will see merit in further tests. It strikes me as highly 
implausible that Taiwan alone should possess a cohort of ‘smart and dedicated’ technocrats 
crafting financial markets. Giving credit where it is due is an agenda for policy research just as 
much as a reform goal.
***000***
Noble, ‘Luring the Multinationals, Unleashing the Locals: Beyond Authoritarian Developmentalism in 
Taiwan,’ draft research paper, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and 
Asian Studies, Australian National University (February 1997).
19 See e.g.: China News (7 October 1994), p. 1; China News (8 October 1994), p. 1; Gongshang Shihao 
[Commercial Times) (7 October 1994), p. 1-2; and Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily News) (8 October 
1994), p. 1.
- 183-
-Photographs-
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Photo taken c. late 1980s.
Photo from: http://www.ey.gov.tw/web/ 
[home page of the RoC Executive Yuan] -  viewed 
1 December 2001.
Li Kwoh-ting, b.1910, d.2001
Photo taken c. late 1980s.
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Photo taken c. early 1980s.
Photo from: http://www.ey.gov.tw/ 
[home page of the RoC Executive Yuan] 
-viewed 1 December 2001.
Robert Chien, b.1935
Photo taken 1988.
Photo from: Tianxia Zazhi 
[Commonwealth Magazine], 
(1 March 1988).
Chang Chi-cheng, b.1918
Photo taken c. late 1980s.
Photo from: Zhonghua Minguo Zhongyang 
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China: System and Functions] (Taipei: Central 
Bank of China, 1992).
- 185-
Photo taken c. early 1990s.
Photo from: Chien-shien Wang, Rang Haoren 
Chutou: Wang Jian-xuan de Congzheng Linian 
[Let Good People Rise: Wang Chien-shien’s 
Political Thinking] (Taipei: Commonwealth 
Magazine Publishers, 1995).
Shirley W.Y. Kuo, b.1930
Photo taken 1989.
Photo from: Financial and Investment 
Yearbook, RoC 1990 (Taipei: Central Economic 
News Service, 1990).
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Bruce Berkman, Chair of AmCham Committee on the Legislative Yuan, American Chamber of 
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interview, 16 January 1997.
Chang, Ching-hsi Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, National
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Chang, Roy ( 3 J l f S p e c i a l i s t ,  Trading Department, RoC Over-the-Counter Securities 
Exchange. Government contact, 1996.
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20 July 1999.
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Chien, Cheng-Chen, Deputy Director, Department of Finance, Taiwan Provincial Government. 
Research interview, 11 September 1996.
Chu, Yun-han (T ^ ltfJ iX  Professor of Politics, Department o f Political Science, National Taiwan 
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1999.
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Kuei, Hsien Nung (f=£5fcjil), Deputy Director, Division of International Banking, Bureau of 
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Kuo, Cheng-tian Professor of Political Science, National Chengchi University.
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Kuo, Shirley W.Y. Minister Without Portfolio, Executive Yuan. Research interview,
4 December 1996.
Kuo, Tony Sowang (^PS?FE), International Secretary, Kuomintang Party Relations Department, 
Kuomintang Central Committee. Research interview, 14 May 1999.
Lavoie, Scott, Consultant, LAJDO Management Consultants. Business contact, 1996.
Lei, Paul C.D. Senior Economist, Department of Foreign Exchange, Central Bank of
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Liu, Lawrence Shao-liang Attorney at Law, Lee and Li Attorneys at Law. Research
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Liu, Y.T. Senior Vice President and General Manager, Research and Investigation
Department, First Commercial Bank. Research interview, 14 October 1996.
O’Shea, Daniel Securities Analyst, Masterlink Investment Advisory Company.
Research interview, 6 May 1996.
Pai, David Ya Long (W 55fl), Business Manager, China Post. Business contact, 1996.
Pan, Tina Wei-gang (j|f$l[31IJ), Legislator, Legislative Yuan, and President of the Board of 
Modem Women Foundation. Newspaper interview, 17 December 1996.
Peng, Bai-xianpy Legislator, Legislative Yuan. Newspaper interview, 18 December
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Pickles, John, Director of Research, Asian Pacific Research Ltd., Pacific Consulting Group. 
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Pong, Vincent Securities Analyst, International Investment Division, Security
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1996.
Siew, Vincent C. Legislator, Legislative Yuan. Newspaper interview, 16 December
1996.
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Tien, Jackie, Security Analyst, Core Pacific Securities. Newspaper interview, 12 September 
1996.
Tsai, Tzeng-Jia Ph D. student, Department of Political Science, National Chengchi
University. Academic contact, 1999.
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Insurance, Ministry of Finance. Research interview, 5 November 1996.
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Office. Research interview, 14 November 1996.
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Research interview, 6 July 1996.
Wang, Chien-Shien Chairman, Renewal Foundation. Research interview, 9 July 1999.
Wang, Hong-zen (ZE^fC), Senior Officer, Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. Research interview, 5 March 1999.
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